July 20th, A Day Which Will Live in Victory

[jmc247]

Originally Posted by Hörnla

I was Not refering to Moral implications, it would only Be clear that ressources could Be better spent.

Yes, I agree, but my only point was there was a revenge component to the firebombings of German civilians IMO as well as a wanting to shock and awe Stalin by showing off Allied air power, because of that I can't be certain they would stop the fire bombings, but oviously they should.

BTW, hitler OTL did a similar Strategy OTL the other way Round by heavily investing in the ardennes-Offensive. That basically allowed the Red Army to Be First in Berlin.

To avoid not much spectacular akin to rommel's ideas has to happen. just Imagine the unexpected German Units around arnhem would have been redeployed to poland.

OTL, Rommel never was more furious publicly even when Hitler ordered his troops to stand and die then when he heard Hitler was sending troops from the Russian front to the Western front which he knew would cause the mass rape and alot of other bad things when the Red Army took Eastern Germany. He said they were all unsuferable cowards who want to delay their own inevitable deaths for a few weeks at the horrible expense of the German people.

So, yes Rommel would have done the reverse. My guess is that he would activate his plans he tried unsucessfully to promote in early 1943 for the East and would in this timeline have turned Poland into a massive anti tank and anti personnel obstacle course for the Red Army to have to fight though to try to massively slow them down.

Of course the plan if actually instituted in early 1943 instead of going with attacking Kursk could have made a difference. Here it will be just a delaying action to make sure the Western Allies at least occupy half of Poland.

If it worked it would mean a divided Poland.

[Shaby]

I am sure herr Rommel would have found that this strategy would be impossible in the East. How many AT guns would Germans need for this sort of thing to work? How many men? How many shells? What about the partisans in the rear? How would Germans respond to Red Army plastering the entire front with mass artillery fire? IMHO this is a fantasy strategy even if taken in 1943. The front line in the Soviet Union is so long that it could never be adequately covered by Germans and once you lose the initiative that's it.

[jmc247]

Originally Posted by Shaby

I am sure herr Rommel would have found that this strategy would be impossible in the East. How many AT guns would Germans need for this sort of thing to work? How many men? How many shells? What about the partisans in the rear? How would Germans respond to Red Army plastering the entire front with mass artillery fire? IMHO this is a fantasy strategy even if taken in 1943. The front line in the Soviet Union is so long that it could never be adequately covered by Germans and once you lose the initiative that's it.

It was a better strategy IMO on paper then attacking the Kursk salient which he opposed. His plan as he said called for pulling the troops back to a more suitable prepared line so there would be less of a front. His idea was to slow the Russian advance and to bleed the Red Army to get Stalin to agree to a peace deal after running into critical manpower shortages. Russia even without such a plan focusing on defense in the East not offense did run into real manpower shortages by 1944 even with Lend Lease.

Keep in mind he developed this plan while in the hospital in Germany after being recalled from Africa (his health was a wreck from the stress of two years at war) and it was based almost entirely on the battlefield reports he was reading from the East at the time.

Though it would be an interesting TL to put to AH posters in its own thread rather then it derailing this thread.

[Michele]

Originally Posted by jmc247

Yes, I agree, but my only point was there was a revenge component to the firebombings of German civilians IMO as well as a wanting to shock and awe Stalin by showing off Allied air power, because of that I can't be certain they would stop the fire bombings, but oviously they should.

I don't see much of anything so obvious about such a decision.
You may wish to call it "firebombing civilians". But the top-ranking British decision makers called it "dehousing the workers, dislocating German economy, and attacking German morale". The US planners, on their part, said they were precision-bombing.

All of that was, especially in the eyes of the British generals, soon going to bring about a general German collapse, on the morale plan, or on the economy plan, or maybe both. If Hitler dies and Germany is involved in internal strife, they will assume the overall morale of the nation is going further down, so maybe a harsher, more sustained bombing campaign is exactly what it takes. Maybe the strategic bombing effort is just a couple of destroyed cities away from achieving immediate, unconditional surrender.

And since the July 1944 plotters will try not to surrender unconditionally - bombs away.

[Michele]

Originally Posted by jmc247

It was a better strategy IMO on paper then attacking the Kursk salient which he opposed. His plan as he said called for pulling the troops back to a more suitable prepared line so there would be less of a front. His idea was to slow the Russian advance and to bleed the Red Army to get Stalin to agree to a peace deal after running into critical manpower shortages. Russia even without such a plan focusing on defense in the East not offense did run into real manpower shortages by 1944 even with Lend Lease.

Keep in mind he developed this plan while in the hospital in Germany after being recalled from Africa (his health was a wreck from the stress of two years at war) and it was based almost entirely on the battlefield reports he was reading from the East at the time.

Shaby is right. Rommel's experience was with a motorized Corps plus Italian allied assets, and with anti-tank lines, sure... only, the anti-tank lines he dealt with came in two sizes.

Size a) puny, no longer than 70 kms, when both ends were propped by impassable obstacles (the sea and the Qattara depression). These are no lesson to be applied to Russian-sized frontages.
Size b), with one end hanging open, like at Gazala. This kind of line is a lesson for Russia, and the lesson is: the enemy can outflank them.

Another place were fortified lines worked was Italy. There, the frontage to cover was longer than at El Alamein, say 270 kms at its widest. Central Italy however came with its own natural obstacles, mountains, narrow valleys, ravines and whatnot; man-made fortifications could exploit all of that, and the actual passable avenues for motorized units were few. Again, nothing comparable to the Russian frontage. From the Barents Sea to the Black Sea we're one order of magnitude above the Italian front, roughly 2,700 kms to 270. And there are nice long long stretches of easygoing plains.

[Gregorius]

Originally Posted by jmc247

and would in this timeline have turned Poland into a massive anti tank and anti personnel obstacle course for the Red Army to have to fight though to try to massively slow them down.

Have you ever been to Poland? It's a flat country, very flat, with easily crossable small rivers and almost no mountains or hills, besides the furthest area to the South. It's not country with defensive capabilities(one of its curses), and this was one of the reason why interwar Poland wanted Pripet Marshes so much(but in WW2 they are already dead zone for Germans fighting Red Partisans).
The only defensive area would be Vistula-and it is too long to defend, and urban areas, where local population was keen on uprising against Germans.

Originally Posted by jmc247

If it worked it would mean a divided Poland.

It wouldn't. All major Polish political groups and resistance(besides NSZ which was marginal compared to Home Army or Peasant Battalions) supported cooperation with Soviets and government of national unity. Also the German conspirators wanted borders from 1914.

Originally Posted by Michele

The new German government tries to negotiate peace with the Western Allies and get the disappointment of their lives.
They do not try to negotiate with the USSR; the point of the exercise was to keep the Soviets out.
They may decide on an unilateral withdrawal from the West while keeping up the fight in the East. The Western troops move in, but that doesn't mean that Stalin won't present his claims. Churchill might be unwilling to appease him, Roosevelt will.

Remember that July 20th plotters wanted to keep Hitler's conquest in Central Europe, meaning that they will face not only Stalin's troops but other Allies like Czechs and Poles.
But really, UK as well won't give in to demands to accept what it refused in 1939, when Hitler invaded Poland. They didn't fight for 5 years, to suddenly give Germany more than then Germany demanded in August 1939.

[Simon]

So the only way it would work is if the 20 July plotters had been reasonable and seen that unconditional surrender was their only option, which they weren't prepared to do.

Random thought but supposing in a timeline where the plotters face reality but decide on one last screw you to the Soviets by offering a cease-fire/armistice but only if the Western Allies minus the Soviets are the first to occupy them and say Poland, Czechoslovakia, and possibly Hungary before allowing the Soviet troops in to occupy them as well. Stalin would of course go mental since he'd see it as the Western Allies possibly trying to cut a deal but if he's allowed to send troops to jointly occupy them after the initial takeover he hasn't got too much of a leg to stand on. Just go with it. So coming to the main question I had now that it's set up with the Western Allies now have a reasonable amount of troops in those three countries what happens in the post-war elections if it's much harder if not impossible for the Soviets to rig them for the local communists? Stalin will no doubt demand and probably get Poland being moved westwards as his price, also still has a chain of satellite states to act as a buffer against future invasions. The other main question I had was that without a land route to their occupation zone in eastern Germany does the GDR still come about with the border that they control now much farther east?

[Rich Rostrom]

Originally Posted by jmc247

Here is an example of where primary sources well before the Cold War began matter alot more then primary sources or secondary sources after it began.

British Intelligence found out a month before Rommel was suicided that he was telling other generals in France that Hitler had to be killed. This has only been reciently released to the public and Nat Geo decided to make it into a documentary, here is a brief clip.

Very interesting. Thanks.

Rommel was no anti-Nazi saint.

He was extremely pro-Hitler in 1938-1942. During the battle of France, his 7th Panzer Division murdered hundreds, perhaps thousands of black French colonial troops who had surrendered.

The Allies began to elevate him as an "honorable German" during the war. After his death... and after the war... Protecting Rommel's German reputation by concealing his support for assassination; OTOH elevating the respectability of assassination by revealing Rommel's support could work too. Sometimes the personality carries the proposition, and sometimes the reverse. "X" is good because "Y" says so; or "Y" is good because because he says "X".

I'm oddly reminded of the Gilbert and Sullivan operetta Patience. Bunthorne, a fleshly poet, enjoys the worshipful attention of the Aesthetic Maidens, till they desert him for Grosvenor, an idyllic poet. Bunthorne forces Grosvenor to renounce poetry and become commonplace, thinking the Maidens will return to him. But instead they follow Grosvenor and turn commonplace too, i.e. the personality carries the proposition.

Just rambling...

[MattII]

Rommel wasn't perfect, but since he flat-out refused to hand over Jews to the Gestapo, or execute commandos you've got to admit he had a conscience, and a hell of a lot of guts. As for his support for assassination, considering the target, I think most people would be more in favour of him for it.

[Cook]

Originally Posted by MattII

...since he flat-out refused to hand over Jews to the Gestapo...

I'm just wondering when he would have had Jews within his responsibility?

[MattII]

He captured Jewish POWs in North Africa whom he refused to execute, and during his time in France he refused direct orders to deport the country's Jews, and indeed wrote letter protesting their treatment. Beats me how he kept his position.

[Michele]

Originally Posted by MattII

He captured Jewish POWs in North Africa whom he refused to execute,

Actually Western Allied soldiers who were Jews normally weren't killed, nor sent to concentration camps. It happened in a handful of cases only. So Rommel didn't do anything special in this case.

[jmc247]

Originally Posted by MattII

Rommel wasn't perfect, but since he flat-out refused to hand over Jews to the Gestapo, or execute commandos you've got to admit he had a conscience, and a hell of a lot of guts. As for his support for assassination, considering the target, I think most people would be more in favour of him for it.

Today it certainly does, but one has to put themselves into the era. Rommel was already considered during the war to be honorable when it came to the the Americans, British, and to the Jews where he made a real effort to protect them wherever he was at even if it meant getting into fights with Arab nationalists, Hitler, or Himmler. He didn't need to be linked to Hitler being assassinated at that time to be liked among those key groups.

It was Rommel's amazing popularity he built up with ordinary Germans that protected him for so long and made him hard for the Nazis to deal with to the extent they had to fake his death from war wounds and have a state funeral entirely focused on the concept he always supported Hitler.

In regards to the attempt on Hitler's life it was the German population at the time that was the issue. I have met Germans of that era and even though they hate what Hitler did with every bone in their body, there is still a real kind of reluctance to approve of the attempt to kill him among that generation. They were really indoctrinated against certain concepts from an early age. So, a happy middle ground for Cold War reasons was promoted by the Allied governments and press that he wanted to overthrow Hitler and put him on trial for his crimes and not stab him in the back, which certainly given what I have read very well may have been his view in early 1944, but it became more of 'screw this we need to kill the entire Nazi leadership' as the year went on.

The episode was lets just say a bit of minipulation of history so that all those Hitler Youth and 20-30 somethings who fought at the time could look up to him as trying to save Germany without being too tied to the not so well supported at the time attempt to kill him.

After the war Rommel was turned into less of a real person and more of an apolitical anti-Communist symbol to support German rearmament among all aspects of their population except hard core socialists and Communists.





Of course today the way the Western Allies threaded the needle during the Cold War hurts the opinion of him in modern Germany where like in the film soon to be released in Germany they treat him as a coward at least according to some of the early reviews I read for not supporting Hitler being killed. Of course the film was developed and made before the classified British documents and audio tapes were released.

I will say reading the old newspaper documents pre-Cold War on the issue from the Nuremberg trials and the rest they were pretty upfront regarding him wanting the entire Nazi leadership killed off by 1944. But, then post Berlin blockade the news articles on him suddenly changed and what he wanted was to overthrow and put Hitler on trial not stab him in the back.

Its a good example of how history is often minipulated to suit policy ends and how an idea that is popular in one generation can be a fair bit less so a generation or two later.

Rommel was no anti-Nazi saint.

Of course not, he loved war and loved leading troops into battle. People in that era though really liked his strict view on the notion that armed combatants are fair game to be killed, but civilians must be kept off limits. Today though there is a far greater focus on when combatants should or shouldn't be killed then there was in that era and there is near unanimity today in the West that targeting civilians in war is wrong.

Keep in mind in that era it was considered acceptable, but not exactly liked to burn hundreds of thousands of civilians alive by creating fire storms in civilian areas as a part of 'war'. Today it would be viewed across the world as a horrible war crime if say Bush had ordered enemy cities firebombed. What is acceptable as a part of war changes with the era.

[pipisme]

Originally Posted by Gregorius

The July 20th plotters were out of touch with reality, and actually wanted to preserve what German conquered in the East. There would be no talks with Allies such as Poland or Czechoslovakia-as these areas in minds of the plotters were to be part of Germany directly or German vassals.
The most likely outcome is infighting between them and Nazis and quicker collapse of Germany.

Here are the preconditions laid down by von Stauffenberg in early summer 1944 for negotiations with the allies:
1. Immediate abandonment of aerial warfare [by the Allies].
2. Abandonment of invasion plans.
3. Avoidance of further bloodshed.
4. Continuing function of [German] defence strength in the East. Evacuation [by Germany] of all occupied regions in the North, West and South.
5. Renunciation of any occupation [of Germany by the allies].
6. Free government, independent, self-chosen constitution [by Germany]
7. Full co-operation in the carrying out truce conditions and in peace preparations.
8. Reich borders of 1914 in the east. Retention of Austria and the Sudetenland within the Reich. Autonomy of Alsace-Lorraine. Acquisition of the Tyrol as far as Bozen, Meran.
9. Vigorous reconstruction with joint efforts for European reconstruction.
10. Nations to deal with own criminals.
11. Restoration of honour, self-respect and respect for others.

Source: Gestapo report on von Stauffenberg's conditions for negotiating with the Allies, early summer 1944, as quoted in Resistance and conformity in the Third Reich by Martyn Housden, London: Routledge, 1997.

[jmc247]

Originally Posted by pipisme

Here are the preconditions laid down by von Stauffenberg in early summer 1944 for negotiations with the allies:
1. Immediate abandonment of aerial warfare [by the Allies].
2. Abandonment of invasion plans.
3. Avoidance of further bloodshed.
4. Continuing function of [German] defence strength in the East. Evacuation [by Germany] of all occupied regions in the North, West and South.
5. Renunciation of any occupation [of Germany by the allies].
6. Free government, independent, self-chosen constitution [by Germany]
7. Full co-operation in the carrying out truce conditions and in peace preparations.
8. Reich borders of 1914 in the east. Retention of Austria and the Sudetenland within the Reich. Autonomy of Alsace-Lorraine. Acquisition of the Tyrol as far as Bozen, Meran.
9. Vigorous reconstruction with joint efforts for European reconstruction.
10. Nations to deal with own criminals.
11. Restoration of honour, self-respect and respect for others.

Source: Gestapo report on von Stauffenberg's conditions for negotiating with the Allies, early summer 1944, as quoted in Resistance and conformity in the Third Reich by Martyn Housden, London: Routledge, 1997.

No doubt Stauffenberg was living in lala land in that regard. The combo of regime change in Berlin and far greater military success at the beaches could have brought the Western Allies to consider something short of unconditional surrender, but they would have laughed at those conditions.

In this case Rommel was at least living in a closer to reality based world. He knew the Americans alone were producing 4 times as much as Germany in war material and the British and the Soviet's about as much each. He believed the Americans and the British understood that with Germany defeated Stalin would turn on them soon thereafter so his view was to try for a surrender with limited conditions, namely that the British and Americans occupy central Europe and keep the Soviet's out.

That was his view after the successful landings at Normandy. His view before then on what kind of conditions could be achieved with regime change and a successful defense of the Allied invasion is unclear.

Given it took nearly 70 years for the British to release tapes showing they knew before his death that he was telling other generals in France that Hitler had to be killed who knows how long it will take before they declassify the rest of their files dealing with Rommel and Speidel's attempts (successful or unsucessful) at under the table talks with Ike and Monty at Normandy and what Speidel really said to them after the war.

[Rich Rostrom]

Originally Posted by pipisme

Here are the preconditions laid down by von Stauffenberg in early summer 1944 for negotiations with the allies:

That may have been Stauffenberg's list; it is not clear that it would be the actual policy of the new regime. He would not be the head of it.

1. Immediate abandonment of aerial warfare [by the Allies].

One assumes the Germans immediately stop all V-weapon attacks. This offers a quid pro quo, which the Allies have at least some reason to accept. (Not that they would.)

2. Abandonment of invasion plans.

What does this mean? That the Allies renounce all future intent of entering Germany? In "early summer 1944" the western Allies have already invaded France.

3. Avoidance of further bloodshed.

That's a generality, not a specific condition.

4. Continuing function of [German] defence strength in the East. Evacuation [by Germany] of all occupied regions in the North, West and South.

Here is the first offer by Germany to give up something. This sounds like Germans evacuating Norway, Denmark, Finland (?) (the North), France, Belgium, Netherlands, Luxemburg (the West), Italy, Greece, Albania, and Yugoslavia (?) (the South). But - not withdrawing and continuing to fight in the Baltic states, USSR, Poland, and Romania. The date is key here. "Early summer" sounds like 22 June-22 July. Probably no later than 10 July, but that's still well into BAGRATION.

5. Renunciation of any occupation [of Germany by the allies].

Fuggedaboutit.

6. Free government, independent, self-chosen constitution [by Germany]

Fuggedaboudat too. The Allies will insist on a veto over any new German constitution.

7. Full co-operation in the carrying out truce conditions and in peace preparations.

A pointless generality.

8. Reich borders of 1914 in the east. Retention of Austria and the Sudetenland within the Reich.

Absurd.

Autonomy of Alsace-Lorraine.

Absurd and grotesquely offensive.

Acquisition of the Tyrol as far as Bozen, Meran.

As above. The neo-Germans presume, that because Germany has removed the Nazis, it now has status to make demands on moral grounds, including territorial demands on Allied countries in places (Alsace-Lorraine, the eastern borders, Tyrol), where the ethnic alignment is allegedly German.

9. Vigorous reconstruction with joint efforts for European reconstruction.

Generally a good idea. A platitude.

10. Nations to deal with own criminals.

Exactly what does this mean? That only Germany may judge and punish German criminals? Germany may wish to deal itself with those Germans who committed crimes against Germany. But Germans committed enormous crimes against other countries. This denies those countries the right to justice against those criminals, except as granted by Germany. On what basis can Germany now claim to stand between these criminals and their victims?

11. Restoration of honour, self-respect and respect for others.

Yet another platitude.

I notice no discussion of submarines.

Supposing the neo-Germans would issue this manifesto; the only response from the Allies would be "Unconditional surrender." The neo-Germans would then start to thrash, because that wasn't supposed to happen. Meanwhile COBRA has started, and also the Warsaw Uprising (BAGRATION is petering out).

If the manifesto has been made public - Finland will tell the Germans to get out of the country, and make peace ASAP. The question is whether (in the north) the Germans leave peacefully, or make a scorched-earth rear guard fight as OTL. I would hope they just go.

In Italy - Mussolini has just been thrown under the bus. The RSI forces start to dissolve - the men trying to disappear before the Germans leave rather than fight on their own (and be identified).

The Germans will also evacuate the Greek islands, and then Greece, regardless of what the Allies do.

In France - a general withdrawal from the west and south.

We'll guess the terms are issued on 30 July, the response is immediate, and it is understood by 3 August.

The neo-Germans will dither. They will get no official response except "Unconditional surrender", but they may get some unofficial feedback explaining that any German territorial demands are right out. (Especially Alsace-Lorraine, but also Austria, Sudetenland, and against Poland.) And that Germany is going to be occupied, and any new German government must first be accepted by the Allies whenever they get around to it.

The neo-Germans try again by 6 August - including release of US, British, and French PoWs, end of U-boat operations, withdrawal from the Baltic states, dropping the claims on Alsace-Lorraine, Austria, and Sudetenland, and offering Allied participation in German constitution-making. Perhaps also offering (de facto demanding) that the Allies accept custody of all the concentration camp inmates.

This starts to put a little pressure on the US and UK, but still "Unconditional Surrender". Meanwhile the Germans clear out of Finland, the Greek islands, and most of France. The DRAGOON landings in southern France get moved up five days, and meet no opposition.

Romania and Bulgaria are frantically negotiating to surrender, and not getting much response. Britain would like to see them avoid Soviet occupation, but there's little Britain can do. Hungary too is wiggling, but has no real choice. In Slovakia, a faction in the army is preparing a rebellion (which OTL came off at the end of August, partly misfired, and was suppressed over the next two months); it will be sooner and stronger. German forces also evacuate Estonia and Courland by August 20.

Strong local German counterattacks punish the Soviet lead elements in Poland, and secure the Vistula north and south of Warsaw, which falls to the Polish Home Army.

Allied troops land in Crete and Rhodes 18 August; Athens and Lesbos, 21 August.

Romania surrenders to the Allies and declares war on Germany on 18 August, anticipating Soviet attacks by two days. Bulgaria follows Romania on 20 August. German forces that can simply evacuate west and north, with extensive skirmishing. Others (especially in Romania) are trapped, as Soviet forces zip through Romanian positions and join in the fighting.

On 22 August, Hungary announces its surrender, leading to heavy fighting with German forces in the country. On 26 August, the Slovak National Army rises against the Germans. On 28 August, Slovak troops capture the Dukla Pass through the Carpathians; on 4 September Soviet troops reach the Pass from the east.

On the same day, Allied forces from southern France link up with forces from Normandy near Dijon and with forces in Italy near Genoa. However, British forces trying to cross the lower Seine are repulsed near Rouen. German forces which have retired in good order from western France have formed a strong line on the Seine.

After their second proposal is rejected, the neo-German regime begins to panic. Finally a third more modest measure is offered - a five day truce on the Western front (including cessation of bombing) while western Allied PoWs and camp inmates are repatriated en masse. This is an offer the US and UK could not refuse, despite Stalin's indignation, and the truce begins on 10 September.

But when the truce expires with tens of thousands of transferees still in transit, the US and UK are faced with a grim choice. German aircraft, relieved of anti-bomber duties, had been shifted to the Eastern Front to harry the Soviets; and many of the British, American, and French representatives who had entered Germany to oversee the prisoner movement accuse the Germans of dragging out the transfers in hopes of prolonging the truce. The US and UK refuse to extend the truce. Only 59,000 prisoners have been transferred.

On 16 September, with five days rest to prepare, 3,700 Allied bombers hit targets in Germany. And to mollify Stalin, the demand for unconditional surrender is renewed. British and American forces cross the Seine in four places, and the French First Army breaks through Belfort Gap into Alsace. All of Italy is now clear except a few areas in the Alps. German rearguards are passing through Zagreb.

On 20 September German forces evacuate Paris. As a "good will gesture", the Germans declare Paris an "open city" and forego any demolitions or booby traps (they said).

In Berlin, the neo-German regime is in despair. It seemed nothing would shake the Allied insistence on unconditional surrender. Stauffenberg, the most ruthless of the neo-German leaders, proposes offering a separate peace to Stalin, but this is rejected. It is pointed out that if unconditional surrender was inevitable, and it seems that way, there is no point in delaying the surrender. With great bitterness, the neo-German leaders agree to this after another day's debate.

On 26 September Germany announces its surrender effective October 1.

[Cook]

Originally Posted by pipisme

Here are the preconditions laid down by von Stauffenberg...

Dear Santa,

I have been a good boy (fingers crossed) and would like the following…

[Michele]

Originally Posted by Rich Rostrom

On 26 September Germany announces its surrender effective October 1.

Bravo, nice job.

[Gregorius]

Originally Posted by Rich Rostrom

That may have been Stauffenberg's list; it is not clear that it would be the actual policy of the new regime. He would not be the head of it.

Carl Friedrich Goerdeler was going to be head of the government.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Carl_Friedrich_Goerdeler

In September 1943, Goerdeler appealed to his friend Jacob Wallenberg to ask that the British suspend bombing attacks against Berlin, Stuttgart and Leipzig until the middle of October because "the oppositional movement has its centres there and the interruption of communications would make the putsch more difficult"[131] In a memo Goerdeler sent to the British and American governments in the fall of 1943, he called for a negotiated peace between the Allies and Germany once the Nazis were overthrown.[3] In the same memo, Goerdeler called for the "1914 frontier" to serve as the basis of Germany's borders both in Western and Eastern Europe, called for Austria and the Sudetenland remaining part of the Reich, and for the annexation of the south Tyrol region of Italy.[3]

He also wanted to deported majority of Jews to South America.
Yup, the July 20th plot members were that nice bunch of chaps.

[Simon]

Originally Posted by Rich Rostrom

This starts to put a little pressure on the US and UK, but still "Unconditional Surrender". Meanwhile the Germans clear out of Finland, the Greek islands, and most of France. The DRAGOON landings in southern France get moved up five days, and meet no opposition.

If Germany is visibly retreating from southern France and France in general as fast as they can I could see Churchill returning to his old hobby horse and pressing for it to be re-tasked somewhere else like the Balkans, whatever the feasability. Not sure doable it is or how receptive the American would be though.