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Mid-Eastern Proposal Regarding WW2
ABWEHR Hintergrund(Background)...Militarishe Nachrichtendienstliche Wertschätzung und Empfehlungen (Military Intelligence Appreciation & Recommendations) die Meisten Geheimnis On 1 Apr., Rashid Ali of Iraq, along with top officers known as the "Golden Square", conducted a coup d'état vs pro-British regent Prince 'Abd al-Ilah, who fled to Amman, Jordan. Rashid Ali did not overthrow the monarchy & has named a new regent to King Faisal II, who is a child. The leaders of Ali's "National Defence Gov't." have arrested many pro-British citizens & politicians, and the new gov't. has explained its policy to the German Min. of Foreign Affairs as refusing further concessions to the UK, to expel pro-British politicians, & to improve relations with Italy & Germany. On 17 Apr. the National Defence Gov't. asked Germany for military assistance in the event of war vs the UK. Under the Anglo-Iraqi Treay of 1930 the UK has the right to establish & use military bases in Iraq and the right to the unrestricted passage of Brit. troops thru Iraq. The stated Iraqi policies indicate a clear intention to violate those treaty provisions at some point, which will undoubtedly lead to a Brit. military attempt to enforce them. The armed forces of Iraq are inadequate to defend the country vs the UK. The fall of Iraq to Brit. aggression would have profound consequences with regard to the Vichy French colonies of Syria & Lebanon, to the posture of Turkey & Iran, & possibly to the campaign in North Afrika. Although under the terms of its armistice with Germany Vichy France is obligated to defend its territories, & will probably fight, it is unlikely to do so with sufficient vigor to defend them vs the UK. We therefore face a situation in which Iraq, Iran, Syria, & Lebanon are presently all pro-Axis, & Turkey is delaying its decision on whether or not to enter the war as an Axis partner-- but within a matter of weeks, if the UK invades Iraq, this entire situation could reverse itself. Iraq, Syria, & Lebanon could all be occupied by Brit. troops, while Iran & Turkey could find themselves forces to adopt more neutral postures. Furthermore, a pro-Axis gov't. in Iraq would have profound effects on the supply of oil to the UK via the Persian Gulf, the policies of the Iranian & Turkish gov'ts., as well as on Brit. deployments in Egypt & possibly India, which might favorably influence the campaign in North Afrika. The decision on whether & how much aid to provide Iraq is therefore very much an all-or-nothing proposition. Sufficient aid will have profound favorable consequences in the theatre. Inadequate aid will most likely result in the complete loss of all German influence thruout the theatre, from Turkey to the Indian Ocean & from India to Egypt. Krafte(Forces)... The Royal Iraqi Army is composed of approximately 60,000 men, most of whom serve in 4 infantry divs. & 1 motorized bde. The 2nd Div. is stationed in Kirkuk in the N. & the 4th Div. is in Al Diwaniyah between Baghdad & Basra. The 1st & 3rd Divs. & the Indep. Mech. Bde. are all stationed near Baghdad. Also based near Baghdad are 2 bns. of motor. infantry, a light tank co., an armoured car co., a motor. MG co., & a motor. artil. bde. UK forces presently in Iraq incl. the RAF No. 1 Armd. Car Co. & 6 companies of Assyrian levies. In neighboring Palestine there is the 1st Cavalry Div., incl. the 4th, 5th, & 6th Cavalry Bdes. Also in the region are : the 1st Bn. of the Essex Rgt., RAF No. 2 Armd. Car Co., a battery of 25-pdr. howitzers from the 60th Field Regiment, Royal Artillery, an anti-tank battery, elements of the Arab Legion, consisting of 3 motorized bns. (The Arab Legion isn't part of the Brit. Army, but is the regular Army of Transjordan.); & the 21st & 25th Bdes. of the 7th Australian Div. are training in Palestine along with the 5th Indian Inf. Bde. of the 4th Indian Div. & might be available for an operation in Iraq, & the 1st &/or the 2d so-called "Free French" Bdes. may also be available. On 18 Apr. the 20th Indian Inf. Bde. (10th Indian Inf. Div.) landed at Basra. German intel has identified component units incl. the 2d Bn./8th Gurkha Rifles, 2d Bn./7th Gurkha Rifles, & the 3d Bn./11th Sikh Rgt. Other forces incl. the 3d Field Rgt,. Royal Artillery, & the 1st Bn. King's Own Royal Regiment, flown in from Karachi in India. Elements of the 10th Indian Inf. Div. are reported to be supporting this deployment (21st & 25th Indian Inf. Bdes.). The 8th Indian Inf. Div. (17th, 18th, & 19th Indian Inf. Bdes.) & 2d Indian Armd. Bde. are also believed to be supporting this deployment. Although Iraq does possess an air force, its pilot training is considered poor & the Brit. aircraft in the theatre will certainly confer Brit. air superiority. Absichten(Intentions)... The landing of the Brit. 20th Indian Inf. Bde. & associated units at Basra clearly indicates UK intentions towards Iraq. With the Brit. 1st Cavalry Div., the rest of the Brit. 10th Indian Inf. Div., & associated other units ready to invade, & the possibility of reinforcement by the Brit. 8th Indian & 7th Australian Divs. & the 2d Indian Armd. Bde., once overt hostilities begin Iraq is unlikely to survive for more than a few weeks. Our present experience in Greece indicates that when the UK decides to act in such situations, they can move with rapidity, so that the time to intervene-- if intervention is considered to be politically desirable-- is now. If this proposal is approved, then we must have German forces in position to defend against the invasion before it happens, or else Iraq is likely to collapse too quickly & it will be too late. Schlussfolgerungen(Conclusions)... Today, in the 2d half of Apr. 1941, Germany is heavily committed to the campaign to conquer both Greece & Yugoslavia, to the campaign in North Afrika & the siege of Tobruq, & plans are already underway to conquer Crete in May, & to invade the USSR in June. None of these preliminary & peripheral operations can be permitted to interfere with Operation Barbarossa. However, it would surely be criminal folly to permit entire nations to fall to the UK, when a few German divisions committed now could drive the British back, compromise their plans on 2 continents, secure the entire region for our flag, benefit our campaign in North Afrika, & possibly lead in the near term to Turkish & Iranian declarations of war, opening up a southern front against the USSR. Thus to aid Iraq now would actually contribute in a very meaningful way to the ultimate success of Barbarossa. -- more to follow -- |
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Empfehlungen(Recommendations)...
Germany now has time to move military advisors & 1 or 2 inf. divs. into Iraq, because a pro-Axis gov't. still controls the airstrips. Since this will be a critical corps-level command, the choice of a commander will be pivotal. OKH informs the Abwehr that if this proposal is approved, then without prejudice to Barbarossa they can make available Gen. d. Kav. (***) Erik Oskar Hansen to command the operation. Gen. Hansen served as CG of the 4th Inf. Div. in S. Poland (1939) & France (1940) with the rank of GenLt., where he was commended for his close cooperation with the spearheading panzer forces. After the fall of France he was promoted to the rank of Gen. d. Kav. Since Oct. 1940 he's been serving as chief of German military mission in Romania, & he's presently CG-designate to assume command of LIV Corps in June 1941 for Barbarossa. OKH assures us that another officer can be found for this position. Again, without prejudice to Barbarossa, OKH, the Luftwaffe, & the SS inform us that the following units can be made available : Gbjr. Div. 4 [Gbjr. Rgts. 13 & 91 (3 abt./ea.), Gbgs. Artil. Rgt. 94 (4 abt.), Recon. Abt. 94, Pzjr. Btr. 94, Gbgs. Pioneer Co. 94, & Gbgs. Signals Abt. 94], Balkans (in res.); GenLt.(**) Karl Eglseer (Oct. 1940 to present). As a gebirgsjaeger unit, this div. is highly trained, but since it's been in reserve status during the Yugoslav & Greek campaigns it lacks combat experience. Its size, with only 2 inf. rgts., will conserve airlift space. The div. is presently allocated for Barbarossa, but OKH feels that another formation can be found among our more recently raised divs. to fill in. Inf. Div. 164 [Inf. Rgts. 382, 433, & 440 (3 abt./ea.), Artil. Rgt. 220 (4 abt.), Recon. Abt. 220, Pzjr. Abt. 220, Pioneer Co. 220, & Signals Abt. 220], Balkans/ Greece; GenLt.(**) Josef Folttmann (Jan. 1940 to present). This div. is presently fighting its first campaign in Greece & is outperforming many more veteran units. The div. is presently not allocated for Barbarossa. Current thinking that it may be used as either a follow-on unit in Crete, or be transferred to Afrika, or possibly both in sequence. OKH feels that another formation can be found among our more recently raised divs. to fill in. SS/Inf. Bde. Motorisien 2 (SS/Inf. Stdten. 4 & 14, 2 stbn./ea., SS/Artil. Stbn. 2, SS/Recon. Stm. 2, & SS/Psjr. Btr. 2), Obf. Jean-Philippe Krieger (Feb. 1941 to present). This bde. has only recently been formed, is training in Germany, & has no mission allocation yet. This bde. would be deployed either with or without its vehicles, depending on the situation. Deutsche Militarischer Berater Abt. (German Mil. Advisory Bn.-- 400 men) Ob. Paul Weiss (just app'td.). This abteilung of military advisors is presently being assembled & trained. Arabic-speaking personnel are being identified in the event the proposal is approved. 1st Italian Alpini (Mtn.) Div. (Taurinese) [3d & 4th Alpini Rgts. (3 abt./ea.), 1st Alpine Artil. Rgt. (2 abt.), 53d & 162d CNNN Abt. (Blackshirt), 1st Ingenieur Abt., 305th Medical Sect., 130th Motor Transp. Sect., 60th Supply Sect. Abt.], Ethiopia, France, & the Balkans; Generale di Divisione Paolo Micheletti (May 1940 thru the present). The 1st Alpini Div. will operate under German command. In reserve on occupation duty in Greece-- 78th Inf. Div. (Res.) [195th, 215th, & 238th Inf. Rgts. (3 abt./ea.), 178th Artil. Rgt, (4 abt.), 178th Recon. Abt., 178th Pzjr. Abt., 178th Pioneer Abt., 178th Signals Abt.], French occ.; GenLt. (Artil. / **) Kurt Gallenkamp (Sep. '39-Sep. '41). This div. has no combat experience. The div. is presently allocated for Barbarossa, but OKH feels that another formation can be found among our more recently raised divs. to fill in. Also in reserve on occupation duty in Greece-- 6th Italian Inf. Div. (Cuneo / Res.) [7th & 8th Inf. Rgts. (3 abt./ea.), 27th Artil. Rgt. (2 abt.), 24th CNNN Legion (Blackshirt-- 2 abt.), 6th Ingenieur Abt., 6th Signal Abt.], France & Greece; Generale di Divisione Carlo Melotti (May 1940 thru the present). If committed, then the 6th Italian Inf. Div. will operate under German command. Artil. Bde. 101 [3 abt. towed 100mm artil., 1 abt. 150mm artil.]; Ob. Juergen Hausser. (Newly formed unit.) Flak Rgt. 101 [3 abt.]; Ob. Werner Stumpf. (Unit formed for Sealion, reallocated for Barbarossa but not redeployed, replaceable.) In addition Gen. Henri Dentz in Lebanon-Syria has 7 inf. bns. of regular French troops comprising the 6th Rgt., French Foreign Legion (4 bns.), & the 24th Colonial Inf. Rgt. (3 bns); plus 11 Arab. inf. bns., 2 artillery groups (4 bns.), & more than 90 assorted aircraft. As noted above, he may or may not fight, but alone he will not prevail. Because of the range from Greece to Iraq, Abwehr, in conjunction with OKH & the Luftwaffe, tentatively plans to withdraw roughly half (~100) of our FW-200 Kondor aircraft from other missions & assign them to this airlift. Staging thru Beirut (694 mi. from Athens), this airlift can deploy ~3000 men per sortie & perform a minimum of 1 sortie every 2 days. Our Kondors will be supplemented by enough Italian Fiat BR-20 Cicogna & SM-79 Sparviero bombers, reconfigured as transports, to match our airlift capability. This will get our 2 full divisions into Iraq within 6-7 days, all troops within 12-14 days, and the artillery & vehicles within another 12-14 days after that-- 24-28 days to airlift the entire corps. (Of course, the troops of the 164th Div. will deploy first with their artillery & vehicles, & so forth. See detailed airlift plan tab next under-- not provided.) The Luftwaffe informs the Abwehr that if this proposal is approved, then without prejudice to Barbarossa they can make available Ob. Ernst-August Roth to command Luftwaffe forces committed to the operation. Ob. Roth commanded KG-40 during the Battle of Britain & did well. He presently commands KG-28 in preparation for Operation Barbarossa. OKL feels that Ob. Roth's second in command is sufficiently experienced to assume command without prejudice to Barbarossa. If selected for this operation then Ob. Roth will be promoted to GenMaj. Luftwaffe combat elements can fly directly from Greece. These will consist of : I / ZG-76 (40 Bf-110s). This unit is presently deployed in Norway, where it is of marginal value, & is not a Barbarossa unit. It will be used in Iraq as a schnell-kampfer gruppe. III / JG-2 (40 Bf-109s). This is a French air defense unit, & is not allocated for Barbarossa. It will provide air superiority. 2 / II / KG 26 (12 He-111s). This unit is presently deployed in Norway, where it is of marginal value, & it is not a Barbarossa unit. In addition, our Italian allies will commit the following air forces : 36 SM-79 Sparviero bombers; & 36 Fiat G-50 Freccia fighters. The Italian & French aircraft will serve under German command. It is not yet known whether or not this arrangement will also apply to the Iraqis. Once friendly forces are deployed, they will be resupplied by Italian & possibly French aircraft. Negotiations with France are proceeding. Negotiations are also proceeding with Turkey & Iran to obtain committments to declare war & commit forces to this operation once Brit. aggression vs Iraq is clearly established. > * < This theatre command is deployable to Iraq without prejudice to Barbarossa or to other ongoing operations. In conjunction with Iraqi, Italian, & Vichy forces it has the capability to prevent & even to reverse a British attempt to conquer Iraq, threatening the British rear in Egypt & producing dramatic effects regarding our North African campaign. This proposal is submitted for the approval of der Fuehrer. -- proposal ends -- --Thegn. |
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#3
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Very neatly done. Unfortunately, it is impossible. The Axis air route to Iraq runs directly past Cyprus, which is occupied by Britain and has several air bases. Cyprus was something of a backwater in OTL's WW II, so it's easy to forget about it. It is true that a number of Axis warplanes did fly past Cyprus to Syria and Iraq; but only a small number. For the Axis to transport two full divisions to Iraq would require hundreds of flights; the British could not possibly fail to detect it. And of course it would be impossible to keep the arrival of large numbers of Axis troops secret in Iraq. The transport planes would be without escort, as no German fighters had the necessary range (except the Me-110, which had already proven a failure as an air superiority plane). The British could quickly deploy a couple of squadrons of Hurricanes to Cyprus; such a force would shoot down Ju-52s or Kondors like pigeons. Even Gladiators could do it. In addition, the transports would be intercepted over Iraq, by British fighters from Habbaniyah. (The proposal calls for sending the troops to Iraq before hostilities break out with the British.) And of course if the Germans are using all their transport for the lift to Iraq, they aren't executing the airborne attack on Crete, which stays in Allied hands. |
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#4
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Furthermore, if the Axis intervention is vigurous enough, Habbaniyah airbase could very well fall early on to the Iraqis. However, over the long term, I think the only chance the Germans have of succes in the area would be to have Turkey accept transit rights for Axis suplies via the railroad to Mosul. Given that they weren't totally opposed to this early on OTL, the Germans might have a shot at gaining friendly regimes from the Golan Heights all the way to the Pakistani-Iranian border. Wiki: Quote:
I'm really glad someone is making a TL with a strong axis involvement in Iraq. I find it a very interesting concept and would be really glad to read more of this. |
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#5
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Rich Rostrom...
"Very neatly done." Thank you. I tried. "Unfortunately, it is impossible." Strong words, don't you think? I'd have preferred something more along the lines of, "Unfortunately, there are a few probems with your proposal as written." "The Axis air route to Iraq runs directly past Cyprus...(but) it's easy to forget about it." You're right-- I forgot about it. Ordinarily a proposal like this would have been produced by a staff, & somebody would have caught that before it got this far. Obviously I wrote this myself-- & didn't. ...so instead of flying past Cyprus into Beirut, let's fly from Plovdiv or Varna into Aleppo. The only difference is that you'd need Turkish permission to overfly their territory, which in light of Magnum's observations below yours would almost certainly have been forthcoming. The UK would be unlikely to risk a full-scale war with Turkey by flying into Turkish airspace to attack the transports, assuming they even found out about 'em 'til it was too late-- which they probably wouldn't have. ...and you're right, if the Turks do grant permission then that's tantamount to a declaration, but there's a big difference between granting permission for overflights & having a neighboring country with a large army sending troops to contest the UK invasion of Iraq. ...but this raises another issue. It's a short step from permission to overfly to granting permission to land & refuel aircraft. Turkey might very well have granted this because the whole idea was to stabilize Iraq, which was in the Turkish nat'l. interest. (Turkish relations with the UK were pretty cool at the time because the UK had occupied Iraq at the end of WW1, which had previously been Turkish territory; had stripped Mosul from the Ottoman Empire in 1926, & instead of returning it had set up the whole thing as an indep. country in 1932-- so if the UK will invade Iraq, then is Turkey next? Arguably so.) And if they do, then we can use the shorter-ranged Ju-53 instead of the Kondor. We've got a lot more Ju-53s than Kondors. "For the Axis to transport two full divisions to Iraq would require hundreds of flights; the British could not possibly fail to detect it." True. Flying past Cyprus they'd definitely know, but overflying Turkey they probably wouldn't. See below for how we'll handle this. "And of course it would be impossible to keep the arrival of large numbers of Axis troops secret in Iraq." By the time they found out about that it'd be too late. "The transport planes would be without escort..." True. "In addition, the transports would be intercepted over Iraq..." Your critique led me to perform a little extra research, & it turns out there's an even better way to deliver the troops & equipment without flying into Iraq at all. Airlift everything into Aleppo, which was part of Vichy Syria. The Baghdad Railway was completed by 1940 & ran from Istanbul thru Aleppo & Mosul into Baghdad. ...and yeah, the BR was vulnerable to Brit air attack, but 1st of all the Brits would be unlikely to know about this until the operation was in full swing & the first troops were already in Baghdad, & 2d they didn't have that many planes. If we're the Nazis, then put our a/c in Aleppo to protect the troop movement, & shift 'em to Baghdad immediately afterward. While we're planning the airlift into Aleppo we'll also have to be negotiating with the Turks for everything we can get. Overflight permission as a minimum to keep us clear of Cyprus. Even better, refueling permission to enable us to use Ju-53s instead of Kondors. Or even better than that, permission to ship our divisions & equipment on the Baghdad RR so we don't have to use transport a/c at all. Like I said above, this in the Turkish nat'l. interest. (Being that we're all evil Nazis here, I've also got an idea for how to get the Turks to go along with this if they're reluctant. Sign a secret protocol agreeing that after the war you'll return Iraq to Turkish sovereignty. This screws your Iraqi allies, but who really cares about them? This is all about geopolitical realities, not about being nice to your friends. After the war, if you don't want to go along with this, then you can always find pretexts to delay.) "...if the Germans are using all their transport for the lift to Iraq, they aren't executing the airborne attack on Crete..." The airborne invasion of Crete took place on 20 May, although fighting continued thru the end of the month. Although the proposal doesn't specifically say when the Iraq thing would take place, the proposal was obviously written shortly after 18 April. Assuming the proposal was written & submitted on the 22d (it's obviously a hasty effort) & got to Hitler and was approved on the night of Wednesday the 23d (he was a late riser & usually worked at night), the ground units were already pretty much in place, but it might have taken a week or 2 to assemble the Kondors & Italian a/c. (Faster than that if we're using Ju-53s, because they had to be ready for Crete anyway.) So we're ready to roll, at the latest, by 7 May. We deploy to Iraq from 8-18 May-- except flying into Aleppo we'd have a faster turnaround-- & we're still ready to invade Crete by the 20th. ...or, if we get permission to use trains then we can load sooner, take a little more time getting there, & be in place even earlier. Excellent comments, BTW. You made me scramble. Magnum... "I think the transport planes could fly over Cyprus at night..." I don't like the flying at night idea. Too risky. Better to shift the air route north, miss Cyprus by a wide margin, & use the Baghdad Railroad to move troops into Iraq. "Furthermore, if the Axis intervention is vigurous enough, Habbaniyah airbase could very well fall early on to the Iraqis." With all due respect, I'm not sure about this either. The Axis troops are essentially defensive in nature, intended to preserve Iraq & the Vichy colonies but not really equipped to take offensive action vs the Brits. To threaten it, yeah. But to really do it? Doubtful. ...of course, if the Turks let us use the Baghdad RR then we can send & supply a full panzer div. That turns the whole freakin' war around. Not sure they'd approve this, though, because cooperating with sending a panzer div. is much more belligerent than merely allowing the passage of defensive troops. (Unless, of course, you promise when the war is over to give 'em Iraq.) "...the only chance the Germans have of success...would be to have Turkey accept transit rights for Axis supplies..." I think the resupply of a small force by air is possible, at least over the short term, but supply thru Turkey by RR is more likely to be approved than the refueling of transport planes. The Turks could simply turn a blind eye to the RR cargos & if challenged, claim they knew nothing about it. (Besides, as you point out, they did approve it in OTL.) "...the Germans might have a shot at gaining friendly regimes from the Golan Heights all the way to the Pakistani-Iranian border." Exactly the point of the proposal. -- Thegn. |
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This cripples british air operations, while at the same time giving Ali a much needed victory, important both for morale, as well as for his bargaining position with the axis. |
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...but with the reservation that I tend to be a little more reserved than this about relying on Wikipedia, I'll take your word for it. There's little point to a debate when essentially you're agreeing with me. And even if Raschid Ali's forces might have lacked the morale or the tactical skill to out-fight the Brits, the rest of your implied point is that the Nazis might have prevailed, which I'll grant is possible. That said, it isn't necessary for the Nazis to conduct or to win an offensive in this scenario in order to win. The Nazis for once are on the defensive vs the Brits, who have to conquer Iraq in order to win. And that, with the force structures specified & the Nazis fighting an essentially defensive, economy-of-force campaign with limited offensive action, I maintain would be very hard for the Brits to do. As the Nazi commander on the ground, I would therefore consider offensive ops-- on principle, but maybe not in this particular case-- an unwarranted risk. So, as I say, you may be right. Quote:
As for Raschid Ali's chances of winning, given what happened when he attacked Basra in OTL...? Granted, Basra was defended by a reinforced bde., & Habbaniyah by a scratched-together hodge-podge, but there appear to have actually been more troops at Habbaniyah, so everything depends on their morale, training, equipment, tactical skills, &tc. It could go either way. Thegn. |
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Hi,
Is there any chance this might develop into a TL ? |
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#9
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Good beginning. It might even work out for the Germans in the end.
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Quoted posts: 1 Vlad Tepes Awards: 1 |
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Those lucky Germans. They get to spend the rest of the war in a British POW camp rather than fighting the soviets. The Turks are not going to join the war on the side of the Germans or let them violate their neutrality. IOTL they only joined the war several days before it ended. I'm pretty sure the Turks wouldn't event want Iraq back, this is the Republic of Turkey not the Ottoman Empire. So assuming that the Germans manage to place the troops in Iraq they'll have to surrender eventually due to lack of supplies.
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#11
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Thegn,
What is the point of such a move; it consumes materials that would be much more valuable if sent to Rommel to kick the British out of Egypt whilst they are still weak; those forces dispatched to Iraq would be in a hopeless supply situation and have a difficult time bringing along and fighting without their heavy weapons like tanks and artillery This could also provoke a serious Russian diplomatic problem as well; as the middle east was not covered in the M-R pact and Stalin had shown very clear intentions that he wouldn't take German moves in this theater lightly; Stalin could take this as excuse to move on Turkey for example which would not be beneficial to the German cause
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#12
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Nor were the Brits especially weak in May-June of '41. Rommel couldn't advance because half his army was tied down besieging Tobruq & his supply line stretched all the way back to Tripoli. The Brits were building their strength for Brevity in mid-May, Battleaxe in mid-June, & Crusader in November. Rommel didn't mount a single major attack since occupying Halfaya Pass on 26-27 May. The initiative was all with the Brits. Quote:
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18 May is just a month before Barbarossa. Perfect timing. If Stalin did redeploy troops to the Turkish border, then right about the time they would have been getting there Germany would have been launching its invasion. Quote:
1st it would have brought Turkey into the war as a German ally. 2d any Russian forces diverted to the Caucasus front would have been unavailable to oppose Barbarossa a month later. ...and 3d Russian forces on the Caucasus front would have made Iran very nervous, possibly leading to an eventual Iranian declaration of war. The Iranian thing would have taken a little extra diplomatic maneuvering on the part of Germany, but it was probably do-able. Furthermore, it was obvious even in April that Brit moves against Iraq would ultimately involve an attack on the French colonies of Lebanon & Syria, & equally that Vichy France didn't have the troops in the region to defend them. 2 regular rgts. & a bunch of Middle Eastern & African colonials. So we start out with a pro-Axis Iraq, Lebanon-Syria, Turkey, & Iran. If we let the Brits take Iraq then instead of a possible southern front vs Russia, we end up letting 'em have Lebanon-Syria too, & then they'd be in a position to neutralize any pro-Axis leanings in Turkey &/or Iran. As happened in OTL. Germany had forces laying around that weren't doing anything useful & could have been allocated to this op. There was a gebirgsdiv. on occupation duty in the Balkans-- a non-Barbarossa div.-- that could have been replaced by a German or Italian inf. div., or even a Rumanian or Bulgarian. There were a couple of German inf. divs. here & there. The Italians had a div. or 2 they could send. The French had a whole slew of 'em. It would have been very much an economy-of-force op, but it could have made a huge difference both to Barbarossa & to Rommel. The whole Battleaxe offensive could have been diverted into the ME & destroyed there. I've written a far more detailed timeline on this, 90% complete-- but I'm afraid it's 'way too controversial to post. With a couple of other tweaks here & there, it actually suggests that Germany could have won the war. Heresy! ...but I'll make you a deal, Blair. I've read a ton of your posts on WW2, & I don't always agree with you, but I respect your views. If you'll back me up, then I'll consider it. It would be entertaining-- I'll say that. Thegn. |
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The regime established by Kemal was based on Turkish ethnic nationalism. Iraq was no part of ethnic Turkey. Quote:
Turkish President Inonu was not pro-Axis; in 1939 he suggested a Soviet-British-Turkish alliance. He was also very aware of Turkish weakness, and was at least as cautious as Franco, who despite all the aid Nationalist Spain had from the Axis countries stayed out of the war when Britain seemed all but defeated. |
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Interesting. You need to cancel Barbarossa for the time being and have Turkey pressured into joinig the Axis. A large portion of the mobile units of ArmyGeroup South and Centre are moved through Turkeyfor Operation "Black Gold" which will be supported by elements of the Turkish Army.
The contingency to watch out for is what happens if the Red Army is ordered to strike iinto Eastern Europe while "Black Gold" is in progress. With German forces pushing into the Middle East oilfield supported by Rommel's Afrika Korps pushing into Egypt and perhaps beyond in the Summer of 1941 the Red Army strikes into Poland, Hungary and Roumania on 22 August 1941 in Operation Thunderbolt. Could be an interesting timeline developing from this point/ |
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Why does Barbarossa need to be canceled ? I think Thegn repeatedly pointed out that only a couple of non-Barbarossa units were to be allocated. Plus, you can't supply that many more in the area either, nor would it be very necessary given the rater weak british presence. Also, regarding Turkey, they seemed to be somewhat ok with the axis shipping stuff via train across their border: Quote:
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#16
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I think you'll wait in vain. For what it's worth the clearest statement I could find was here -
"As tensions in Europe heightened, Inönü determined to keep Turkey neutral in the event of war, unless the country's vital interests were clearly at stake. The Nazi-Soviet nonaggression pact of August 1939 prompted Turkey to sign a treaty of mutual assistance with Britain and France in October. Hedging its bets, the government concluded a nonaggression treaty with Nazi Germany on June 18, 1941, just four days before the Axis invasion of the Soviet Union. The early military successes of the Axis forces contributed to increased pro-German sentiment, even in some official circles. However, Inönü seems never to have wavered from his position that the Axis powers could not win the war. Despite German pressure, Turkey at no time permitted the passage of Axis troops, ships, or aircraft through or over Turkey and its waters, and the Montreux Convention was scrupulously enforced in the straits. Turkey broke diplomatic relations with Adolf Hitler's government in August 1944, and, in February 1945, declared war on Germany, a necessary precondition for participation in the Conference on International Organization, held in San Francisco in April 1945, from which the United Nations (UN) emerged. Turkey thereby became one of the fifty-one original members of the world organization." (My emphasis.) Granted, that's a 4 year old Yahoo Answers post, but it does provide it's sources. Furthermore, not only did Turkey not have such an agreement with Germany, but they *did* have a similar agreement with Britain in the form of the Mutual Assistance treaty entered into in October 1939 (details of this are frustratingly sparse on the net but here's the statement in the House of Commons announcing the preliminary agreement in May of 1939 that was superceded and extended by the October treaty). Furthermore, according to this official State Department Report Turkey's status as a pro-allied neutral was sufficiently established by February 1941 that they had been cleared to receive Lend-Lease aid. The idea that Turkey is in a matter of weeks and with no time given to prepare going to do a 180 degree reverse on this position and start aiding the Germans in such a way that will amount to a declaration of war on the allies is - well, improbable is probably the politest word for it. |
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#17
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Regarding Barbarossa, it had been postponed once already for Yugoslavia and Greece so why not again for Black Gold. That way supplies and mobile units slated for Barbarossa already in the region can be used for the Middle East Operation instead.But to do this means Barbarossa has tobe postponed again, as had already been the case for the Balkan operation earlier in 1941 (OTL precedent for this ATL Operation Black Gold which could start mid/late June 1941 if Barbarossa is postponed. In the event of a succesful Black Gold a replanned Barbarossa with an invasion odf the Soviet Union through the Caucasus as well as from Eastern Europe might be planned for the Spring of 1942.If of course the Russians strike in Eastern Europe, which the Germans must plan for sufficient forces need to remain to defend Eastern Europe.In the event the Russians do strike and are defeated a variant of Barbarossa can still be undertaken in the Summer of 1941 with the Wehrmacht pursuing a defeated and perhaps shattered Red Army back through the Soviet Union. Depending on how Black Gold was going at the time some units might be in position to conduct supporting offensives into the Caucasus at this stage. |
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#18
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Rich Rostrom...
Originally Posted by Thegn: "In May 1941 Turkey authorized Germany to ship weapons, ammunition, & other materiel to Iraq thru Turkey by rail..." "I'd like to see a cite for this." See below from Magnum. If that doesn't work for you, then I've got more. "Turkey lost WW I; I've never seen any evidence of any Turkish desire to reestablish the Ottoman Empire..." "Turkey had peaceful relations with Britain for many years at this time." I know they lost, & I said nothing about re-establishing the Ottoman Empire. The fact is that Iraq had been a Turkish province & was taken by the Brits during WW1. OK-- fine. But Mosul had also been a Turkish province & was taken by the Brits without provokation after the signing of the Armistice of Mudros that ended hostilities. "A History of Iraq" (Charles Tripp, New York: Cambridge Press 2007) says, ..."in contrast to Mosul’s neighbors, it was much more directly integrated into the Ottoman Empire. ...Mosul was considered a trading capital because of its location along the trade routes between the Mediterranean and India." Turkey contended the Brit occupation of Mosul was illegal because it came after the armistice, & even when the Treaty of Sevres & the Treaty of Lausanne were signed in 1920 & 1923, respectively-- this is your evidence of peaceful Turko-British relations-- the Turks still contested Brit occupation of Mosul as illegal. In 1926, when the League of Nations ruled in favor of the Brits, Turkey objected that this was due solely to Brit influence in the LN, & not to any principle of internat'l. law. As for me, I've got no love for the Turks whatsoever, but in this case they were right. The only reason they shut up after 1926 is because they were out of ways to contest it short of going to war, & they knew they couldn't beat the Brits. The point of all this is that Mosul had been a valued Turkish province that the Turks contended had been illegally occupied by the Brits, & they wanted it back. See below for more on this point. "The regime established by Kemal was based on Turkish ethnic nationalism. Iraq was no part of ethnic Turkey." Wrong. The population of Iraq in the 1957 census was 6.3 million, of whom over half a million listed themselves as ethnic Turks-- despite the fact that the census had spaces on its form only for Arabs & Kurds. Most of the self-described Turks were concentrated in Mosul province. In 1958 the Iraqi gov't. admitted it had under-stated the actual Turkish population by some 400%, so in reality it was closer to 2 & a half million. Experts suspect even that number is low. The Turkmens of northern Iraq themselves say their population today is well over 3 million. lucaswillen05... "Interesting. You need to cancel Barbarossa for the time being... A large portion of the mobile units of ArmyGeroup South and Centre are moved through Turkey for Operation 'Black Gold'..." Where the hell did I ever say that? The basic proposal lists a German gebirgsdiv. (the 4th), an inf. div. (the 164th), & maybe an Italian alpini div. (the 1st). That's it, except for some smaller supporting units. Gebirgs. & alipini units because they only had 2 inf. rgts. apiece instead of 3, helping to keep airlift & rail lift requirements low. Also a French inf. div. to reinforce Lebanon-Syria, which may or may not become involved in ops. The Axis powers easily had this number of divs. available that had no involvement whatsoever in Barbarossa (the listed units had none). The Brits committed elements of 4 divs. to Iraq & later to Lebanon-Syria, plus a number of small units. The Iraqis had 4 inf. divs. & other units that proved they were utterly incapable of standing up to the Brits on their own, but stiffened by a few Axis divs. it should have been a whole different story. "...what happens if the Red Army is ordered to strike iinto Eastern Europe while 'Black Gold' is in progress." This will never happen, because the Iraqi op happens concurrently with Barbarossa. By Barbarossa standards, remember, Iraq is tiny. Part of the reason for the Iraq op is to prevent the whole ME from turning pro-Brit. Part of it's to help Rommel by making the Brits divert more forces to the ME than in OTL so he can maybe get to Alexandria. (Except I don't think he can do this even against weakened Brit forces because half his army is tied down besieging Tobruq & because his supply line is 'way too long. Still, it's worth a try.) The 3d part of the reason for the op is to draw Turkey into the war & open a southern front vs Russia. We already know (thank you, Magnum) that Turkey will allow the rail passage of materiel thru its territory. We also know this is considered an act of war under internat'l. law. If they'll do that, then maybe troops. And if they'll go that far, then maybe Russia &/or the Brits will do something diplomatically stupid & push 'em right over the edge. Magnum... "Why does Barbarossa need to be canceled ? I think Thegn repeatedly pointed out that only a couple of non-Barbarossa units were to be allocated." Finally! Someone who actually read & understood the proposal! ...and thank you for saving me the trouble of looking up the cite for Rich Rostrom. I get whipsaw-hammered pretty bad with some of the hare-brained stuff that I post trying to broaden people's minds & horizons, & it's always nice to have just a little help. RPW@Cy... "I think you'll wait in vain." See above by Magnum. Evidently he & I read some of the same stuff. "As tensions in Europe heightened, Inönü determined to keep Turkey neutral in the event of war, unless the country's vital interests were clearly at stake." Granted that Inönü wasn't entirely pro-Axis, many of his people & gov't. officials were. And I'll bet that even Inönü wasn't very happy with a Brit invasion of Iraq, right on his southern border. And if he was really so friendly with the Brits, then why in the world was he allowing Germany to ship all kinds of war materiel into Iraq? The thing you've gotta remember, RPW, is that gov'ts. are all the time saying stuff they don't really mean. Actions speak a lot louder than words. At least to me they do. "The idea that Turkey is in a matter of weeks and with no time given to prepare going to do a 180 degree reverse on this position and start aiding the Germans in such a way that will amount to a declaration of war on the allies is - well, improbable is probably the politest word for it." Aw, come on, RPW. You can say it. The word you're looking for is ASB. ...except that it isn't. Turkey did allow Germany to send war material into Iraq to fight the Brits. Even though the Turkish gov't. had very recently conned the Allies into sending 'em Lend Lease aid. Under internat'l. law, my friend, that's already an act of war. It violates Section V, Articles 2 & 5 of the Hague Convention of 1907 on the rights & obligations of neutral powers : Sect. V, Art. 2-- "Belligerents are forbidden to move troops or convoys of either munitions of war or supplies across the territory of a neutral Power." Sect. V, Art. 5-- "A neutral Power must not allow any of the acts referred to in Articles 2 to 4 to occur on its territory." The remedy for violation was that the offended power was supposed to inform the neutral in writing, & if the neutral didn't act to remedy the situation within a reasonable time (usually 48 to 72 hours) then a state of war could be presumed to exist between the two. So if Turkey in May 1941 was in fact willing to commit a material act of war vs its very good friends the Brits, despite all its protestations of amity, then we've gotta ask ourselves-- had Germany actually been willing to send troops to defend Iraq-- to defend it!-- vs naked & unprovoked Brit aggression, then might not Turkey have considered its vital nat'l. interests to be sufficiently involved to have become more active as an Axis partner in the war??? Especially since Iraq used to be a Turkish province? lucaswillen05... "I am thinking a big German push into the Middle East using the Iraqi situation as an opportunity to secure the Middle East oilfields. For this the Germans need to either have a strongly reinforced Afrika Korps or needs to be able to send military units on the ground via Turkey." Granted that Hitler was all about oil, I still don't buy it. His oil obsession came in '42, but this is '41. Reinforcing DAK won't work because Rommel already has all the forces his supply line will support (more, really-- look at his shortages), & reinforcing Iraq might be possible, but Iraq is sold as an Axis economy-of-force op. Doing what you propose would derail Barbarossa, & I don't think Hitler would allow that. "Regarding Barbarossa, it had been postponed once already for Yugoslavia and Greece so why not again for Black Gold." Barbarossa had to be postponed for Yugo & Greece because they were right on its flank. Containment would have been more costly than conquest. But Iraq isn't right on the flank of anything, so it isn't necessary. Also, Iraq can be contained with an economy-of-force op-- unlike Yugo & Greece-- so again it isn't necessary. And delaying it would have shoved Barbarossa into '42, which was too late. "In the event of a succesful Black Gold a replanned Barbarossa with an invasion (1942) of the Soviet Union through the Caucasus..." Maybe. I'm not saying it's ASB 'cause it isn't-- not quite-- but I just don't think it's optimum strategy. You can achieve virtually the same thing with an economy-of-force op using 2 German divs., without delaying Barbarossa. So your extra commitment of forces to the ME just isn't necessary. Thegn. |
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#19
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But the problem with the Hansen Plan as was already pointed out by someone else is that it is jmpossible owing the risk of air interception by the RAF. Not to mention interception of follow on forces/suppies. One point that also seems to have been overlooked is the heavy losses incurred during the invasion of Crete in May 1941. This can only not happen if Crete is cancelled/ Given your POD in March/April 1941 you can cancel Crete.
However, the Hansen Plan could be incorporated into the BlackGold Plan. The fall of Iraq to Germany would open up additional gains for the Germans opening up the Middle East oilfields to conquest which will be really bad for Britain. It also shows Germany is much stronger than Britain, convinces the Arab "street" that Germany could well win the war and poses the real possibility of knocking Britain out of the war by threatening India as well as attacking Egypt from the rear. But to do this you don't need just three or four divisions. You need a Panzer Army or two. The only place Germany is going to get sufficient armoured forces to do this is from the Barbarossa forces. Two magor offensives,Barbarossa and Black Gold is not something the Germanscan do. emember that Barbarossa wasoriginally slated to take place in May 1941 but was postponed for the invasions of Greece and TYugoslavia. So, if the General Staff convince Hitler of the benefits Black Gold (just think of what all that lovely oil can do for the German war effort - oil is often referred to as Black Gold, hence the code name for the larger scale Middle East operation) A clever sell to Der Fuhrer outlning the political, economic and military benefits of Black Gold taking advantage of the situation in Iraq and using it as an excuse to invade. One gain would be to yturn around the tide of pro British feeling in parts of the Med region The Turks don't have to commit their own armyjust to agree to allow passage through their territory for German forces and logistics. Germany has three options for obtaining this. 1 Convince the present Turkish government to join the war on tne axis side. Mosul Province could be ofered as an inducement to the Turks. 2 Overthrow th current Turkish government by engineerin a militaary coup by pro axis arme officers. The groundwork for this could stat before and during the above political efforts. 3 If options 1 and 2 have not woked within a cetain period of time, say May or June 1941 then Black Gold will have to involve a contingency plan for invading Turkey. On the basisis of earlier blitzkrkriegs this phase should last three to six weeks. A ferrying operation over the Dardenelles will be needed early on, probably in the first couple of weeks. Once Turkish territory is secure German Panzer armies can strike directly into Iraq and Syria. One Panzer army will invade Syria, pass through the Lebanon, Jordan, Palestine and into Egypt meet the Afrika Korps coming the other way. The second Panzer army will invade Iraq itself. All German forces win the Middle East will combine forces in the second phase, the conqust of Iran and the capture of the Middle East oilfields. A campaign on this scale would take several months, the whole of 1941 at least. A large part of the German forces committed here can be returned afterwards, even more battle experienced and confident for an Operation Barbarossa in the early sping of 1942 -------------------------------------------------------- |
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#20
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The reason why this is significant is because, as mentioned above, France also had a Mutual Assistance treaty with Turkey and at this time most countries (including Turkey) still recognised Vichy as the legitimate successor of the government that signed that treaty. Furthermore Vichy France at that point was officially neutral itself and the Turks were not violating any treaties by allowing Vichy to export goods through its territories. As for why Vichy was doing this? Well, they had their own reasons for messing about with the British of course. It's also possible of course they were doing it as a favour to the Germans. As to why the Germans would need Vichy to do this if the Turks were happy to let them ship stuff directly, I don't know - perhaps the Turks weren't happy? Quote:
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