No Kiev 1941 - Early Operation Typhoon

In August 1941 Hitler decided to take von Bocks two Panzer groups (Hoth and Guderian) away. Hoth was used to reinforce the assault on Leningrad. Guderian was used. following refitting and reinforcement to become the northern pincer of the Kiev encirclement.

Supposing instead that Hitler decides upon an early Operation Typhoon keeping Hoth and Guderian#s Panzer Groups with Army Group Centere. The mass of Red Army formations around Kiev will be screened while the main effort is placed on the drive to Moscow.

1 Can the Red Army defend effectively against an advance to Moscow itself?
2 Can the Germans effectively defend against the Red army grouping against Kiev which will likely mount a magor counter offensive at some sta\ge against that vulnerable German flank
3 With an Operation Typhoon mounted in early September can the Wehrmacht get to Mosco before the Mud Season (in OTL they got to within a few miles of the city even with the lousy ground conditions
4 If the Germans get to Moscow should they ncircle the city first or directly storm it/
5 Does Moscow become a Stalingrad style urban battle pulling in more and more German units
6 If the Battle of Moscow does become a Stalingrad style battle does this make the Soviet winter offensuive more effective?
7 If the Germns do take #Moscow how likely is it that Hitler wins the Russian war through Soviet collapse (eg a Gneral's coup agains Stalin?
 
1 Can the Red Army defend effectively against an advance to Moscow itself?
Probably, although I think you can write up a plausible scenario where they make big enough mistakes and lose

2 Can the Germans effectively defend against the Red army grouping against Kiev which will likely mount a magor counter offensive at some stage against that vulnerable German flank
Most likely. These had low mobility and were busy facing Army Group South.

3 With an Operation Typhoon mounted in early September can the Wehrmacht get to Moscow before the Mud Season (in OTL they got to within a few miles of the city even with the lousy ground conditions
Most people claim they couldn’t, that their logistics was not up to it. OTOH, they did supply Guderian's pincer from their railheads in Belarus over a similar distance.

4 If the Germans get to Moscow should they ncircle the city first or directly storm it/
IMO, anything other than a super quick victory leads to a sure loss for the Germans.

5 Does Moscow become a Stalingrad style urban battle pulling in more and more German units
Absent a Red Army collapse – almost certainly. Altough germany wouln't really have the time to transfer units from other Army Groups there; merely to focus more of AGC on that one specific point. A recipe for 100% assured disaster if you ask me

6 If the Battle of Moscow does become a Stalingrad style battle does this make the Soviet winter offensuive more effective?
Yes

7 If the Germns do take #Moscow how likely is it that Hitler wins the Russian war through Soviet collapse (eg a Gneral's coup agains Stalin?
No idea. Probably unlikely IMO
 
Probably, although I think you can write up a plausible scenario where they make big enough mistakes and lose


Most likely. These had low mobility and were busy facing Army Group South.


Most people claim they couldn’t, that their logistics was not up to it. OTOH, they did supply Guderian's pincer from their railheads in Belarus over a similar distance.


IMO, anything other than a super quick victory leads to a sure loss for the Germans.


Absent a Red Army collapse – almost certainly. Altough germany wouln't really have the time to transfer units from other Army Groups there; merely to focus more of AGC on that one specific point. A recipe for 100% assured disaster if you ask me


Yes


No idea. Probably unlikely IMO

According to Glantz' history of Smolensk there were strong Red Army forces massed on the road to Moscow although badly deficient in training. Panzergruppes Guderian and Hoth probaby could have reached Moscow. The Germans could probably have contained a Soviet counter offensive against their left flank at Yelnia IOTL.

Then however the Germans would have to encircle Moscow before they bog down in the mud season. In this case they likely have a difficult urban battle with over extended forces trying to hold long flanks and the encirclement of the city.

Or they attempt to storm the city with a frontal attack without encircling the city which lets the Sovies reinforce the garrisson.

Either way, unless the city falls quickly the Germans face weeks of urban combat with limited forces. Like Stalingrad the Panzer Divisions are likely drawn into the battle for Moscow itself.

Zhukov reinfrces as IOTL with the Siberian divisions and hits the Wehrmacht with a winter cunter offensive. Now the Wehrmacht is in as muvch trouble or more trouble than it was IOTL. Even if they hold on to Moscow or part of it German casualties over the winter battles will be horrendous.

If the Germans do manage to take and hold Moscow the Red Army should stiill be able to continue the war but at a disadvantage through losing a vital communications hub. Niether side is likely to be n a particularly good condition by Spring 1942. The Spring 1942 campaign might well center on Red Army attempts to retake Moscow. The Germans might hen choose between an offensive to take Leningrad or somthing very like Operation Blau.

The outcome may very well be determined by whether Stalin is overthrown ii a General's coup and whether a new regime is willing to continue the war or not. If however the Germans fail to take Moscow or are driven out the situation may not be too unlike the historical situation in the spring of 1942.
 

trajen777

Banned
I read a very good academic book - since lost - anyway they have a very good chapter on the drive to Moscow -- they compared the German soviet loss ration at (trying to remember) 10 -1 in tanks etc. For one of the only times in the war the Germans had a decisive numerical advantage vs USSR. He did a comparative distance to time ration and came up with not only the AGC drive to Kiev and back but also the comparative distances in other campaigns (Norway France) 1941 and 42 Russia and the comparative forces involved.

His conclusion was without the drive south (keiv) the distance and force comparisons were reasonable to assume that the Germans could have captured Moscow up to Tula. The results would have been a massive disruption of the Russian manf - centers of mobilization - and basically cutting off the Russian southern armies which would have had to withdraw east (not having the mobility, training , operational skill to interfere north).

I always though this was a logical conclusion to the battle
 

Deleted member 1487

I read a very good academic book - since lost - anyway they have a very good chapter on the drive to Moscow -- they compared the German soviet loss ration at (trying to remember) 10 -1 in tanks etc. For one of the only times in the war the Germans had a decisive numerical advantage vs USSR. He did a comparative distance to time ration and came up with not only the AGC drive to Kiev and back but also the comparative distances in other campaigns (Norway France) 1941 and 42 Russia and the comparative forces involved.

His conclusion was without the drive south (keiv) the distance and force comparisons were reasonable to assume that the Germans could have captured Moscow up to Tula. The results would have been a massive disruption of the Russian manf - centers of mobilization - and basically cutting off the Russian southern armies which would have had to withdraw east (not having the mobility, training , operational skill to interfere north).

I always though this was a logical conclusion to the battle

I think that was Stolfi's "German Panzers East" which has a lot of issues with its theory. Glantz makes the point that the diversion to Kalinin was a bigger factor in the failure to take Moscow, as the distance from the jump of points in October were as far to that city as Moscow and had 3rd Panzer Group instead gone straight to Moscow than trying to flank it from the North they could have pushed into it and potentially caused a lot of issues for the Soviets. But he says leaving Kiev unresolved would have been a disaster in the long term, as they could then launch counteroffensives at AG-Center's flank over the winter and potentially caused a total collapse of the center. He thinks that the Kiev campaign was totally worth it, because the Germans couldn't really move against Moscow until mid/late September anyway due to logistics issues, so Kiev did nothing in terms of delaying Moscow other than weakening 2nd Panzer Group and having it start further south than otherwise.
 
Glantz recently wrote a book series about this issue and he argues that germans couldn't do it. After Smolensk was captured German forces were pretty much blown and required significant operational pause. Infantry was lacking, tanks were worn & torn, supplies were in short supply.... and there were significant Soviet forces in front of them. While they were insufficiently trained they were there and had to be dealt with. These forces then impalled themselves on german defences which weakened them enough so Gemrans bagged them when Typhoon started to blow.

In other words, Germans were in no condition to advance on Moscow at that point and if they pushed on anyway despite weakened state they'd face strong forces in front of them and to their flank (Southwestern Front)
 
The most likely outcome Army Group Center lurches forward another hundred kilometers before its already strained supply chain cracks and then gets bogs down in attritional battles that chews up the panzers (like OTL). Without their support, Army Group South stalls on its Dnepr bridgeheads. Army Group North likewise bogs down earlier without the additional forces from AGC. The Soviets use the time to not only reorient their forces, but also exploit the additional industry and manpower that they lost IOTL to the larger German advance. Neither the Kiev nor the Vyazma-Bryansk encirclement occur, meaning the Soviets have an additional 1.5-2 million men and their equipment to begin with in ten+ armies, and the Germans have a even more greatly extended front to cover. This is a recipe for the winter to be a tide-turning defeat for the Germans (like what happened at Stalingrad a year later OTL), as opposed to the mauling setback they recieved IOTL.

That accelerates the Soviet recovery (and, by extension, when Berlin falls) by a 1 to 1-and-a-half years.
 
Glantz recently wrote a book series about this issue and he argues that germans couldn't do it. After Smolensk was captured German forces were pretty much blown and required significant operational pause. Infantry was lacking, tanks were worn & torn, supplies were in short supply.... and there were significant Soviet forces in front of them. While they were insufficiently trained they were there and had to be dealt with. These forces then impalled themselves on german defences which weakened them enough so Gemrans bagged them when Typhoon started to blow.

In other words, Germans were in no condition to advance on Moscow at that point and if they pushed on anyway despite weakened state they'd face strong forces in front of them and to their flank (Southwestern Front)

Barbarossa Derailed. Guderian's Panzergruppe certainly needed replacements and refitting before Kiev and would still have required the same had a decision beemn made o go to Moscow. As Glantz shows the Red Army was certainly capable of counter offensives as shown by the operations durring the Battle of Smolensk. In principle an Operation Typhon launchd in early/mid September probably could have reached Moscow and fought their way in. Taking the place was another matter. Lacking infantry divisions in sufficient quantities the Panzer Divisions would have had to be committed to urban warfare as they would be at Stalingrad in 1942. And that long left flank would be vulnerable to Soviet counter offensive. If Japan does not attack in the Far East Zhukov brings up the thirty or so tough and full strength Siberian divisions for his historical winter offensive...

In this case the outcome of the Battle of Moscow could concevably be worse for the Germans. Moscow however ends up looking like Stalingrad and in need of very extensiv re-building
 
In principle an Operation Typhon launchd in early/mid September probably could have reached Moscow and fought their way in.

Actually, Glantz points out that reaching Moscow is not the most likely outcome for the Germans and goes on to describe if they did as a "for the sake of argument" sort of thing. Far more likely is that the advance, along with their supply lines, breaks down on Soviet defenses further west.

Zhukov brings up the thirty or so tough and full strength Siberian divisions for his historical winter offensive...
A lot more then just that. The Soviets can also bring in the armies that OTL were used to replace the Southwestern Front and which were lost at Vyazma-Bryansk, along with some forces from the Southwestern Front itself.
 
Barbarossa Derailed.

that's the one. It caused last (two) books in Stalingrad series to get delayed but that's neither here nor now

Guderian's Panzergruppe certainly needed replacements and refitting before Kiev and would still have required the same had a decision beemn made o go to Moscow. As Glantz shows the Red Army was certainly capable of counter offensives as shown by the operations durring the Battle of Smolensk. In principle an Operation Typhon launchd in early/mid September probably could have reached Moscow and fought their way in. Taking the place was another matter. Lacking infantry divisions in sufficient quantities the Panzer Divisions would have had to be committed to urban warfare as they would be at Stalingrad in 1942. And that long left flank would be vulnerable to Soviet counter offensive. If Japan does not attack in the Far East Zhukov brings up the thirty or so tough and full strength Siberian divisions for his historical winter offensive...

In this case the outcome of the Battle of Moscow could concevably be worse for the Germans. Moscow however ends up looking like Stalingrad and in need of very extensiv re-building

I don't think so. If Germans advance earlier they do so under unfavourable conditions. they might create another bag but without sufficient infantry to hold it properly significant numbers of soviets eascape and reform further east.

My guess would be Germans stall about half way to Moscow when their forces get attritioned beyond recovery and face increasing resistence up front and increasing pressure on the flanks.

More like Zitadelle only on larger geographical scale.
 
The most likely outcome Army Group Center lurches forward another hundred kilometers before its already strained supply chain cracks and then gets bogs down in attritional battles that chews up the panzers (like OTL). Without their support, Army Group South stalls on its Dnepr bridgeheads. Army Group North likewise bogs down earlier without the additional forces from AGC. The Soviets use the time to not only reorient their forces, but also exploit the additional industry and manpower that they lost IOTL to the larger German advance. Neither the Kiev nor the Vyazma-Bryansk encirclement occur, meaning the Soviets have an additional 1.5-2 million men and their equipment to begin with in ten+ armies, and the Germans have a even more greatly extended front to cover. This is a recipe for the winter to be a tide-turning defeat for the Germans (like what happened at Stalingrad a year later OTL), as opposed to the mauling setback they recieved IOTL.

That accelerates the Soviet recovery (and, by extension, when Berlin falls) by a 1 to 1-and-a-half years.

Viazma-Bryansk or somehing like it probaby still occurs in an early Typhoon. The Kiev encirclement des not and that long flank becomes increasingly vulnerable as the Wehrmacht strips forces from somewhere for the meagrinder in Moscow. As was the case in 1942 the Red Army would have been mounting counter offensives alon the front. Meanwhile Army Groups North and South bog down which leaves Army Group Centre in a potentially vulnerable salient

At the very least this Battle of Moscow will be at least as bad a defeat as he historical one. If anything it could be worse if Hitler insists on trying to hold whatever parts of the city are taken. If the Panzer Divisions are sucked into the urban battle as they would be at Stalingrad the Wehrmact will be somewhat short of mobile reserves to oppose the Soviet winter offensive.
 
Viazma-Bryansk or somehing like it probaby still occurs in an early Typhoon.

To start with, without the Kiev Operation the jump-off for the southern pincer simply does not exist. Beyond that, the Germans are attacking into stronger forces then they would have faced in October and with a much more fragile supply line then they had in October (as the rail-heads in late-August/early-September are still back around Minsk) that they are moving away from instead of laterally across. This translates into a much slower and costlier advance, giving the Soviet forces plenty of time to pull back from one defense line to another as well as organize counterattacks against the German spearheads. That is not a recipe for successful mass encirclement.

PS: Does the multi-quote function not work for you?
 
Actually, Glantz points out that reaching Moscow is not the most likely outcome for the Germans and goes on to describe if they did as a "for the sake of argument" sort of thing. Far more likely is that the advance, along with their supply lines, breaks down on Soviet defenses further west.

A lot more then just that. The Soviets can also bring in the armies that OTL were used to replace the Southwestern Front and which were lost at Vyazma-Bryansk, along with some forces from the Southwestern Front itself.

I disagree with you there. The Wehrmact nearly gnt to Moscow in OTL Operation Typhoon. The question is. if they had got into the city at the end of September/early October, whether they culd have taken the place quickly or whether it would have become a Stalingrad like urban meatgrinder. I don't see Stalin giving up Moscow without fight. Th place is simply too important for strategic and symbolic reasons which is why Moscow turns into something like Stalingrad if tghe Germans do get there.
 
To start with, without the Kiev Operation the jump-off for the southern pincer simply does not exist. Beyond that, the Germans are attacking into stronger forces then they would have faced in October and with a much more fragile supply line then they had in October (as the rail-heads in late-August/early-September are still back around Minsk). This translates into a much slower and costlier advance, giving the Soviet forces plenty of time to pull back from one defense line to another as well as organize counterattacks against the German spearheads. That is not a recipe for successful mass encirclements.

That's why I said "something like it" The place names would be different of course.
 
That's why I said "something like it" The place names would be different of course.

Not just the place names but also the results. We're probably talking more like "tens of thousands, if any" ITTL instead of "almost a million" like OTL along with a much shallower culmination point.

I disagree with you there.

So you also disagree with Glantz then? Because he makes it pretty clear in the book that is the most likely outcome.

The Wehrmact nearly gnt to Moscow in OTL Operation Typhoon.

Against weaker opposition, a better supply network, and a half-months R&R. None of which apply ITTL.

To illustrate what I am talking about in regards to the railroads: In late-August/early-September, the German railheads were back around Minsk. Distance from Minsk to Lokhvitsa (where the Guderian linked up with AGC) is nearly 350 kilometers, which while somewhat beyond the outer-edge is still manageable for truck-based supply on a temporary basis (like the Kiev turn was conducted under). Then AGC's panzers were able benefit from AGS's supply depots at Cherkasy (which is less then 150 kilometers from Lokhvitsa, well within the capability for reliable truck-based supply) before returning to Smolensk to rest and refit in preparation for the advance on Moscow while the rail-head was extended to Smolensk itself. The resistance for AGC on that axis was also much weaker then it would be on the Moscow axis, both in August/September and in October, as the Soviets were only just starting to redeploy armies to cover the Southwestern Front's right flank. The resulting lack of much combat action also reduced both the wear-and-tear on German equipment and the supply consumption.

Minsk to Moscow, on the other hand, is in excess of 675 kilometers while Minsk to Vyazma is nearly 460 kilometers. At those distances, truck-based supply lines simply collapse.
 
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1 Can the Red Army defend effectively against an advance to Moscow itself?

At that point no. The extra time the diversion to Kiev took gave the USSR more time to prepare for an invasion of Moscow. The armies that did stand in the way in the OTL still got destroyed but some inflicted enough casualties that many German units were combat ineffective afterwards.

Can the Germans effectively defend against the Red army grouping against Kiev which will likely mount a magor counter offensive at some sta\ge against that vulnerable German flank

Yes, these groups were not very well mechanized and even without the encirlclement, the Russian railway system would've been overburdened with both Moscow and Kiev as a priority. Stalin would've undoubtedly focused on keeping Moscow supplied at the cost of Kiev. The distances are so great in this scenario that the German could've easily let any such counterattack proceed for even 100 km and still been ok. The russians would've undoubtedly been exhausted by that point and been easily destroyed.

War is logistics and until the Soviet army was adequately supplied with all-terrain studebakers from the US, they could simply not attempt the kind of aggressive attack we saw later in the war and that was the level of logistics required for the Kiev pocket to be a viable offensive force.

With an Operation Typhoon mounted in early September can the Wehrmacht get to Mosco before the Mud Season (in OTL they got to within a few miles of the city even with the lousy ground conditions

Maybe. Weather worked against the Germans in two phase. First there was the mud season which slowed their advance. After which the ground froze and they were able to make substantial gains again. After that there was the terrible freezing which really destroyed the Germans. Their tanks wouldn't run and their guns wouldn't fire. This weather completely destroyed any advantage the Germans had in training, mobility, and organization.

It was at this point they took their first massive casualties of the war: around 750k Germans were casualties when the Soviets launched their winter counteroffensive in the OTL. I think it was actually at this point and not Stalingrad that the war was lost for the Germans. And it was at this point, that Hitler was clearly and obviously proven to be an incompetent and cruel man. When he hard about the weather at the front he went on some stupid story about how he was easily able to deal with cold weather as a kid. This was at a time where men who had lost limbs to frostbite were returning from the front. He acted as if it were simply a matter of willpower.

4 If the Germans get to Moscow should they ncircle the city first or directly storm it/

They should encircle and storm it. They would take casualties but if they were able to cut off the city, the entire soviet front would be paralyzed. Moscow was the central railway hub for the entire Soviet union and cutting it off would've rendered logistics almost impossible for the lines as they stood at the end of 1941. All soviet fronts would've had to retreat many km if Moscow had been taken.

5 Does Moscow become a Stalingrad style urban battle pulling in more and more German units

It is hard to say if casualties would've been at Stalingrad levels. Soviet morale was at an all-time low at that point and Moscow would've been poorly supplied and equipped if the Germans had moved faster. You can cut Moscow completely off with Panzer encirclement whereas Stalingrad was split by the Volga and so the Russians were always able to supply from their base across the river. At any rate, the casualties to take Moscow would've been worth it given Moscow's strategic importance. It had about 15% of the industrial capacity of the USSR and was THE central railway hub for the entire Soviet Union. Losing it would've made logistics extremely difficult for the Soviet army.

If the Battle of Moscow does become a Stalingrad style battle does this make the Soviet winter offensuive more effective?

The Soviet Winter effective was largely possible because the 18 or so Siberian Divisions were moved by Rail and deployed right to the front at Moscow itself. Without Moscow as a hub, they would've had to been deployed several hundred km inward which would've made the winter offensive much harder if not impossible.

7 If the Germns do take #Moscow how likely is it that Hitler wins the Russian war through Soviet collapse (eg a Gneral's coup agains Stalin?

It is hard to say. Stalin had purged the military so brutally that even during the darkest days of the war in the OTL his position was largely secure. And even if the Germans had taken Moscow, they would've done it with little time and men to spare. Both sides would've been severely outside the reach of their supplies at that point if Moscow's railway lines had been cut. The German supply position was terrible but so would the Russian supply position at that point. I think there's a serious chance that the Soviet winter offensive might've been effective at pushing the Germans out of Moscow anyways.

The most important turning point after the fall of moscow was whether Leningrad would've fallen. If the Germans were able to capture it (it would not have had moscow to help supply it), then they could use the railway line to supply their moscow garrison. It would've made the supply situation much more tenable for the Germans. Leningrad was also responsible for about 15% of the industrial capacity of the USSR as well. In the OTL, the Germans had taken about 40-50% of USSR industrial capacity and population at their peak gains. The twin blows of Leningrad and Moscow fallen would've put the Soviets in a terrible place.


The fundamental problems with Operation Barbarossa was that Hitler was an idiot that didn't understand military strategy at all and secondly the logistics/production of the German economy. The Germans really had no plans to adequately supply or provision their troops should they capture their objectives anyways. The rail lines did not extend far enough and the railway gauge of the Soviet Union was completely different from the Germans. Not only that, they had not stockpiled enough oil for a long campaign and even more arrogantly, they had actually decreased arms production during the fall because they expected the Soviet Union to fall. They didn't even produce enough tanks to replace the 25% or so tanks the Germans lost to simple wear and tear during their early massive victories.

So even with a victory at Moscow, so much else has to go right for them that it is unlikely that it changes the final outcome, though the war might've lasted a year or so longer on the eastern front and the iron curtain would've been farther to the east if they had been successful at Moscow.
 

Faeelin

Banned
War is logistics and until the Soviet army was adequately supplied with all-terrain studebakers from the US, they could simply not attempt the kind of aggressive attack we saw later in the war and that was the level of logistics required for the Kiev pocket to be a viable offensive force.

Didn't the Russians launch a major (and successful) counteroffensive in the winter of 1941?
 
Didn't the Russians launch a major (and successful) counteroffensive in the winter of 1941?

They did. They also launched major offensives in Spring 1942 that was adequately supplied (but failed) and in the winter of 1942 (that succeeded wildly), all before they were receiving very much in the way of lend-lease supplies. Diogenes is obviously not familiar with recent scholarship on the issue of a "early push to Moscow" given his reiteration of several long dispelled myths.

Wouldn't their armour and their logistics train, biological or mechanical, get just as stuck in the mud?

The Soviets? Well, only if their idiotic enough to launch their counter-offensive before the Raputitsa has passed...
 
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