WWIII 1946 FAQ

[Hairog]

Wasserfal could have worked
1. The Wasserfal could be launched

a. 45 launches
b. A number of which were filmed

2. The Wasserfal could reach the altitude of the B29
3. The Wasserfal could be steered to target.
4. The only failure of the Wasserfal is it's guidance system and that has been corrected by using a system that was invented in 1943.

http://www.popscreen.com/v/62sPX/Was...r-missile-1943

The Bäckebo rocket
See also: Project Big Ben


A German V-2 rocket.
On June 13, 1944, a V-2 rocket under test by the Germans (test rocket V-89,serial number 4089) from Peenemünde crashed in Sweden after the rocket had flown into cumulus clouds which had strayed into the controller's line of sight, it was supposed to crash in the sea outside Bornholm in occupied Denmark.

Quote:
V-89 contained "Kehl-Strassburg"joystick radio control equipment that had been designed for the Wasserfall anti-aircraft missile (code named Burgund), a development of that used to guide the Henschel Hs 293 glide bomb.The ground controller appeared to have no trouble manoeuvring the rocket until it disappeared into the high cloud layer.

A captured German prisoner later explained to the British that the controller was an expert at steering glider bombs from aircraft, but that the spectacle of a rocket launch had caused him to incorrectly operate the control lever in his astonishment. Peenemünde guidance and control expert Ernst Steinhoff explained that the excited operator applied a set of planned corrections (such as that for the Earth's rotation) in the opposite direction to the way he had been instructed. The rocket subsequently exploded in an air burst (a common V-2 malfunction) several thousand feet above the county of Bäckebo mainly over a farm with no injuries and the valuable wreckage was exchanged by the Swedes for British Supermarine Spitfires.On July 31, 1944, experts at the Royal Aircraft Establishment at Farnborough in Hampshire, England, began an attempt to reconstruct the missile.

[Hairog]

1. The X4 could be launched

a. Dozens of launches filmed and more

2. It had the range to reach it's target
3. It could be steered
4. It was entering production when the war ended and 600 were waiting for engines
5. The same guidance system is used as the Wasserfal

http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jX2Cd...eature=related

GERMAN EXPLOSIVE ORDNANCE
U.S. OP 1666, 11 June 1946
X-4
GENERAL DESCRIPTION. The X-4 is a fin-stabilized guided missile with a proximity fuzed warhead developed specifically for use by fighter planes against enemy bomber formations. (See figs. 197A and 197B.)

Stabilization is obtained by four large fins fitted symmetrically to the body and steering is achieved by rake spoilers operating in four small tail fins which are interdigitated with respect to the large fins. In appearance, it is quite similar to "Fritz X" except it is much smaller, the warhead weighing only 20 kg and a total weight being 60 kg. It is launched without assisted take-off from fighter planes. It can be either wire-controlled by an operator in the fighter plane or it can be used as a self-steering target seeker by the use of acoustic homing. If it is wire-controlled, some sort of rocket propulsion is to be used; while if acoustic homing is used, it is proposed to dispense with the rocket propulsion unit.

OPERATIONAL ASPECTS. The principal operational use of the X-4 would be for fighter use against enemy bomber formations. Of course, the wire-control version would necessitate the launching plane remaining in the vicinity in order to control the flight of the missile and this would in turn seriously restrict its maneuverability. On the other hand, if acoustic homing were used, the X-4 could be launched and the parent plane could immediately execute an evasive maneuver.

With the 20 kg warhead, it is extremely doubtful that much damage could be done to a four-motored bomber at a distance of 15 meters, the operating range of "Kranich." The effectiveness would undoubtedly be increased if the power plant were dispensed with and the payload doubled, as would be the case if acoustic homing were utilized.

If the X-4 with acoustic homing were used in conjunction with a plane of the ME 262 type, it would be quite a formidable weapon to counter enemy bomber formations, and could probably be used for other tactical purposes as well.

DETAILS. Airframe. The airframe of the X-4 consists of a cylindrical body 190 cm in length and 22 cm maximum diameter on which are mounted four large plywood fins fitted to the midsection of the missile and four small tail fins, in which the rake spoilers are mounted. The main wing span is 58 cm.

Rotation about the longitudinal axis is achieved by small trim tabs attached to the four large stabilizing fins. These give a rotational speed of 1 1/2 r.p.s., which in turn is used to give greater stability in flight and also permits greater manufacturing tolerances in the entire assembly. The main fins are swept back at an angle of 45 deg., which gives a maximum air speed of 270 m/sec. However due to the comparatively short range over which this weapon is to be used, it is not expected to attain a velocity of greater than 240 m/sec. before it reaches the target.

Steering is effected by means of rake spoilers located in the tail fins. These spoilers vibrate at a rate of 5 cycles per second, control being effected by making the period during which the spoiler projects from one side longer than that during which it projects from the other. When the two periods are equal, no control is applied. This method of steering has the disadvantages of appreciable drag and a certain amount of delay, but has the advantage of simplicity and instantaneous mechanical response.

DESIGN DATA:

Launching weight: 60 kg.

Weight less fuel: 50 kg.

Wing surface: 0.56 sq.m.

Wing loading: 200kg/m.2.

Maximum speed in horizontal flight at 6,500 m. altitude:

270m/sec.

Lateral acceleration in horizontal flight at 6,500 m altitude:

40 m/sec.2.

Total energy available during 33sec. burning time: 1,600

kg/sec.

POWER PLANT. The Bi-fuel liquid propellant motor is the BMW 109-548 rocket motor using a mixture of Salbei (98 to 100 percent nitric acid) and Tonka 250 (57 percent crude m-xylidine with 43 percent triethylamine). This motor is capable of delivering an initial thrust of 150 kg which drops to about 25 kg after 30 seconds.

The solid propellant which it was proposed to use was "Mixture 167" by Wasag. Initial thrust is 120 to 140 kg which is also reduced to about 25 kg after 30 seconds.

Of course, there were also plans under way to eliminate the propulsion unit entirely, in which case the payload could have been appreciably increased.

INTELLIGENCE AND CONTROL SYSTEM. In all the proposed versions of X-4, the missile rotates and therefore only one gyro is needed. When wire control is used, the principal purpose of the gyro and commutator systems is to translate the right-left and up-down signals into the proper pulses to feed to the rake spoilers in the tail fins. The gyro is spun up while the missile is still attached to the launching aircraft. During the flight of the missile, the gyro is not power driven. The gyro was made by Th. Horn. Leipzig.

The wire control system consists essentially of a small joystick control unit mounted in the aircraft, a pair of control wires and a receiving unit in the missile consisting of a gyroscope and a pair of relays. The control unit contains two drums which revolve at a rate of 1 1/2 r.p.s., one drum controlling azimuth the other elevation. The control wires consist of 2 insulated single strand Swedish spring-steel wires 6,000 m length and 0.22 mm diameter. The receiving unit in the missile is quite simple consisting primarily of a polarized relay for azimuth control and a unpolarized marginal relay for elevation control. The polarized relay responds only to polarity changes in the direction of current flow through the wires while the unpolarized marginal relay responds only to changes in the value of the current, regardless of its polarity. In this way, both azimuth and elevation control signals can be transmitted simultaneously over the same pair of wires.

The relays are connected to the spoiler solenoids in the tail fins, through the gyro commutator system. This arrangement converts the left-right and up-down signals into the proper pulses which are to be fed to the solenoids actuating the spoilers. The power supply is a small 9-volt dry battery located in the afterbody of the missile.

During the flight tests, there were no detrimental effects from static electrical charges accumulating on the wires and the mechanical difficulties had been solved by paying out the wire from the bobbins on the missile and similar bobbins on the parent plane simultaneously. Wire control was selected primarily because, compared to radio remote control, it is practically jamproof.

In March 1945, there was also under development a plan to dispense with the power plant and wire control and to use an acoustic homing system "Pudel" as the control device. This system is based on the same fundamental principles as the acoustic proximity fuze "Kranich." It consist essentially of a mica and 0.03 mm aluminum foil diaphragm connected to a carbon microphone, the output of which is fed to a single stage amplifier and relay output. This assembly is is mounted at an angle of approximately 60 deg. to the longitudinal axis of the body and the sound passes into the diaphragm through a series of wire mesh screens which serve to attenuate differences of air pressure due to rotation but not the sound of motors and propellers of enemy aircraft. A small lyre arrangement is attached to the vibrating system in such a way as to broaden out the mechanical resonance curves of the individual components of the system. The composite curve of the acoustic system with the 15-wire lyre attached is practically flat from 200 to 400 cycles. The wire mesh screens attenuate the slow air pressure variations about 40 or 50 db, whereas the sound vibrations of 200 to 400 cycles are attenuated only 1 db.

As the X-4 rotates, if the missile is homing directly on target, the output of the microphone will be constant and there will be no modulation output and consequently no steering corrections. If the missile is not aimed directly at the target, there will be generated a modulation frequency of 1 1/2 cycles per second, the rotation speed of the X-4. This modulation frequency of 1 1/2 cycles per second is used to transmit information to the spoilers through the gyrocommutator system. For this purpose, the the normal gyrocommutator system has been modified to some extent. Only 8 models of "Pudel" have been built and so far no flight test have been made.

The modification of the X-4 with "Pudel" and also equipped with the "Kranich" acoustic proximity fuze when launched from a fighter plane of the ME 262 type appears to be a weapon of great promise, since after launching, the fighter pilot can immediately take evasive action. The range of the acoustic homing device is expected to be about 1,000 meters, so that if it were launched at a range of 2,000 meters, the first 1,000 meters of flight would be uncontrolled.

WARHEAD AND FUZE. When X-4 was originally conceived it was expected to use a 20-kg. cast-steel warhead enclosing the explosive material. However, due possibly to the shortage of steel in Germany at the beginning of 1945, some thought was being given to the use of an uncased molded plastic type of warhead which was to be attached to the afterbody by wood screws and had an adaptor for the nose fuze attached to the nose in the same way.

The fuzing system consisted of the acoustic proximity fuze "Kranich" which forms the nose of the missile, an impact and graze fuze, and a self-destroying fuze which operates 35 seconds after release. The acoustic and impact fuzes are armed 7 seconds after release. The acoustic fuze consists of a light diaphragm actuated mechanism which responds to the sound of aircraft propellers at a range of 15 meters. This fuze has a tine delay of 1/50 second to make it more effective. A complete description of "Kranich" has been given in other Intelligence Reports. Specimens have been shipped to Naval Research Laboratory, Washington, D.C., on Consignment Tag No. 3980.

LAUNCHING DEVICES. Originally the X-4 was being carried only by the Focke-Wolf 190. However, it was later planned to use it also in connection with ME 262 and DO 335. The missile is suspended from the parent craft by means of ETC70AI, which is a modified 70-kg bomb-rack with a 7-prong umbilical cord and provisions for two control wires. The X-4 is released electrically when the pilot presses the release switch.

[Hairog]

1. Advanced 800 miles in 10 days in Manchuria.

a. Worse terrain
b. Less infrastructure in area
c. at the end of a 3500 mile long supply line
d. against a dug-in, tenacious, more numerous and committed enemy

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/car...z3/glantz3.asp

Too often soldiers fall victim to their preconceptions about potential adversaries' patterns of behavior. A popular notion among U.S. officers is that military history in the Soviet Union consists of little but propaganda broadsides to justify Soviet actions. On too few occasions do U.S. officers critically analyze the past campaigns of potential adversaries. In particular, the rich vein of military history in Russian language military periodicals and literature has been neglected. The language barrier, time constraints, and changing Army requirements combine to hinder the type of in-depth historical research that affords penetrating insights into Soviet military planning, operations, and tactics.

LTC David M. Glantz, a Russian linguist at the Combat Studies Institute, has, using a wide variety of Soviet sources, reconstructed a comprehensive two-part account of the 1945 Soviet Manchurian campaign. This Leavenworth Paper offers an operational overview of the campaign, while Leavenworth Paper no. 8 expands the general campaign analysis in eight case studies that highlight Soviet tactical doctrine and operations in Manchuria. In both papers, LTC Glantz has also used Japanese accounts of the campaign to check the veracity of the Soviet version. For these reasons, I believe that these two Leavenworth Papers will become the standard works in the English language on the campaign.

Two features of Soviet war-making stand out in the Manchurian campaign: (1) meticulous planning at all levels; (2) initiative and flexibility in the execution of assigned missions. For those who dismiss the campaign as a walkover of an already defeated enemy, LTC Glantz presents overwhelming evidence of tenacious, often suicidal, Japanese resistance. The sophistication of Soviet operations made an admittedly inferior Japanese Kwantung Army appear even more feeble than it actually was. Reminiscent of the lightning German victory in northwest Europe in May 1940, surprise, bold maneuver, deep penetrations, rapid rates of advance, and crossing terrain the defender thought impassable enabled the attacker to rupture vital command and control networks of the defenders and to hurl defending forces into disarray. In 1945 the Soviets demonstrated their mastery of combined arms warfare that four blood-soaked years of fighting against the Germans had perfected. As LTC Glantz observes, the Manchurian campaign was the postgraduate exercise for Soviet combined arms.

Finally, this operational level account drawn almost exclusively from Soviet sources gives the U.S. Army officer an insight into how the Soviets interpret the Manchurian campaign, the lessons they draw from it, and how they relate their Manchurian experience to Soviet military art. Indeed, much truth lies in Ovid's words, "It is right to be taught, even by an enemy."


JACK N. MERRITT
Lieutenant General, USA
Commanding

[Hairog]

See above post.


1. See Operation August Storm

a. 60 divisions transported 3500 miles
b. 3600 aircraft transported 3500 miles
c. Combat supplies and all

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/car...z3/glantz3.asp

[Hairog]

1. In June 1946 800 bridges were repaired and operational in Germany
2. There were 60 bridges alone over the Rhine

Page 85 "Post War" by Tony Judt

3. If the Allies could supply 60 divisions on the East German border in 1945 from the west then the Soviets can supply them from the east using the same infrastructure.

[Hairog]

Demobilization and the Fitness of the US Army in May 1946

1. The ranks of the occupation forces in Western Europe were decimated and stripped of their veterans.
a. See Points System

In referring to demobilization at the end of World War II, General George C. Marshal said, “It was not demobilization, it was a rout.”

2. The soldiers left behind had no combat experience, motivation or even combat training. They were glorified policemen.

The junior enlisted were mostly inexperienced, young, and had been lured into the Army by the generous GI Bill. The motivation of these young men had much to do with post service education and low-interest loans and had little to do with being prepared for battle.

3. The US army was had only 12 divisions in Germany and all but two were at half strength.
4. The combat effectiveness of those divisions was non-existant.

General Bradley wrote, “in a shockingly deplorable state.” It had “almost no
combat effectiveness and could not fight its way out of a paper bag.”

http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA415899

[Hairog]

Surprise attack

1. An even semi well planned surprise attack is usually devastating. In a study done on surprise attacks that percentage of successful ones was astounding. They work.




2. The Russians were masters at surprise attacks and battle field deception.

a. Kursk
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Kursk
b. Operation August Storm
http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/car...z3/glantz3.asp

[Top hats daily]

So, with the extremely poor performance American soldiers who are demoralized, whats stopping Soviet troops from becoming demoralized from waging a war that they just sought to turn around. How is the misinformation campaign running strong enough that Soviet soldiers still think they're fighting for the motherland, despite occupying multiple soverign countries?

How come the combat effectiveness of two "fresh" countries (Finland/Sweden) are so low?

[Hairog]

Originally Posted by Top hats daily

So, with the extremely poor performance American soldiers who are demoralized, whats stopping Soviet troops from becoming demoralized from waging a war that they just sought to turn around. How is the misinformation campaign running strong enough that Soviet soldiers still think they're fighting for the motherland, despite occupying multiple soverign countries?

How come the combat effectiveness of two "fresh" countries (Finland/Sweden) are so low?

Sorry Top hats daily but this is not really meant to be another discussion thread. I'll try and answer your question later when I've dealt with the more common questions.

[Derek Pullem]

Originally Posted by Hairog

1. Advanced 800 miles in 10 days in Manchuria.

a. Worse terrain
b. Less infrastructure in area
c. at the end of a 3500 mile long supply line
d. against a dug-in, tenacious, more numerous and committed enemy

http://usacac.army.mil/cac2/cgsc/car...z3/glantz3.asp

From your source

The most serious difficulties the Soviets encountered were in the realm of logistics. The Soviets had foreseen problems and done all in their power to alleviate them. The logistical factor was simply part of the risk the So viets took. Fuel shortages headed the list of problems. Even before it crossed the Grand Khingan Mountains, the 6th Guards Tank Army was low on fuel. After the crossing, the chronic problem persisted until the day the unit arrived in Mukden. Any resolute-or even token-Japanese resistance could have compounded 6th Guards Tank Army's difficulty regarding fuel and ammunition resupply. Other units, including the 39th Army and 35th Army, experienced similar problems on a lesser scale.

Problems also surfaced regarding the supply of river crossing and ferrying equipment in 2d Red Banner Army, 15th Army, and 5th Separate Rifle Corps. Shortage of such equipment led to lengthy crossing times and piecemeal commitment of forces to battle.

[Derek Pullem]

Originally Posted by Hairog

1. In June 1946 800 bridges were repaired and operational in Germany
2. There were 60 bridges alone over the Rhine

Page 85 "Post War" by Tony Judt

3. If the Allies could supply 60 divisions on the East German border in 1945 from the west then the Soviets can supply them from the east using the same infrastructure.

See comment on lack f soviet bridging equipment.

More than half of Soviet "frontline" trucks were lend-lease. Spares just dried up

Allies had between 3-4 time number of trucks available per division compared to Soviets

Allied railways are of different gauge to Soviets and the Soviet rail stock was decimated in Great Patriotic War

The infrastructure is not the same.

[Hairog]

Originally Posted by Derek Pullem

From your source

The bottom line is that they did it. They advanced through a better trained, dug in, motivated and larger army than they would face in Western Europe in May, 1946. Yes the British and US had better equipment but the occupation forces left behind did not have the training and the heavy equipment was basically in storage.

The Soviet Deep Battle is devastating and unlike anything the US/UK/FR have ever experienced. Properly done it makes the Blitzkrieg look like a Calvary charge and by 1945 the Soviets had perfected it.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_deep_battle

[deathscompanion1]

Originally Posted by Hairog

The bottom line is that they did it. They advanced through a better trained, dug in, motivated and larger army than they would face in Western Europe in May, 1946. Yes the British and US had better equipment but the occupation forces left behind did not have the training and the heavy equipment was basically in storage.

The Soviet Deep Battle is devastating and unlike anything the US/UK/FR have ever experienced. Properly done it makes the Blitzkrieg look like a Calvary charge and by 1945 the Soviets had perfected it.

http://en.m.wikipedia.org/wiki/Soviet_deep_battle

The Manchurian army were the those too stupid, weak, young , poorly trained and demotivated to fight in the Pacific or in Indochina.

The logistics had broken down and they had almost no effective air support.

Yes the Wallies would be understrength but they weren't starving they were well equipped and they weren't only in europe because the high command forgot about them.

[juanml82]

About missiles, you should look at the times, in OTL, when missiles became reliable and efficient.

[Hairog]

Originally Posted by Derek Pullem

See comment on lack f soviet bridging equipment.

Obviously not needed as the bridges had been rebuilt.

More than half of Soviet "frontline" trucks were lend-lease. Spares just dried up

Allies had between 3-4 time number of trucks available per division compared to Soviets

Ah... no they wouldn't have. 6 months to prepare, repair, build what they need . There were 9 huge depots located in Germany, Benelux, France, Austria, full of hundreds of thousands of trucks who's location are well known. The very same trucks that the Soviets received through Lend Lease

Allied railways are of different gauge to Soviets and the Soviet rail stock was decimated in Great Patriotic War

Once again, 6 months to prepare. In the Spring of 1945 they moved 60 divisions 3500 miles, 3600 planes etc. using a single track railroad. History has proved that what I proposed is not only possible but plausible. They did it twice through Poland/Eastern Germany and Manchuria and they can certainly do it again.

The infrastructure is not the same.

You're right ... the infrastructure of Western Europe in 1946 was in much, much better shape than both Poland, East Germany and Manchuria. Therefore much easier for the Red Army to advance and the advances would have been much faster and a much easier logistics challenge. Not to mention there are a series of supply depots along the way just in case.

I still have not found one historian who has written on this subject who has stated that the Red Army could not have taken all of Western Europe in a matter of a month or less in May 1946. If you find one please let me know. Otherwise I consider this a closed subject that has been beaten to death.

[Herzen's love-child]

Conversely, can you quote a historian who thinks the Soviets could? All of Western Europe, that is. Though, of more interest to a historian might be the question of whether the Soviets ever seriously considered it in the time period in question.

[Hairog]

Originally Posted by Herzen's love-child

Conversely, can you quote a historian who thinks the Soviets could? All of Western Europe, that is. Though, of more interest to a historian might be the question of whether the Soviets ever seriously considered it in the time period in question.

Joint Chiefs of Staff Report Oct. 1945.

"The report estimated that the Soviet Union had the military capacity of overrunning Western Europe including Scandinavia and excluding Britain at any time between 1945 and 1948."

American War Plans by Steven T. Ross Page 3

"Because of American and British demobilization and the chaotic conditions prevailing in Europe, The Soviets, even after completing their mobilization, could easily overrun the area, and by generating additional forces could also conquer Turkey and Iran."

History of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Volume 1 1945-47 by James F. Schnabel pp. 14-15

"In effect the intelligence staff believed that Soviet and satellite armies could with relative ease overrun Europe and the Middle East at any time during the next several years."

American War Plans by Steven T. Ross Page 7

"On April 11, the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that in case of war the Russians could conquer the Mid-East and Western Europe. The Americans would have no strategic option but to retreat from the continent and assist the British in defending their homeland. "

JCS 1641/5 April 11th, 1945

"The committee was comprised of representatives
of the CIA and the intelligence sections of the Department of State, Army, Navy and the Air Force. The committees assessments , and the debates which they generated, became the basis of a new batch of contingency plans, turned out in 1948 at a frenetic pace (see glossary).
The committee delivered its first report on March 30, 1948. It concluded that the Soviets had the military capacity to overrun Western Europe and "the Near East to Cairo within a short period of time".

Fighting World War Three From the Middle East by Michael J. Cohen pp 7

I concur that because the Soviets had no defense against the B29 and the atomic bomb IOTL most historians agree that Stalin would not have attacked until he developed an equal deterant.

But what if he did develop a defense against both?

Now that's what I call Alternate History.

[GarethC]

Originally Posted by Hairog

Wasserfal could have worked
1. The Wasserfal could be launched

a. 45 launches
b. A number of which were filmed

2. The Wasserfal could reach the altitude of the B29
3. The Wasserfal could be steered to target.
4. The only failure of the Wasserfal is it's guidance system and that has been corrected by using a system that was invented in 1943.

I'm not saying it won't work at all, but that it will only work in the day, and then it will be defeated by Allied countermeasures; if the Soviets add the radar that the Germans never did to make it work at night, it will be vulnerable to the usual antiradar measure, and the missile will still be vulnerable to the daytime countermeasures as well.

Have a Google for the "Kehl-Strassburg" guidance system - unmolested, it did work, but Allied jamming became effective against it after samples were obtained from crashed aircraft; initial successes at Anzio and Salerno were not repeatable by Normandy.

That guidance system is Manual Control Line Of Sight (MCLOS) - it does not work at night, when the target is not visible.

The "Rheinland" firecontrol radar intended for night guidance (when MCLOS is unusable) was never completed. It was also known to the Allies; the scientist in charge was picked up in Paperclip.
If the Rheinland development had been successful, it would still have been defeatable by chaff, which could be specifically tailored to the known wavelength of the guidance radar.

To get an atomic strike through, it's worthwhile just sticking a pair of escort planes with the bomber, one with a jamming system and one with a payload of chaff.

[Herzen's love-child]

Originally Posted by Hairog

Joint Chiefs of Staff Report Oct. 1945.
etc. etc. etc.

I concur that because the Soviets had no defense against the B29 and the atomic bomb IOTL most historians agree that Stalin would not have attacked until he developed an equal deterant.

But what if he did develop a defense against both?

Now that's what I call Alternate History.

Yes, BUT. Those pessimistic assessments were largely based on the lack of intel the West really had of Soviet forces in the European theatre. See: http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2007/N2859.pdf (esp. pp 3-5) for instance. (It is interesting to see the contemporary perspectives of the U.S. high brass on the subject that you cited. Thank you.)

Of course you are attempting alternative history---dystopic alternative history, and with Social/Political assumptions that I think we don't agree on---but it is alternative history. I'm not attacking your TL by the way. I'm reading it, after all... Nor do I need absolute technological veracity in such a TL. I think you might be a little too defensive in this department, to the point where you are expending more energy defending elements of the story than writing it. I encourage you to do the latter. Cheers.

[Hairog]

Originally Posted by Herzen's love-child

Yes, BUT. Those pessimistic assessments were largely based on the lack of intel the West really had of Soviet forces in the European theatre. See: http://www.rand.org/pubs/notes/2007/N2859.pdf (esp. pp 3-5) for instance. (It is interesting to see the contemporary perspectives of the U.S. high brass on the subject that you cited. Thank you.)

Of course you are attempting alternative history---dystopic alternative history, and with Social/Political assumptions that I think we don't agree on---but it is alternative history. I'm not attacking your TL by the way. I'm reading it, after all... Nor do I need absolute technological veracity in such a TL. I think you might be a little too defensive in this department, to the point where you are expending more energy defending elements of the story than writing it. I encourage you to do the latter. Cheers.

I hope you're enjoying the story. Hopefully this FAQ will help keep me on task of writing the story.