What if IJN codes changed on May 1st, 1942

Looking at the Pacific war of 1942 (especially Midway- again!) from another angle. Historically the fact the US were reading the JN-25 code allowed them to build an accurate image of the japanese intentions, timeframe and forces allocated, and set up an ambush accordingly.

OTL the japanese were planning to change the aforementioned codes, initially slated for April 1st, then postponed to May 1st and finally to May 27th (when it was far too late).

Of course, that is not to say that being locked from reading the JN25 code for a while will mean the US are totally blind, they could derive intelligence from other means. Looking at the map it would be clear that the japanese will further advance into South Pacific (and indeed the USN leadership was fully expecting that), as well as Central (Midway-Hawaii) and Northern areas as well. But without the critical intelligence they obtained OTL, they will need to be on guard in all areas at once (especially South and Central).

So if they don't have the ability to descipher and confirm in time the critical details of japanese plans and intentions in May, how would things have turned out? Would they reinforce Midway as quickly and a much as OTL? Would they still keep TF16 in the South Pacific (and have it actually attack the Ocean-Nauru invasion force rather than feinting and letting themselves be seen then rush for Hawaii) until too late to be available for the Midway defence, and even perhaps King will have his way to get some of the carriers, especially damaged ones (like Yorktown) to commit their aircraft to land bases in the South Pacific? Would the japanese plan unfold exactly as planned with perhaps Yorktown and Saratoga rushing to help Midway on the 6th or 7th only to fall into Yamamoto's trap? Or perhaps they are held in hawaiian waters and let the Midway garrison on it's own? Would the garrison be weaker than OTL, thus making a japanese invasion virtually certain to succeed?

It would be most interesting to see what would be a realistic appraisal of how things would have turned out in this scenario.
 
Chatted with some people who gamed this out a few times. Results were all over the place.

This butterflies way the water distillation trick that confirmed Midway as the June target. That means Redmonds analysis is used, that the next IJN attack will be a continuation in the SE Pacific. ..and it means Redmond will be embarrassed when Yamamoto shows up off Midway & Kiska. Nimitz will throw a fit over that one & King would not suffer the same error twice. It might be the Redmond brothers commanding a Liberty ship on caargo runs instead of Roachfort.

As for a battle off Midway I really cant say. My guess is the Marines are on their own again while Nimitz scrambles to cover Oahu with the carrier & surface fleet & tries to figure out what the IJN is really up to.

If Nimitz does not sortie the fleet to save Midway then the Yorktown is properly repaired in June-July, the Hornet has time to sort out the command/staff problems in its air wing. Several torpedo & dive bomber squadrons survive to complete their training.

If the US fleet does not rush off the Midway then I'm unsure what the worst case for the japanese would be, have its landing force defeated, or have it succeed & then be isolated & starving on Midway. If the USN does not offer battle then Yamamoto has wasted a huge chunk of his fuel reserves for no purpose, but he still has four fleet carriers & their wings intact.
 
Last edited:
Chatted with some people who gamed this out a few times. Results were all over the place. This butterflies way the water distillation trick that confirmed Midway as the June target. That means Redmonds analysis is used, that the next IJN attack will be a continuation in the SE Pacific. ..and it means Redmond will be embarrassed when Yamamoto shows up off Midway & Kiska. Nimitz will throw a fit over that one & King would not suffer the same error twice. It might be the Redmond brothers commanding a Liberty ship on caargo runs instead of Roachfort.

As for a battle off Midway I really cant say. My guess is the Marines are on their own again while Nimitz scrambles to cover Oahu with the carrier & surface fleet & tries to figure out what the IJN is really up to.

And to this day Chester W. Nimitz is a hated name among US Marines.
 
I was under the impression that a landing on Midway would have been.... difficult for the Japanese, to say the least, given that they'd have to wade through chest high water for a sizable distance into machine gun fire. I don't think you could physically find a better shooting gallery for the defenders, other then maybe a narrow hallway.
 
Better out come for Japan overall, since they won't lose those carriers, but bad for the picked garrison, since they'll be starved out.
 
Their is a alternate history story in Peter G. Tsouras book Rising Sun Victorious, about how the Japanese started to suspect that the Americans had broken their naval codes. Everything goes exactly as the OTL, up until after the Battle of the Coral Sea, and than Admiral Yamamoto changes everything for the upcoming Midway campaign. The story is called Coral and Purple.
 
I was under the impression that a landing on Midway would have been.... difficult for the Japanese, to say the least, given that they'd have to wade through chest high water for a sizable distance into machine gun fire. I don't think you could physically find a better shooting gallery for the defenders, other then maybe a narrow hallway.
Plus going by the 3 to 1 attacker ratio the Japanese were just outclassed as the Marines had tanks, 4000 men, mines, and arty to the Japanese 5000 men invasion force.

Of course there is the Yamato. :eek:

If the US learns about that ship the reaction is going to be interesting.
 
Plus going by the 3 to 1 attacker ratio the Japanese were just outclassed as the Marines had tanks, 4000 men, mines, and arty to the Japanese 5000 men invasion force.

Of course there is the Yamato. :eek:

If the US learns about that ship the reaction is going to be interesting.

18 inch gun shells are notoriously poor at taking and holding ground. I have no doubt the Japanese can bombard the facilities on Midway and make them inoperable for the short term, I just have serious reservations about their ability to TAKE the island.
 

Ramontxo

Donor
18 inch gun shells are notoriously poor at taking and holding ground. I have no doubt the Japanese can bombard the facilities on Midway and make them inoperable for the short term, I just have serious reservations about their ability to TAKE the island.

Yes but after Wake Nimitz and the Us Navy would have been under an enormous pressure to send whatever they have to relieve the garrison and fight the battle on (more or less) Japanese terms
 
If the US fleet does not rush off the Midway then I'm unsure what the worst case for the japanese would be, have its landing force defeated, or have it succeed & then be isolated & starving on Midway. If the USN does not offer battle then Yamamoto has wasted a huge chunk of his fuel reserves for no purpose, but he still has four fleet carriers & their wings intact.

How many submarines would be available in this scenario? In OTL there were 24 without much success, but in this case the invasion fleet will be anchored by the Midway island for days providing a very target rich environment. Considering the difficulty in getting damaged ships back to Japan it is hard to imagine IJN would escape without many ships being lost.
 
If the Imperial Japanese Navy decided to change their Codes on May 1942..

Wouldn't they have to warn their various Task Forces and Observation & HQs to be ready to change, thus alerting the USN Code Breakers of the possibility that the Imperial Navy will be planning to change over and be given a few weeks warning..

Likewise... maybe some Naval units or Naval GHQ might report back that they aren't ready to do the change over and the IJN might want to hold off until all Naval GHQ are ready... meh.
 
If the Imperial Japanese Navy decided to change their Codes on May 1942..

Wouldn't they have to warn their various Task Forces and Observation & HQs to be ready to change, thus alerting the USN Code Breakers of the possibility that the Imperial Navy will be planning to change over and be given a few weeks warning..

Likewise... maybe some Naval units or Naval GHQ might report back that they aren't ready to do the change over and the IJN might want to hold off until all Naval GHQ are ready... meh.

Yes, yes & yes.

However the IJN changed the JN25 code keys fairly often. It had been changed in November 1941 & Again in March 1942. Changeovers go fairly smoothly if planned in advance. Abrupt changes increase the odd of units not receiving the new code, books, encryption keys or whatever. When that happens some messages are duplicated in the old code, which can (no guarantees) give the enemy a crib into the new system.
 
How many submarines would be available in this scenario? In OTL there were 24 without much success, but in this case the invasion fleet will be anchored by the Midway island for days providing a very target rich environment. Considering the difficulty in getting damaged ships back to Japan it is hard to imagine IJN would escape without many ships being lost.

In the short run the Midway garrison is ok. In the longer haul it is far worse off than the hundreds of by passed garrisons in the Pacific. One factor is its proximity to Oahu. A introductory raid on Midway would be a final training exercise for every new carrier & squadron. Surface ships would use the Japanese for target practice, & may the Emperor help any cargo runs. The IJN bases are too far away to help.
 
Plus going by the 3 to 1 attacker ratio the Japanese were just outclassed as the Marines had tanks, 4000 men, mines, and arty to the Japanese 5000 men invasion force.

Of course there is the Yamato. :eek:

If the US learns about that ship the reaction is going to be interesting.

You'd have to modify those numbers. The garrison was heavily reinforced when Rochfort first started arguing the target was Midway. Reducing the islands garrison by between 30 & 40 % is realistic. Reduce its AA battery by up to 30%. Still given the lightweight assault force the Japanese organized that may have had a chance.

18 inch gun shells are notoriously poor at taking and holding ground. I have no doubt the Japanese can bombard the facilities on Midway and make them inoperable for the short term, I just have serious reservations about their ability to TAKE the island.

The Yamamoto was not assigned to the invasion force. IJN doctrine placed that task with cruisers. Two were given the shore bombardment task, & its claimed their commanders were humiliated by the assignment. A pair of destroyers were assigned to close in support when the assault actually crossed the reef & beach.

If the first wave was repulsed, then maybe the BB of the main fleet might join in, but that would have been out of character for the IJN of June 1942. Until things got desperate on Guadalcanal fire support for landings was a task for gun boats, destroyers, and light cruisers.
 
18 inch gun shells are notoriously poor at taking and holding ground. I have no doubt the Japanese can bombard the facilities on Midway and make them inoperable for the short term, I just have serious reservations about their ability to TAKE the island.

You're also forgetting that the Japanese assigned cruisers, not Battleships for shore bombardment. The Battleships were for the Kantai Kessen (Decisive Battle) with the USN and couldn't be troubled to pound the Marines. Furthermore, the IJN wasn't exactly known for it's naval gunfire support.

From everything I've read, Japanese plans for the amphibious assault on Midway were the same as their second attempt on Wake Island. Aerial bombardment followed by shore bombardment, followed by a landing of their entire landing force by running what were essentially APD's ashore (or at least as close as they could get with the reefs). If that's what they decide to do in TTL, I have a hard time seeing the Japanese landing forces succeed against the Marines at Midway. The land battle at Wake was a close run thing as it was in OTL, and the garrison at Midway has countless other advantages.

By the time the Japanese realize their mistake and bring their BB's into position it's going to be too late for the bulk of their landing forces. The Japanese will unleash a punitive bombardment with their BBs once they realize the USN isn't going to party and will then retreat with their tails between their legs.
 
Ok, so we have Yamamoto burning off a immense portion of the IJN fuel reserves, failing to find a enemy fleet for decisive battle, and Col Ichikis detachment massacred 90 days ahead of schedule. I guess its off to Fiji then?
 
The best case for the Japanese is that the landing is repulsed at Midway and decide that attacking new places will be difficult because the Americans are too strong on these various islands and then go on the defensive. It would be best if they kept changing their codes more often and didn't use the usual same flowery introductions in each message that made it easier to decode whenever it did change OTL.

They use the next year and a half to build their defensive ring. The codes changes means the Allies have less success sinking merchants and the Japanese build up is better than OTL.

At some point late 43 once the Essex class carriers arrive and the Hellcat fighter and all the fancy radars and command centers these new ships have, no one beats the United States in a naval battle.

But maybe the Allies do tire of grinding it out fighting on all these islands and with worse intel invade some tougher spots than OTL.

Maybe the Allies avoid invading anything after Saipan and Tinian and Guam and rely on B-29 bombing and submarines and battleships parked off the Japanese coast shelling stuff to win the war after that point.

At least more Japanese might live until the general peace (justed stranded in these places, instead of fighting and dying on Leyte, Luzon, Okinawa, etc.).
 
...
They use the next year and a half to build their defensive ring. The codes changes means the Allies have less success sinking merchants and the Japanese build up is better than OTL.

....

Cargo fleet used the "Water Transportation Code" not the JN25 the fleet admirals used. When the Brits attacked the WTC they found it a easy one. It was a low grade system, necessitated by the poorly trained radio techs used by the merchant fleet and port operating units. The WTC remained transparent to the RN & USN through the war despite some efforts to alter or upgrade it.

The Brits identified 24 or 25 distinctly different code & encryption systems used by Japan. The Diplomatic code, called "Purple" by the US intel services, is another well known encryption system. Most of these were broken by the US, Brits, and Dutch by mid 1943. A few were altered & the Allies shut out of the related traffic for a while. One high level Japanese Army code or encryption system remained unbroken by the Allies to the end of the war.

'The Emperors Codes' by Stripp and 'Codebreaker in the Far East' by Smith are decent primers on the Japanese codes & encryption.
 
Top