Hitler does not give "stop order" in 1940

[Alternate History Geek]

WI Hitler had not given his "stop order" of 24 May 1940?

Would the British Expeditionary Force have been crushed?

[wiking]

Edit:
I've been schooled.

[Cook]

Originally Posted by Alternate History Geek

Would the British Expeditionary Force have been crushed?

Yes, undoubtedly they'd have lost at the very least well over half of the troops that were eventually evacuated from Dunkirk, and the bulk of the front-line combat troops.

Hitler actually issued two halt orders; on on the 17th of May and the second on the 24th, the first was because a gap had formed between the Panzer divisions leading the attack and the infantry following, the second was the infamous 'Furhrer Halt Order' to allow the Luftwaffe to destroy the B.E.F. and the French 1st Army.

He halted the Panzers in part because out of concern at the number of tanks that had been reported out of action over the previous days; this was a major mistake, most of the tanks reported out of action were due to mechanical breakdowns that could be repaired in hours or at most a couple of days, they had not been destroyed in combat.

It has also been claimed that the approaches to Dunkirk were not suitable for Panzers, this too is false; Guderian, who had experienced the terrain there first hand in the First World War, was fully confident that his Panzers would have no difficulties. From Guderian:

‘Hitler ordered the left wing to stop on the Aa. It was forbidden to cross the stream. We were not informed of the reasons for this. The order contained the words: ‘Dunkirk is to be left to the Luftwaffe.’ We were utterly speechless.’

When the order to halt came on the 24th, the Panzers had just secured crossings of the Aa Canal; the last physical obstacle of any sort between them and Dunkirk, only 15km (less than 10 miles) from the harbour and with no organised British forces of any signifigance between them and Dunkirk. Without the Fuhrer’s halt order the right flank of the allied pocket would not have gone static, allowing the B.E.F. and French 1st Armies to withdraw in good order to the coast as they did, there is every possibility that the German Army Groups could have met north Ypres sometime before the 28th of May, trapping more than half the forces that were subsequently evacuated. With much of their forces trapped in a pocket to the south, forming a secure perimeter near the coast would have been all but impossible.

If that had been the case, those evacuated would have consisted almost entirely of rear echelon personnel, supply and logistics staff, not combat personnel. Likewise, if the Germans had pushed harder and reached Dunkirk and the evacuation beaches only a few days earlier than they finally did, say on the 1st of June instead of the 4th, only 194,000 would have been evacuated.

So it is entirely possible, in fact it was probable, for the B.E.F. to be entirely destroyed, or for only a small portion of it to be evacuated consisting of none of the fighting soldiers, which brings us to the next question: What would Britain do next?

There is a popular perception that Britain would fight on alone regardless of the severity of the losses at Dunkirk. It is romantic to believe that Britain would have fought on no matter the odds, but it doesn’t reflect the historical facts. In fact this belief is the result of some very deliberate myth making by none other than Winston Churchill himself. All of his writing and every speech he gave after the war emphasised that Britain stood united in their darkest hour. This is manipulation of perception by a master of the art; where other lesser men might emphasise their personal role during the moment of crisis, especially after years being ridiculed in the wilderness, Churchill chose to emphasise British unity and resolve. It was his final gift to the British nation, that every English schoolboy would grow up believing that when faced with insurmountable odds, his countrymen didn’t waver, that every one of them stood resolutely determined to fight on to final victory. It is a beautiful and a masterful legacy and Churchill at his most magnanimous best, but it does not reflect historical truth.

If the B.E.F. had been lost, General Ironside’s assessment for the cabinet would have been extremely bleak. Prior to the evacuation, when he estimated that they would be lucky to get more than 40,000 men back to England, Ironside privately recorded that with 'the loss of the B.E.F. would spell the loss of all hope of continuing the war'. Ironside was not someone noted for exaggeration or for hysteria; if that was his professional opinion then it is likely to have been very close to the mark.

Churchill’s grip on power remained tenuous from May to August 1940. Many members of parliament, including Churchill himself, believed that his premiership would be short lived. There were many in parliament that were waiting for him to falter before they would make a move against him while others were actively conspiring to see him replaced. Churchill inherited Chamberlains cabinet and when he expanded it with the inclusion of some Labour Party members, merely expanded the cabinet rather than dispensing with the services of some of the less steadfast members. He was still heavily dependent on Chamberlain, who remained leader of the Conservative Party with strong support even after Churchill had replaced him as Prime Minister. Nor was he able to do without Halifax as foreign minister. Halifax and Chamberlain were only the most prominent members of parliament willing to explore peace negotiations, there were considerably more even after the B.E.F. had been successfully evacuated.

Had the B.E.F. been lost and the CIGS assessment of the war situation been as bleak as Ironside’s would undoubtedly have been, those looking for a negotiated way out of the crisis for Britain would have been seen as the only sane way to save Britain from invasion.

And Churchill is unlikely to have been able to avoid such peace feelers being approved by cabinet by inviting other, more reliable members into cabinet; aside from his lukewarm support in cabinet, he was also unable to judge who his real friends were in the wider parliament. During 1940 Churchill repeatedly asked David Lloyd-George, British Prime Minister during the First World War, to join his war cabinet. Lloyd-George refused because of the presence of Chamberlain in cabinet; the pair mutually detested each other and refused to work together. It was only late in 1940 that Churchill found out that Lloyd-George had been conspiring to replace him as Prime Minister with the intention of entering into peace negotiations with Hitler; a British Petain.

This does not mean that Britain would have surrendered; there would not have been columns of jackbooted soldiers marching through London. None of those looking to negotiate were talking of capitulation; the terms they were looking for were for an end in the fighting, preferably after some small British victory to improve her standing at the negotiations table.

Britain would have come out of the war largely intact, but those who had opposed fascism would have been thoroughly discredited. Just what parts of the Empire Britain lost would depend on when they entered negotiations, they lost British Somaliland shortly after Italy entered the war and this would probably have been demanded as part of any Italian terms. Just what else would be lost would depend heavily on the negotiators, and on what other sharks would have gathered once the scent of blood entered the water; Spain had become a pro-Axis non-belligerent on the day Paris fell and occupied the neutral city of Tangier and considered annexing it. With France defeated and Britain impotent and seeking an end to the fighting, Franco may have looked for other real estate to acquire while there was the opportunity.

With a much weaker Great Britain, America’s aid to the UK cannot be expected to have increased and would most likely have been a lot less. American support was based on the belief that Britain was strong enough to fight on alone and that anything sent to Britain would not end up in Nazi hands with the fall of the U.K.The term ‘aid’ is amusing in this context; American aid to Britain in 1940 consisted of allowing the British to buy arms and equipment from the United States, provided that the British pay for everything before if left the wharf. Pay in full, in gold. The first significant aid to Britain from America was the ‘Destroyers for Bases Agreement’ which wasn’t made until 2 September 1940, well after the timeframe of any British peace negotiations would probably have commenced and only took place because of the U.S. president’s assessment that Britain was still a credible combatant power; something that would not have been the case with almost the entire regular British Army languishing in German P.O.W. camps.

In June 1940 the US army’s War Plans Division drafted what came to be known as the ‘Strong Memorandum’ . The memorandum predicted the imminent defeat of Britain and France and called for immediate American mobilisation for hemispheric defence, termination of military aid to the allies and an entirely defensive American posture. Roosevelt was only willing to disregard the memorandum and continue support to the allies when his personal envoy Harry Hopkins had reported back to him that Britain could continue the fight. If Hopkins’ report had matched that of Ambassador Kennedy’s, that Britain was on the ropes, the American Strategic policy would have been to build up the defences of the Western Hemisphere exclusively.

With Britain withdrawing from the war the status of the Free Governments in Exile would have been extremely difficult if not impossible. A lot would depend upon the government that replaced Churchill’s, but certainly no peace agreement would be possible with Germany if Britain were harbouring enemies of the Reich. Depending on the time frame of negotiations, and the government, some would possibly be able to relocate to Washington, but once there they’d be unlikely to have any more influence than the members of the former Tsar’s administration had. Exiled governments such as the Dutch, with extensive colonial empires still loyal to them would probably move to the capital cities of the colonies. The position of de Gaulle and the Free French would be possibly the most difficult; they would not be able to flee to the United States because the U.S. still had diplomatic ties with the Vichy regime, and no significant French colony recognised them as a government.

For Hitler, a peace that left British power on the continent destroyed but still undefeated at home would be entirely acceptable; he would be secure in his realm and would have achieved everything he had set out to do in the west and could be confident that the British would reconcile themselves to the new order in Europe and any muttering s about wars of revenge would be isolated to the lunatic, warmongering fringe, who would not have a voice in the new government in London. He could then consider a readjustment of his relationship with Stalin at his leisure, planning for war against the Soviet Union some time in 1942-43 and undistracted by difficulties elsewhere.

The summery of Major General Julian Thompson, in his book ‘Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory’ puts it best:

'Gort’s decision to evacuate his army from Dunkirk saved the BEF. He may not have been a brilliant army commander – his faults have been discussed already and need no repeating. But he was able to see with absolute clarity that the French high command were utterly bankrupt of realistic ideas and that consequently Allied plans would lead nowhere, and he had the moral courage and unwavering willpower to act in the face of censure and criticism, thus ensuring that the BEF was saved. There are few occasions when the actions of one man can be said to be instrumental in winning a war. This was one of those. Had the BEF been surrounded, cut off and forced to surrender, it is inconceivable that Britain could have continued to fight without an army. That is not to say that Britain would necessarily have been occupied, but a humiliating accommodation with Hitler would surely have followed. Without continuing British resistance, weak at first but daily growing stronger, Hitler would have won the war. For the reasons already given, the United States was incapable of intervening to limit Hitler’s hold on Europe.'


Sources:
Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory by Major General Julian Thompson.
To Lose a Battle: France 1940 by Alistair Horne.
Blood, Tears and Folly by Len Deighton.
Fateful Choices by Ian Kershaw.
Finest Years: Churchill as Warlordby Max Hastings.
Eagle Against the Sun: The American war with Japan by Ronald H. Spector.
England’s Last War Against France: Fighting Vichy 1940 – 1942 by Colin Smith.

[Devolved]

Originally Posted by Cook

Yes, undoubtedly they'd have lost at the very least well over half of the troops that were eventually evacuated from Dunkirk, and the bulk of the front-line combat troops.

Hitler actually issued two halt orders; on on the 17th of May and the second on the 24th, the first was because a gap had formed between the Panzer divisions leading the attack and the infantry following, the second was the infamous 'Furhrer Halt Order' to allow the Luftwaffe to destroy the B.E.F. and the French 1st Army.

He halted the Panzers in part because out of concern at the number of tanks that had been reported out of action over the previous days; this was a major mistake, most of the tanks reported out of action were due to mechanical breakdowns that could be repaired in hours or at most a couple of days, they had not been destroyed in combat.

It has also been claimed that the approaches to Dunkirk were not suitable for Panzers, this too is false; Guderian, who had experienced the terrain there first hand in the First World War, was fully confident that his Panzers would have no difficulties. From Guderian:

‘Hitler ordered the left wing to stop on the Aa. It was forbidden to cross the stream. We were not informed of the reasons for this. The order contained the words: ‘Dunkirk is to be left to the Luftwaffe.’ We were utterly speechless.’

When the order to halt came on the 24th, the Panzers had just secured crossings of the Aa Canal; the last physical obstacle of any sort between them and Dunkirk, only 15km (less than 10 miles) from the harbour and with no organised British forces of any signifigance between them and Dunkirk. Without the Fuhrer’s halt order the right flank of the allied pocket would not have gone static, allowing the B.E.F. and French 1st Armies to withdraw in good order to the coast as they did, there is every possibility that the German Army Groups could have met north Ypres sometime before the 28th of May, trapping more than half the forces that were subsequently evacuated. With much of their forces trapped in a pocket to the south, forming a secure perimeter near the coast would have been all but impossible.

If that had been the case, those evacuated would have consisted almost entirely of rear echelon personnel, supply and logistics staff, not combat personnel. Likewise, if the Germans had pushed harder and reached Dunkirk and the evacuation beaches only a few days earlier than they finally did, say on the 1st of June instead of the 4th, only 194,000 would have been evacuated.

So it is entirely possible, in fact it was probable, for the B.E.F. to be entirely destroyed, or for only a small portion of it to be evacuated consisting of none of the fighting soldiers, which brings us to the next question: What would Britain do next?

There is a popular perception that Britain would fight on alone regardless of the severity of the losses at Dunkirk. It is romantic to believe that Britain would have fought on no matter the odds, but it doesn’t reflect the historical facts. In fact this belief is the result of some very deliberate myth making by none other than Winston Churchill himself. All of his writing and every speech he gave after the war emphasised that Britain stood united in their darkest hour. This is manipulation of perception by a master of the art; where other lesser men might emphasise their personal role during the moment of crisis, especially after years being ridiculed in the wilderness, Churchill chose to emphasise British unity and resolve. It was his final gift to the British nation, that every English schoolboy would grow up believing that when faced with insurmountable odds, his countrymen didn’t waver, that every one of them stood resolutely determined to fight on to final victory. It is a beautiful and a masterful legacy and Churchill at his most magnanimous best, but it does not reflect historical truth.

If the B.E.F. had been lost, General Ironside’s assessment for the cabinet would have been extremely bleak. Prior to the evacuation, when he estimated that they would be lucky to get more than 40,000 men back to England, Ironside privately recorded that with 'the loss of the B.E.F. would spell the loss of all hope of continuing the war'. Ironside was not someone noted for exaggeration or for hysteria; if that was his professional opinion then it is likely to have been very close to the mark.

Churchill’s grip on power remained tenuous from May to August 1940. Many members of parliament, including Churchill himself, believed that his premiership would be short lived. There were many in parliament that were waiting for him to falter before they would make a move against him while others were actively conspiring to see him replaced. Churchill inherited Chamberlains cabinet and when he expanded it with the inclusion of some Labour Party members, merely expanded the cabinet rather than dispensing with the services of some of the less steadfast members. He was still heavily dependent on Chamberlain, who remained leader of the Conservative Party with strong support even after Churchill had replaced him as Prime Minister. Nor was he able to do without Halifax as foreign minister. Halifax and Chamberlain were only the most prominent members of parliament willing to explore peace negotiations, there were considerably more even after the B.E.F. had been successfully evacuated.

Had the B.E.F. been lost and the CIGS assessment of the war situation been as bleak as Ironside’s would undoubtedly have been, those looking for a negotiated way out of the crisis for Britain would have been seen as the only sane way to save Britain from invasion.

And Churchill is unlikely to have been able to avoid such peace feelers being approved by cabinet by inviting other, more reliable members into cabinet; aside from his lukewarm support in cabinet, he was also unable to judge who his real friends were in the wider parliament. During 1940 Churchill repeatedly asked David Lloyd-George, British Prime Minister during the First World War, to join his war cabinet. Lloyd-George refused because of the presence of Chamberlain in cabinet; the pair mutually detested each other and refused to work together. It was only late in 1940 that Churchill found out that Lloyd-George had been conspiring to replace him as Prime Minister with the intention of entering into peace negotiations with Hitler; a British Petain.

This does not mean that Britain would have surrendered; there would not have been columns of jackbooted soldiers marching through London. None of those looking to negotiate were talking of capitulation; the terms they were looking for were for an end in the fighting, preferably after some small British victory to improve her standing at the negotiations table.

Britain would have come out of the war largely intact, but those who had opposed fascism would have been thoroughly discredited. Just what parts of the Empire Britain lost would depend on when they entered negotiations, they lost British Somaliland shortly after Italy entered the war and this would probably have been demanded as part of any Italian terms. Just what else would be lost would depend heavily on the negotiators, and on what other sharks would have gathered once the scent of blood entered the water; Spain had become a pro-Axis non-belligerent on the day Paris fell and occupied the neutral city of Tangier and considered annexing it. With France defeated and Britain impotent and seeking an end to the fighting, Franco may have looked for other real estate to acquire while there was the opportunity.

With a much weaker Great Britain, America’s aid to the UK cannot be expected to have increased and would most likely have been a lot less. American support was based on the belief that Britain was strong enough to fight on alone and that anything sent to Britain would not end up in Nazi hands with the fall of the U.K.The term ‘aid’ is amusing in this context; American aid to Britain in 1940 consisted of allowing the British to buy arms and equipment from the United States, provided that the British pay for everything before if left the wharf. Pay in full, in gold. The first significant aid to Britain from America was the ‘Destroyers for Bases Agreement’ which wasn’t made until 2 September 1940, well after the timeframe of any British peace negotiations would probably have commenced and only took place because of the U.S. president’s assessment that Britain was still a credible combatant power; something that would not have been the case with almost the entire regular British Army languishing in German P.O.W. camps.

In June 1940 the US army’s War Plans Division drafted what came to be known as the ‘Strong Memorandum’ . The memorandum predicted the imminent defeat of Britain and France and called for immediate American mobilisation for hemispheric defence, termination of military aid to the allies and an entirely defensive American posture. Roosevelt was only willing to disregard the memorandum and continue support to the allies when his personal envoy Harry Hopkins had reported back to him that Britain could continue the fight. If Hopkins’ report had matched that of Ambassador Kennedy’s, that Britain was on the ropes, the American Strategic policy would have been to build up the defences of the Western Hemisphere exclusively.

With Britain withdrawing from the war the status of the Free Governments in Exile would have been extremely difficult if not impossible. A lot would depend upon the government that replaced Churchill’s, but certainly no peace agreement would be possible with Germany if Britain were harbouring enemies of the Reich. Depending on the time frame of negotiations, and the government, some would possibly be able to relocate to Washington, but once there they’d be unlikely to have any more influence than the members of the former Tsar’s administration had. Exiled governments such as the Dutch, with extensive colonial empires still loyal to them would probably move to the capital cities of the colonies. The position of de Gaulle and the Free French would be possibly the most difficult; they would not be able to flee to the United States because the U.S. still had diplomatic ties with the Vichy regime, and no significant French colony recognised them as a government.

For Hitler, a peace that left British power on the continent destroyed but still undefeated at home would be entirely acceptable; he would be secure in his realm and would have achieved everything he had set out to do in the west and could be confident that the British would reconcile themselves to the new order in Europe and any muttering s about wars of revenge would be isolated to the lunatic, warmongering fringe, who would not have a voice in the new government in London. He could then consider a readjustment of his relationship with Stalin at his leisure, planning for war against the Soviet Union some time in 1942-43 and undistracted by difficulties elsewhere.

The summery of Major General Julian Thompson, in his book ‘Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory’ puts it best:

'Gort’s decision to evacuate his army from Dunkirk saved the BEF. He may not have been a brilliant army commander – his faults have been discussed already and need no repeating. But he was able to see with absolute clarity that the French high command were utterly bankrupt of realistic ideas and that consequently Allied plans would lead nowhere, and he had the moral courage and unwavering willpower to act in the face of censure and criticism, thus ensuring that the BEF was saved. There are few occasions when the actions of one man can be said to be instrumental in winning a war. This was one of those. Had the BEF been surrounded, cut off and forced to surrender, it is inconceivable that Britain could have continued to fight without an army. That is not to say that Britain would necessarily have been occupied, but a humiliating accommodation with Hitler would surely have followed. Without continuing British resistance, weak at first but daily growing stronger, Hitler would have won the war. For the reasons already given, the United States was incapable of intervening to limit Hitler’s hold on Europe.'


Sources:
Dunkirk: Retreat to Victory by Major General Julian Thompson.
To Lose a Battle: France 1940 by Alistair Horne.
Blood, Tears and Folly by Len Deighton.
Fateful Choices by Ian Kershaw.
Finest Years: Churchill as Warlordby Max Hastings.
Eagle Against the Sun: The American war with Japan by Ronald H. Spector.
England’s Last War Against France: Fighting Vichy 1940 – 1942 by Colin Smith.

I agree with much of what is written here but I am sceptical of anything the Nazi generals said after the war. They blamed all failures on Hitler and it was never their fault. I have a feeling Guderian was trying to keep his new job as an after dinner speaker at the wartime nostalgia gatherings.

In the case of British Generals like Ironside. The fact that he only expected 40,000 men to be recovered either shows how miraculous Dunkirk was or Ironside's own lack of understanding of military realities. Churchill replaced him quite quickly as he saw many of the top brass as defeatist (or realist depending on your view). It took him until late '42 to get rid of the worst of the old guard and have leaders who weren't overcome by the scale of events.

It's also telling that Gort never held a field command again. He did good work as governors of Malta and Gibralter but he was not trusted on a battlefield.

[Cook]

Originally Posted by Devolved

I agree with much of what is written here but I am sceptical of anything the Nazi generals said after the war.

Halder argued with Hitler against both of the halt orders, which is undoubtedly why he, of the few senior officers involved in the campaign, was conspicuously not promoted or awarded afterwards. And Guderian disobeyed the first halt order and was threatened with dismissal if he did it again.

[jmc247]

Stalin's best hope here would be to try to buy time with Germany. If he can put off the attack to 1942 he would have the forces to fight Germany to a long and bloody draw. Offering Hitler to carve up Turkey together no pun intended would be a good bet for Stalin. Him offering land to buy time would also be a good bet.

Otherwise, the full might of the entire Germany Army is coming at him in 1941 including most of the forces left in Western Europe OTL and the 1/6th the German Air Force, the tons of trucks, the German and Italian tanks, officers and troops that OTL had to fight in Italy. There would also be no Lend Lease to the Soviet Union.

The one thing Stalin would have on his side would be his forces would be on high alert the entire Summer of 1941 and even then I think the Soviet Union gets steamrolled if the attack occurs that year.

[BlondieBC]

Cook's post largely matches what I have read. The BEF is largely lost. Now the political dynamic is complex, but in many/most cases it will result in the UK leaving the war. I know there are sources that say the "UK fights on to the last man" and the many Churchill speeches. It is possible that some of the leaders sincerely believed it, but it is important to look at other countries that left major wars after humiliating defeat.

Japan - Took the Emperor intervention at the very end. Mere hours or days before surrendering, you should be able to find lots of documents/diaries about fighting on.

Germany in WW2. Hitler was delusional until the end. It was only after D-Day that the reality begins to sink into the flag officers.

Germany in WW1. Went from we are winning to make peace today in a few months.

Tsar - He believed he could stay in war until almost the very end despite good evidence by middle of 1916 he had to make peace. Then the Whites and then the Reds were too optimistic until the the very end. You can find a lot more examples in history. The underlying reality of defeat is clear long before senior leaders accept the defeat. The process of "we can hold on" to "we must surrender" is normally pretty short (days to weeks).


Now Cook does a nice job with the underlying reality of the situation. The details will vary, but a lot of things will break badly compare to OTL for the UK. The UK likes to talk about how the RN could defend the shores and how these evacuated troops were not used again for many months/years. These facts are largely true, and are often used to justify that the UK could fight on, but they ignore what the UK is likely to do. Panic can't be ruled out, but even without panic, the UK always kept sizeable land forces to defend the UK even when the RN could likely win at sea. They did this in both WW1 and WW2, so they likely do this again here. The UK will be pulling forces from around the world to replaced the lost BEF. They will not be attacking the Italians in North Africa, but instead be drawing down forces to the minimum seen as need for defense. They will seriously consider abandoning the Med Sea and the Suez, even thought I doubt they will do it fully. Stripping colonies of almost all soldiers is a given. They may well pull even more RN forces to the home island. Something like the forces in RN Egypt being sent to the British Isles. While all this may not make military sense and it may not make sense to modern readers, it is critical to understand that the UK had been using invasion scares to get extra naval funding for at least two generations. And telling the public that your country can easily be invaded has a price. The price here happens to be that the BEF forces need to be replaced to avoid public panic.

And this panic (or if you prefer hasty repositioning) will be obvious and will have diplomatic consequences. Spain may make demands. The USA is may abandon the UK. The USA might even go the the UK with demands to turn over control of British possession in the Western Hemisphere to the USA. It was the actual plan if the UK fell. We should not dismiss the possible effect of the UK cabinet having to consider an USA "request" for annexing many smaller islands on the morale of the UK cabinet. Japan always gets aggressive when face with weakness, and as forces are rapidly stripped from the far east, Japanese demands are sure to follow. The whole Pacific diplomacy will unfold differently, assuming it can even get that far. I am less familiar with Indian politics, but I would not rule out demands coming from India for things like immediate Dominion status.

I can't rule out the UK fighting on, the USA coming to its aid, and the Allies eventually wining, but it does look like this is less likely than the UK effectively leaving the war.

[jmc247]

Would be world conquorers have a habit of biting off more then they can chew. There is a not small chance that had the British been knocked out of the war Hitler would have still found new ways to screw things over for himself and the rest of Europe.

[Devolved]

Originally Posted by BlondieBC

Cook's post largely matches what I have read. The BEF is largely lost. Now the political dynamic is complex, but in many/most cases it will result in the UK leaving the war. I know there are sources that say the "UK fights on to the last man" and the many Churchill speeches. It is possible that some of the leaders sincerely believed it, but it is important to look at other countries that left major wars after humiliating defeat.

Japan - Took the Emperor intervention at the very end. Mere hours or days before surrendering, you should be able to find lots of documents/diaries about fighting on.

Germany in WW2. Hitler was delusional until the end. It was only after D-Day that the reality begins to sink into the flag officers.

Germany in WW1. Went from we are winning to make peace today in a few months.

Tsar - He believed he could stay in war until almost the very end despite good evidence by middle of 1916 he had to make peace. Then the Whites and then the Reds were too optimistic until the the very end. You can find a lot more examples in history. The underlying reality of defeat is clear long before senior leaders accept the defeat. The process of "we can hold on" to "we must surrender" is normally pretty short (days to weeks).

In the cases of Germany in 1918, Japan in 1945 and Russia in 1917 there was war weariness among the population and economic collapse. It wasn't a case of suddenly changing minds from fighting on to giving in. There were many things over a long period of time that resulted in those decisions.

Those precedants don't stand up in the 1940 scenario. The war was only 9 months old by June 1940. War weariness was not an issue until the defeats of early to mid 1942.


The British government made its decision to continue the war before the end of May 1940 when many expected that the BEF was all but lost.



The fall of France and its huge army was the issue of most concern and not the potential loss of the BEF which had been largely written off anyway until they were evacuated in numbers not expected.


Losing the BEF badly damages Britain's future ability to fight the war on land but the survivors of Dunkirk weren't really used again until mid 1941 onwards. They played no role in Operation Compass or the conquest of Italian East Africa and were in no condition to help repel an invasion in the critical summer months of 1940.


Also the chances of losing the whole BEF were next to none. There were approx 250,000 British troops in the perimeter plus huge numbers of French and Belgians. The French units were fighting hard. Thousands would still have escaped no matter what the Germans did. There were also large British forces being landed elsewhere in France and these were withdrawn in June. Britain's main defence after Dunkirk was the navy and air force and the survivors of Dunkirk didn't really come into the equation.


The issue wasn't defeat it was whether Britain could achieve anything by fighting on without Allies. Churchill had persuaded the cabinet that holding out was a viable option and that the US would provide help and eventually enter the war.


The decisions taken OTL in May/June/July 1940 were not dependent on a successful evacuation from Dunkirk. It certainly helped things but IMO it wasn't decisive.

[Magnum]

Could Franco see a "once in a lifetime opportunity" in the event that the BEF is captured and join the axis, just like Mussolini ?

[Shaby]

Originally Posted by Magnum

Could Franco see a "once in a lifetime opportunity" in the event that the BEF is captured and join the axis, just like Mussolini ?

I don't think so. Franco mostly worried about being unable to get food and oil from US and Germany being unable to fill the gap. He would only join after Britain retreats from the war.

[AdA]

Sun Tzu said that the most economical way of defeating an oponent is to partially sorround him, but leave a narrow way out, so they might flee rather than fight.
Assumption on the losses of the BEF should consider that by allowing Dunkirk the Germans got rid of the whole of the BEF manpower for months, of the whole of its equipment for good, demoralized the French and did that without any casualties.
If the BEF (and the large French forces that were with it) would surrender without much fighting once the Panzers reached the sea, it would be great. But if they decided to fight as long and hard as they could, German casualties would be making a bad bargain.
If the BEF does a Singapure, the Germans win even more, but if it pulls a Coruna, the Germans are in a worst position for the unsuing battle of France, and the possibility of France continuing the war from its colonial possessions gets credibility point. (BEF dying heroically with their backs to the sea is a lot more inspiring for the French than the BEF swimming back home Michael Phelps fast...)

http://www.alternatehistory.com/disc...d.php?t=232056
http://1940lafrancecontinue.org/

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Devolved

In the cases of Germany in 1918, Japan in 1945 and Russia in 1917 there was war weariness among the population and economic collapse. It wasn't a case of suddenly changing minds from fighting on to giving in. There were many things over a long period of time that resulted in those decisions.

Those precedants don't stand up in the 1940 scenario. The war was only 9 months old by June 1940. War weariness was not an issue until the defeats of early to mid 1942.

The British government made its decision to continue the war before the end of May 1940 when many expected that the BEF was all but lost.

The fall of France and its huge army was the issue of most concern and not the potential loss of the BEF which had been largely written off anyway until they were evacuated in numbers not expected.

Losing the BEF badly damages Britain's future ability to fight the war on land but the survivors of Dunkirk weren't really used again until mid 1941 onwards. They played no role in Operation Compass or the conquest of Italian East Africa and were in no condition to help repel an invasion in the critical summer months of 1940.

Well, since the UK did not make peace in OTL, it obviously requires significant additional negative events. Losing the BEF would be one of these. You also seem to be missing the point about my analysis. In each of the cases listed, the powers intended to fight on mere months before giving in. They also had grandiose statements about fighting on. They had plans to win the war. The were taking actions to help win the war. The majority of the leaders probably believed they could win. But they were mistaken. These other examples clearly show that looking at the statements and plans of the leaders is a poor way to predict when a nation gives up. If I look at any of the examples listed a few months before the war ended and only looked at the plans and statements, I would conclude that none of them would surrender. The method you are using to determine when the UK leaves the war is a flawed method. You have to look at the battlefield results and the on the ground reality.

Now comparing the 1940 to the 1917/18 time frame is relevant. Let us look at some of the plus and minuses.

1) Large Plus - UK does not have food issues like A-H, Russia, and Germany had in WW1.

2) Negative - UK finances were as bad in 1940 as early 1917.

3) Negative - Russia and A-H had allies when they folded. UK does not yet.

4) Negative - BEF has been destroyed in this ATL.

5) Negative - UK had unstable coalition government. Germany and Russia had strong leaderships structure.

6) Negative - Germany can base off French coast.

7) Plus - Germany Navy is weaker.

Much like in WW1, we are dealing with a situation where Germany has the war won and then throws it away. Unlike WW1, the Germans winning is obvious to everyone in WW2. I am not disputing the intention of the UK to fight on, but the ability. You also missed my point on the BEF. The UK moves units to replace the lost BEF to the UK and the other operations are largely cancelled. While the BEF did not fight in 1940, they were largely the men counted on to help stop Sea Lion. And the point is not whether Sea Lion could have worked. The point is the mindset of the public. After over 2 generations of invasion scares done by the RN to gain funding, the UK public will simply panic if additional units are not brought to the UK after the BEF is lost.

[AdA]

"the Germans winning is obvious to everyone in WW2"

Blondie, from loosing the BEF to "Hitler in London" there are many steps that would not be obvious to the RAF, the Royal Navy and lots of others...

[Xachiavelli]

I think we might very well see Franco join in this scenario in order to claim French Morocco, Gibraltar and perhaps even French Catalonia if he's feeling particularly brave.

I will say however that if he joins it's likely going to be after Mussolini.

If we can twiddle one more thing, and that's to have Mussolini go for Malta straight away, which in July of 1940 wouldn't stand a chance, then you have the BEF destroyed, Malta and Somaliland in Italian hands, Gibraltar under siege and France down for the count. British morale would be shattered IMHO. Would they fight on? Perhaps, but ducking out would without a doubt be talked about

[jmc247]

Originally Posted by Xachiavelli

I think we might very well see Franco join in this scenario in order to claim French Morocco, Gibraltar and perhaps even French Catalonia if he's feeling particularly brave.

I will say however that if he joins it's likely going to be after Mussolini.

If we can twiddle one more thing, and that's to have Mussolini go for Malta straight away, which in July of 1940 wouldn't stand a chance, then you have the BEF destroyed, Malta and Somaliland in Italian hands, Gibraltar under siege and France down for the count. British morale would be shattered IMHO. Would they fight on? Perhaps, but ducking out would without a doubt be talked about

You aren't going to see Yugoslavia flip either and most likely join the Axis. This would have prefound effects on the time line even if the British do not bow out quickly.

[King Augeas]

Every opinion I read about the halt order seems to be different.
Wiki (yeah, yeah...) has this:

On 23 May, Günther von Kluge proposed that the German 4. Armee, which was poised to continue the attack against the Allied forces at Dunkirk, should "halt and close up".[186] Seeing the Allies were trapped in the city, Gerd von Rundstedt agreed with von Kluge. In the 4. Armee diary, it is recorded on 23 May "will, in the main, halt tomorrow [May 24] in accordance with Colonel-General von Rundstedt's order."[186] General Walther von Brauchitsch, commander in chief of the German Army, disagreed with his colleagues and wanted to continue the attack against Dunkirk by putting the 4. Armee under Bock. Bock was busy and Halder agreed with Von Rundstedt and with von Kluge to stop action against Dunkirk. The disagreement went to Hitler, who overruled Brauchitsch and agreed with stopping action against Dunkirk.[186] Hitler's error wasn't in making the command to halt the German army but in allowing the orders already drawn up by the German generals to stand.[186] It appears that Kleist also agreed with the halt order, which Hitler "rubber-stamped".[187] The halt order remains extremely controversial.[186]

This has Halder, Rundstedt, Kluge and possibly Kleist favouring halting, and Brauchitsch favouring an attack. Is this assessment accurate and fair? If it is, it's hardly surprising that Hitler sided with the three generals favouring a stop - choosing otherwise would surely be regarded as "interfering"?

[Devolved]

Originally Posted by BlondieBC

You also seem to be missing the point about my analysis. In each of the cases listed, the powers intended to fight on mere months before giving in. They also had grandiose statements about fighting on. They had plans to win the war. The were taking actions to help win the war. The majority of the leaders probably believed they could win. But they were mistaken. These other examples clearly show that looking at the statements and plans of the leaders is a poor way to predict when a nation gives up. If I look at any of the examples listed a few months before the war ended and only looked at the plans and statements, I would conclude that none of them would surrender. The method you are using to determine when the UK leaves the war is a flawed method. You have to look at the battlefield results and the on the ground reality.

Now comparing the 1940 to the 1917/18 time frame is relevant. Let us look at some of the plus and minuses.

1) Large Plus - UK does not have food issues like A-H, Russia, and Germany had in WW1.

2) Negative - UK finances were as bad in 1940 as early 1917.

3) Negative - Russia and A-H had allies when they folded. UK does not yet.

4) Negative - BEF has been destroyed in this ATL.

5) Negative - UK had unstable coalition government. Germany and Russia had strong leaderships structure.

6) Negative - Germany can base off French coast.

7) Plus - Germany Navy is weaker.

Much like in WW1, we are dealing with a situation where Germany has the war won and then throws it away. Unlike WW1, the Germans winning is obvious to everyone in WW2. I am not disputing the intention of the UK to fight on, but the ability. You also missed my point on the BEF. The UK moves units to replace the lost BEF to the UK and the other operations are largely cancelled. While the BEF did not fight in 1940, they were largely the men counted on to help stop Sea Lion. And the point is not whether Sea Lion could have worked. The point is the mindset of the public. After over 2 generations of invasion scares done by the RN to gain funding, the UK public will simply panic if additional units are not brought to the UK after the BEF is lost.

I'm not sure I missed the point of your analysis and I believed I answered it.

You listed Germany in 1918, Russia 1917 and Japan 1945 as examples of countries that seemed intent on fighting on and then asking for peace a few weeks or months later.

My answer was that those examples don't apply to the UK in 1940. I already listed war weariness as a factor with those other countries and that didn't apply in 1940.

Also Germany in 1918 wasn't strong. The Reichstag wanted peace negotiations in July 1917 and the political system was under terrible strain for a long time before it collapsed like a pack of cards. The German economy had been in decline since 1914, the people were hungry and the army exhausted. They got a renewed burst of energy after Brest Litovsk and then deflated quickly after Ludendorf's failure to force a decision in the West. Peace was not a sudden decision. It had been on many peoples minds for a long time.

Russia in 1917 was run by an autocratic government that had survived one revolution in 1905 and had been a poweder keg ever since. It's army had suffered enormous losses since 1914 and there were food shortages. The leadership was out of touch with the people and the army was becoming unreliable.

Japan in 1945 had it's navy destroyed in 1944 and its country starved of food and fuel plus extremely heavy air raids. Their plans to fight on were based on delusion rather than any strategic assessment.

As I said these examples couldn't be compared to Britain in 1940. The economy was in a difficult postion from the Treasury point of view but at face value GDP was rising, unemployment was falling and heavy bombing and shortages hadn't really happened yet. The man in the street knew little of the war except in the news papers and one of the problems of the government was convincing people that things were serious not dealing with a panic. There was little evidence of panic at that time. They would have known little of troop movements and if the country was defenceless after the loss of the BEF they wouldn't be told.

[Michele]

What I find remarkable here is that nobody seems to challenge the notion that if the halt order is not given, the BEF does get either entirely or in large part captured/destroyed.
And all of that on the basis of a couple of lines in a memoirs book by... Guderian?

This, even if somebody rightly wrote:

I agree with much of what is written here but I am sceptical of anything the Nazi generals said after the war. They blamed all failures on Hitler and it was never their fault. I have a feeling Guderian was trying to keep his new job as an after dinner speaker at the wartime nostalgia gatherings.

"Nobody looks bad in his own memoirs".

[Some Bloke]

Perhaps the destruction of the BEF will embolden Hitler to the point that he attempts an invasion.

(Ducks for cover).