Anzio - was it really necessary?

ivanotter · Jul 2, 2015

We have probably been there before, but let us see if we can have a different perspective?

If the objective of Anzio was to draw German forces away from Cassino front, it did not achieve its objective.

Could Anzio have been cancelled shortly before it went in? as in 20 January?

When was it clear that Anzio was going to be a liability?

On the other hand, what was the alternative to Anzio?
1) Nothing - Just pushing at Cassino?
2) Adriatic landing - where?
3) North of Rome - Where?

What could Mackensen's divisions have been doing instead if there were no Anzio?

If Brooke had been a bit more interested in Anzio, something might have come off it, but it also seems he was 'busy' with other things.

So, If Anzio is not on the cards in its current form, what else could have been happening?

Ivan

Derek Pullem · Jul 2, 2015

With hindsight if the Anzio divisions had been available to exploit the initial success of X corps crossing the Garigliano on 17 January then Anzio would never have been necessary and the Allies would have been in Rome before the end of February.

ivanotter · Jul 2, 2015

That is a good argument.

However, Anzio was initially only 2 divisions (plus a few other odd ends).

Could Lucas' VI corps have been deployed or how should have they have been utilised? break-in or follow-up?

Maybe if the French advance was coordinated and enforced? But would there be trained mountain troops available.

Ivan

606jae · Jul 2, 2015

lost a great uncle there

marathag · Jul 2, 2015

Or forget about Anzio completely and do an initial two division landing for an early Dragoon, and make both Monty and Churchill's head explode.

Given the opposition, Lucas should be able to secure Toulon and possibly Marseille, and hold along the Argens River, before the Germans can move any forces there. Most were static troops, and many were Soviet Prisoners who joined up. They won't be fighting like the front line Germans did south of Rome.

Yeah, dreaming to get Lucas to move that far, but grabbing Toulon monkeywrenches the German plan to defend France, and will pull combat troops away from Italy.

ivanotter · Jul 2, 2015

606: condolences! it must be a bit awkward to read this. My apologies. Sorry for introducing this topic.

Ivan

ivanotter · Jul 2, 2015

Brooke's strategy was to get German troops into Italy where it would be difficult to get them into France.

Italy should be a strategic trap.

Landings in Southern France would do the opposite of what Brooke wanted.

This whole thing was of course centred on Overlord.

If Italy (according to Brooke) should not have a life of its own, outside of a trap supporting Overlord, then Anzio becomes a bit too much.

On the other hand, just the threat of another invasion of Italy did get Kesselring to have reserves non-committed and on stand-by.

Should this have been the decision rather than an actual landing (where the suspension then goes)?

Was Lucas too cautious? after all, he had his order from Gen. Clark not to stick out his neck too far. Surely he did not even attempt it.

Lucas in France might not have been an idea, but maybe as a corps commander under Bradley?

Ivan

Look More Closely Later · Jul 2, 2015

Operation Shingle?

I thought that Shingle did at least persuade the Germans to keep forces in Italy that otherwise would have been moved to Northwest Europe (and possibly thus have been available to keep the Allies potentially trapped/contained in Normandy).

Gannt the chartist · Jul 2, 2015

Did it achieve its objectives - no

Did it draw off troops from the Winter Line - No

Did it tie down 75- 100k german troops, including mobile troops - Yes

Could the germans have made better use of those troops elsewhere, absolutely.

Would the Allies have made better use of the troops elsewhere, probably not.

The Idea of a two division landing on the south of France achieving anything except the loss of those two divisions is nonsense. The defender has an intact rail system he can reinforce far far faster than you can unload.

ivanotter · Jul 2, 2015

Fair comments.

So, if it did not achieve its objective, could something else have been attempted?

Would the threat of any other landing in Italy have been enough to tie down the amount of German forces?

Would that have saved a lot of Allied lives? Admittedly, also German lives in that instance.

Another view is also to look at the Italian campaign. Why start fighting from the very 'bottom' of Italy and all the way North?

Why not a landing (Anzio?) to cut Italy in two, and then do it with all necessary force?

Ivan

Blackfox5 · Jul 2, 2015

I believe that had the landings been exploited aggressively - but not foolishly - that it would have caused panic and forced the Germans to withdraw. Lucas did not need to take Rome, but he should have seized the Alban Hills and sent a small detachment to cut the highway road at Valmontane cutting off the Germans from their supply lines.

I don't believe the Germans could have successfully attacked the landing forces before Lucas received additional reinforcements. It would have shocked the Germans who would have needed to make some critical decisions. Keeping their forces along Cassino would have been a big risk with the Allies potentially cutting them off. I think the Germans would pick the safer, more prudent option of withdrawing their forces rather than risk losing them all. Holding onto southern Italy wasn't worth losing the troops, when the Germans could have held just as good as a defensive line north of Rome.

The entire point of the landing was to cut off Route 6. When it was shown the Allies had achieved complete surprise landing there, it was criminal to be as defensive as Lucas. Sending some of your forces to take the heights overseeing the landing zone and cutting off the road (even if they had to later withdraw) should have been done.

Most of the initial doubts about the landing assumed the invasion would be contested. It wasn't. A better commander would have taken reasonable risks to make the invasion a success.

Carl Schwamberger · Jul 2, 2015

ivanotter said:
We have probably been there before, but let us see if we can have a different perspective?

I ought to keep a index of similar subject threads. Must have followed ten or more variants on this one in the past decade.

If the objective of Anzio was to draw German forces away from Cassino front, it did not achieve its objective.

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Some, but not enough to allow that defense to be defeated during the winter.

Could Anzio have been cancelled shortly before it went in? as in 20 January?

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Yes. It originally appeared in a staff conference at Supreme Allied Commander Med (SACMED) memo in October 1943 & shortly after a "appreciation study" was made. Literally dozens of proposals like this were made & most never made it past the initial Appreciation paper or outline plan. In this case Churchill took a fancy to it when briefed at SACMED on his way to the Terhan confrence. By mid December it was a done deal in Churchills mind & detailed planning & preparation was underway. When the plan fell to 5th Armies level Mark Clark decided it was not for him & advised it not happen. At this point either Alexander, Clarks senior, or Clark could have stood up to Churchill & refused. It would have been the end of their career but they could have stopped it.

Some useful reading on this would be either WGF Jacksons 'The Battle for Italy' or Atkinsons 'Day of Battle' The latter includes a quote from Patton who saw this plan to capture Rome when visiting Lucas in early january 1944. He pronounced it a "suicide mission" & advised Lucas to save the last bullet for himself.

When was it clear that Anzio was going to be a liability?

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Depends on who is asking. Churchill never caught on, I'm not sure about Alexander. Clark thought the plan unworkable with the ampib fleet & ground forces at hand. Patton thought so too & predicted Rome could not be captured. Lucas who understood the operation would be executed with or without him took counsel of his HQ staff, who had been present at Salerno

What could Mackensen's divisions have been doing instead if there were no Anzio?

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Waiting in reserve for any random emergency. Kesselring was blessed with enough men he could keep a large reserve, which was expected back at Hitlers HQ. Repeatedly the garrisons in northern Italy were tapped for emergencies.

If Brooke had been a bit more interested in Anzio, something might have come off it, but it also seems he was 'busy' with other things.

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Interesting question. I have no idea what Brookes real attitude here was. If he tried to talk Churchill out of it he failed. If he tried to provided adaquate amphibious lift for a army size invasion vs a corps, he failed as well. But. I dont know if he tried either.

Gannt the chartist said:

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The Idea of a two division landing on the south of France achieving anything except the loss of those two divisions is nonsense. The defender has an intact rail system he can reinforce far far faster than you can unload.

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Sure, a two division operation in south France would have been useless. Operation Dragoon had a two division assault, but a fleet load of follow up units. It also had a big chunk of the amphib transport formerly supporting Op Overlord. Something that was not possible in January, or later in the spring. Eisenhower decided the amphib fleet would be concentrated in the UK for Op Overlord, leaving only a token force in the Mediterranean.

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ivanotter · Jul 3, 2015

Lloyd Clark in his book 'Anzio' does hint that Brooke had gone grouse shooting in the Scottish swamps. And only had a side-remark about it all.

Apparently he treated it as 'Churchill's project'. Maybe because he was tired of always fighting Churchill and then just letting him have this project as his 'toy'. Maybe it didn't matter that much at this stage of the war. 1944 was going to see Overlord and possible defeat of Germany anyway.

According to Lloyd Clark, Alexander's briefing to Churchill (in Churchill's bedroom!) was full of holes and a professional like Alexander should have seen it.

All that said, With the slim resources to begin with, could more have been achieved?

The Alban hills might have been occupied, but could they have been held when Kesselring got into the swing of things? Even with a more dynamic corps commander?

It does come down to one thing: If the original objective could not have been achieved, it should have been cancelled on 20 January and a new plan for the utilisation of those two divisions be made.

Ivan

marathag · Jul 3, 2015

Carl Schwamberger said:
Sure, a two division operation in south France would have been useless. Operation Dragoon had a two division assault, but a fleet load of follow up units. It also had a big chunk of the amphib transport formerly supporting Op Overlord. Something that was not possible in January, or later in the spring. Eisenhower decided the amphib fleet would be concentrated in the UK for Op Overlord, leaving only a token force in the Mediterranean.

http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/sfrance/sfrance.htm

During a series of Allied strategic planning conferences in 1943, the invasion of southern France, ANVIL emerged as a possible complement to the cross-Channel attack against northern France, now code-named OVERLORD and finally projected for 1944. Taking place either just before or during OVERLORD, ANVIL would weaken the overall German defenses in France or prevent the Germans in the south from reinforcing those in the north. Throughout the fall and winter of 1943 the U.S. Seventh Army headquarters based on Sicily thus drew up plans for a one-, two-, or three-division assault on the French Mediterranean coast, using what amphibious lift remained after all OVERLORD needs had been met.

Patch didn't get the greenlight till June 24 for an invasion set for 15 August.

I'm betting at least Toulon could have been captured relatively intact, as OTL the German demolitions were not that effective and then have offloaded as many of the French troops there without the need for LSTs and such for over the beach unloading reinforcement

Also, being earlier in the year, 11th Panzer won't be ready, but still working up after being thrashed in the Ukraine.

There are no nearby mobile units, and OTL the Resistance made a mess of the rail network in the South, that were not as extensive as in the North

Carl Schwamberger · Jul 3, 2015

ivanotter said:
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The Alban hills might have been occupied, but could they have been held when Kesselring got into the swing of things? Even with a more dynamic corps commander?

...

I cant see a advance to the Alban Hills achieving anything. The German reserves were too large, and responded far to fast. With the US soldiers available during the first week a lodgement that large wount have a solid permeniter or a reserve of any significant size, & the Germans had more men in the containment force. The problem here comes back to amphibious lift. Long before the Allied Joint Cheif had started shifting men & material to the UK for the projected Overlord operation. Morgans COSSAC staffs work in 1943 made it clear the amphib fleet in the UK was inadaquate & what might be required. So, the shift of combat power from the Med. including amphib lift, had started months earlier.

This left the Shingle operation planners contending with a shrinking fleet. They were stuck with a maximum combination of five divisions for the assault and long term follow up. Cross beach supply aggravated this. Had a reasonably sized port been at hand a larger & faster build up could have been accomplished. This problem seems to have been a significant part of Clarks objection to the Shingle Operation. He could not land the multi corps force needed to make it work. The ships were simply not there.

Again, I'd recommend Jacksons 'The Battle for Italy' His chapter 'The Tyrany of Overlord' dicusses how Alexanders army group in Italy was hamstrung by shrinking reinforcements and withdrawls for the main event.

marathag said:
http://www.history.army.mil/brochures/sfrance/sfrance.htm

During a series of Allied strategic planning conferences in 1943, the invasion of southern France, ANVIL emerged as a possible complement to the cross-Channel attack against northern France, now code-named OVERLORD and finally projected for 1944. Taking place either just before or during OVERLORD, ANVIL would weaken the overall German defenses in France or prevent the Germans in the south from reinforcing those in the north. Throughout the fall and winter of 1943 the U.S. Seventh Army headquarters based on Sicily thus drew up plans for a one-, two-, or three-division assault on the French Mediterranean coast, using what amphibious lift remained after all OVERLORD needs had been met.

Multiple books discuss this stratigic problem. Eisenhoweres biographys, as well as Pogues bio of Marshal, and Atkinson pick over The Anvil question. Eisenhower badly wanted Op Anvil executed a few weeks before Op Nepturne, as part of the larger Overlord scheme. Dates ranging from late March to late April were proposed (a early May target for Neptune was still set at that time). As with Op Shingle the move of the amphib fleet to the UK crippled any realistic Anvil plan. Ike kept SACMED & SHAEF staff wresting with this one through the winter, tho by February it was clear the problem was beyond difficult. If Op Neptune was to have more than a three division/beach assault a Anvil Op was impractical. Ike finally let the Allied staff groups off the hook in March & Op Anvil was postphoned indefinitely.

Patch didn't get the greenlight till June 24 for an invasion set for 15 August.

That was triggered by solid appreciation of the continuing logistics lift requirements for the ongoing Overlord Op. the projections of the logistics planners gave Ike confidence the shift of amhibs could start relatively quickly. Planing for a invasion of south France had continued apace.

I'm betting at least Toulon could have been captured relatively intact, as OTL the German demolitions were not that effective and then have offloaded as many of the French troops there without the need for LSTs and such for over the beach unloading reinforcement

Also, being earlier in the year, 11th Panzer won't be ready, but still working up after being thrashed in the Ukraine.

There are no nearby mobile units, and OTL the Resistance made a mess of the rail network in the South, that were not as extensive as in the North

I researched this quite a bit last year and gamed it out multiple times. The German player has a serious problem in deploying his reserve. He can lock down this south invasion, but this requires weakening the ability to respond to any other invasions anywhere else in western Europe. Keeping the defense strong everywhere else gives up the mega port group of Marsailles/Toloun.

Off to work

Maybe I'll post on a january execution of op Anvil later

marathag · Jul 3, 2015

Carl Schwamberger said:
Off to work Maybe I'll post on a january execution of op Anvil later

Please do, I don't recall too many TL where the Ike and Marshall force a real Sledgehammer/Anvil Invasion plan over Churchill's objections

My opinion is even if Anvil is only 50% as successful as OTL, Sledgehammer can be more successful than Overlord, in getting Caen and Antwerp sooner, even if Sledgehammer can't plant as many Troops across the Beach due to shipping shortages. I don't see those SS Panzer Divisions just sitting around Calais, waiting for D-Day,while Patch is moving in the South.

Extra Points if Patch and Free French liberates Paris from the South

Another point to raise is that Area that was invaded for Dragoon, had been mostly under Italian control until Fall, 1943 when the Germans took over. A late January attack, they have less time to settle in

Gannt the chartist · Jul 3, 2015

As at 26 December 44 the Germans have:

Army group D reserve
182, 189, reserve, 325 security 9 SS Panzer, 10 SS panzer, 159 Reserve, 157 reserve, 165 reserve, 155 Reserve Panzer, 179 Reserve panzer 12 SS forming

2 Pz, 15th army reserve
273 reserve panzer div, 17 22 Pz Gr and two inf div under preparation in SW france

Army group C has 3 PG, 4 FJ elts of 29 Pz, Hermann Goring Pz, and 16 SS Pz in preparation.

That's just the reserves. Throwing away a couple of divisions on the off chance that a port can be captured.

Stupid Stupid and pointless Idea. See Dieppe.

Carl Schwamberger · Jul 3, 2015

First off I'll clarify what I mean by the term "Overlord" & a few others in a effort to clarify & avoid confusion from my posts.

'Assault' of amphib assault: The intial landing force to capture a beach.

'Follow up': the forces imeadiatly following the assault force to secure the beachead & expand it. Since "division" is the most commonly refered to unit size in this thread the follow up force would include the 'divisions' landing within the 24-48 hours after H Hour, & fighitng close to the beach.

'Build Up forces': Those landing 48 hours & beyond and fighting beyond the beachhead. In operational or stratigic terms the size of the build up force is more important than the initial assualt force, tho the size and number of beacheads or landing sites may influence the size of the Follow Up force.

'Sledgehammer' was a blanket name for several plans first developed by the British through mid 1942, during Dills tour as Chief Imperial General Staff. Work on those halted in the summer of 1942, after Brooke replaced Dill as CIGS. The Sledgehammer plans had the objective of securing a major port and permanent lodgement on the edge of France sometime in 1942. Sources: Michaels Guimarras essay on Op Sledgehammer & relevant chapters in 'Hyperwar'

'Roundup' was a second group of several plans, designed to capture a mainland port in a sort of oversized commando/partroop raid. The ostensible purpose was to take advantage of a substantial weakening of the German garrison in France. Presumablly withdrawn for a emergency in the east. The three Rankin plans were the best developed of the Roudup plans. Sources: Hyperwar & Pogues bio of Marshal.

'Overlord' as a operational name emerged in the latter half of 1943 when COSSAC was given the task of consolidating Allied planning for invading the mainland. COSSAC was formed as a planning staff reporting not to the usual single commander but to the Combined Joint Chiefs of Staff. The instructions to Morgan the chief of staff at COSSAC were to plan for invading with the material at hand in the UK. This limited Morgan to three thin beacheads & a build up to a single but robust army. As with the earlier Sledgehammer plans the objective was to capture a major port or two. A build up suffcient to advance into the interior would require many months. When Eisenhower was appointed as commander of the the Allied forces for invading Western Europe & SHAEF formed the obstacle of limiting to only forces on hand in the UK was removed. The Joint Chiefs made it clear any request from SHAEF for material or men was not to be denied. In a instant the theoretical follow up to the initial landing tripled from perhaps fifteen divisions in 90 days to over forty in 90 days.

'Neptune' Was the principle sub operation within Op Overlord. Neptune was the actual landing operation. It started with the assembly of the invasion fleet/ground forces in the embarkation ports & effectively ended when Monty & his army commanders moved their command posts ashore.

marathag said:

Please do, I don't recall too many TL where the Ike and Marshall force a real Sledgehammer/Anvil Invasion plan over Churchill's objections

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Churchills objections were far less relevant to the 'Anvil' question than the availbility of amphibious transports. In mid 1943 the British General Staff started cutting Churchill out of the decision loop, usually through subterfuge. While never perfect Brooke did a credible job of sheilding Eisenhower from the worst of Winstons attention. With similar support from Marshal Ike as Supreme commander was able to politely & tactfully ignore Churchills 'Suggestions'. His skill at politics & diplomacy served the Allies well in this.

My opinion is even if Anvil is only 50% as successful as OTL, Sledgehammer can be more successful than Overlord, in getting Caen and Antwerp sooner, even if Sledgehammer can't plant as many Troops across the Beach due to shipping shortages. I don't see those SS Panzer Divisions just sitting around Calais, waiting for D-Day,while Patch is moving in the South.

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On the game board it comes down to how the German player wants to gamble. Commit his reserve to a attempt to stuff the early southern invasion. Or gamble on a delaying force in the south & using the bulk of the reserves to defeat a later northern invasion. My test games were inconclusive on which might be better. A lot of variables and sub decisions to sort through.

A second major decision for the German player was how much to withdraw from Italy to defend France. The effects here were more difficult to acess since I did not extend the game boards to Italy. Similarly the Allied player had a decision to make in terms of how much to withdraw from the Mediterranean for use in France. My take is the maximum practical needed to be committed. A build up to 9 - 12 divisions in 30 days was essential. Tho a lodgement could be sustain & a major port captured with less it was unrealistic to advance into the interior with less.

Extra Points if Patch and Free French liberates Paris from the South

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Har! I never came close in any of the tests. The primary focus was on getting the southern force - 6th Army Group to the Rhine as fast as possible. Some French units were sent west to liberate Bourduex, but that had more of a political than stratigic payoff.

Another point to raise is that Area that was invaded for Dragoon, had been mostly under Italian control until Fall, 1943 when the Germans took over. A late January attack, they have less time to settle in

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To give the German side the benefit of the doubt I left that consideration out & gave the German pieces full defense capability against amphib assaults.

Linked below is a thread where this subject, and the test games I did are discussed. It is a fair read at fifteen pages but has the results of some OB research by several contributors.

http://www.armchairgeneral.com/forums/showthread.php?t=145796&highlight=Operation+Anvil

ivanotter · Jul 4, 2015

Carl, That should clarify that aspect a bit.

It neatly points out the 'enemy' of all operations: logistics.

If any initial landing is not immediately repulsed, it comes down to logistics: who can get the most to where it matters (to paraphrase a US civil war general very liberally!).

Anzio shows it in spades I think: a 2-divisional landing but a build-up over some weeks.

Could it have gone terrible wrong? Yes if Kesselring had immediately forced the issue with enough troops (and panzers).

Did 'Cautious Lucas' then do the right thing? maybe he did?

Clark was also adamant that he was not to be 'brave' but to support Cassino by drawing away troops. That it never happened might say more about Kesselring than about Lucas.

If we remove the entire Italian campaign from the board (as Rommel wanted it), we will have a totally new situation.

I shall put that up as another thread.

Ivan

Aber · Jul 4, 2015

Carl Schwamberger said:
First off I'll clarify what I mean by the term "Overlord" & a few others in a effort to clarify & avoid confusion from my posts.

'Roundup' was a second group of several plans, designed to capture a mainland port in a sort of oversized commando/partroop raid. The ostensible purpose was to take advantage of a substantial weakening of the German garrison in France. Presumablly withdrawn for a emergency in the east. The three Rankin plans were the best developed of the Roudup plans. Sources: Hyperwar & Pogues bio of Marshal.

There was plenty of confusion on names (IIRC in 1942 had to send a letter to the US clarifying them) but "Round-up" seems mostly to have been used for a general invasion of Northern France in 1943, not just raids. However this varied over time, especially after a full-scale invasion in 1943 was put on hold.

When Eisenhower was appointed as commander of the the Allied forces for invading Western Europe & SHAEF formed the obstacle of limiting to only forces on hand in the UK was removed. The Joint Chiefs made it clear any request from SHAEF for material or men was not to be denied. In a instant the theoretical follow up to the initial landing tripled from perhaps fifteen divisions in 90 days to over forty in 90 days.

I've not seen it presented in this way before - sources? Fifteen divisions sounds a little low given that British/Canadian/Polish could have provided at least twelve.