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#141
August 25th, 2012, 10:07 PM
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I trust I have made it obvious I thought the Taiwan Crisis added quite a lot.
For one thing, the fact that the Soviets largely sat it out is very significant; it makes detente between Moscow and Washington far more likely. The Russians won't want to go into a whole-hog love fest with the Yankee capitalists (nor will the Yankees all want it with the "Godless Commies") but there's clearly a lot for diplomats to talk about and a lot of common ground to be explored, despite outstanding differences. Perhaps the beginnings of such detente don't even have to wait for a Republican administration? OTL, certainly after the Cuban Missile Crisis Kennedy and Khrushchev could talk to each other on a higher level--the reason a Democratic administration could not move farther to cool down the Cold War was that Republican candidates would have their hides for dealing with the Devil--it was much more OK for one of their own to do that since they weren't already prejudged to be "pinkos" and the hardliners were more willing to give them some latitude; Democrats, especially as the party tended to move a bit more to the left, could hardly attack a Republican president for talking to Russians or Chinese the way Republicans could attack Democrats. It could be that many things have been butterflied in this timeline, including possibly the perception of the relative positions of the parties in the USA. God knows OTL there were and are plenty of very hawkish Democrats, and back in the '60s anyway there were liberal Republicans. But even if we assume US domestic politics parallels OTL, such a dramatic gesture of good faith on the Soviet part as they made here in the Taiwan Crisis might give Kennedy license LBJ never had at this point in OTL. To be sure, other crises, to come up soon or even already ongoing during the Taiwan Crisis, like say Soviet support for Israel's Arab foes, might offset the kindly glow of the Bear staying out of the conflict with China. Perhaps on the whole it means business as usual--which was sort of the spirit of the OTL '60s, the 1950s "brand" of the Russians as designated foe was rather worn down by then and popular culture tended to seek out a lighter, more ambiguous or even patronizing view of the Soviet monolith. It brings in a whole topic of discussion that contemplating the Taiwan Crisis had me thinking about, which is the nature of popular culture and mood in the USA in this timeline in general. I think I touched on it in the last couple weeks--what would an America that had no space program in the 1960s be like, a USA where high technology was associated only with either consumerism or military prowess but there was no third way of seeing it, as part of a challenging yet peaceful exploration of a new frontier? I think it would have some heavy consequences, and American society would be different for it--rather worse, I tend to think, with no middle ground opening up between radical rejection of the whole system root and branch and mindless conformity with a top-down military/industrial culture. The space program was among other things an attempted proof we had a soul as a nation; without it, I fear "soul" would by default become contested in a bitter fight between radicals of the left--and right. What could an American kid growing up in this timeline's 50s and 60s dream of, with no spaceships in magazines and on TV and in the movies? Except war and its glories? Even more Westerns? Or what? I obviously think the space program had a cultural impact far beyond either its economic importance or the apparent importance it is assigned in politics. I think we pretty much take it for granted and not many people will go out of their way to sacrifice for it, but if you poll people they generally like it. Without it I think we'd be different people. And this would have a lot of bearing on the potential turbulence of the '60s, if we don't assume all that would simply be butterflied away. I wouldn't assume that, I think a lot of the turmoil was about deep and pressing issues that won't have been sidestepped here. Again I've already said how seductive the war in defense of Taiwan was to me, a person born in the '60s who has identified as a lefty since I became an adult in the '80s. Perhaps I only am tempted by its glories because first I was a self-identified moderate conservative military brat, but I think it probably goes deeper than that; the defense of Taiwan, despite the risks, would have been an easy sell for JFK even in the midst of developing cynicism about Vietnam. As the crisis reached its climax I was dizzied by the realization this thing could indeed split wide open into a big war on China and might lead to WWIII despite Soviet forebearance. But I walked right into it, despite my hippie peacenik baggage. How hawkish might the USA become in the wake of this victory? No, wherever it leads, I think this Taiwan stuff was a very important development in this timeline.
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This is Carthag, nor am I out of it. 
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#142
August 26th, 2012, 01:33 AM
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At the very least, the US is going to be much more committed to Vietnam in this timeline. There definitely will not be a situation like 1975 where South Vietnam gets invaded by the North and the US sits back and does pretty much nothing. Also, the Americans are going to be (not unreasonably) very afraid that the North Vietnamese will end up as a Chinese puppet. Couple that with the less effective antiwar movement (due to the aforementioned factors of them being seen as antitechnology), and Vietnam could end up a lot bloodier. However, its justification is going to be less ambiguous, so you might still see the optimism of the 50s and early 60s survive into the 70s.
There's actually not a bad chance that you might end up with a tripolar world in this scenario. Obviously, you have the Americans and the Soviets, who are ideological and military opponents but are able to talk to each other in a civilized manner. Then you have the Chinese. The Americans think they're warmongering lunatics by now, and the Soviets won't touch them with a ten foot pole (unless they want them to test some of their new toys out in combat, in a manner that can be easily swept under the rug if someone complains about it). Meanwhile, the Chinese consider themselves the "true believers" compared to the decadent Soviets, and to them the Americans are basically the antichrist (and the Taiwanese are their puppets). Also, expect the Chinese to leverage their one advantage any way they can. Compared to a B-58 or Tu-22, a hopped-up Scud is very cheap. All sorts of pariah regimes in the world (North Koreans, 3rd world Marxist dictators) are going to end up with cheap Chinese missiles in their arsenals. Obviously, the Americans (and to a lesser extent the Soviets) are going to be positively overjoyed about this. On the cultural front, there's going to be a lot of idolization of the military. Especially the Air Force after their gallant (and nicely gore-free) defense of Taiwan. Perhaps there might be a spiritual successor to the Strategic Air Command movie? It could be called Air Defense Command and be about a guy who joins the Air Force, becomes an F-106 pilot, and ends up becoming an ace over Taiwan. It would also feature cameos by a ROCAF F-104 pilot and a Canadian Arrow pilot who says "eh" at the end of every sentence  .Also, I've gone through my notes and compiled aircraft loss statistics for the Taiwan Strait Crisis; ROCAF: 52x F-100 57x F-104 USAF: 22x F-102 13x F-103 27x F-105 1x F-12 USN: 5x A2F 17x F4H 3x A3J USMC: 3x A4H RCAF: 1x CF-105 PLAAF: 71x J-5 181x J-6 75x J-7 76x H-5 90x H-6
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#143
August 26th, 2012, 02:58 AM
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 I believe of course the motivations were somewhat different and driving the North Vietnamese into the arms of Beijing--or Moscow if they could pry those distant arms open, as they did and clearly preferred OTL to China as an ally--was an inevitable side effect. Insofar as we believed Ho Chi Minh and company were mere agents of a monolithic international Communist conspiracy and thus already beholden to Moscow (or Beijing, or somehow both) from the get-go this wasn't a cost or risk at all--they were already there. But that understanding of the nature of the Viet Minh is profoundly wrong. They professed loyalty to international revolution, but all their actions were taken from the point of view of Vietnam's interests (as they saw it) alone. Like all successful Leninist revolutionaries they were loose cannon from the Kremlin's point of view; intrabloc relations within the Leninist sphere were either cases of rigidly controlled puppets, where the Red Army held sway in the Warsaw Pact, or herding cats.If in fact our main worry was whether Vietnam would fall into the Chinese sphere of influence, we had other ways of dealing with it. Our concern of course had little to do with that; mainly we just didn't want them to be any kind of Leninists at all. Quote:
It's that first step that is so challenging. Americans who believed in the war, like say my Dad who fought in it, already accepted the wisdom and importance of the considerations you've mentioned--can't have China or Moscow taking over. They were refighting the last war in classic fashion, taking the lesson from Hitler's diplomatic aggression and Western appeasement that aggressive dictators needed to be opposed, not appeased. But it would be one thing to say defend Czechoslovakia, a nation already identified with its own borders, loyal forces, and national identity, against a foreign invasion, to retaliate against a great power for violating those borders--this was in fact just the kind of war that your timeline has in the Taiwan Crisis, and I certainly think a decisive majority of Americans could understand and support such a war. Victory was a matter of stopping an enemy invasion force. I don't want to misrepresent people like my Dad by the way--he believed, aside from the American interest in the matter, that we intended to do right by the South Vietnamese people and that saving them from rule by Ho Chi Minh and company was a matter of protecting them from evil. But Vietnam was quite something else, no matter how Americans tried to shape it into their preconceived view of innocent little sheeplike countries being preyed upon by Red wolves. Bluntly put, in our timeline anyway, South Vietnam could scarcely be said to exist, save by American fiat. If Vietnam had armed forces, it was because we paid for them. If they had stable boundaries, it was because we upheld them. There just wasn't much coherency to the so-called nation; our job, if we looked at it honestly, was to build that nation, among people whose activist nationalists had overwhelmingly joined the side we called the enemy--the Viet Minh. So it wasn't a matter just of building up a credible nation of South Vietnam among indifferent people; it was trying to force a majority to accept that as their only alternative when there was in fact another alternative many of them actively wanted and others were willing to live with. To "win" in South Vietnam we had to destroy North Vietnam, and along with it a lot of Vietnamese people on both sides of the line. Looked at that way, the approach we made to genocidal policies, and the fact that we dropped more munitions on the place in sheer tonnage than all combatants put together managed to lob at their enemies in WWII, makes a grim sense. But is that a war your alternate America would support, looking it boldly in the face and recognizing what they are doing? That's what "less ambiguous" would mean if the basic realities on the ground are the same in Vietnam of your timeline as OTL. Perhaps instead you mean, something is quite different, not just in the US, but in Vietnam--say the South has acquired a competent and respected leader and support for the Saigon government is building, or the North is considerably worse than OTL, perhaps a manifest Chinese puppet indeed (which would be deeply dismaying to any Vietnamese patriot, including the OTL Viet Minh!) You might mean that. But I don't think these alternate realities on the ground there are particularly probable or plausible; I've been following an attempt at trying to portray a believable South Vietnam but I can't say I find the logic compelling. Or finally, the realities are still the same but Americans more successfully cling to delusions that our sheer military might allows us to retain indefinitely--we just blow our doubts and questions away in a barrage of sheer firepower! Well, OTL we used quite a lot of that stuff--it's hard to imagine what Vietnam would be like today if we'd somehow managed to double or triple the warload and body counts...  Quote:
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I bolded what I think is a typo; I was wracking my brains trying to remember if any F-103 was developed ITTL--the OTL F-103 program was for a plane that would have been about as fast as the F-12 but was in development considerably earlier--the mockups look downright science-fictional, the pilot didn't even get a canopy but only a space-capsule like window and a periscope for landing, since the plane was uncompromisingly streamlined for high supersonic speeds. Whether or not that thing ever actually flew ITTL (and I think if it did it would be superseded by now by the F-12) I think what you meant to type there was "F-106."
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This is Carthag, nor am I out of it.
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#144
August 26th, 2012, 03:55 AM
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Yes, that is a typo. The F-103 didn't make it past the mockup stage, like in real life (I simply don't think its performance level was possible using 1950s technology).
I probably should have mentioned that the public is going to perceive the Vietnam War as being more justified. The people that favor the containment viewpoint are going to be able to point at Taiwan and show that as an example of how the "godless communists" are trying to subjugate the world. As a result, the public opinion is going to be more willing to stomach staying in Vietnam for longer. Of course, as you mentioned, the reality might be somewhat different. Additionally, given that the Americans (and friends) just succeeded against the PRC by sheer military might, they're definitely going to think that the same approach will work against North Vietnam. Whether they actually win will depend on how soon they recognize the different nature of the conflict. I'm not, at this point, trying to make an objective statement about whether we were right to go into Vietnam, either in this timeline or in real life. While people will be idolizing the military more in this timeline, I definitely don't mean to say that the US is going to end up as some sort of militaristic state masquerading as a democracy. Instead, I think that, at least at this point in the timeline, people such as interceptor pilots, and other air force personnel will occupy a place in popular culture not too dissimilar from what astronauts had in the 1960s. Although they probably won't be celebrities to quite the same extent. To be honest, I'm much more uncertain about the plausibility of the political and cultural aspects than any other aspect of the timeline. I'm an engineer, not a sociologist . So your feedback is greatly appreciated.
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#145
August 31st, 2012, 12:52 AM
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16 August 1967: PRC forces complete their withdrawn from Quemoy and other islands in the Taiwan Strait. Tensions remain high.
3 September 1967: Following the events of the Taiwan Strait Crisis, and great debate within the Diet, Japan officially repeals Article 9 of its constitution. This move is condemned by the PRC, but receives tacit approval from the United States. Japan also begins efforts to improve its indigenous defense industry. 15 October 1967: NACA officially establishes a research group to investigate the possibility of orbital and suborbital rockets. Although this is officially a civilian effort, much of the groups funding and support comes from the USAF, and it is expected that any advances produced will ultimately be used in weapons development. 19 November 1967: Work begins on the first prototype of the mach 3 Soviet bomber aircraft, designated the Sukhoi Su-14. Although the aircraft is similar in shape to the B-70, it is much smaller. It is intended to be used against time-sensitive targets, such as American bomber bases and cruise missile launch sites. 2 December 1967: The office of Strategic Rocketry Research (сир) is established in the Soviet Union. 19 December 1967: US-Taiwan mutual defence agreement signed. The US agrees to permanently base interceptor aircraft in Taiwan, as well as a brigade-sized ground force. Additionally, the US will sell the ROCAF 160 F-106s at a discounted price. These will replace the remaining F-100s in the ROCAF inventory. 3 January 1968: Mitsubishi Heavy Industries signs an agreement with Avro Canada to begin license production of the Arrow Mk II. Also, JASDF expresses an interest in the development and possible procurement of the Arrow Mk III. 7 February 1968: American and Soviet leaders meet in Reykjavik to discuss arms limitations measures, in the wake of recent events. After a few days of negotiations, both parties agree to a treaty with two main clauses; a. 1. All nuclear weapon designs with a possible yield of greater than 5 megatons are banned. b. 2. The mounting of nuclear warheads on ballistic missiles is banned. The treaty, which China is not a signatory of, will take effect on 1 January 1969. 18 March 1968: Aerial photography indicates that DF-2s, with North Korean markings, have been positioned near the DMZ. 1 May 1968: The redesigned MiG-25 makes its first appearance with a 12 aircraft flyby at the 1968 May Day parade. Western observers note the large wing and tail surfaces, in addition to the colossal engines. It is expected that the aircraft will begin entering squadron service later in the year. A new, swing wing Soviet bomber prototype also makes its first appearance. 8 June 1968: Canada signs an agreement with the US, giving them full control over the nuclear warheads on the AIM-26 missiles carried by the CF-105 fleet. The agreement will also cover the AIM-47 missiles to be used on the Arrow Mk III. 29 August 1968: Scientists at MIT, in conjunction with NACA, successfully manufacture slush hydrogen for the first time. 19 September 1968: The prototype F5H, a highly improved version of the F4H, is rolled out for the first time. The aircraft features new engines, as well as redesigned inlets and wing surfaces. October 1968: Development begins on a large, ramjet-powered carrier vehicle for the MiG-103. 5 October 1968: First glide test of the X-11B is conducted. The engines are not expected to be ready for at least another 6 months. 1 November 1968: The MiG-25 enters service with its first operational unit, the 939th Interceptor Regiment, in Khabarovsk. January 1969: The American SM-78 missile begins entering service. The Soviet equivalent, the R-9, has experienced delays in its development and is not expected to be ready until 1970. 27 January 1969: The PLAAF conducts the first test of the improved DF-3 missile, designed to have a range of approximately 3,000 km. The test is unsuccessful. However, western and Soviet observers are worried, as the missile likely has the capability to carry a nuclear warhead, albeit at a short range. 14 February 1969: Construction begins on the first prototype Avro 740. 6 March 1969: The Arrow Mk III is approved for production. Both Japan and Israel have expressed interest in purchasing the aircraft, in addition to the RAF. Last edited by LostCosmonaut; August 31st, 2012 at 02:53 AM..
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#146
August 31st, 2012, 06:20 AM
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Hmm....wonder what the effect of U.S. troops will have on the worst excesses of the White Terror (*considers writing a supplementary piece)
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#148
August 31st, 2012, 07:44 AM
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#149
August 31st, 2012, 07:51 AM
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#151
August 31st, 2012, 06:45 PM
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The slush hydrogen's main advantage is its density, so you need less tank space. If that lets you reduce your tank diameter, that makes your vehicle more aerodynamic, which is important if you're going to be spending a lot of time in atmosphere. Something interesting I found while doing research the other day, which could possibly be relevant; combination of this and this . Probably not for a while though.
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#152
September 1st, 2012, 12:45 AM
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You doing anything to push forward CFD? Also I highly recommend 'Facing the Heat Barrier: A History of Hypersonics.' The whole book is available on nasa's website as a pdf.
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#153
September 8th, 2012, 11:23 PM
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7 May 1969: The PLAAF conducts a second test of the DF-3. The missile is launched from a coastal area and successfully impacts in the general vicinity of the test area in Lop Nur.
19 July 1969: A junior engineer at the Mikoyan design bureau acquires a copy of Method of Edge Waves in the Physical Theory of Diffraction, by Pyotr Ufimtsev. After perusing the paper for a few days, he presents his findings to his superiors. 27 July 1969: Work begins on project 982 at the Mikoyan design bureau. The project is assigned the highest level of secrecy, as the Soviet Union considers it to be their best chance to counter the NATO lead in interceptor technology. 28 July 1969: SR-71 overflights over coastal areas of China reveal that China has begun to rebuild its strategic bomber force, mostly through building more H-6s. The presence of numerous newly built J-7s is revealed. 15 October 1969: The Avro 740 makes its first flight. The aircraft appears somewhat similar to the B-70, with canards and an aft-mounted delta wing. However, unlike the Valkyrie, the Avro 740’s 8 engines are mounted on pods near the wingtips. December 1969: The Arrow Mk III enters service, with 416 Squadron RCAF. February 1970: The Soviet Tu-26 bomber enters service. The swing-wing bomber is capable of Mach 2, and is capable of carrying the AS-9, the most advanced Soviet ALCM. It is expected that the Tu-26 will be used highly in the maritime strike role. March 1970: The Soviet R-9 missile enters service. May 1970: The RAF receives the first of its Arrow Mk IIIs. 3 June 1970: Total US casualties in the Vietnam conflict exceed 40,000. While some progress has been made in establishing a stable government in South Vietnam, the country continues to be plagued by widespread insurgency. Additionally, North Vietnam remains militarily strong thanks to continuing support from the Soviet Union and, to a lesser extent, China. July 1970: Development begins on the SM-78N, a ship launched version of the SM-78 cruise missile. Additionally, preliminary studies begin into the feasibility of basing strategic nuclear weapons on submarines, in order to enhance their survivability. 29 July 1970: The X-11B, with pilot Neil Armstrong at the controls, reaches an altitude of 101.9 km, making Armstrong the first person to officially enter space. August 1970: The F5H Super Phantom begins entering US Navy service. 14 August 1970: After being dropped from a hastily modified Tu-26 and fitted with booster rockets, a MiG-103, piloted by Viktor Patsayev, reaches an altitude of 107.5 km, making him the first Soviet to enter space. The Soviet Union hopes that once the hypersonic Su-104 carrier plane becomes available, the MiG-103 will be able to achieve near-orbital performace. January 1971: Convair and Avro Canada begin a joint effort to improve the F-106 and CF-105 in response to the American experiences in Vietnam. It is planned that the improved F-106E and Arrow Mk IV will incorporate an internal gun, as well as modifications for improved low-level performance. 13 February 1971: The Su-14 makes its first flight. April 1971: The United States and Canada conduct a joint air defense exercise, including live fire weapons tests from both the F-12 and Arrow Mk III. Following the exercise, the following conclusions are reached; (1) The F-12 possesses a superior top speed and range compared to the Arrow, whereas the Arrow’s initial climb rate and maneuverability are superior. (2) The F-12’s radar is able to track targets at a significantly longer range than that of the Arrow. As a result, it is decided that the F-12 will be based in Northern Canada and Alaska, to intercept Soviet bombers flying over the Arctic. The Canadian aircraft will be based farther south, nearer to highly populated areas, in order to intercept any bombers that escape the American aircraft. 22 April 1971: Israeli and Egyptian forces engage in a small scale firefight in a disputed area of the Sinai peninsula. During the course of the fighting, an Egyptian MiG-19 inadvertently crosses into Israeli airspace and is shot down. Diplomatic pressure from the Soviet Union and France (a major supplier of Israeli weapons) prevents open war, although tensions remain high. Many Arab countries in the area begin turning to the Soviets for weapons and training. June 1971: The United States Air Force begins deployment of an improved version of the SM-78. While the initial version of the missile was only deployable from fixed bases, the newly updated version is capable of being fired from specially modified railcars. It is planned that railway networks will be constructed in remote areas of Nevada and Utah, in order to all for mobile basing of missiles. July 1971: It is realized that direct production of a naval SM-78 is unfeasible, due to the missile's large size and the dangers of storing such large quantities of fuel in a naval situation. It is realized that a smaller, shorter ranged missile will be necessary. Development of this system will proceed concurrently with the SM-78s planned successor, and incorporate many of the same technologies. November 1971: Conceptual work begins on the MiG-105, a successor to the MiG-103. It is planned that the MiG-105 will be able to achieve orbit with a small payload. 17 December 1971: Project 982 is provisionally assigned the designation MiG-28. (1) It is not expected to produce a working prototype for at least 3 more years, due to the poor state of Soviet computer technology. 18 December 1971: Seismic sensors detect a shallow Magnitude 4.3 earthquake centered near the city of Kimchaek in North Korea. Hours later, radiation sensors in Japan detect low levels of radioactive isotopes in the atmosphere. A joint US-Japanese analysis shows that the isotopic signature corresponds to one of two nuclear reactors constructed by North Korea in the 1960s with Chinese assistance. (1) It looks nothing like a T-38. Last edited by LostCosmonaut; September 9th, 2012 at 06:10 AM..
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#154
September 9th, 2012, 12:53 AM
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are you aiming for a more technologically even cold war where the USSR develops stealth aircraft first?
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#155
September 9th, 2012, 01:32 AM
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#156
September 9th, 2012, 06:10 AM
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Made a few minor edits.
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#157
September 21st, 2012, 08:16 PM
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20 December 1971: The US moves to increase troop presence in South Korea as a result of the nuclear test. Japan moves to acquire additional air defense assets.
March 1972: Japan receives the first of its Arrow Mk IIIs. April 1972: The Soviet Su-14 enters service. It is initially deployed near the Polish border. Western intelligence believes that the bomber will therefore be used to attack British and French nuclear weapons before they can launch. 6 April 1972: The revised Arrow Mk IV makes its first flight. The F-106E flies a few days later. Both feature an internal 20mm cannon, as well as upgraded avionics, and some minor modifications to control surfaces. 27 June 1972: American pilot/astronaut Glen Thomasson reaches an altitude of 137.6 km in the X-11B, the highest to date. July 1972: The Avro 740 enters RAF service. September 1972: The RAF issues contracts for designs for an intermediate range cruise missile, as they fear that their bomber bases will be too vulnerable to Soviet strikes, and maintaining forces on airborne alert is too expensive. October 1972: Full deployment of the mobile version of the SM-78 is completed. Over 2,000 miles (3200km) of track has been laid in the Nevada and Utah deserts. It is hoped that this will allow for second-strike capability. December 1972: In response to the subpar performance of American aircraft against North Vietnamese fighters in Vietnam, the United States Air Force begins studies into development of a lightweight interceptor. Additionally, funds are earmarked for the development of a dedicated close support aircraft. January 1973: For the first time since 1958, American troop levels in Vietnam have decreased from the previous year. While there is nominally a democratic government in South Vietnam, it remains ineffective and dependent on American support. The main bright spot is that North Vietnamese military activity has decreased in the past few years, mainly due to fears of American forces launching a direct assault north of the DMZ. January 1973: France approaches the UK about the possibility of cooperation in the ongoing cruise missile program. The French Air Force was working on developing a similar weapon, but was encountering severe technical difficulties. February 1973: Israel receives the first of its Arrow Mk IIIs. In response, the Soviet Union “leases” MiG-25s to the Egyptian and Syrian air forces. Despite being nominally owned by the Middle Eastern countries, the ground crews and pilots are all Soviets. 7 March 1973: A ¼ scale mockup of the Project 982 design is produced. It will be used for radar testing over the next few months. May 1973: The United States begins studies into an armed variant of the X-11C, which is currently in development and nearing initial flight tests. It is believed that the X-11C, which is planned to have orbital capacity, would be completely uninterceptable by any present or future Soviet defences. 18 May 1973: An Israeli Arrow pilot intercepts a Syrian MiG-25 near Tel Aviv. The Israeli fires upon the MiG, however, it accelerates to over Mach 3 and escapes. June 1973: Radar testing indicates that the Project 982 model has less than 1/1000th the radar signature of a Tu-95 or MiG-23. 29 July 1973: China conducts a nuclear test with a 350 kiloton yield. Isotopic signatures from the test indicate that the weapon features a boosted-fission design, indicating that China is close to developing a hydrogen bomb. Additionally, western analysts fear that the warhead design used is small enough to be carried by the DF-3, which recently began deployment. August 1973: France and the UK agree to cooperate on their cruise missile program. British companies will provide most of the airframe, while the French will provide the engine, as well as use of their testing ranges. The US pressures both nations to buy the SM-78, but is unsuccessful.
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#158
September 21st, 2012, 09:01 PM
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#159
September 21st, 2012, 10:38 PM
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#160
September 21st, 2012, 11:43 PM
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I like this TL a lot. It's rare that we see stories about technological rather than only geopolitical alterations in AH.
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