Japanese target oil farm

[SgtD]

Some interesting reading

[SgtD]

[QUOTE=Glenn239;6838428]SgtD writes,
Historian Mike Wenger is working on the definitive PH account, and has been for about ten years or more. Look to it being out in a few years – by all accounts it’s going to be awesome. He posts over at Combined Fleet occasionally.


Thanks! I'll looked for it.

The Combined Fleet site is awesome....the article on production capabilities of the US V Japan is mind blowing....what were the Japanese thinking?

[Kevin C. Smith]

Originally Posted by mowque

They really did that? That sounds crazy dangerous.

Originally Posted by ModernKiwi

And in four words you have summed up Japan's war...

True that...but which four?!

[Shaby]

Originally Posted by SgtD

The Combined Fleet site is awesome....the article on production capabilities of the US V Japan is mind blowing....what were the Japanese thinking?

That they'll win before the incredible economic potential of US comes to play. They gambled (and lost) on the notion that weak willed and decadent democracies will shun from engaging spirited and firm resistance of Japanese fanatics and concede the war. They also believed that US will orient itself heavily toward European conflict, especially when Germans defeat Soviets, as it looked like will happen by the time Japanese initiated hostilities.

[SgtD]

Originally Posted by Shaby

That they'll win before the incredible economic potential of US comes to play. They gambled (and lost) on the notion that weak willed and decadent democracies will shun from engaging spirited and firm resistance of Japanese fanatics and concede the war. They also believed that US will orient itself heavily toward European conflict, especially when Germans defeat Soviets, as it looked like will happen by the time Japanese initiated hostilities.

It's amazing how both the US and Japan underestimated each other....

Reports immediately after PH had "Messerschmit" type aircraft and "white" pilots involved in the attack. The Japanese certainly couldn't have been capable of pulling it off by themselves.

[Unconsensual]

Originally Posted by Elfwine

This sums up the problem with the entire Japanese war effort, including China.

Yup, what Calbear said . The OTL effect was probably the best they could've hoped for since the psychological damage caused the USN to turtle, avoiding any major confrontations (thus giving the Japanese effective free reign) and pulling so many naval assets from the Atlantic that it almost crippled the US oil tanking fleet.

But on a grand scale there was just no way, Japan tried to take on the USN, RN, Chinese armies, and all occupied peoples in East Asia at the same time.

[CalBear]

Originally Posted by Unconsensual

Yup, what Calbear said . The OTL effect was probably the best they could've hoped for since the psychological damage caused the USN to turtle, avoiding any major confrontations (thus giving the Japanese effective free reign) and pulling so many naval assets from the Atlantic that it almost crippled the US oil tanking fleet.

But on a grand scale there was just no way, Japan tried to take on the USN, RN, Chinese armies, and all occupied peoples in East Asia at the same time.

Not to mention the planet's largest economy, one with virtually unlimited resources and a veritable ocean of money available to exploit them.

[Elfwine]

Originally Posted by CalBear

Not to mention the planet's largest economy, one with virtually unlimited resources and a veritable ocean of money available to exploit them.

And while it might be argued that resources are not everything, Japanese decisions within the context of this environment were not of the caliber to change this - nor were American decisions dumb enough to hand victory to Japan.

[Glenn239]

The Combined Fleet site is awesome....the article on production capabilities of the US V Japan is mind blowing....what were the Japanese thinking?

Good article there on the invasion of Oahu too. Careful though, judging from the collosal oversight of geography made, those guys apparently thought 'Maui and Kauai' were the brothers of 'Fili and Kili' for Thoren Oakenshield's quest to the Lonely Mountain.

Anyways, your original post and follow-up questions suggest to me that you see a fundamental disconnect between the historical Pearl Harbor attack and what cold hard logic suggests should have been the Pearl Harbor attack. That is, that Yamamoto seems to have taken on too much risk for too little potential gain. Why make an effort that is not strong enough to get the big payoff, but also so strong that if disaster strikes you’ve lost the war? Makes no sense.


I think it was mainly Japan’s divided command structure. You had GHQ, Combined Fleet and 1st Air Fleet, and all three of these had different ideas about strategy. Rather than put one HQ in control of all the armed forces to achieve harmony between tactics, operations and war strategy, the ‘system’ forced compromises between different commands. Too many chefs cooking the meal, and there was no Ernest King to chuck deadweight out of the kitchen. Yamamoto wants to fight at Hawaii, 1st Air Fleet did not. So what you get is a bad compromise between competing forces. (The US Pacific command system seems to have functioned at least reasonably until the Marianas, but after the 'Turkey Shoot' MacArthur seems to have pulled strategy off kilter. The difference was, these problems were not fatal because the US had already won the war.)


Japan’s original decision for war – IMO, same problem generally. Too many chefs, too many egos, too many divergent interests all being pulled together into some horrible compromise.

[Glenn239]

They really did that? That sounds crazy dangerous.

Prange, at Dawn We Slept,
Ship......Overloaded
Akagi..........1450t
Hiryu............700t
Soryu...........700t
Tone/Chikuma...580t
CL's.................0t
DD's................0t
The CL’s and DD’s were judged too structurally weak to be overloaded. The others were chosen on the basis of which ships would need refuelling to make the round trip.

Term is impossible. West Coast is a THOUSAND miles further from Japan than Oahu is and to get to Oahu the Japanese did things that were, quite literally, insane, up top and including deck loading fuel barrels on the hanger decks of carriers.

The specific worry causing the barrel storage was meeting horrible weather enroute, not the distance to Hawaii. Refuelling techniques had only recently been practiced (from scratch for many ships) to perform the mission, and rehearsed in the months leading up to the attack. At the time, with yet no confidence in the robustness of the method, they knew they were going to be crossing seas that could be subject to typhoon-strength winds for long stretches. The barreled-oil was a contingency measure to guard against an inability to refuel.

Operationally, it would have been suicide.

Operationally Califorina was certainly too risky (and too long in duration) for a simple raid; too much risk, too little payoff. Having a major US base (Oahu) “behind” the strike force was also a doctrinal anathema. Nor was there compensating prospect of strategci success to offset all these ‘downsides’, so California would never have happened. The only target in California worthy of attack would be the USN’s 44 million tons oil reserve.

[mowque]

Originally Posted by Glenn239

Careful though, judging from the collosal oversight of geography made, those guys apparently thought 'Maui and Kauai' were the brothers of 'Fili and Kili' for Thoren Oakenshield's quest to the Lonely Mountain.

As much as I love this analogy, it is spelled "Thorin".

[deathscompanion1]

The main problem with the Japanese planning things better is...

You have to make them smart enough to plan long term yet insane enough to fight long term.

[Glenn239]

As much as I love this analogy, it is spelled "Thorin".

I was thinking, ‘should I google it? Nah…’

[burmafrd]

Disagree about the fuel farm.

As meticulous as they were in preparations they could have turned their attention to the fuel farms as well.

Concentrated attention could have cause a lot more damage then some here believe.

IF and of course all attacks have that word in them, you are able to destroy most of the fuel there then operations for the entire pacific fleet are hamstrung for months. And tankers are needed JUST to refuel Pearl. Those tankers cannot do anything else for MONTHS. And with only 7 available without bringing more in from the Atlantic, that effort will pretty much scuttle any raids that we were planning.

And what does THAT do to planning?

The attacks and raids that Halsey did in early 42 are either delayed or canceled.

Butterfly effects.


I agree the dry docks and machine shops are problematical. Though frankly worth some effort.

Also as regards the US ability to resist a third strike I believe that is over stated here. AA was not all that good at the time and we really did not have that many fighters left to really resist all that well.

[phx1138]

Correct on all points, gentlemen, & you've said it better than I could. To which I'd add only this: loss of the Torpedo Store would IMO have been a net benefit to the Sub Force. (BTW, there were no "sub pens": they were berthed at open piers. This isn't Lorient.)

And had even a stray bomb or two hit the Admin building, & killed the cryppies in the basement, the impact would have been bigger than all the others.

[Glenn239]

Concentrated attention could have cause a lot more damage then some here believe.

The tanks could have been badly knocked about, but to eliminate the yard facilities there would need to be uncontrolled fires. OTOH, space on Oahu was at a premium and no one was thinking about air raids, so it’s not at all unlikely that fire hazards were everywhere. The yard certainly would not have been prepared for an air attack.

IF and of course all attacks have that word in them, you are able to destroy most of the fuel there then operations for the entire pacific fleet are hamstrung for months.

The Pacific Fleet may have been using maybe 250,000 tons of oil each month for war operations. Since the tank farms are largely destroyed, most of this now has to come from California. The Pacific Fleet tankers therefore cannot even keep up with demand, leave alone replenish any eliminated stocks. The easiest way to square the circle is for the fleet to withdraw to California.

Also as regards the US ability to resist a third strike I believe that is over stated here.

All 20 aircraft lost in the 2nd wave were shot down at low level. So if a 3rd wave is made at low level over the harbor it might lose 20 aircraft, but if it is a high level attack over the harbor than losses might be negligible. Genda indicated there would be no more torpedo attacks, but I don't recollect him saying what he intended to do with his dive bombers).

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

Originally Posted by burmafrd

Disagree about the fuel farm.

As meticulous as they were in preparations they could have turned their attention to the fuel farms as well.

Could have? Yes. What point? see below

Originally Posted by burmafrd

Concentrated attention could have cause a lot more damage then some here believe.

Since "some here" basically means CalBear, the board's acknowledged expert on the Pacific war, I'll go with him. Sorry.

Originally Posted by burmafrd

IF and of course all attacks have that word in them, you are able to destroy most of the fuel there then operations for the entire pacific fleet are hamstrung for months. And tankers are needed JUST to refuel Pearl. Those tankers cannot do anything else for MONTHS. And with only 7 available without bringing more in from the Atlantic, that effort will pretty much scuttle any raids that we were planning.

And what does THAT do to planning?

The attacks and raids that Halsey did in early 42 are either delayed or canceled.

Sure. But that's irrelevant. The US HAD to be knocked out immediately, or Japan loses, and Japan knew that. What happens months later is irrelevant. Either the US has already surrendered, as the Japanese counted on; OR Japan has lost. Dragging out her own defeat wasn't the Japanese strategy (which is all targeting the oil tank farms could do). Winning was. ANYTHING more than knocking out the US Pacific Fleet and therefore, hopefully, causing the US to come to the table, is using up resources needed against the British and Netherlands.

You keep on trying to approach the issue with attitude 'this would improve the situation for the Japanese', rather than 'would this do anything at all to let them win the war'. Japan wanted to win. It didn't want to drag out a war they had to lose.

[Bob in Pittsburgh]

There is no way that the destruction of the intelligence staff would have had any impact on the war, although obviously the end for the people. Hawaii didn't even have a Purple machine to decode Japanese messages.

When you come right down to it nothing might have altered the result other than no attack on Pearl Harbor. If Japan had simply proceeded south, with or without attacking the Phillipines there might have been a chance for a negotiated peace.

[Glenn239]

Sure. But that's irrelevant.

Nagumo’s orders were to guarantee that the Pacific Fleet could not interfere with operations to the south for six months. Changing the discussion to some observation about winning the war is out of context to Nagumo’s original mission orders. The destruction of the oil tank farm was a means to that end, so it is relevent to Nagumo's orders.

[Grimm Reaper]

On the subject of Japanese attitudes I might raise the IJN's near-obsessive goal of a decisive battle which led to hysteria when it became clear that the USN felt no desperate need to engage in any such thing.

Such as at Midway where an American commander with two carriers somehow felt no need to engage a majority of Japan's battleships in a surface action.