How lang has the US to stay out of the war for Britain to collapse in WWII?

How long has the US to stay out of the war - providing no Lend-Lease only Cash & Carry- for Britain to collapse?

By the beginning of 1941 Britain had less than £ 3 million left in its gold and dollar reserves. This was as near to bankruptcy as it was possible to go without actual default.

Throughout 1941 US LL deliveries of food amounted to 1.1 million tons - saving the British islands from a famine.

Can Britain collapse financially or be starved into submission before the end of 1941 if the US does not provide LL?

Well by my way of thinking to force a collapse the Germans have to invade which, LL or not, is not going to happen.

joeferrito said:

Well by my way of thinking to force a collapse the Germans have to invade which, LL or not, is not going to happen.

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Really, is that the only way to defeat the Brits? As it was the tea rationing of 1940 almost caused riots, okay slight exaggeration but it was the hot topic of conversation for a good month after it's introduction amongst British citizens ... just imagine what would happen if other items not only started to be rationed but worst still run out.

Britain was able to coast on a $300 million loan in gold from the Belgians until LL was signed in March, but needed some South African loans before it took effect starting in May (and really later than that even). Beyond that they are really going to have to draw hard on the Commonwealth for loans and supplies. I'd say by 1942 without LL Britain much throw in the towel for lack of sufficient funds and by June-July it will really have to reduce imports and prioritize production. Beyond that the British are going to really be turtled up by Autumn as they cannot really afford much offensively and they could theoretically go on for longer if Stalin paid cash for British LL.

If the U.S. stayed truly on the sidelines?

The scenario is skirting ASB, but barely possible, take one hell of a POD to eliminate the Japanese empire. However...

The UK has to seek terms by early 1943, maybe mid 1942.

The issue is far greater than simply the supplies, although that was huge. The issue is vessels. Until it was changed U.S. law forbade American flagged vessels from entering declared war ones.

The KM was sinking Commonwealth vessels five times faster than replacement hulls could be produced. The UK entered the war with 14 million tons of merchant shipping, it acquired an additional 4.5 million tons, mainly from Norway and France after those countries fell. The Commonwealth managed to produce 3.5 million tons of new bottoms a year.

U-boat sank 14 million tons of shipping in the North Atlantic, 21 million tons overall.

When you consider transit time, dockside time, and the occasional, inevitable breakdowns it is easy to see that the math kills the UK. IOTL the U.S of course, did enter the fray, first with extant shipping, then with new contruction (all 38.5 million tons of it), and simply swamped the KM.

I don't think Britain was likely to collapse. However, its dire situation (financial and otherwise), might have eventually led it to consider a negotiated peace (assuming Hitler was sane enough to consider one).

jahenders said:

I don't think Britain was likely to collapse. However, its dire situation (financial and otherwise), might have eventually led it to consider a negotiated peace (assuming Hitler was sane enough to consider one).

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As mentioned before Britain had 3 million pounds left in gold and dollar reserves by early 1941.

From 1941-1945 the US delivered nearly 5 million tons of food - which fed more than 10% of British population.

And we are not even talking about the other resources like petroleum and steel or war material like tanks and aircraft + that the Germans were sinking ships faster then the British can build them.

So how does all this make a British collapse " not likely"?

CalBear said:

If the U.S. stayed truly on the sidelines?

The scenario is skirting ASB, but barely possible, take one hell of a POD to eliminate the Japanese empire. However...

The UK has to seek terms by early 1943, maybe mid 1942.

The issue is far greater than simply the supplies, although that was huge. The issue is vessels. Until it was changed U.S. law forbade American flagged vessels from entering declared war ones.

The KM was sinking Commonwealth vessels five times faster than replacement hulls could be produced. The UK entered the war with 14 million tons of merchant shipping, it acquired an additional 4.5 million tons, mainly from Norway and France after those countries fell. The Commonwealth managed to produce 3.5 million tons of new bottoms a year.

U-boat sank 14 million tons of shipping in the North Atlantic, 21 million tons overall.

When you consider transit time, dockside time, and the occasional, inevitable breakdowns it is easy to see that the math kills the UK. IOTL the U.S of course, did enter the fray, first with extant shipping, then with new contruction (all 38.5 million tons of it), and simply swamped the KM.

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I thought the Battle of the Atlantic had swung in favor of the Allies by late 1941, a pattern only broken by U-boats preying on low hanging fruit before the USN got their act together. Were the U-boats still sinking more ships than were being built in, say, November 1941?

I dont think Britain will colapse,before that they would break out the anthrax cakes if the situation was that desperate.....

Collapse? Probably not...

Angrybird said:

How long has the US to stay out of the war - providing no Lend-Lease only Cash & Carry- for Britain to collapse? By the beginning of 1941 Britain had less than £ 3 million left in its gold and dollar reserves. This was as near to bankruptcy as it was possible to go without actual default. Throughout 1941 US LL deliveries of food amounted to 1.1 million tons - saving the British islands from a famine. Can Britain collapse financially or be starved into submission before the end of 1941 if the US does not provide LL?

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Collapse? Probably not... even with the decline in specie accounts, there were other assets the British had they could trade for support.

I would expect if the US stays out entirely, or even with cash and carry, the British could stay active - at least in the pre-Peace of Amiens in 1802 situation - for years; the problem, of course, is if the US is in a neutralist/cash and carry policy AND the Japanese do not attack US territory in the Pacific, for whatever reason - the PI gains its independence in 1936, for example.

At that point, all other things being equal, if the British face all three members of the Axis essentially alone and the Germans are pressing the Soviets as hard as they were historically in 1941-42, I can see a Peace of Amiens type stalemate coming into being, at least in the ETO, while the British focus on the Japanese - and I can see the Germans being happy to accept such, so they can focus on the Soviets.

How long that lasts, of course, probably depends on how much the British can devote to an atomic weapons program while fighting the Japanese.

Be an eventful period, certainly.

Best,

I want to learn said:

I thought the Battle of the Atlantic had swung in favor of the Allies by late 1941, a pattern only broken by U-boats preying on low hanging fruit before the USN got their act together. Were the U-boats still sinking more ships than were being built in, say, November 1941?

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If the US doesn't extend the patrol zone into the middle Atlantic. If they don't then shipping losses are probably higher before November 1941 IOTL because of it being a fertile hunting ground. The Uboats tried to avoid USN patrols in these areas, but if the US ITTL is not extending their patrol zones out their in 1940 they remain open all through 1940 onward and British defenses cannot reach that far from the air. Part of British convoy defense success in 1941 was having wide aerial patrol zone East of the US patrol zone and the threat of US entry held back Uboats moving much west of that before 1942.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle...tle_widens_.28June_.E2.80.93_December_1941.29

betrayor said:

I dont think Britain will colapse,before that they would break out the anthrax cakes if the situation was that desperate.....

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Those weren't ready before 1944 and even they didn't want that to be returned; the Germans could retaliate until May 1944, so if worse came to worse the British themselves would fear a bio-weapon used on them, as they did not know the extent of the German program there.

Even if the Japanese attack 12/41, if the USA has been truly "isolationist" until then - cash and carry only, any ASW patrols fairly close to USA (not halfway), etc. - Britain is still in trouble. OTL it would have been politically impossible for FDR to declare war on Germany right after Pearl Harbor, Hitler did it for him. In this scenario, with the USA at war against Japan and Britain against Germany and Japan the amount of "relief" going to the UK, even if LL/loans start right after Pearl Harbor will be less than OTL as the US would want LL war material to be used against Japan. Given the USSR is not involved against Japan, no LL will flow their way making it harder for them and easier for the Germans short and long term.

Without the USA in the war against Germany the UK is going to be very very strained. Without US involvement, there won't be a TORCH equivalent. The Germans might eventually be pushed out of North Africa but it will take much longer. HUSKY won't happen, and forget any invasion of France. OTL the war against Japan was very heavily a US show - yes Burma campaign, ANZAC involvement - here Britain's ability to move resources to the war against Japan is even less as they are fighting alone against Germany in the west.

Assuming the British do manage to kick Germany out of North Africa by the end of 1943, absent US support that's all she wrote. Churchill may have to make the choice of an armistice with Germany and helping the USA trounce Japan and getting lost imperial possessions back. This would cut losses - the UK can't bail on the US & make separate peace with Japan.

IMHO in this scenario, a truly isolationist USA until PH, then Pacific/Japan only war, the USSR is screwed. Lack of pressure in the west allows Germany to devote more resources to the east. Furthermore, any material support the USSR got from the UK is going to be drastically reduced (no LL for the UK early on, reduced volume later), and no LL from the USA. Germany and Japan are not going to meet up in the USSR, but the USSR having a Brest-Litovsk on steroids is highly likely.

BTW this scenario means less US-UK cooperation on things like a-bomb, radar, etc.

sloreck said:

Even if the Japanese attack 12/41, if the USA has been truly "isolationist" until then - cash and carry only, any ASW patrols fairly close to USA (not halfway), etc. - Britain is still in trouble. OTL it would have been politically impossible for FDR to declare war on Germany right after Pearl Harbor, Hitler did it for him.

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Except both the pre- and post-Pearl Harbour, pre-German DOW data we have on the American public's mood does not support this. On December 10, 1941, Gallup/AIPO (American Institute of Public Opinion) poll asked. "Should President Roosevelt have asked Congress to declare war on Germany, as well as on Japan?": yes — 90%, no — 7%." A full day before the German DOW on the US.

Heck, plenty of people in the USA did not believe the Japanese were able to play out Pearl Harbor on their own. Many believed that they had received training by the Germans, others added the aircraft, and others still believed the pilots attacking pearl were German too. This was part racist sentiment and part expressive of how anti-Nazi Germany that public already was by the time Pearl Harbor occurred but it does not support the idea that the Americans would remain neutral against Germany now that they were in alliance with Britain against Japan.

There is also incidentally no reason to think that if the US rather than Germany had declared war first it would have made any difference to the "Germany first" strategy which US planners had agreed on well before Pearl Harbor. As Louis Morton writes, by the summer of 1941...

"...the decision on the course the United States would follow in the event it was "compelled to resort to war" had, in effect, been made. The United States would make the main effort in the Atlantic and European area where the major enemy, Germany, was located, Just how the final blow would be delivered was not yet known, but the Americans expected it would require a large-scale ground offensive. In the Pacific and Far East, United States strategy would be defensive, with greatest emphasis on the area encompassed by the strategic triangle, Alaska-Hawaii-Panama. Implicit in this concept was acceptance of the loss of the Philippines, Wake, and Guam, Thus, in a period of less than three years, the Pacific orientation of U.S. strategy, developed over a period of many years, was completely reversed. By mid-1941, in response to the threat from Europe, the eyes of American strategists were focused on the Atlantic. It was there, they believed, that the war in which the United States was certain to be involved would be decided."

"These expectations were more than fulfilled. Though the war when it came opened with an attack in the Pacific, the President and his military advisers made it clear at the outset in the first of the wartime conferences with the British held at Washington in December 1941-January 1942 (ARCADIA) that they would stand by their decision to defeat Germany first. Not once during the course of the war was this decision successfully challenged."

It would be a rather bizarre diplomatic situation for the United States to be allied with the British and Dutch against Japan, yet let itself remain uninvolved in the war with Germany.

How about the OP present a sane POD for actions that border on ASB? The USA did not aid the UK just to be mean to poor old Germany, there were sound strategic reason for what they did and as others have pointed out the isolationism card is severely overstated. A British collapse pretty much hands over critical resources and bases to the Japanese in the Pacific, and it leaves Europe in the hands of an unstable maniac, either Hitler or Stalin depending how you think that will work out.

I want to learn said:

I thought the Battle of the Atlantic had swung in favor of the Allies by late 1941, a pattern only broken by U-boats preying on low hanging fruit before the USN got their act together. Were the U-boats still sinking more ships than were being built in, say, November 1941?

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The Battle of the Atlantic, by late 1941 was very much a combined Anglo/American operation. U.S. bottoms made up nearly half the total tonnage being shipped and USN vessels conducted escort for any convoy including U.S. flagged vessels to mid ocean. The KM didn't have to sink every ship the British managed to acquire, just the majority.

Using the example I gave earlier, the British had 18.5 million tons of shipping to start the war, and could produce, with the rest of the Commonwealth, 3.5M tons annually. That wold mean that, by the end of 1942 total British shipping would amount to 29,000,000 tons, assuming no losses.

In 1939 losses were manageable, amounting to around 350,000 tons. In 1940 they were anything but manageable, reaching 3.4M tons (15% of the total shipping stock of the Commonwealth, including new construction, assuming no U.S. hulls had been allowed to enter the war zone) with a net loss of available tonnage of over 1M tons. In 1941 the figure soared to 4.3 million tons (close to 20% of the available tonnage), with a net loss of ~!1.3M tons. in 1942, a year that is impacted by "Operation Drumbeat" losses jumped to 6.2M tons (with the heaviest losses occurring AFTER the "Happy Time" including 755,000 tons in November 1942).

Between the start of the war and end of 1942 the KM had accounted for ~14 million tons of shipping, by all platforms, worldwide. The UK/Commonwealth, on its own could have had, at maximum, 25 million tons of shipping on hand/constructed during the same period, leaving, at best 11M tons (an additional 3M+ tons were lost in the first five months of 1943, enough to wipe out Commonwealth 1943 production for the entire year). Net losses of non-tankers to the UK merchant marine in 1939 to 1942 was 2,327 bottoms and 545 tanker bottoms.

Just to transport the minimum amount of oil from the U.S. needed to continue the war, not including oil obtained in the Middle East and shipped to Great Britain, required 4.5M tons of shipping. That would have left only 5.5M tons of shipping to transport EVERYTHING else needed, including oil from the Middle East being shipped to the Western Desert. Over the course of a year that means a total shipping of around 34 million tons (at 8 knots the Atlantic is BIG ocean, Slow Convoys took 15-18 days for one way transit and a cargo ship can carry roughly 1/3 of its rated displacement as cargo, faster ships were somewhat better, but each ship was good for around a trip a month). Just ration level food for the civilian population of the Islands came in at ~16M imported tons.

Without massive U.S. building of merchants, escorts and aircraft (all as part of Lend-Lease, which BTW was a really good deal for the U.S., considering) the UK withers on the vine no later than June of 1943.

CalBear said:

Without massive U.S. building of merchants, escorts and aircraft (all as part of Lend-Lease, which BTW was a really good deal for the U.S., considering) the UK withers on the vine no later than June of 1943.

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That actually brings up another point. US industry was making a nice profit out of supplying the UK, how likely is it they are going to back this absolutist approach? I mean yes the UK can't go indefinitely without US support but the notion that the US basically shrugs its shoulders and lets the UK fall because they're out of gold, seem unrealistic to say the least.

Consequences?

Angrybird said:

How long has the US to stay out of the war - providing no Lend-Lease only Cash & Carry- for Britain to collapse?

By the beginning of 1941 Britain had less than £ 3 million left in its gold and dollar reserves. This was as near to bankruptcy as it was possible to go without actual default.

Throughout 1941 US LL deliveries of food amounted to 1.1 million tons - saving the British islands from a famine.

Can Britain collapse financially or be starved into submission before the end of 1941 if the US does not provide LL?

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Assuming no destroyers-for-bases deal happens, the UK government (even including Churchill here, if he feels sufficiently disillusioned about the US stance) might feel it prudent to go for some sort of ceasefire deal (that will ideally let them frantically try to build coalitions and rearm for Round 2 several years down the line) by the end of 1940.
Of course, if the USA doesn't want to do things that would assist the UK, the UK has no reason not to declare neutrality in SE Asia and - say - close the Burma Road to anything remotely resembling US military aid going into China. And there's not much reason for the UK to not sell stuff to Japan that Japan really really wants, like oil. (If the UK financial situation is desperate, and the USA isn't willing to help, then why not sell oil to that island nation that the British were allied with only twenty years earlier?...)

Garrison said:

How about the OP present a sane POD for actions that border on ASB? The USA did not aid the UK just to be mean to poor old Germany, there were sound strategic reason for what they did and as others have pointed out the isolationism card is severely overstated. A British collapse pretty much hands over critical resources and bases to the Japanese in the Pacific, and it leaves Europe in the hands of an unstable maniac, either Hitler or Stalin depending how you think that will work out.

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Collapse from within?

An US civil disorder during the Great Depression might be a possibility. Now, how you could bring that on is a different question but it would change the dynamics of WW II completely.

Look More Closely Later said:

Assuming no destroyers-for-bases deal happens, the UK government (even including Churchill here, if he feels sufficiently disillusioned about the US stance) might feel it prudent to go for some sort of ceasefire deal (that will ideally let them frantically try to build coalitions and rearm for Round 2 several years down the line) by the end of 1940.
Of course, if the USA doesn't want to do things that would assist the UK, the UK has no reason not to declare neutrality in SE Asia and - say - close the Burma Road to anything remotely resembling US military aid going into China. And there's not much reason for the UK to not sell stuff to Japan that Japan really really wants, like oil. (If the UK financial situation is desperate, and the USA isn't willing to help, then why not sell oil to that island nation that the British were allied with only twenty years earlier?...)

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The problem for Japan was its lack of foreign exchange after the US froze their accounts as part of the embargo for their 1941 occupation of Indochina. The Dutch were willing to sell until the Japanese couldn't pay.