Welcome Back, Lenin! - An Alternate 1996 Presidential Election
"[A]ll too often the beliefs of the "born again" Russian Marxist-Leninists were disregarded by Western observers of contemporary Russian developments. If it was commonly thought before perestroika that the Soviet order could never really change, it was just as frequently assumed after 1991 that communism in Russia was somehow dead and gone forever."
- Russia's Communists at the Crossroads
Having cast his vote, President Yeltsin had a few drinks and went to bed. The next morning, an aide woke him up. "Mr. President, I have good news and bad news," says the aid. "What's the bad news?" asks Yeltsin, his hands shaking. "Zyuganov got 55 percent of the popular vote." "Oh God, no! Well, what's the good news?" "You got 65 percent."
- Russian joke from before the first round of voting in 1996.
The CPRF
The difficulties which faced the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in its formative years were numerous, but so too were its advantages.
The CPRF was temporarily banned by Yeltsin in 1993, and its papers were shut down, preventing it from effectively competing in the elections to the Duma on December 12. It was constantly attacked with visions of the worst of the Soviet past by Yeltsin's 1996 Presidential campaign; a past which it had to hold onto, as those nostalgic for it were the party's base. It was divided between what would be most easily described as Gorbachevists, Zyuganovists and Leninists, each of which was a vastly different tendency. Outside the party, there were numerous anti-parliamentary Communists constantly attacking it for social-democratic deviations.
On the other hand, the CPRF was fortunate to have suddenly purged itself of its "careerist" elements; anyone who was in the CPSU for personal advancement would not join a fledgling opposition party. It was capable of appealing not just to the left-wing of Russian politics, but also to the right: for nationalists and traditionalists, what was more nationalistic or traditionalistic than the party of Stalin? It could call upon a history which not everyone - and certainly not everyone who wouldn't vote for Yeltsin - looked back on poorly.
The CPRF Program, adopted at its Third Congress in January 1995, showed heavy influence of the Leninists. It did not mention political pluralism or a mixed economy, as some drafts had, but rather mentioned the end of the exploitation of man by man, a classless society, and scientific planning and management. On the other hand, the party's Presidium contained relatively few Leninists, and its Secretariat contained only one (of five members). The party had also come under fire from the ultraleftists outside (and for that matter inside) the party for its social-democratic tendencies, so the platform is most likely both a concession to the weak Leninists within and an attempt to prevent criticism from the left.
Zyuganov
Zyuganov represents, naturally, the Zyuganovist tendency within the CPRF. It would perhaps be best described as social democratic and nationalistic. The exact degree to which Zyuganov is and is not a social democrat can be debated, but he has put forward a firmly peaceful and legal policy for the advancement of the CPRF, and pushed for a mixed economy rather than a centrally planned one. Comparisons can (and have) been made to the strategic policies of communists during and immediately after WW2. In 1996, he pursued a political campaign that united a broad spectrum of progressive forces in Russia, from the center-left to the ultraleft.
Zyuganov is also quite anti-Presidency; when he attempted alongside other anti-Yeltsin forces to form a coalition, he stated that the Presidency should be abolished altogether. Later this lightened to simply bringing it under the control of the legislative branch. This could perhaps be attributed to his experiences during the October 1993 showdown between the legislative and executive forces which ultimately resulted in the victory of Yeltsin.
Elections in Post-Soviet Russia by Gregory Lynch (published 2001)
...however, most historians now feel that the greatest mistake of the new oligarchs in Russia was with respect to the events leading up to the 1996 Presidential election. While there were numerous opposition candidates, among them Alexander Lebed and Grigory Yavlinsky, the political campaign of Boris Yeltsin was capable of convincing the oligarchs to support him, even in ways which were illegal. This mistake was mirrored by the United States, which pushed through a $10.2 billion dollar IMF loan that helped Yeltsin's campaign.
Of course, the fact that Yeltsin was the wrong choice should have been obvious, even then. He lacked significant support, getting single digit numbers in the polls at the beginning of 1996. He was responsible for huge losses to the day-to-day lives of people at every level of Russian society - workers, soldiers, and state employees in particular. Unemployment skyrocketed, the elderly lost their savings due to hyperinflation, and the state could not pay its employees. While it is possible that Yeltsin could have won the campaign, the sheer amount of aid that the United States and the new oligarchs in Russia gave to Yeltsin would have been far better given to Lebed or Yavlinsky. Their reasons for siding with Yeltsin appear to have been simple blindness, cultivated by Yeltsin himself, to the fact that there were other viable non-Communist candidates.
In the end, they bet on the wrong horse. Yeltsin suffered a heart attack on June 27, and was quickly rushed to the hospital. This was directly between the first and second rounds of voting, and demoralized his supporters when the news was leaked. Although the source of the leak was never discovered, the administration of Zyuganov soon called the investigation off, leading some to believe that a member of his party had somehow discovered it and informed the press. In the end, it is all conjecture; what is important is that between the first and second round, one of the candidates suffered a serious loss in apparent ability to govern, and as a consequence was rendered political dead weight.
As a consequence of this, Gennady Zyuganov eventually beat Yeltsin in the run-off 51-37, a vote total which most likely should have been higher for Zyuganov, but was artificially decreased due to fraud, particularly in the ethnic republics [Author's Note: See Alexander Peterson and Jason Stockholm's study titled Voter Fraud in the 1996 Russian Presidential Election for more information]. Nearly 12 percent of the public voted for no one, implying very real dissatisfaction at the process which took place, wherein there was (in many's eyes) only one "real" candidate...
"[A]ll too often the beliefs of the "born again" Russian Marxist-Leninists were disregarded by Western observers of contemporary Russian developments. If it was commonly thought before perestroika that the Soviet order could never really change, it was just as frequently assumed after 1991 that communism in Russia was somehow dead and gone forever."
- Russia's Communists at the Crossroads
Having cast his vote, President Yeltsin had a few drinks and went to bed. The next morning, an aide woke him up. "Mr. President, I have good news and bad news," says the aid. "What's the bad news?" asks Yeltsin, his hands shaking. "Zyuganov got 55 percent of the popular vote." "Oh God, no! Well, what's the good news?" "You got 65 percent."
- Russian joke from before the first round of voting in 1996.
The CPRF
The difficulties which faced the Communist Party of the Russian Federation in its formative years were numerous, but so too were its advantages.
The CPRF was temporarily banned by Yeltsin in 1993, and its papers were shut down, preventing it from effectively competing in the elections to the Duma on December 12. It was constantly attacked with visions of the worst of the Soviet past by Yeltsin's 1996 Presidential campaign; a past which it had to hold onto, as those nostalgic for it were the party's base. It was divided between what would be most easily described as Gorbachevists, Zyuganovists and Leninists, each of which was a vastly different tendency. Outside the party, there were numerous anti-parliamentary Communists constantly attacking it for social-democratic deviations.
On the other hand, the CPRF was fortunate to have suddenly purged itself of its "careerist" elements; anyone who was in the CPSU for personal advancement would not join a fledgling opposition party. It was capable of appealing not just to the left-wing of Russian politics, but also to the right: for nationalists and traditionalists, what was more nationalistic or traditionalistic than the party of Stalin? It could call upon a history which not everyone - and certainly not everyone who wouldn't vote for Yeltsin - looked back on poorly.
The CPRF Program, adopted at its Third Congress in January 1995, showed heavy influence of the Leninists. It did not mention political pluralism or a mixed economy, as some drafts had, but rather mentioned the end of the exploitation of man by man, a classless society, and scientific planning and management. On the other hand, the party's Presidium contained relatively few Leninists, and its Secretariat contained only one (of five members). The party had also come under fire from the ultraleftists outside (and for that matter inside) the party for its social-democratic tendencies, so the platform is most likely both a concession to the weak Leninists within and an attempt to prevent criticism from the left.
Zyuganov
Zyuganov represents, naturally, the Zyuganovist tendency within the CPRF. It would perhaps be best described as social democratic and nationalistic. The exact degree to which Zyuganov is and is not a social democrat can be debated, but he has put forward a firmly peaceful and legal policy for the advancement of the CPRF, and pushed for a mixed economy rather than a centrally planned one. Comparisons can (and have) been made to the strategic policies of communists during and immediately after WW2. In 1996, he pursued a political campaign that united a broad spectrum of progressive forces in Russia, from the center-left to the ultraleft.
Zyuganov is also quite anti-Presidency; when he attempted alongside other anti-Yeltsin forces to form a coalition, he stated that the Presidency should be abolished altogether. Later this lightened to simply bringing it under the control of the legislative branch. This could perhaps be attributed to his experiences during the October 1993 showdown between the legislative and executive forces which ultimately resulted in the victory of Yeltsin.
Elections in Post-Soviet Russia by Gregory Lynch (published 2001)
...however, most historians now feel that the greatest mistake of the new oligarchs in Russia was with respect to the events leading up to the 1996 Presidential election. While there were numerous opposition candidates, among them Alexander Lebed and Grigory Yavlinsky, the political campaign of Boris Yeltsin was capable of convincing the oligarchs to support him, even in ways which were illegal. This mistake was mirrored by the United States, which pushed through a $10.2 billion dollar IMF loan that helped Yeltsin's campaign.
Of course, the fact that Yeltsin was the wrong choice should have been obvious, even then. He lacked significant support, getting single digit numbers in the polls at the beginning of 1996. He was responsible for huge losses to the day-to-day lives of people at every level of Russian society - workers, soldiers, and state employees in particular. Unemployment skyrocketed, the elderly lost their savings due to hyperinflation, and the state could not pay its employees. While it is possible that Yeltsin could have won the campaign, the sheer amount of aid that the United States and the new oligarchs in Russia gave to Yeltsin would have been far better given to Lebed or Yavlinsky. Their reasons for siding with Yeltsin appear to have been simple blindness, cultivated by Yeltsin himself, to the fact that there were other viable non-Communist candidates.
In the end, they bet on the wrong horse. Yeltsin suffered a heart attack on June 27, and was quickly rushed to the hospital. This was directly between the first and second rounds of voting, and demoralized his supporters when the news was leaked. Although the source of the leak was never discovered, the administration of Zyuganov soon called the investigation off, leading some to believe that a member of his party had somehow discovered it and informed the press. In the end, it is all conjecture; what is important is that between the first and second round, one of the candidates suffered a serious loss in apparent ability to govern, and as a consequence was rendered political dead weight.
As a consequence of this, Gennady Zyuganov eventually beat Yeltsin in the run-off 51-37, a vote total which most likely should have been higher for Zyuganov, but was artificially decreased due to fraud, particularly in the ethnic republics [Author's Note: See Alexander Peterson and Jason Stockholm's study titled Voter Fraud in the 1996 Russian Presidential Election for more information]. Nearly 12 percent of the public voted for no one, implying very real dissatisfaction at the process which took place, wherein there was (in many's eyes) only one "real" candidate...
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