Fall of France - The pursuit after Dunkirk.

According to all sources, France after Dunkirk was doomed.

When Germany started to operate across the Somme and Paris fell, there was not much hope according to conventional wisdom.

I do not see any Weygabd-line being held, nor the scheme to make a stand in Normandy for th winter and start war again in spring, properly enforced from Britain. Any other strange scheme also looked a bit wack.

When the Maginot-line was fully encirlced, the last few French froces ware out of any action.

Now, with all of this, I wonder:

- French forces in the South did put of a fight
- a new BEF was launched back on the continent
- Churchill was full of fight
- German armour was worn out

Was it hopeless? and if so, what should have been done after the fall of Paris? armistice immediately? surrender?

Whne did it become hopeless? smack after Dunkirk? - I am not sure on that

The new BEF nearly got caught in France because the French government didn't even bother tell their own allieds about the surrender.

Could they have been used better?

Was it just a matter of French leadership having given up?

Ivan
 
Well it was a combination of multiple events, but mostly it was the leadership losing hope, people being demoralized and army giving up in the face of superior method and equipment by the Germans.

The primary assumption on which their entire war effort was based was invalidated and they simply gave up. With a little more determined leadership and someone like Churchill to lead them, they could have continue the war. It was just that no one was able to formulate it in palatable terms.

Edit: also the best French units were destroyed in Belgium. They thought they couldn't rise a new army.
 

Archibald

Banned
Ivanotter,

French forces in the South did put of a fight
Yes, what was left did try to put a (desesperate) fight, like these brave soldiers in Saumur

smack after Dunkirk
Spot on.

Your question is extremely interesting.
Unfortunately after Dunkirk france had lost 2/3 of its army; and that included the best units, those in Belgium

After Dunkirk (or even Sedan) there was no way to stop the Germans. Past Sedan, metropolitan France is toast.
Which doesn't mean the fight had to stop.
Reynaud, De Gaulle, Mandel essentially had two options
- Dunois the sword of Freedom
- France fights On !

Which mean: fights from North Africa or renew the alliance with Great Britain.

Unfortunately it was a third option that won the day: stop the German advance through an armistice... whatever humiliation or moral compromise that may bring in the future.
Last chance for metropolitan France in 1940 is in Sedan, May 13 1940 in the afternoon. Don't lose that battle and everything is possible.
Past Sedan, metropolitan France is toast. Only a week later, on May 20 the German armies reach the Atlantic coast in Abbeville. Northern France is now an immense trap. Figures an immense Sedan - Abbeville - Dunkirk triangle: there are BEF and France best units. The triangle destroyed, they ceased to exist, and Paris is ready to fall.
The French campaign of 1940 is as simple as that...
 
Now, with all of this, I wonder:

- French forces in the South did put of a fight

By this time the French forces had adopted hedgehog tactics and focused their remaining armor units into mobile reserves - a system theoretically similar to Soviet methods in the battle of Kursk and the German defences in Normandy in 1944.

What they lacked was enough forces to defend their new exposed northern flank, and enough equipment (fighters, AT and AP mines, AT and AA guns, tanks ech.) to stem the German offensive at this point.

- a new BEF was launched back on the continent
A symbolic gesture considering the balance of forces involved.

- Churchill was full of fight
But no matter how much he huffed and puffed, he could not change the strategic situation and re-arm the defeated BEF.

- German armour was worn out
And the tank crews were so filled with Pervitin that combat fatique was reaching critical levels...But none of this mattered - the armored forces had created a new frontline situation where the French no longer had enough forces to defend themselves against German numerical superiourity.

Was it hopeless? and if so, what should have been done after the fall of Paris?
armistice immediately? surrender?

Evacuating to Algeria with a reshuffled wartime cabinet could have kept France in the war - and doomed French metropolitan territories to the full horrors of Nazi occupation policies.

When did it become hopeless? smack after Dunkirk? - I am not sure on that

When Gamelin adopted a plan that needlessly deprived the Allied armies of a strategic reserve and pushed his best forces to a trap. The man was a loyal servant of the Republic, but responsible for his fatal strategic mistake that doomed the French war effort.

The new BEF nearly got caught in France because the French government didn't even bother tell their own allieds about the surrender.

Perhaps because the new Vichy clique gathered begind the figurehead of Petain no longer considered Britain their ally? Considering the chaotic conditions prevailing at the time it wasn't that surprising.

Was it just a matter of French leadership having given up?

Men like Paul Reynaud just never got the chance to reorganize the government and fight on - from their point of view, Petain and his cronies seized the worst possible moment to start their own scheme, since the public was in state of panic and shock due the disastrous frontline situation.
 
I also read it as the lack of leadership that really let the French down.

However, it is also correct that 2/3 of the French army and the best formations with the ost equipment as well, were lost in Belgium/Northern France.

That said, the German armies might also have got a bit tired at this time. Did they any more fresh troops thatn what the French had in the South, especially as these troops had not been committed.

Of course being on a winning streak has a tendency to sompensate for sleep, which defeat does not do very well.

I also read the most significant turn was the encirclement of the Maginot line. The troops staioned there were then taken out of the equation.

Could they have had an impact if they had attacked West? with what really, they were stationary after all.

Brooke took one look at it and were all for getting out as he saw it as total waste.

But was it?

Not the Weygand line perhaps, not the Normandy scheme (I like that one, very Churchill, I believe).

One compared the Pursuit to a swarm of locust. Unstoppable because there are so many of them. But is that really the case?

Air cover is important. Stuka's used to demoralise troops not a bad idea. The rumour of tanks and whole sections cave in. But was that also the case in the South where the pace of war must have been starting to be seen and therefore losing its grip?

Other options in France proper? Loire valley?

Ivan
 
The defences were smashed/bypassed the allies could fight better and inflict losses but making the enemy bleed more is not a good idea when you've already (on the French side anyway) realised that your going to have to work out favourable peace terms surprisingly the French didn't want any more of their country to become a warzone for Britain's benefit as France was already doomed.
 
It is a little known fact that after Dunkirk, the daily casualties totals for the German started to increase with upwards of a thousand men lost in action on a daily basis. Strangely enough, the morale of the French Army also went up about the same time and some really though and nasty fights took place either on the Somme, near Rouen or later on on the Loire river.

The France fights on scenario is the msot extensive study on this, but yes fighting on after Dunkirk and after Paris had fallen was indeed possible. France woukd ultimately be lost, but the cost to the Germans can be massively increased simply by fighting on.

In June the German own logistic train was in need of a pause. Some people don't always realise that France is a big country, the distance between Dijon and Marseille is nearly 400km, crossing watersheds, river valleys and large towns, all of which can be chokepoints of their own. By fighting on right until the end, the French army can easily delay the Germans for another six weeks if not two months.
 
I also thought there was more to this.


So, if a part of France could have put up a fight, denying Grmany the full contol.

IF then a better and more comitted leadership having emerged (that one is difficult), could the armistice tems have been much different? Would Germany have relaxed those a bit, rather than having to do more fighting?

In that instance France would not have been defeated per se.

Would Vichy-France having emerged then? Petain would not have been in on it.

What was the armour strength after the fall of France?

Ivan
 
According to all sources, France after Dunkirk was doomed.

When Germany started to operate across the Somme and Paris fell, there was not much hope according to conventional wisdom.

I do not see any Weygabd-line being held, nor the scheme to make a stand in Normandy for th winter and start war again in spring, properly enforced from Britain. Any other strange scheme also looked a bit wack.

When the Maginot-line was fully encirlced, the last few French froces ware out of any action.

Now, with all of this, I wonder:

- French forces in the South did put of a fight
- a new BEF was launched back on the continent
- Churchill was full of fight
- German armour was worn out

Was it hopeless? and if so, what should have been done after the fall of Paris? armistice immediately? surrender?

Whne did it become hopeless? smack after Dunkirk? - I am not sure on that

The new BEF nearly got caught in France because the French government didn't even bother tell their own allieds about the surrender.

Could they have been used better?

Was it just a matter of French leadership having given up?

Ivan

This subject has been done to death.

The French were not fools. They knew their campaign was over by about May 15th/16th. They still fought on out of pride and the hope of a miracle. Neither was forthcoming or enough.

The same was true for Germany and Japan in 1944 and they still lost.
 

Archibald

Banned
In France Fights the fighting stops on August 15, 1940 near Perpignan. This with the best remaining units going to Northern Africa. I vaguely remember FFO members discussing optimistic variants where a pocket last well until September 1940. France still lose in the end, however 'incidentally I'd like to see a "French Brittany redoubt" TL, but it may be ASB.)

As for Vichy France, I hate to say that but Mers El Kebir was a formidable opportunity for them. They were quick to exploit that, claiming it was "a british backstabbing" :rolleyes:

A month later Dakar did the same for De Gaulle and the Free French - it gave Vichy the occasion it dreamed about to treat the Free French like traitors.

There was already some anger against the British since early June, when the RAF at some point had to stop burning Hurricanes and Bleinheim in a now hopeless French campaign (that was around June 10). The French air force was so weakened that French generals considered the RAF as the magical solution to their military collapse.

The best scenario for France 1940 (from best to worse)
- no defeat in Sedan (POD: May 13)
- depart for North Africa (POD: around June 10)
- reinforce the alliance with Great Britain (June 10 again)
After June 16 Reynaud is out; Petain come June 17; on June 18 De Gaulle is in London. Capitulation is June 25, but even Vichy is far from a given, they still have not much legitimacy.
Best case after June 25
- no Mers El Kebir, the fleet goes to South America and later to the allies. There's also a possibility that the empire join the allied side (no Dakar in August)
That pretty much Some Bloke "The Mers el kebir resolution TL.
 
After the horrors of World War I and the threat of Paris's destruction, the French people had no will to fight when defeat became clear.
 
I would be surprised if this topic has not been debated before. Maybe this one will have some new elements?

French position was difficult, but maybe not totally hopeles after Dunkirk.

The rise in morale and fighting spirit? well, maybe an awakening after the losses in Belgium. Time to leave the past and go forward.

I believe the encirclement of the Maginor line, cutting off the divisions there, was the final blow. If those would have been deployed, the final end could well have been dragged for some more time.

How much was left of French airforce at the time of the armisitice?

There was enough to bomb Gibraltar even in September.

The question really is: Was France doomed due to its lack of leadership and general apathy? or was it totally hopeles from a military point of view?

It opens another angle: What if France does not capitulate but an armistice turns into a sort of Vichy-regime but much more German-aligned?

If, as the speculation also goes, not all French saw an alignment with Germany as a bad thing, could a non-defeated France have become a German ally? If Mesr-el-Kebir still happens, the incentive is surely there.

This probably also has been discussed before, but any new ideas?

Ivan
 
In France Fights the fighting stops on August 15, 1940 near Perpignan. This with the best remaining units going to Northern Africa. I vaguely remember FFO members discussing optimistic variants where a pocket last well until September 1940. France still lose in the end, however 'incidentally I'd like to see a "French Brittany redoubt" TL, but it may be ASB.)

As for Vichy France, I hate to say that but Mers El Kebir was a formidable opportunity for them. They were quick to exploit that, claiming it was "a british backstabbing" :rolleyes:

A month later Dakar did the same for De Gaulle and the Free French - it gave Vichy the occasion it dreamed about to treat the Free French like traitors.

There was already some anger against the British since early June, when the RAF at some point had to stop burning Hurricanes and Bleinheim in a now hopeless French campaign (that was around June 10). The French air force was so weakened that French generals considered the RAF as the magical solution to their military collapse.

The best scenario for France 1940 (from best to worse)
- no defeat in Sedan (POD: May 13)
- depart for North Africa (POD: around June 10)
- reinforce the alliance with Great Britain (June 10 again)
After June 16 Reynaud is out; Petain come June 17; on June 18 De Gaulle is in London. Capitulation is June 25, but even Vichy is far from a given, they still have not much legitimacy.
Best case after June 25
- no Mers El Kebir, the fleet goes to South America and later to the allies. There's also a possibility that the empire join the allied side (no Dakar in August)
That pretty much Some Bloke "The Mers el kebir resolution TL.

Similar to but not identicle. The colonies and fleet trickle to the Free French over about a year. In this scenario they're fighting alongside Britain from July 1940 without interruption.
 
I would be surprised if this topic has not been debated before. Maybe this one will have some new elements?

French position was difficult, but maybe not totally hopeles after Dunkirk.

The rise in morale and fighting spirit? well, maybe an awakening after the losses in Belgium. Time to leave the past and go forward.

I believe the encirclement of the Maginor line, cutting off the divisions there, was the final blow. If those would have been deployed, the final end could well have been dragged for some more time.

The field formations had been move out of the fortified zone during late May. None were surrounded & trapped there in June. A check of any of the comon histories of the 1940 campaign should confirm this. Kemps 'The Maginot Line' is a quick & accesable refrence.

How much was left of French airforce at the time of the armisitice?

A suprising amount. When the battle started a larger than usuall number of groupes were far to the rear & out of reach in south France. They had been withdrawn to reequip with the new US made aircraft just arriving. Some 300 had been delivered by May & another 300+ were enroute.

Over 1200 French ordered aircraft were scheduled for production in latter 1940, and orders for over 3000 more were being negotiated. A assembly facility had been built in Morroco and a training facility was being stood up there. Another service/training facility was under assembly in Algeria.

I dont have numbers at hand for modern operational aircraft at hand in mid June. Losses had been high but not catastrophic. More important was losses in experienced pilots had been lower than for the Germans. A even more important point is the performance of the French fighter pilots had been credible. Approx half the gross losses of the German airforce have been credited to French interceptors, or over 2/3 of the combat losses.

There was enough to bomb Gibraltar even in September.

That was flown by some of the newly delivered US made bombers

The question really is: Was France doomed due to its lack of leadership and general apathy? or was it totally hopeles from a military point of view?

A seriously complex question. In strictly technical terms it is possible to see how the French military prevails. ..but it is difficult to see how the existing leadership under Gamelin could use that tool more effectively.

It opens another angle: What if France does not capitulate but an armistice turns into a sort of Vichy-regime but much more German-aligned?

The number of real pro German politicians was very small. As long as Petain is in charge the policy would remain France first with such collaboration as seemed necessary. Germany could squeeze France more efficiently than in OTL, but that risks the French breaking away to the Allies in small packets sooner.

If, as the speculation also goes, not all French saw an alignment with Germany as a bad thing, could a non-defeated France have become a German ally? If Mesr-el-Kebir still happens, the incentive is surely there.

This probably also has been discussed before, but any new ideas?

Ivan

Petain & few others saw any real future in alignment with Germany. They were well aware of Germanys long term economic problems under nazi administration. Petain managed a concensus under a policy of French restoration seperate from Germany & the eventual goal of returning to greater power than Germany. This was the long term goal & depended on the continued control of the empire. The dismemberment of the colonies from French control from March 1941 to November 1942 proved that policy bankrupt. The earlier refusal of Hitler to negotiate the expected peace treaty with France in the winter/spring of 1941 undercut Petains expectations/policy as well, and lost much French confidence in Germany as any sort of partner.
 
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I did rely on Wiki (again, sorry). It is a bit vague reading it now, but the German claim was 500,000 prisoners. The sentence can be read in many ways and I read it as 500,000 in the Maginot line. In hindsight, a bit on the high side.

Back to the "fun" question: Could Hitler have turned France into an ally as an (nearly) equal partner?

Reading some of the Torch stories, I looks as though the French forces were more opposed to the British than to the Germans. And that was some years after Mesr-el-Kebir

Did the common soldier feel "betrayed" by Britain? RAF going away when they really needed them, sinking of the fleet and so on. Dynamo focused mostly on BEF althogh French troops were not denied passage.

Ivan
 
I would be surprised if this topic has not been debated before. Maybe this one will have some new elements?

French position was difficult, but maybe not totally hopeles after Dunkirk.

The rise in morale and fighting spirit? well, maybe an awakening after the losses in Belgium. Time to leave the past and go forward.

I believe the encirclement of the Maginor line, cutting off the divisions there, was the final blow. If those would have been deployed, the final end could well have been dragged for some more time.

How much was left of French airforce at the time of the armisitice?

There was enough to bomb Gibraltar even in September.

The question really is: Was France doomed due to its lack of leadership and general apathy? or was it totally hopeles from a military point of view?

It opens another angle: What if France does not capitulate but an armistice turns into a sort of Vichy-regime but much more German-aligned?

If, as the speculation also goes, not all French saw an alignment with Germany as a bad thing, could a non-defeated France have become a German ally? If Mesr-el-Kebir still happens, the incentive is surely there.

This probably also has been discussed before, but any new ideas?

Ivan

Yes it has been discussed before.

The French 1st army was their best formation with the best equipment and it was surrounded and defeated at Lille after a hard fight. The French troops evacuated from Dunkirk (almost a 140,000) and then returned to the battle were without equipment too. I think the French had just 60 ish divisions left after June 5th.

Their airforce was not capable of protecting their troops. The British tried to send a second BEF that was poorly equipped and organized and was lucky to escape during the rest of June.

There was nothing the French could do to stop the Germans and by the armistice they were already falling back to the Loire.

France signed the armistice because they were defeated militarily as well as psychologically and the only country that could help them, Britain had little to give them at that stage.

It may be interesting to speculate on what would happen if they fought on but the answer is not all that interesting. They would be defeated and more people would have died for no gain and the terms would have been harsher if the Germans had to conquer the country. In fact a German conquest means no need for them to negotiate at all.
 
Take the text in the link with a grain of salt. I've discussed the details with a French expert on the subject & checked parts elsewhere. Kirkland it appears either had a agenda, or was sloppy in his interpretation of the data & French Air Force leaders intent. I also found it a very interesting read, but would not cite Kirklands conclusions, or much of the data he presents without checking other sources. My accquainatance recommended some modern French works, but I dont have the titles or names at hand.
 
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After Dunkirk, the French showed they had learnt about how to defeat the panzers by mounting a defence in depth, with troops occupying fortified villages and woodlands in a chequer board fashion, and the often superior French tanks operating in the gaps between the other troops. This system, used to defend the line of the Somme River, hardly slowed down the panzers at all. The German tanks bypassed the opposition in the villages by moving through the surrounding fields. They came under intense gunfire from many directions but overcame the opposition with a combined arms approach that involved air attacks on villages and a mixture of direct and indirect fire, followed by an all-arms assault,[1] Despite massed French tank attacks (involving up to 50 tanks), the panzers were soon on their way.[2]

[1]Nigel Cawthorne, “Steel Fist”, Capella, London, 2003, pp 76-77
[2]Kenneth Macksey, “Rommel: Battles & Campaigns”, pp 41-43


Anyway, the way I read it, the French were exhausted by their huge casualites in WW1 and didn't want the war. You might as well ask why they didn't pursue their Saar offensive with more vigour.
 
After Dunkirk, the French showed they had learnt about how to defeat the panzers by mounting a defence in depth, with troops occupying fortified villages and woodlands in a chequer board fashion, and the often superior French tanks operating in the gaps between the other troops. .


This describes the system that the Morrocan Division in the 1st Army to halt & repulse the attacks of the German 3rd & 4th Armored Divisions, in mid May, before Dunkirk. In that case the density of the French defense was enough to prevent infiltration IIRC the density of the French battalions in the Weygand line in June was about one third that of those in the Dyle Line occupied by the 1st Army in May. Similarly the reserves of the 1st Army in May were far larger than those of the individual army commanders in the Weygand Line in June. Tho in the case of the 1st Army it was unnecessary to to deploy the army commanders reserve. The Germans ceased the attack in two days after failing to penetrate the main defense zone and withdrew the two armored divisions.

If you take a look a books like Doughtys 'The Breaking Point' the maps of the 55th Infantry Divisions & 10th Corps deployment at Sedan show the same defense in depth, with the infantry battalions deployed in layered zones or strong points. The corps reserve consisted of two entire infantry regiments & two tank battalions. Additionally Georges HQ released on early 13 May the 21st Corps from the Stratigic Reserve with the 3rd Motorized Infantry Div and the 3rd Armored Div to take up a reserve position behind the 10th Corps at Sedan.

At Dinant the 18th Infantry Divisions positions were organized in depth when it arrived from 11 to 13 May. It took Rommels armored div all of the 13th & 14th to fight through the depth of the 18ths ID positions & a 'breakout' was not achieved until the morning of the 15th May.

The organization of infantry divisions into strong points arrayed in depth, with substantial reserves had been standard French doctrine since 1917 or 1918. The organization of the Weygand line was nothing new. It failed in part because there were no longer enough battalions of infantry & artillery to create the necessary density, depth, and fire power to make the system work against the weight of the German attacks.
 
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