WI Menzies said no?

Riain

Banned
Australian PM Robert Menzies attended the British War Cabinet meeting on 24 Feb 1941 where the Greek Campaign was discussed for some 45 minutes. Menzies said that the discussion would have only lasted 10 minutes if he had not asked numerous questions about air support, equipment, shipping and time. At the end it was decided to continue with the Greek campaign if the Australian Cabinet agreed to the use of Australian troops.

WI Menzies was not satisfied with the answers and deferred the decision or decided against sending Australian troops to Greece?
 

It's

Banned
Australian PM Robert Menzies attended the British War Cabinet meeting on 24 Feb 1941 where the Greek Campaign was discussed for some 45 minutes. Menzies said that the discussion would have only lasted 10 minutes if he had not asked numerous questions about air support, equipment, shipping and time. At the end it was decided to continue with the Greek campaign if the Australian Cabinet agreed to the use of Australian troops.

WI Menzies was not satisfied with the answers and deferred the decision or decided against sending Australian troops to Greece?

If he was the sort of PM who was this ultra tentative, or supported an "independent" (I.e. Anti-British, as it would have been then) foreign policy, he would not have been in like Flynn in September 1939. Earlier POD required with a Labor PM and party full of socialists who didn't mind hitler that much, at least while he was Stalin's best mate.
 
If they don't go to Greece there aren't any other troops immediately available to Wavell to send in their place. Therefore British Empire doesn't throw away 10,000 men and the equipment of 3 divisions.

Apart from try to take Tripoli (if possible logistically) that would give Wavell more men to invade Syria and put down the Arab revolt. They might be available for Battleaxe and Brevity (if they didn't take part in them anyway, I didn't check). Or perhaps one of the 3 divisions (2 Aus, 1 NZ) plus part of the armoured brigade could be sent to reinforce the garrison of Crete, but this time with its equipment.

And as this will hopefully avoid the need to re-equip them the replacement equipment could be used for something else. E.g. sending their anti-aircraft guns to Singapore.
 
Ordbat of Middle East Command Early 1941

This is an extract from the British official history of the war in the Middle East and Mediterranean, which is on the Hyperwar website.

Nevertheless the total defeat of the Italian 10th Army and 5th Air Squadra in the campaign which ended at Beda Fomm on 7th February 1941 and the loss of most of the armour and artillery which the enemy had in North Africa seemed to have removed any threat to Egypt by land for some time. Within a week of the surrender the Defence Committee in London decided that Cyrenaica was to be held as a secure flank for Egypt with the minimum forces that the Commanders-in-Chief considered necessary and that all available land forces were to be concentrated in Egypt preparatory to moving to Greece. This order was easier to give than to carry out.

Of the divisions at General Wavell's disposal for all purposes, the:
• 4th and 5th Indian Divisions were heavily engaged at Keren in Eritrea, and;
• the 1st South African and the two African Divisions were just beginning to attack Italian East Africa from the south.
• In Palestine there was the 1st Cavalry Division, still for the most part horsed for want of motor vehicles, and the 7th and 9th Australian Divisions, both short of equipment and both in need of further training.
• In Cyrenaica were the two seasoned divisions of the 13th Corps—7th Armoured and 6th Australian. The latter was fully equipped and had not had heavy casualties. The former had been continually in action for eight months and was mechanically exhausted and needed complete overhaul.
• Of the divisions in Egypt, the New Zealand Division was ready for war as a two-brigade division; its third brigade had not yet arrived from England. 6th (British) was a division in name only, having no artillery or other supporting arms, and was being trained for landing operations in the Dodecanese which, as the Chiefs of Staff had confirmed, were to be undertaken at the earliest possible moment. The Polish Brigade Group was not fully equipped. The 2nd Armoured Division had arrived from England early in January, but two of its regiments had come on ahead to fill gaps in the 7th Armoured Division, had fought with it in the recent campaign, and had shared its wear and tear. This left the 2nd Armoured Division's two armoured brigades with a total of only two cruiser and two light tank regiments. The cruiser tanks were in a particularly bad mechanical state, and their tracks were almost worn out. As an additional misfortune the divisional commander, Major-General J. C. Tilly, died suddenly; he was succeeded by Major-General M. D. Gambier-Parry, who had been in Greece and Crete, and who thus took over an unfamiliar and incomplete formation in most unfavourable circumstances.

The formations ready and available for use at reasonably short notice were therefore the three Australian Divisions, the New Zealand Division, most of the 2nd Armoured Division, and the Polish Brigade Group. In a few weeks time one at least of the Indian Divisions might be able to leave Eritrea; also if all went well the 1st South African Division could be withdrawn from East Africa, though it rested with the South African Government to say whether it could be used any farther north. The two African Divisions were not suitable for use in Egypt or Europe even if they could be spared from East Africa. As for 7th Armoured Division, it was very difficult to say when this could again be made into a fighting force.

In these circumstances General Wavell decided to make available for Greece one armoured brigade group, the 6th and 7th Australian Divisions, the New Zealand Division and the Polish Brigade Group, together with a large number of non-divisional troops, mostly British. Not all these would be able to go in the first flight. General Blarney advised that the 6th should be the first of the Australian divisions to go. This plan left available for Cyrenaica the 9th Australian Division and whatever remained of 2nd Armoured Division after one armoured brigade group had been fitted out to go to Greece. In view of the possibility that German troops would be sent to assist the Italians in North Africa it was obvious that a garrison of this size could not permanently secure the desert flank, but what information there was by the middle of February—and it was unquestionably meagre—led General Wavell to consider that there would be no serious threat to the British position in Cyrenaica before May at the earliest. By that time two more divisions and various non-divisional troops, notably artillery, might be available; the 9th Australian Division would be better trained, and the 2nd Armoured Division ought to be in a far better state to fight than it was at present. Evidence soon began to accumulate that this breathing space was likely to be greatly curtailed.
 

Riain

Banned
The British lied and mislead the Australians. When they told Blamey that he was to move his troops on the 18t of Feb they told him that Menzies had been informed, Blamey had his misgivings but assuming Menzies didn't object he didn't pass them on. When Menzies was informed of the intention to use Australian troops in Greece I believe he was told that Blamey knew and was not opposed to the idea.

If Menzies and Blamey had nutted this story out between them they may have smelled a rat and looked more closely into the situation with suspicious eyes. This might have been enough to delay the Australian deployment and limit it should it have gone ahead.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Reinforcing failure is never a good option, but there

Reinforcing failure is never a good option, but there were the larger questions of the Balkans generally; Romania, was, after all, about the only place in Europe where the Germans had unfettered access to an oil industry, and the possibility of a bombing campaign from Greece was a lot more likely in 1941 than one from Cyprus or Egypt.

Likewise, not sending anything to try and support the Greeks and Yugoslavs could easily be portrayed by Britain's enemies as leaving its allies to face Germany alone.

It's not an easy needle to thread.

Best,
 

Riain

Banned
I understand the strategic dilemma but I think it could have been handled differently.

Iotl the British set up a mobile naval base at souda bay in Crete and then sent troops to defend it which allowed the 5th Cretean division to deploy to the mainland. Perhaps this sort of thing could be expanded on, maybe a brigade to defend the RAF units on the mainland. Given that 2 divisions and an armoured brigade met the requirements perhaps a single division could be seen in the same way.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
True, but by definition, any troops, air power, and shipping

I understand the strategic dilemma but I think it could have been handled differently.

Iotl the British set up a mobile naval base at souda bay in Crete and then sent troops to defend it which allowed the 5th Cretean division to deploy to the mainland. Perhaps this sort of thing could be expanded on, maybe a brigade to defend the RAF units on the mainland. Given that 2 divisions and an armoured brigade met the requirements perhaps a single division could be seen in the same way.

True, but by definition, any troops, air power, and shipping deployed and sustained in Crete, for example - aside from the MNBDO, of course - are going to have to be drawn from the same forces that (as outlined above) were barely adequate for COMPASS and all the rest of the operations Wavell et al were trying to accomplish in the winter of 1940-41...

They could have just written off the Balkans in 1941, but there's also a question as to whether even if they had, they could have gotten from Cyrenaica into Tripolitania...

The British (and by extension, the Commonwealth/Empire/Allies) just didn't have that much they could deploy and sustain outside of (essentially) British territory for active operations in 1939-41.

In 1940, they managed a field army and (essentially) a tactical air force in France (not exactly an austere theater), a division+ equivalent in Norway, and an understrength corps in western Egypt (and Egypt was essentiallly British territory) and Libya; in 1941, they managed a corps in Greece (again, friendly territory), a field army in Egypt-Libya, and various division+/corps- sized expeditionary forces in East Africa, the Levant, and Iran.

They really didn't have an "expeditionary" army-air force worth the name until TORCH in the winter of 1942-43.

Best,
 

Errolwi

Monthly Donor
The British lied and mislead the Australians. When they told Blamey that he was to move his troops on the 18t of Feb they told him that Menzies had been informed, Blamey had his misgivings but assuming Menzies didn't object he didn't pass them on. When Menzies was informed of the intention to use Australian troops in Greece I believe he was told that Blamey knew and was not opposed to the idea.

If Menzies and Blamey had nutted this story out between them they may have smelled a rat and looked more closely into the situation with suspicious eyes. This might have been enough to delay the Australian deployment and limit it should it have gone ahead.

The same approach also worked with the New Zealanders. Freyberg (despite being on secondment from the British Army) was fully on board with the NZ Government needing to give approval for new areas of operations. Also, Freyberg would not allow the use of part of the Division (outside dire emergency), so sending it off as a 2 brigade division isn't going to fly.
 

Riain

Banned
Looking at the detail of British tank deliveries to the theatre and the deployment of the DAK I don't think that the British could hold the al agheila position in the short term. However I think gazala would be a practical position to maintain until the tiger convoy arrived to undertake battleaxe.

Either way losing a corps in Greece and failing to hold Crete was a disaster that I think could have been avoided.
 
Greece evacuation

Looking at the detail of British tank deliveries to the theatre and the deployment of the DAK I don't think that the British could hold the al agheila position in the short term. However I think gazala would be a practical position to maintain until the tiger convoy arrived to undertake battleaxe.

Either way losing a corps in Greece and failing to hold Crete was a disaster that I think could have been avoided.
Churchill claims about four fifths of the British/Allied troops sent to Greece were in the end evacuated:
...In all 50,662 were safely brought out, including men of the Royal Air Force and several thousand Cypriots, Palestinians, Greeks, and Yugoslavs. This figure represented about 80 per cent. of the forces originally sent into Greece. These results were only made possible by the determination and skill of the seamen of the Royal and Allied Merchant Navies, who never faltered under the enemy's most ruthless efforts to halt their work. From April 21 until the end of the evacuation twenty-six ships were lost by air attack. Twenty-one of these were Greek and included five hospital ships. The remainder were British and Dutch...
The Second World War, volume 3, page 206. (1950 edition)

How long those troops took to subsequently re-equip and reform (or were subsequently lost in Crete) is another matter...
(And those shipping losses were presumably highly painful.)

*****

On the decision to send troops into Greece in the first place, I get the impression that Churchill and company seem to have underestimated the German intentions to move troops to Tripolitania, not realised that the Germans were about to suppress Malta by heavy air-attack to prevent Malta from interfering with the shipping of said troops, and to have been thrown off-balance by Axis aircraft dropping mines in the Suez Canal, messing with allied logistics arrangements and movements by sea around the east end of the Mediterranean. Absent those impending factors, Greece as a gamble is easier to understand.
If they'd known these things were coming, possibly they'd have reached a different decision, at least with regard to any attempt to pile men and equipment into the Greek mainland. Or then again, maybe not...

Edit:
And as I understand it, when the British/Allied command decided to go into Greece, it looked to them like there might be a chance to form a front with Yugoslavia and Turkey...
 
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When I noticed this thread-title, I dared hope for a moment that the topic would be about Stewart Menzies. Oh well. Back to ze topic at hand. :p
 
Reinforcing failure is never a good option, but there were the larger questions of the Balkans generally; Romania, was, after all, about the only place in Europe where the Germans had unfettered access to an oil industry, and the possibility of a bombing campaign from Greece was a lot more likely in 1941 than one from Cyprus or Egypt.

Likewise, not sending anything to try and support the Greeks and Yugoslavs could easily be portrayed by Britain's enemies as leaving its allies to face Germany alone.

It's not an easy needle to thread.

Best,

Quite true, and focusing on the larger picture still, every Axis soldier and piece of hardware that can be diverted from Operation Barbarossa and pinned down in the Balkans is a plus on the Allied side of the column, even if that is more of a long-term thing. Because losing Greece or Yugoslavia is terrible, but losing the Soviet Union in 1941 might be terminal to the Allied cause. Mind you, that is hindsight speaking, so make of it what you will.
 
WI Menzies was not satisfied with the answers and deferred the decision or decided against sending Australian troops to Greece?

We know Churchill really, really wanted to back Greece so I'm thinking if Menzies said "nah", the Allies would've gone in anyway but with different forces, maybe at a different time. If the forces aren't as good as the Australian divisions, Greece goes worse for us.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Yep - it's really a Hobson's choice

Quite true, and focusing on the larger picture still, every Axis soldier and piece of hardware that can be diverted from Operation Barbarossa and pinned down in the Balkans is a plus on the Allied side of the column, even if that is more of a long-term thing. Because losing Greece or Yugoslavia is terrible, but losing the Soviet Union in 1941 might be terminal to the Allied cause. Mind you, that is hindsight speaking, so make of it what you will.


Abandon the Greeks, and the Axis gains real advantages, and the British may not be able to do anything in Libya anyway, given the logistic issues inherent in the desert campaigns.

Go in with a force worth the name, and the Germans can still reinforce with more ground and air forces than the British can dream of...

Best,
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Against the Italians, true...

But in early 1941, the Greeks are winning. So the British move was reinforcing success.

Against the Italians, true...

But if the British turn what was something of a Greco-Italian private war into something greater, the Germans will intervene to protect Romania, and the British could not match the forces the Germans could make available for the Balkans anywhere shy of Great Britain itself.

Best,
 

Riain

Banned
Churchill claims about four fifths of the British/Allied troops sent to Greece were in the end evacuated:
The Second World War, volume 3, page 206. (1950 edition)

How long those troops took to subsequently re-equip and reform (or were subsequently lost in Crete) is another matter...
(And those shipping losses were presumably highly painful.)

*****

On the decision to send troops into Greece in the first place, I get the impression that Churchill and company seem to have underestimated the German intentions to move troops to Tripolitania, not realised that the Germans were about to suppress Malta by heavy air-attack to prevent Malta from interfering with the shipping of said troops, and to have been thrown off-balance by Axis aircraft dropping mines in the Suez Canal, messing with allied logistics arrangements and movements by sea around the east end of the Mediterranean. Absent those impending factors, Greece as a gamble is easier to understand.
If they'd known these things were coming, possibly they'd have reached a different decision, at least with regard to any attempt to pile men and equipment into the Greek mainland. Or then again, maybe not...

Edit:
And as I understand it, when the British/Allied command decided to go into Greece, it looked to them like there might be a chance to form a front with Yugoslavia and Turkey...

The evacuation of troops from Greece and Crete was akin to that of Dunkirk, men were taken off but their equipment was lost, more so for Greece/Crete than Dunkirk. Some 14,000 troops were taken prisoner, that's about 1/5 of the total troops deployed to Greece and Crete between January and May 1941.

IIUC they knew that the DAK was deploying to Libya, I think they even knew the schedule more or less and knew that Rommel was told to stay on the defensive. Sonnenblume was a surprise to all concerned, even Rommel himself I imagine.
 
If the Australians don't want to go, might the reduced numbers mean a more conservative deployment, ie, to places like Crete and Rhodes?
 

Riain

Banned
If the Australians don't want to go, might the reduced numbers mean a more conservative deployment, ie, to places like Crete and Rhodes?

If Australia gets cold feet what would NZ do? They are the other division in the Corps.

Perhaps all that needs to happen is for Blamey to inform Menzies of his doubts about Greece soon after he is informed of Operation Lustre on Feb 18.
 
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