WI: Rommel's defensive strategy for the Soviet Union had been enacted?

[Orry]

Defensive action is never going to win WW2 - it just keeps you to avoid rapid defeat and keeps you in the war longer to allow your forces to recover / build up and I do not see how Germany would be able to build up the forces to 'win' even with a defensive strategy.

The Allies have to get many things wrong even if the Germans get things right. In an infinite universe its possible but realistically?

IMHO Switching to the defensive pre-Kursk almost certainly means that the Russians are further away from Berlin when the German army collapses after the use of Atomic bombs by the Americans.

Once they failed to Knock Russia out of the war quickly in 1941 and ended up with an active war on multiple fronts Germany's inherent weakness comes into play - lack of resources, lack of 'manpower' and inefficient use of both means, fortunetly, the Nazi regime is going down.

[aktarian]

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

they can't be strong everywhere in 1943 because the front is over 2000 miles long and because they have large elements of their manpower sucked up in fruitless enterprises

Indeed.

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

the 1941 border on the other hand could be held with 100 infantry divisions and 30ish mobile divisions if they were properly equipped and had a replacement stream

That's a big if for anytime after 1943.

[BlairWitch749]

Originally Posted by wiking

Isn't this quote from and about 1944? That's a very different time than 1943.

AFAIK that quote is 1943 pre kursk after Rommel got all introspective following his final relief in Africa

[jmc247]

Originally Posted by wiking

Isn't this quote from and about 1944? That's a very different time than 1943.

The quote was from a meeting between Rommel and Bayerlen in mid 1943, but they put it in a chapter of the Rommel Papers mainly dealing with events in 1944 so I can understand the confusion.

[oshron]

for a second there i read this as "Romney's defensive strategy for the Soviet Union"

[Julian]

How do the Germans even execute a withdrawal to a 1941 line to prepare defenses? Operation Buffel took months of planning and the construction of multiple intermediate switchlines, and that was just for 9th and 4th Panzer armies. A withdrawal to 1941 positions would require backwards movement on a scale the Germans have never even considered attempting, all the while being pursued by multiple tank armies, corps, and whatever partisan formations and airborne units the Soviet use to delay their retreat. It would take a year of planning and construction which the Germans in 1943 simply don't have.

[jmc247]

Originally Posted by Orry

Defensive action is never going to win WW2 - it just keeps you to avoid rapid defeat and keeps you in the war longer to allow your forces to recover / build up and I do not see how Germany would be able to build up the forces to 'win' even with a defensive strategy.

The Allies have to get many things wrong even if the Germans get things right. In an infinite universe its possible but realistically?

IMHO Switching to the defensive pre-Kursk almost certainly means that the Russians are further away from Berlin when the German army collapses after the use of Atomic bombs by the Americans.

Once they failed to Knock Russia out of the war quickly in 1941 and ended up with an active war on multiple fronts Germany's inherent weakness comes into play - lack of resources, lack of 'manpower' and inefficient use of both means, fortunetly, the Nazi regime is going down.

This timeline assumes that Hitler died in the early 43 attempted plane bombing and the new leadership in Germany is willing to play defense in the East. Had things gone worse for Stalin in 1943 and there was a new leadership in Berlin willing to accept peace with him unlike Hitler it might have happened in late 1943. Stalin was somewhat willing to consider peace with Hitler himself in 1943, its simply that Hitler would rather eat a bullet then make peace with him at that point.

If peace between Germany and the USSR happened in late 1943 or even early 44 it would leave the Western Allies in a bit of a bind to say the least. Nukes are still about a year and a half away as we know, but in their minds it might be five years away, they didn't know for certain. An invasion of Europe in 1944 would be a bust without the German Army tied down in the East. The smart money says they agree to peace with the new government rather then trying for an invasion in 1944 in exchange for France, the low countries and a bunch of other concessions from Germany.

Could Hitler have been convinced not to do Kursk and go on the defensive in the East? I don't think it would be easy, but it wouldn't be impossible. Still if he did I don't see him agreeing to peace with Stalin so Germany will lose the war completely, just more slowly then OTL and as I said with the WAllies getting further. If Germany is still fighting the Soviet Union come mid 1944 then Germany will be crushed and occupied.

[BlairWitch749]

Originally Posted by Julian

How do the Germans even execute a withdrawal to a 1941 line to prepare defenses? Operation Buffel took months of planning and the construction of multiple intermediate switchlines, and that was just for 9th and 4th Panzer armies. A withdrawal to 1941 positions would require backwards movement on a scale the Germans have never even considered attempting, all the while being pursued by multiple tank armies, corps, and whatever partisan formations and airborne units the Soviet use to delay their retreat. It would take a year of planning and construction which the Germans in 1943 simply don't have.

in theory, if such a course was decided in spring 43 a major effort could be made.

between 3rd kharkov and kursk, the front was more or less supine all around for 120 days; the germans in this period both built major defensive positions and built up for their ultimately doomed offensive (and in the later case concentrated all of the panzers on very small sections of the front leaving them vulnerable to secondary attacks which ate them alive in otl)

the defensive line the germans built then (particularly around orel and belgorad) was immense in local effort but strategically useless given the immensely improved mobility of the red army

if instead a major plan was developed to make the current position an "outpost line" followed by medium scale development of the dneiper line (otl wotan line) with large longer scale development for the 1941 border at the bug something could be accomplished especially if tank production has a significant portion diverted to forming reserve formations to man these lines as the army falls back

[Julian]

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

in theory, if such a course was decided in spring 43 a major effort could be made.

between 3rd kharkov and kursk, the front was more or less supine all around for 120 days; the germans in this period both built major defensive positions and built up for their ultimately doomed offensive (and in the later case concentrated all of the panzers on very small sections of the front leaving them vulnerable to secondary attacks which ate them alive in otl)

the defensive line the germans built then (particularly around orel and belgorad) was immense in local effort but strategically useless given the immensely improved mobility of the red army

if instead a major plan was developed to make the current position an "outpost line" followed by medium scale development of the dneiper line (otl wotan line) with large longer scale development for the 1941 border at the bug something could be accomplished especially if tank production has a significant portion diverted to forming reserve formations to man these lines as the army falls back

Except that the Soviets would detect German strategic intentions and respond accordingly, just as they did IOTL. Rather than hunkering down in the late spring and early summer they would execute Kutuzov and Rumianstev early to secure the Kursk bulge's flanks. They would of course run into better off German forces, but as you said fortifications wouldn't be as concentrated as IOTL. Plus in turn Soviet forces, particularly in the south, wouldn't be nearly as damaged as they were after Kursk. From there offensive actions can expand in any number of directions.

Essentially any massive defensive scenario requires the Soviets to allow the Germans to work unmolested, which is really unlikely.

Originally Posted by jmc247

This timeline assumes that Hitler died in the early 43 attempted plane bombing and the new leadership in Germany is willing to play defense in the East. Had things gone worse for Stalin in 1943 and there was a new leadership in Berlin willing to accept peace with him unlike Hitler it might have happened in late 1943. Stalin was somewhat willing to consider peace with Hitler himself in 1943, its simply that Hitler would rather eat a bullet then make peace with him at that point.

If peace between Germany and the USSR happened in late 1943 or even early 44 it would leave the Western Allies in a bit of a bind to say the least. Nukes are still about a year and a half away as we know, but in their minds it might be five years away, they didn't know for certain. An invasion of Europe in 1944 would be a bust without the German Army tied down in the East. The smart money says they agree to peace with the new government rather then trying for an invasion in 1944 in exchange for France, the low countries and a bunch of other concessions from Germany.

Could Hitler have been convinced not to do Kursk and go on the defensive in the East? I don't think it would be easy, but it wouldn't be impossible. Still if he did I don't see him agreeing to peace with Stalin so Germany will lose the war completely, just more slowly then OTL and as I said with the WAllies getting further. If Germany is still fighting the Soviet Union come mid 1944 then Germany will be crushed and occupied.

Stalin wasn't willing to accept any peace short of total victory, even in 1941.

[BlairWitch749]

Originally Posted by Julian

Except that the Soviets would detect German strategic intentions and respond accordingly, just as they did IOTL. Rather than hunkering down in the late spring and early summer they would execute Kutuzov and Rumianstev early to secure the Kursk bulge's flanks. They would of course run into better off German forces, but as you said fortifications wouldn't be as concentrated as IOTL. Plus in turn Soviet forces, particularly in the south, wouldn't be nearly as damaged as they were after Kursk. From there offensive actions can expand in any number of directions.

Essentially any massive defensive scenario requires the Soviets to allow the Germans to work unmolested, which is really unlikely.

kutuzov and rumianstev would not be nearly as effective without the germans burning themselves out in the kursk offensive

[AdA]

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

Guderian was calling for line shortening and staticish defense in 1943; that was his camp on the kursk decision

The way to counter soviet gun massing is to build multiple lines; an outpost line to absorb the artillery and then one farther back out of artillery range 30 miles or so as the main defensive position. this compels the soviets to displace after securing the outpost line (leaving them vulnerable to artillery themselves) and during the displacement a new line is erected to the rear

mobile defense doesn't work when the enemy has a 10 to 1 superiority in mobile formations, there are too many fires to put out at once nor can you concentrate enough force to rescue retreating footbound formations which will be encircled in the pull backs

that's why manstein's 43 backhand blow idea would have never worked

Mobile defence works when:
Terrain compartments do not offer clearly defined defence lines;
The defenders have better mobility than the attackers
The defenders have a qualitative edge over the attackers
The Defenders can guarantee local air superiority

The Soviets had a 3/1 or 2/1 advantage over the Germans in mobile formations if you factor in the superior avarage quality, integration and organisation of German formations. The problem here was that the Germans could only motorise a small portion of their forces and couldn't guarantee air superiority during counter attacks.

[Julian]

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

kutuzov and rumianstev would not be nearly as effective without the germans burning themselves out in the kursk offensive

I doubt that. For one thing, only a quater of all German losses were actually taken during Citadel itself, and the rest during the Soviet counteroffensives. For another, as you yourself said, much of the resources put into the defenses around Orel and Bryansk would be invested elsewhere, as would the resources used to reinforce 4th Panzer, 9th, and Kempf in preparation for the offensive. Thirdly several Soviet rifle and tank armies, especially along the Belogorod-Khrakov axis, began the offensive tired and understrength after being mauled during Citadel. That would obviously be avoided. Finally, as IOTL, the Soviets will use Maskirovka to its fullest extent, including but not limited to diversionary offensives along the Donets and Mius, and careful deception procedures to lead the Germans to underestimate or even disregard the scale of Soviet intentions in the Orel and Kharkov regions. Even IOTL when they knew an offensive around Orel was guaranteed they failed to detect two tank armies, underestimated the size of 11th guards army by half, missed two tank corps, and missed another reserve army entirely. In all cases the Soviet's deception efforts prevented the Germans from detecting assault concentraions except in a couple sectors.

[wiking]

Originally Posted by Julian

I doubt that. For one thing, only a quater of all German losses were actually taken during Citadel itself, and the rest during the Soviet counteroffensives. For another, as you yourself said, much of the resources put into the defenses around Orel and Bryansk would be invested elsewhere, as would the resources used to reinforce 4th Panzer, 9th, and Kempf in preparation for the offensive. Thirdly several Soviet rifle and tank armies, especially along the Belogorod-Khrakov axis, began the offensive tired and understrength after being mauled during Citadel. That would obviously be avoided. Finally, as IOTL, the Soviets will use Maskirovka to its fullest extent, including but not limited to diversionary offensives along the Donets and Mius, and careful deception procedures to lead the Germans to underestimate or even disregard the scale of Soviet intentions in the Orel and Kharkov regions. Even IOTL when they knew an offensive around Orel was guaranteed they failed to detect two tank armies, underestimated the size of 11th guards army by half, missed two tank corps, and missed another reserve army entirely. In all cases the Soviet's deception efforts prevented the Germans from detecting assault concentraions except in a couple sectors.

But without the Kursk offensive the Germans don't have enough resources to stay in their positions around the salient, so would withdraw at some point either before and at the start of a Soviet offensive and fall back on the Dniester/Panzer line. Masknirovka or no, the Axis would bug out if they aren't going to attack.

[aktarian]

Originally Posted by AdA

Mobile defence works when:
Terrain compartments do not offer clearly defined defence lines;
The defenders have better mobility than the attackers
The defenders have a qualitative edge over the attackers
The Defenders can guarantee local air superiority

The Soviets had a 3/1 or 2/1 advantage over the Germans in mobile formations if you factor in the superior avarage quality, integration and organisation of German formations. The problem here was that the Germans could only motorise a small portion of their forces and couldn't guarantee air superiority during counter attacks.

The whole praise for German mobile defence is based mostly around Kharkov counter-offensive. While that was a great coup Germans had several things working for them and Soviets against them. Germans knew where Soviet thrust was (obviously) and could still muster good mobile formations. OTOH Soviet logistics were still shaky, their planning and handling of large scale formations still left a lot to be desired, they lacked good mobile artillery and mobility in general and were still cursed with overoptimism boosted by their victory at Stalingrad.

Later Soviet disadvantages were corrected, mostly planning while German advantages evaporated so Germans couldn't pull it off again. As I said, Soviets always had several options to play while Germans had troubles predicting which one they'll choose.

[BlairWitch749]

Originally Posted by Julian

I doubt that. For one thing, only a quater of all German losses were actually taken during Citadel itself, and the rest during the Soviet counteroffensives. For another, as you yourself said, much of the resources put into the defenses around Orel and Bryansk would be invested elsewhere, as would the resources used to reinforce 4th Panzer, 9th, and Kempf in preparation for the offensive. Thirdly several Soviet rifle and tank armies, especially along the Belogorod-Khrakov axis, began the offensive tired and understrength after being mauled during Citadel. That would obviously be avoided. Finally, as IOTL, the Soviets will use Maskirovka to its fullest extent, including but not limited to diversionary offensives along the Donets and Mius, and careful deception procedures to lead the Germans to underestimate or even disregard the scale of Soviet intentions in the Orel and Kharkov regions. Even IOTL when they knew an offensive around Orel was guaranteed they failed to detect two tank armies, underestimated the size of 11th guards army by half, missed two tank corps, and missed another reserve army entirely. In all cases the Soviet's deception efforts prevented the Germans from detecting assault concentraions except in a couple sectors.

kursk wasn't just about physical losses of men and armored vehicles, it was about concentration and consumption of irreplaceable resources; namely all of the striking power of the german army was concentrated in two small places whilst the russians didn't have to weaken other fronts to amass their superior striking power in those places

it also surrendered all german superiority in mobile warfare, long range tank cannons and command structure by bashing their heads against a brick wall; and they couldn't afford anything other than super lopsided knock out ratios

a kutsuov and rumianstev against a fresh german army on the defensive with in tact fuel and ammo reserves would be a harder (though certainly not impossible) nut to crack

the russians would still break them given the width and number of places of attack however, they would not get as far as they did in otl

[AdA]

Originally Posted by aktarian

The whole praise for German mobile defence is based mostly around Kharkov counter-offensive. While that was a great coup Germans had several things working for them and Soviets against them. Germans knew where Soviet thrust was (obviously) and could still muster good mobile formations. OTOH Soviet logistics were still shaky, their planning and handling of large scale formations still left a lot to be desired, they lacked good mobile artillery and mobility in general and were still cursed with overoptimism boosted by their victory at Stalingrad.

Later Soviet disadvantages were corrected, mostly planning while German advantages evaporated so Germans couldn't pull it off again. As I said, Soviets always had several options to play while Germans had troubles predicting which one they'll choose.

I'd go further than that. The whole praise for German defensive tactics on the East is based on one sided German accounts inflated by US Army tactical studies. Mobile defence is dangerous because it assumes you can outmanouver your opponent.

[AdA]

All those advocating a return to a 1941 border defensive line are aware that they are leaving Romania, Hungary, Bulgaria, etc wide open, I presume?

[BlairWitch749]

Originally Posted by AdA

I'd go further than that. The whole praise for German defensive tactics on the East is based on one sided German accounts inflated by US Army tactical studies. Mobile defence is dangerous because it assumes you can outmanouver your opponent.

polar star, mars, 2nd kharkov, 3rd kharkov and east prussia 44 were one sided battles though. the soviets got chewed up by german defenses with 6-10 to 1 losses in these battles

[Julian]

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

kursk wasn't just about physical losses of men and armored vehicles, it was about concentration and consumption of irreplaceable resources; namely all of the striking power of the german army was concentrated in two small places whilst the russians didn't have to weaken other fronts to amass their superior striking power in those places

it also surrendered all german superiority in mobile warfare, long range tank cannons and command structure by bashing their heads against a brick wall; and they couldn't afford anything other than super lopsided knock out ratios

a kutsuov and rumianstev against a fresh german army on the defensive with in tact fuel and ammo reserves would be a harder (though certainly not impossible) nut to crack

the russians would still break them given the width and number of places of attack however, they would not get as far as they did in otl

That seems reasonable enough. Anyways, their replenishment capablity was such that once the flanks of the Kursk bulge had been cleared they could begin operations on a larger scale within a few weeks to a month, striking everywhere from Nevel to the Mius. Even with stronger forces the Germans will break and retreat to the Dnieper, as they did IOTL. If Proto-Kutusov and Rumianstev were launched in early May, finished by early June, and wider offensives commenced in late June/early July there's no way the Germans could organize defenses of sufficient depth to delay the Soviets during a retreat to the border. In a year yes, but not in a few months from April-July.

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

polar star, mars, 2nd kharkov, 3rd kharkov and east prussia 44 were one sided battles though. the soviets got chewed up by german defenses with 6-10 to 1 losses in these battles

Agreed, the Germans won a lot of onesided victories due to the Soviets blundering into positions where well entrenched defenders, or ones skilled in maneuver, could tear them apart.

[AdA]

Originally Posted by BlairWitch749

polar star, mars, 2nd kharkov, 3rd kharkov and east prussia 44 were one sided battles though. the soviets got chewed up by german defenses with 6-10 to 1 losses in these battles

It works some times. People doing NATO doctrinal research in the 60s/70s were not stupid. But it's efectiviness against a capable oponent was overblown by manipulative interpretations of WW2 in the east. And in late 43/early 44 the Germans had a qualitative edge on tanks, in that interval when they had enough Panthers and Tigers from their 43/44 production effort and the T34/85 and IS2 were not yet common. And usually those perfect battles were against either the last phase of a soviet offensive taken too far or against a secondary attack.