Singapore 1942 - again

All,

The disaster at Singapore was evidently started a bit earlier than 1942.

Bad leadership, bad ideas, bad .. nearly everything, but what was the alternative?

We probably need to go back to the early 30's (?).

UK to admit it cannot afford to be a super power
- Give Singapore away to the US?
- Let Japan do whatever they want
-> in essence: go home and leave Asia

UK to try to stay as a super power
- Build more ships, put a decent command in place, more troops in general
- Starve European waters of ships (Germany on the rise?)
-> UK bankrupt before 1939

UK try to bluff its way through it - OTL


In essence: was there any realistic options for UK when Asia had got out of hand from 1936 and onwards?


... and how would that have played out?

Ivan

Well, there is, I think a rather simple PoD to allow Singapore to remain in British hands a bit longer in 1942. It would require the British to abandon the Greeks and not send anything up there. The result would be clearing the Italians out of NA and releasing a lot of forces for alternative employment, plus not starving the Far East forces of logistics and replacements. Possibly the three ANZAC and two Indian divisions that OTL remained in NA could be deployed to Far East?

Of course, the Japanese would know about that, probably. IIRC they had pretty good intel on the British positions in Malaya and Singapore. However, AFAIK they also operated at the limit of what they could deploy both in terms of forces available and transportable. So there is no margin to improve, as the Japanese have to rob Peter to pay Paul, i.e. weaken the Phillipines expedition which almost failed OTL.

More British ships in IO translates in less successful Nagumo's raid, hopefully or more successful, if they have a bit more of luck (as in they sink RN carrier or two in addition to BB/BCs.

That is one possible thing the British could have done.

Forsaking Singapore to anyone, even the US, was not really an option for the British. Not in the 30s, anyway. It just gives the Indian independence movement more motive.

Shaby said:

Well, there is, I think a rather simple PoD to allow Singapore to remain in British hands a bit longer in 1942. It would require the British to abandon the Greeks and not send anything up there. The result would be clearing the Italians out of NA and releasing a lot of forces for alternative employment, plus not starving the Far East forces of logistics and replacements. Possibly the three ANZAC and two Indian divisions that OTL remained in NA could be deployed to Far East?

Click to expand...

This is by no means certain, or even probable. The British were quite overstretched and the axis was pouring in large numbers of reinforcements.

See
https://www.alternatehistory.com/Discussion/showthread.php?t=319491

Dobbie was GOC(Malaya) before the war, and instructed Percival (who was his Chief of Staff 36-7) to investigate how Japan might attack Singapore.

Percival identified that an invasion of Northern Malaya and an overland campaign was possible in the monsoon season and that the Malayan jungles were passable.

In May '38 Dobbie wrote to Lord Gort specifically highlighting this threat. If the CIGS decides to get exercised about this, then that is probably a sufficient POD almost on its own.

At that point, the Imperial approach to the war needs a revamp. With two and a half years to go, there is time to look at the training and equipment of the troops in the theatre, to construct fixed defences that will support a campaign in Malaya, rather than Lionel Bond's* strategy for a close-in defence of Singapore and Johore that occupied planning for most of that time.

There needs to be a serious look at the officer corps in the Far East, which seems to have been of really uneven quality - both firebrands and donkeys ended up there. Percival ought not to have been jumped up to GOC (Malaya) - he was made acting Lt. General without having a Corps-level command.

But in that 38-41 time period, with the luxury of the diversion of some early-war tanks, some USSR-bound Hurricanes and some 2-pdr AT guns with fresh ammunition (if the issues with storage in the Far East can be identified), the headstart on preparation should allow the troops in place, if they are better trained in the run-up to war, and better-led during it, to put on a much better show against Yamashita.

The AT guns and ammunition are not really a luxury, though - the quality of Japanese armour may be validly criticised, but lousy tanks are not so lousy when they have two hundred of them and you have none.

The thing is, in the inter war years, the UK is a superpower. Malaya is a vastly profitable colony and there is no valid incentive to giving it up. Only the USN is the equal of the RN - the IJN is not. It takes fighting Germany, Italy, and Japan and the capitulation of France to enable the Japanese success in the Far East.

*Dobbie's successor, and Percival's predecessor, as GOC(Malaya) 39-41

Yes, I was also under the impression that the quality of the troops (and especially the last minute additions) was a bit all over the place.

It is probably also true that the cupboard was bare, so whatever had to go to Singapore, would have to be shaved off from somewhere else. And that could only be ME.

Ivan

To hold Singapore, don't try to defend it while fighting a major land campaign in North Africa and sending convoys to the Soviet Union while trying to re-equip your own armed forces after a catastrophic evacuation and having just experienced a major invasion scare.

Removing one of those might be enough; I'd say that two would be sufficient. The problem is that after May 1940 I can't see how to change any of it. The Soviets must be supported immediately and reinforcements are better sent to the actual war in North Africa rather than the potential one in Malaya.

The only real way is to have cleared North Africa by summer 1941 at the latest. But that's really difficult with Benny crying out to Hitler for help. Maybe if we delay Compass a bit, let Italy stagger a bit deeper into Egypt and then accumulate the logistics, shipping and forces to rush all the way to Tripoli without getting stuck around Sirte long enough for a load of angry Germans to arrive in Tripoli?

Alternatively, just have Hitler send nothing to Africa (or Greece). After all, the Med is a sideshow, the war will be won and lost in Russia.

I've said it before and I'll say it again, the men and equipment sent to Singapore was sufficient to defend against the initial 3 division IJA offensive. The problem was the civilian and military leadership, they couldn't have held Yamashita even if they had their wish list of more men, hundreds more first rate planes and a fleet fulfilled.

King Augeas said:

To hold Singapore, don't try to defend it while fighting a major land campaign in North Africa and sending convoys to the Soviet Union while trying to re-equip your own armed forces after a catastrophic evacuation and having just experienced a major invasion scare.

Removing one of those might be enough; I'd say that two would be sufficient. The problem is that after May 1940 I can't see how to change any of it. The Soviets must be supported immediately and reinforcements are better sent to the actual war in North Africa rather than the potential one in Malaya.

The only real way is to have cleared North Africa by summer 1941 at the latest. But that's really difficult with Benny crying out to Hitler for help. Maybe if we delay Compass a bit, let Italy stagger a bit deeper into Egypt and then accumulate the logistics, shipping and forces to rush all the way to Tripoli without getting stuck around Sirte long enough for a load of angry Germans to arrive in Tripoli?

Alternatively, just have Hitler send nothing to Africa (or Greece). After all, the Med is a sideshow, the war will be won and lost in Russia.

Click to expand...

I'd say let the Soviets rot.

Riain said:

I've said it before and I'll say it again, the men and equipment sent to Singapore was sufficient to defend against the initial 3 division IJA offensive. The problem was the civilian and military leadership, they couldn't have held Yamashita even if they had their wish list of more men, hundreds more first rate planes and a fleet fulfilled.

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I would not quite go that far, however, they did have some right second raters "on the spot".

Percival- a not unintelligent, but lacklustre leader with no spark, no initiative, no vision, completely reactive, with no ability to inspire and little in the way of heart
Brooke-Popham- an incompetent past it that needed to be retired years before but somehow was not. His snores at meetings were his main contribution, seemingly
Phillips- another utter incompetent that never even bothered to obtain the air cover that had been offered for his ships.
Bennett- an egotistical fool

However, as has been stated before in this thread, a successful prosecution of the North African campaign, which was quite possible without a Greek commitment in 1941, would see at least another Australian Division in Malaya, more naval forces including most likely a carrier of two and much stronger air assets.

That being the case, even this motley collection of leaders likely could not have failed.

I think what they should've done is freed Singapore earlier, so they'd have the defense self-interest to do it themselves.

This' a failure of imperialism because they can only watch Europe by themselves.

ivanotter said:

All,

The disaster at Singapore was evidently started a bit earlier than 1942.

Bad leadership, bad ideas, bad .. nearly everything, but what was the alternative?

We probably need to go back to the early 30's (?).

UK to admit it cannot afford to be a super power
- Give Singapore away to the US?
- Let Japan do whatever they want
-> in essence: go home and leave Asia

Click to expand...

Why on earth would they do this in the richest port of one of the parts of the Empire that was turning a profit and didn't have much in the way of nationalism?

jkay said:

What they should've done is freed Singapore earlier, so they'd have the defense self-interest to do it themselves.

This' a failure of imperialism because they can only watch Europe by themselves.

Click to expand...

Eh? There was little nationalist movement in Singapore (and in Malaya as a whiole). Britains failure to defend Singapore created a generation of young intellectuals who realised that they couldn't depend on the Empire.

Once again why would they free a region which wasn't showing much resistance to British rule and which was turning a profit?

johnboy said:

I would not quite go that far, however, they did have some right second raters "on the spot".

Percival- a not unintelligent, but lacklustre leader with no spark, no initiative, no vision, completely reactive, with no ability to inspire and little in the way of heart
Brooke-Popham- an incompetent past it that needed to be retired years before but somehow was not. His snores at meetings were his main contribution, seemingly
Phillips- another utter incompetent that never even bothered to obtain the air cover that had been offered for his ships.
Bennett- an egotistical fool

However, as has been stated before in this thread, a successful prosecution of the North African campaign, which was quite possible without a Greek commitment in 1941, would see at least another Australian Division in Malaya, more naval forces including most likely a carrier of two and much stronger air assets.

That being the case, even this motley collection of leaders likely could not have failed.

Click to expand...

I often got the impression that Percival (who had suceeded at all other levels of command) had suffered what can only be described as a mental breakdown and his own staff should have replaced him as soon as this became apparent.

I alway wonder what might have happened if some of those Hurricanes and Valentines had been syphoned off from those sent to Russia.

Hmm a Type 95 vs a Valentine!

Yes they were needed in Russia but charity begins at home

And send some to Malta while they are about it



C Force should never have been sent to Hong Kong - indeed If I was in charge I would have withdrawn the entire Garrison to Malaya and declared Honk Kong an open city - It was never going to hold vs 50 Thousand + experianced Japanese Soldiers and it was folly to try - Imperial Honor be damned.

With C Force and the garrison withdrawn to Singapore that could have been 2 more Infantry Brigades in Malaya - with the Machine gun battalion and the Royal Artillery personel + other specialist withdrawn from HK you now have a good core for an Infantry Division - Particularly if the ship carrying the C-Forces heavy Equipment makes it to Singapore.

So it just needed someone with the courage to make that decision and already we are 2 Brigades of Infantry + Supporting arms + a couple of Hundred more tanks and Hurricanes above OTL

Now whats Dowding doing in 1941?

In essence: Not a lot of extra was really needed. It could be found.

If try the assumption that a bit is allocated from Russia, Hong Kong abandoned, Greece abandoned earlier but Egypt being held although more delaying action than actual offensive stuff.

That would free up a (per centage wise at least) considerable extra's.

Chuck out the pre-war management and put a real commander in charge (who? Alexander? Gort? Monty? Brooke? ...)

We could then have a realistic defence?

What havoc could this then mean to Japan? Singapore would not just be 'holding out' but actually do something real, I should think?

Ivan

The British Empire wasn't a spent ball pre-WWII - far from it.

The fall of Singapore IMHO however doomed the Empire - but it wasn't an inevitable defeat.

Much more the whole campaign culminating with the fall of Singapore appears like a shoestring of events preconditioning good Japanese luck and British bad luck/incompetence difficult to reproduce.

I understand why Churchill was shocked over the fall of Singapore (and blamed the Local commanders) but in many ways he himself was to blame. He had been so keen on not provoking Japan into war that it also meant intimidating Brooke-Popham into not reacting to the good intel. on Japanese preparations and movements to an invasion. A timely activation of Plan Matador (incl. an invasion of S. Thailand) would have had a good chance of at least slowing the Japanese movement down the peninsula.

After Matador wasn’t initiated in time Percival simply gave up and even refused to prepare Singapore itself for defence – in order not to worry the civilians! I wonder how he could stay in command from December to February, but apparently Churchill believed that everything was OK as long as he ordered Singapore to be held at all costs.

Even with the OTL resources I think Singapore would have had a fair chance if the local leadership had been just slightly more vigorous. An example could be the fortifications of Singapore (incl. 15 inch guns). It is a myth that the guns couldn’t fire inland, most could. But the local leadership hadn’t requisitioned HE shells, only AP for heavy naval targets! At Singapore the Japanese were at the end of their logistic chain, had no heavy artillery and very little ammo. Holding out just a couple of weeks more would have made a big difference, also because the reinforcements sent would have had a chance to organize (like entire 18th Division) and not go just about directly from the transports to the PoW camps.

Next comes of course the question about the extra resources needed to have a successful defence of Singapore be likely. Matador requested something like 500 modern fighters and 50 battalions and from memory that would require 250-300 extra modern fighters and 20-30 battalions, depending on how many of the ones in place you would consider ready for combat.

But anyway, considering that UK alone (excl. Empire) in 1941 produced more than the entire Axis combined it would not at all be a problem to equip such a force. The problem lay in Churchill’s priorities; he was extremely focused on “gaining the initiative” and saw especially the Mediterranean as the place to gain it. So in short realizing that Greece couldn’t be saved and/or being less ambitious in one of the OTL Western Dessert offensives that failed anyway (fighter sweeps over France were extremely costly too) would leave an abundance of not only materiel but also trained personnel.

All it would require would be Churchill being more under “strategic control” – having Brooke in the seat as CIGS before OTL would do miracles (he took over in OTL at 1st of December 1941), but the previous CIGS actually had suggested sending far more resources to Singapore. Churchill refused that – not even a light tank regiment - he wanted all focused on the Med. and believed a symbolic naval force in Singapore would deter the Japanese – it didn’t.

Fall of Singapore

Wikipedia, as of the date of this post, claims figures (presumably approximate) for the Battle of Singapore of 36,000 as the troop strength of the 25th Army, and 85,000 as the troop strength of Malaya Command.
And yet Malaya Command was the side which ended up surrendering...

GarethC said:

The thing is, in the inter war years, the UK is a superpower. Malaya is a vastly profitable colony and there is no valid incentive to giving it up. Only the USN is the equal of the RN - the IJN is not. It takes fighting Germany, Italy, and Japan and the capitulation of France to enable the Japanese success in the Far East.

Click to expand...

Actually, in a thread a few days ago, I was surprised to see Calbear argue that "At its peak the ONLY naval force that could match the IJN was the USN circa 1942 or later. This assumes the IJN pre-Coral Sea, with all six fleet carriers. The RN carrier force lacked the throw weight and defensive fighter strength to match up with the Kido Butai. " I don`t know all that much myself, but I am curious to hear more about the relative strengths of the RN and IJN circa 1941.

Look More Closely Later said:

Wikipedia, as of the date of this post, claims figures (presumably approximate) for the Battle of Singapore of 36,000 as the troop strength of the 25th Army, and 85,000 as the troop strength of Malaya Command.
And yet Malaya Command was the side which ended up surrendering...

Click to expand...

Is that ration strength? If so it presumably includes a number of non-combat personnel that would be next to useless in fighting the Japanese.

mcdo said:

Actually, in a thread a few days ago, I was surprised to see Calbear argue that "At its peak the ONLY naval force that could match the IJN was the USN circa 1942 or later. This assumes the IJN pre-Coral Sea, with all six fleet carriers. The RN carrier force lacked the throw weight and defensive fighter strength to match up with the Kido Butai. " I don`t know all that much myself, but I am curious to hear more about the relative strengths of the RN and IJN circa 1941.

Click to expand...

Well, the original quote refers to the interwar years, before Japan acquired modern carriers and their aircraft, and it's a fair comment based on Treaty tonnage at that point.

By January 1942, war losses and disruption to FAA aircraft supply makes Calbear's comment accurate.

Sufficient troops?

Shaby said:

Is that ration strength? If so it presumably includes a number of non-combat personnel that would be next to useless in fighting the Japanese.

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It's Wikipedia. Even allowing for inaccuracies and assuming non-combat personnel are included in the figure (and I would have thought that if Wikipedia overstates the Allied strength, it may well overstate the Japanese strength too) there were apparently thousands more Allied troops on Singapore Island, at the end, than there were Japanese.
And yet the Allies surrendered.

General Wavell (the ABDA commander) commented in a report to Churchill about the situation on Singapore Island (dated 11th February,1942):
'...I do not think that Percival has the number of troops at his disposal that you mention. I do not think that he has more than 60 to 70 thousand at the most. He should however have quite enough to deal with enemy who have landed if the troops can be made to act with sufficient vigour and determination... ' (The Second World War (Churchill), Volume 4, page 88. (1951 edition) )