Asia, Singapore and ABDA

Apparently, Churchill had wanted a substantial US presence in Singapore.

It would have been defeating the purpose of "Germany First".

Poor ABDA was never going to fulfil its role anyway.

Wavell was disliked by Churchill and his command suffered.

MacArthur was .. well, MacArthur.

Now, let us imagine that US and UK find each other in the defense of Singapore (not sure where the UK ships would be coming from nor the US land troops).

Let us further imagine that the Asia strategy is now going to be a real one, and being implemented from 1940 and onwards (presumable after BoB and the invasion scare is over).

- Asia anchored on Pearl, Philippines, Singapore
- A substantial US naval fleet in Singapore (which units)
- A substantial UK naval presence (units?)
- A substantial US land forces presence (where would they come from)
- A Supreme commander of some substance (who?)
- Australian participation
- Indian Army presence?

I imagine the background being that US cannot leave Japan alone and that the US sentiment is towards the Pacific rather than another go at a European war. This is a bit speculative.

I also imagine that the build-up is through 1941

The ramifications are of course:

1) Will Japan be forced to do a 'PH' on Singapore?
2) Will Singapore be a real threat to any Japanese expansion?
3) Will any such strategy slow down the Japanese conquests?
4) China? will US still be paranoid about China?
5) will any such move thin out ABDA forces to the extent where nothing is really possible
6) How much of an impact will it have on Yamoto's plans?

Ivan

The big problem with Singapore is the Governor and the High Command of the Far East Command itself. Each of the 9 Malay states had a rajah who had to be consulted before any troop training could be conducted, and without a firm Governor to ensure freedom of the high command to train troops all the troops in the world aren't going to save Malay and Singapore. Brook-Popham was a good military Governor in Kenya in 1936-39 with the Italian threat, perhaps he should have been given the Governors job in Malaya in 1940 rather than Command of the Far East Command.

As for the large fleet, I think the Kido Butai would hunt down the largest fleet no matter where it was. And if a second fleet formed in Singapore they'd put a powerful task force together to fight it.

Singapore

I wrote a little doodle regarding the US sending a 'squadron' to Singapore, though I'm not sure how 'in character' those depicted were, so I put it on the writer's forum: Link (Writer's forum, thus site members only)
Self-promotion out of the way, my thought is that for the Allies to be able to do much with Singapore they will need to at least hold enough of Malaya to keep Singapore out of artillery range and to have sufficient fighters and/or anti-aircraft guns in the area to be able to keep down disruption from enemy aircraft in range. (Keep in mind that from the moment the Japanese take over French Indo-China, that gives the Japanese airfields in range to bomb Singapore.) And the more surrounding territory that gets lost (Sumatra, in particular) the more difficult that it's going to get for the allies to bring supplies in by sea or to conduct naval operations in/out of Singapore except under very heavy air-cover.
The opening post also makes no reference to the shoe-string that the UK was operating on, in terms of manpower and ability to deploy it from the UK in 1940 and 1941, after the Fall of France. The east end of the Mediterranean had several crises going on in mid-1941, some of them simultaneously, with the Greek campaign, the Libyan campaign, the Syrian campaign, and a pro-German revolt in Iraq. Any British troops sent to bolster Singapore in 1941 probably means less troops/tanks for at least one of these. (Planes for Singapore/Malaya might be less of a problem, if obtained and sent direct from the USA, although the UK would still have to get the pilots out there from the UK or establish facilities to train locals or Indians...)
Regarding specific points of the opening post, in my opinion:
1) Probably, yes, if there's any kind of naval force of any size there. A naval force (unless it can be contained by Japanese airpower in the vicinity) is a threat to Japanese attempts to obtain and ship oil. (I would assume, unless the majority of the Pacific Fleet has moved to Singapore pre-November 1941, that the Japanese Carrier Fleet would still go for Pearl Harbour ahead of Singapore.)
2) Allied naval forces operating out of Singapore potentially threaten Japan's oil supply. If Japan is at war with Britain, Singapore thus has to be contained or neutralised.
3) If Singapore is successfully operating significant naval forces against the Japanese it doesn't need to slow the conquests (apart from of Malaya/Singapore) down. Seizing every last oil well in the Dutch East Indies in a couple of months is not going to assist Japan one bit if they can't then move the oil off the islands back to where they need it.
4) No idea what you mean here. As far as I know the USA was *helping* at least one Chinese leader in the original timeline.
5) I don't understand what you mean here.
6) I'm not sure if you mean an allied build up in Singapore/Malaya in 1941 or Singapore not being captured. The Japanese had *spies* in Malaya/Singapore though; before December 7th/8th 1941, they would notice any but the most 'last minute' of arrivals in the area, in time to adapt their plans. If it looked like there were too many in the area for the originally planned forces to put-down, they might opt for an initial strategy of attempting containment on the ground, and control by air of any shipping movements, until other operations were complete and forces could be reassigned.

Finally, with regard to deployment of American forces before 7th/8th December 1941, President Roosevelt has to work against a background of possible resistance from Congress. I imagine that any ground forces being sent to Singapore would raise particularly loud questions of why they're being sent to protect a British colony, and not instead to somewhere like the Philippines (which is also closer to Japan). If naval forces were sent there'd be questions about whether, if war broke out, the Brits could be relied on to protect them properly, and wouldn't American ships be safer under American protection at Pearl? And whilst America is still at peace, it would be unquestionable that American forces would only answer to American commanders.
*****
PS
So a few thoughts there; not sure how coherent they are. If you do try to write anything keep in mind that that annoying thing the International Dateline runs through the Pacific, with Japan, the Philippines, and Singapore (etc, etc) on one side of it, and the mainland USA and Hawaii on the other...
PPS
Remember, once any war breaks out in the Pacific, the USA have to supply any forces that they have in Singapore; and things like ammunition, unless there are factories in, say, India or Australia, which can supply it, is going to be a very long and circuitous shipping route. (Fuel, is less of a problem whilst Burma holds, if secure shipping down the coast from Rangoon is possible, although that ideally needs holding Burma and as much of Malaya as possible.)
Edit:
Although obviously the USA was willing to insist on some considerable logistical effort to continue to support Chiang (or however-you-spell-him) in the original timeline.
PPPS
I recommend Astrodragon's (incomplete at the time of this post but nonetheless magnificent) 'The Whale Has Wings'; Singapore holds in that (due to earlier butterflies) so it might be of interest to you on some points.