Royal Navy without the Washington Naval Treaty

[PhilKearny]

Originally Posted by sharlin

The RN actually favoured the larger cruisers, its why we built so many County class cruisers. Heavy cruisers and light cruisers were coming. The RN laid down the Hawkins class which was the archetype of the Heavy Cruiser pattern, 10k tonnes, heavy caliber guns, high speed.

The UK did and did not favor heavy cruisers. The UK originally favored the 10,000 ton treaty cruiser size, as did the Japan and the US.

The UK, after the WNC 5 power treaty was signed, found it could not afford to build the number of cruisers that it felt it needed for trade protection if the cruisers were all 10,000 ton. The RN estimated the UK needed 70 cruisers. While the RN sought these, treasury said no.

The UK, thus, sought to have treaty cruiser displacement reduced to 7500 tons. The US and Japan thought this size was too small for the the Pacific and said no. (The US also felt that the UK was starting a naval race in cruisers and was none too happy about this, but the treaty allowed the UK to do this even if the US felt it was against the treaty's spirit.)

[Captain Jack]

Originally Posted by sharlin

Fishers Follies were recognised as basically being ships without a job, their one action showed them to be fragile and not really fit for service, they would either be laid up pending disposal or looked at for conversions to CVs. The RN was already starting to build CVs with HMS Argus and the slightly later Eagle.

Fishers Follies?

In regards to other nations designs the G3s were probably without a match until the 1940s when the OTL South Dakota's would be built. Compaired to the Tosa/Akagi classes of Japan the G3's had much thicker armour all round and comparable firepower, they would run rings round the planned USN's South Dakotas but be outgunned (12 x 16 inch guns on the super Standards) and was massively more protected than the Saratoga class BCs as well as being more heavily gunned.

The French and Italians would not have anything that compaired. So basically the G3s would have been the most powerful ships in the world for a bloody long time.

How about Germany? What affect would the G3's have on the Kriegsmarine when it starts to rebuild a surface fleet?

Fishers Follies?

[sharlin]

Fishers follies = Glorious, Furious and Couragious.

[David S Poepoe]

The British delegation to Washington in 1922 arrived in town with a proposal similar to that which US Secretary of State Hughes was going publicly propose, except the British were going to suggest steeper cuts.

[stevep]

PhilKearny

Even for you this is stupid. You have argued that Britain was bankrupt, which is crap, that the G3 is a bad design, which virtually no naval expert believes, that the G3s would have the same problems as the Nelson's which has often been pointed out was wrong.

Now you're trying to say the the US, which has started this naval race then slumped back into isolationism and has no intent to build more than the Washington would become insanely aggressive if Britain decided to build new ships to match those being built by the US and Japan. Try and get some touch with reality! There were extreme Anglophobes and assorted business interests that would play the propaganda card for further naval build-ups but no one was listening to them. The Us had no interest in attacking the power it relied upon to do most of the work of keeping world trade safe.

Steve

Originally Posted by PhilKearny

No Washington Conference Five Power Naval Treaty plus the United Kingdom tries to build the G3s equal financial disaster for the United Kingdom.

Basically, the UK could not afford the G3s. Not only were the G3s more expensive than the NelRods (and had most of the flaws that mad the NelRods probably the worst post WW I battleship class), the G3 were so long that they would required new facilities be built for mooring and servicing them.

And as the British politicians recognized at the time, the construction of the G3s probably would have been even more unaffordable as it would have angered the Americans, who held huge amounts of UK debt. Beyond probably provoking a naval race with the US that the UK could neither afford nor win, the UK risked having the US destroy the UK's economy by taking such steps as demanding payment of the bonds at the original terms.

There was a strong distrust of imperialism in the US. Were the UK to have spent money on the G3s rather than making an attempt to repay their debt to the US, this anti-imperialism would have exploded.

[stevep]

Originally Posted by Captain Jack

How about Germany? What affect would the G3's have on the Kriegsmarine when it starts to rebuild a surface fleet?

Fishers Follies?

Captain Jack

You're got to allow for luck and also how much the G3's would have been upgraded or not. However:
a) 9x16" [or 16.5" is keeping the original design] guns v 8x15"
b) An advanced armoured design that includes many lessons from WWI plus tests afterwards against one that was designed by a nation which had built no capital ships since 1916, other than the twins. Not only did the Bismarck have less armour but it was markedly inferior in total and in layout. [The Bismarck had its main deck armour quite low, which maintained better buoyancy but meant anything above this deck was very vulnerable to bombs or shell fire. This is often cited as why Bismarck was disabled so quickly OTL].
c) Probably also due to the lack of experience since WWI there were also doubts about the German shells, which had a lot of fires.
d) Also I know the turrets of the twins were very poor, they even suffered serious flooding during action off Norway, I'm not sure if the Bismarck's was any better. While Britain did have problems with the 16" shell, this was partly due to the design compromises made in cutting down the G3 design to the Nelson and partly to a mistaken interpretation of the lessons of WWI, which meant the Admiralty went from a heavy shell to a lighter one. However those problems had largely been resolved by the mid-30's.

Hence, the likelihood would have been that if the Bismarck came up against a G3 in Denmark strait its career would have ended there. Probably if it had come up against a Nelson the same would have applied, although in that case the Bismarck might have been able to use its superior speed to escape.

Steve

[CalBear]

Don't insult people

Originally Posted by stevep

PhilKearny

Even for you this is stupid. You have argued that Britain was bankrupt, which is crap, that the G3 is a bad design, which virtually no naval expert believes, that the G3s would have the same problems as the Nelson's which has often been pointed out was wrong.

Now you're trying to say the the US, which has started this naval race then slumped back into isolationism and has no intent to build more than the Washington would become insanely aggressive if Britain decided to build new ships to match those being built by the US and Japan. Try and get some touch with reality! There were extreme Anglophobes and assorted business interests that would play the propaganda card for further naval build-ups but no one was listening to them. The Us had no interest in attacking the power it relied upon to do most of the work of keeping world trade safe.

Steve

[Cockroach]

Originally Posted by PhilKearny

The failings of the armor scheme was that while the belt was thick, it was short and narrow relative to the practice of other nations.

Similar level of coverage length-wise as the Lexington class (60%); a taller belt (4.3m total with 1.4m below the waterline vs 2.8m) and greater slope (18 deg vs 11 deg)? Taller main belt than Hood (4.3m vs 2.9m... though Hood had two thinner belts above the main one)?

Now I'm just a vaugly interested amature in this field and so may have missed some of the detai of armour perfomance but looking at that I'd say the G3's scheme compares quite well with contempary fast capitals ships.

They were less expensive to man and to fuel than the G3s would have been.

400 men over and above a Nelson class? Or 600 men over an an Iron Duke or R class? Yeah... could be an issue but not to the extent it'd kill the program.

The NelRods did not require new facilities as they not nearly as long as the G3s would have been.

G3? 260.9m length (oa) 32.3m beam 10.9m draught at maximum load.
Hood? 262.1m length (oa) 31.7m beam 9.6m draught at maximum load.

During WW1 the poms had Hood and three sister ships on the slips... so it seems reasonable to say that the poms had at least four yards that should be capable of building G3s.

As I noted before, building the G3s may well provoke a naval race with the US. The UK could not afford afford a naval race with the US.

The poms retire a dozen old 12 inch gunned capital ships and shove a few 13.5in-ers into reserve... but somehow building four new Battlecruisers is going to drive the yanks into an arms race?
Even if it does draw an american response it'll likely drive the yanks to complete the Eggshells-with-hammers they had on the slips rather than develop a new class.

[stevep]

Originally Posted by Captain Jack

How about Germany? What affect would the G3's have on the Kriegsmarine when it starts to rebuild a surface fleet?

Fishers Follies?

Captain Jack

Oops, sorry. Realised I mis-read your post. For some reason thinking it was how the German OTL ships would match against a G3 equipped fleet, most especially a G£ v Bismarck.

In terms of actual German production difficult to say. If being logical then their existence might prompt the Germans not to build any new ships. The Bismarcks were about the best that Germany could produce before war would be likely and, with all experience of capital ship construction for two decades lost, were rather dated designs that would be outclassed by the G3s and probably anything Britain had produced since. Similarly the twins, which were the largest they could manage in the immediate aftermath of Hitler assuming power would be heavily outclassed. Hence possibly going for a trade war with more subs earlier.

This assumes of course that:
a) Germany considers only the UK as an enemy in naval terms. Since they could face a conflict with France, Russia or possibly some minor powers there are arguments for such ships.

b) That Germany considers the issue rationally. Since for Germany we must read Hitler this is a big question. He rather liked the big ships, which were still the symbol of power at sea and wanted Germany to be number one at everything. Furthermore, even if you think subs can win a naval war with Britain, they can't support an invasion which Hitler might feel necessary.

However there is more likelihood that Germany might go for a sub war a bit earlier, and/or having some of the resources committed OTL to other areas. This would however mean than an even more powerful RN, which it would be without any treaties, wouldn't have as much of its strength tied down in Scapa watching for a German breakout. The only danger would be if Britain missed the signs of a sub build-up or because some gunnery fanatic gets too powerful doesn't develop the trade protection ships and doctrine of OTL. Which were only just about adequate once France suddenly fell.

Steve

[stevep]

Originally Posted by sharlin

The RN actually favoured the larger cruisers, its why we built so many County class cruisers. Heavy cruisers and light cruisers were coming. The RN laid down the Hawkins class which was the archetype of the Heavy Cruiser pattern, 10k tonnes, heavy caliber guns, high speed.

sharlin

I'm not sure you're right here. They did build the three Hawkins but the latter E class were again markedly smaller.

After the treaty was signed and with inadequate capital ship resources there was more argument for building up to the limit, hence the County's but Britain's primary need was for smaller trade protection cruisers, hence the smaller ships built latter. Numbers mattered more than size, at least until the government conceded to US demands in 1930 to number as well as tonnage limits. One of a series of errors in that period that turned a problem into a crisis later on.

Large ships were more important for the US, partly because of distances in the Pacific but, more importantly, because their purpose was offensive support of the fleet. Unlike Britain they didn't have a large overseas trade network or major possessions, let alone the criticality of the trade lines to the nation's survival. Even then it could be argued that they would have been better off with more, smaller cruisers as they were seriously deficient in scouts, the traditional fleet cruiser role. However they had the ability to spend more time tooling up for war than the other powers plus the increasing development of air power that increasingly covered the need.

For Britain the tonnage limits were a more serious problem and agreeing to numerical limits as well greatly compounded this. Hence Britain was always short of cruisers, despite building markedly more than the US pre-war and maintaining a lot of older C class cruisers from WWI.

It would have been better making clear to the US that while it fixated on Britain Britain had to deal with numerous more serious threats and hence needed a drastically different fleet that what the US desired for its own navy. Unfortunately, for whatever reason, the politicians of the period were unwilling to do this, or face up to the growing obsolescence of the fleet until it was too late. The mis-guided pacifism that was so strong at the time, along with the ill thought out economic programmes the assorted governments followed in the 20's and 30's.

Steve

[PhilKearny]

Steve, you may feel what I wrote is stupid but you have little reasonable or factual basis for your assertions. You misrepresent what I have posted in the past. You offer an interpretation of history that contrary to the facts and contrary to the interpretations of facts set out in scholarly texts. Basically, everything you wrote is wrong.

I have indicated that the G3 was a flawed design, though not necessarily a "bad" design. (It was also an innovative design.) It would have had armor scheme with issues and other flaws. This is discussed in a number of sources. At my fingertips, is Jordan's Warships after Washington which makes the point that the G3s would have many of the same failings as the NelRods. I believe Worth also discusses these issues in his Fleets Of World War II. I believe I also have several other sources just in my own collection of naval books but I am going to comb through 80 or 100 volumes just to provide additional citations that you will just ignore.

The most important flaw in the G3s, imho, would have been the guns. This flaw it would have most certainly shared with NelRods, as this is gun the only gun that was ever made for G3s that were laid down. (The 16.5" gun considered at one one point was never even built.) The 16" Mark I guns simply did not work well as their service record demonstrates. Compared to the prior BL 15" Mk I, the BL 16" was a failure. It was less accurate than the 15", had a firing cycle about half as fast, fired a shell not much heavier than the 15", and had a range not much further. The failings of the gun the G3s were to carry is discussed at length at the Naval Weapons site. The gun was also certainly worse than both of the American 16" guns of the time in just about every aspect. And the gun is the whole reason for warships such as the G3s.

Almost all of these problems were not due to "weight savings required for the NelRods." The guns were based on a flaw premise of increased velocity. This, not weight savings, led to the inaccuracy. The firing cycle was slow mainly due to the interlocks being overly complicated not due to weight savings. Campbell book on WW II naval weapons notes that rate of fire problems due to the interlocks also occurred in other UK ships designed at the same time. The interlocks were just too complicated.

As to the United Kingdom's financial status, I don't believe I have ever posted that the UK was bankrupt after WW I. Still, even if I did, that would be a reasonable metaphor. The UK after the WW I was in dire financial straits. I have about a dozen economics textbooks on the period in my library at home and they all say that. That's what I learned years ago in my various international economics and finance classes. The volume by Joseph Moretz on Interwar Capital Ship Design also covers some of this material explaining the financial pressures on the RN. Simply put, because of the UK's perilous financial standing, politicians in the UK felt they could not afford a naval race, particularly after the last one with Germany. Building the G3s would have triggered another naval race--scholars generally agree on this.

You continue to express a grave misunderstanding both of the political situation of the United States and of the situation concerning the naval rivalries after WW I. A good summary can be found in Phillips P. O'Brien's British and American Naval Power--Politics and Policy, 1900-1936. A more in depth analysis can be read in the Washington Conference 1921-1922: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability, and the Road to Pearl Harbor.

Both these volumes make the same point: The politicians of the United Kingdom feared the United States 1916 program because they realized the UK could not afford to keep up. O'Brien points the UK leaders were particularly concerned because the felt the US would be able to outbuild the UK by a huge margin due to money and to limitations on available shipyards. The G3 and N3 programs basically were started in response to being left behind the US. (Other factors did play a role, such as a fear of Japan. Lord Jellicoe, after 1919 mission to the far east, estimated the UK would need a remarkably huge fleet of 8 battleships and 8 battlecruiser in the far east just to protect the Empire's East Asian assets and contain Japan. Admiralty knew it could not afford such.)

The US position was that it had a legitimate need for a large navy. The US was the leading international trading power at the end of WW I. At a minimum, wanted parity with the UK to protect its greatly increased foreign trade and foreign interests. Both texts set out in detail that UK was willing to settle for this and that he G3s were going forward only as a hedge if the US would not settle for parity at level below the US Navy's 1916 plan, which the US showed every sign of completing.

O'Brien's book specifically notes that the anti-naval forces tried to stop the US Navy's post war expansion based on the 1916 plan but failed to secure enough support to do so. The Navy had strong backing among most Republicans except in some of the less populous western states. (Burton K. Wheeler--not to be confused with Burton K Wheeler--from Montana was one of the few Republican opponents. Borah from Idaho was another.) The Democrats, particularly southern Democrats, tended to be against the naval expansion. The Republican support was great enough to prevent cuts. Thus, the US Navy's expansion continued, with work proceeding on the South Dakotas and Lexingtons.

The expansion was finally checked by the 5 Power Treaty of the Washington Naval Conference, which gave the the 5-5-3 UK, US, Japan ratios we are so familiar with. This treaty, which was engineered by Secretary of State Hughes, raised the ire of the US Navy. They felt betrayed. The US Navy's officials were not even allowed to testify in Congress at the hearings over the treaty, as they were opposed to it, and such testimony might have blocked the passage of the treaty or at least caused considerable political problems for the Republicans.

What is particularly interesting to me is what O'Brien specifically points out about the US Navy's views at the time. Secretary of State Hughes and the US Navy both felt that the Japanese were a major adversary not to be trusted. But the Naval General Board had an official policy that also included a strong distrust of the UK. The US Navy Board felt that the UK was a major adversary and US needed to expand far beyond the 1916 plan to be able to meet and crush the threat the UK posed. The General Board set forth scenarios of an aggressive UK raiding the US eastern seaboard and invading from Canada.

Beyond the US Navy, there were others who did have strong interests in larger US Navy. These did include business interests and Anglophobes (one of the few correct assertions you make). It also included such diverse groups as those who felt the US needed a stronger Navy to protect against foreign imperialism and those who wanted the US to have its own empire. President Harding, after all, campaigned on having a stronger US Navy.

Thus, the well documented scholarship in these books and similar well researched volumes set out, rebuts any claims of isolationism running rampant in the post-war United States.

Hence, pretty much everything you posted about my positions, the G3s, and the US political climate lacks support, Steve. Just because others have posted inaccurate and incorrect assertions does not make them correct when you repeat them.

Originally Posted by stevep

PhilKearny

Even for you this is stupid. You have argued that Britain was bankrupt, which is crap, that the G3 is a bad design, which virtually no naval expert believes, that the G3s would have the same problems as the Nelson's which has often been pointed out was wrong.

Now you're trying to say the the US, which has started this naval race then slumped back into isolationism and has no intent to build more than the Washington would become insanely aggressive if Britain decided to build new ships to match those being built by the US and Japan. Try and get some touch with reality! There were extreme Anglophobes and assorted business interests that would play the propaganda card for further naval build-ups but no one was listening to them. The Us had no interest in attacking the power it relied upon to do most of the work of keeping world trade safe.

Steve

[AdA]

Originally Posted by ModernKiwi

I am pretty sure that the Hood's sisters were scrapped on the yard before the end of the war.

A RN that constructs the G3 and N3's isn't going to have any money for carriers, so they're probably only going to have the Argus and the Eagle. The Couragous/Glorious/Furious are likely to be scrapped instead.

Rodney Howe and Anson were authorised to be scrapped in October 1918 and had been scraped by August 1919.

[AdA]

Britain was not really in a race with anybody. The US would however soon be in a real race with Japan. The treaty was probably the best thing that could have happened to the RN, that had 10 15'' BB and 3 15''BC and didn't really need the Nelsons.
The G3 and N3 were probably only meant as paper designs, only ordered to give Britain a good bargaining position for the oncoming treaty.

[PMN1]

Originally Posted by PhilKearny

The most important flaw in the G3s, imho, would have been the guns. This flaw it would have most certainly shared with NelRods, as this is gun the only gun that was ever made for G3s that were laid down. (The 16.5" gun considered at one one point was never even built.) The 16" Mark I guns simply did not work well as their service record demonstrates. Compared to the prior BL 15" Mk I, the BL 16" was a failure. It was less accurate than the 15", had a firing cycle about half as fast, fired a shell not much heavier than the 15", and had a range not much further. The failings of the gun the G3s were to carry is discussed at length at the Naval Weapons site. The gun was also certainly worse than both of the American 16" guns of the time in just about every aspect. And the gun is the whole reason for warships such as the G3s.

Almost all of these problems were not due to "weight savings required for the NelRods." The guns were based on a flaw premise of increased velocity. This, not weight savings, led to the inaccuracy. The firing cycle was slow mainly due to the interlocks being overly complicated not due to weight savings. Campbell book on WW II naval weapons notes that rate of fire problems due to the interlocks also occurred in other UK ships designed at the same time. The interlocks were just too complicated.

As to the United Kingdom's financial status, I don't believe I have ever posted that the UK was bankrupt after WW I. Still, even if I did, that would be a reasonable metaphor. The UK after the WW I was in dire financial straits. I have about a dozen economics textbooks on the period in my library at home and they all say that. That's what I learned years ago in my various international economics and finance classes. The volume by Joseph Moretz on Interwar Capital Ship Design also covers some of this material explaining the financial pressures on the RN. Simply put, because of the UK's perilous financial standing, politicians in the UK felt they could not afford a naval race, particularly after the last one with Germany. Building the G3s would have triggered another naval race--scholars generally agree on this.

You continue to express a grave misunderstanding both of the political situation of the United States and of the situation concerning the naval rivalries after WW I. A good summary can be found in Phillips P. O'Brien's British and American Naval Power--Politics and Policy, 1900-1936. A more in depth analysis can be read in the Washington Conference 1921-1922: Naval Rivalry, East Asian Stability, and the Road to Pearl Harbor.

Both these volumes make the same point: The politicians of the United Kingdom feared the United States 1916 program because they realized the UK could not afford to keep up. O'Brien points the UK leaders were particularly concerned because the felt the US would be able to outbuild the UK by a huge margin due to money and to limitations on available shipyards. The G3 and N3 programs basically were started in response to being left behind the US. (Other factors did play a role, such as a fear of Japan. Lord Jellicoe, after 1919 mission to the far east, estimated the UK would need a remarkably huge fleet of 8 battleships and 8 battlecruiser in the far east just to protect the Empire's East Asian assets and contain Japan. Admiralty knew it could not afford such.)

The US position was that it had a legitimate need for a large navy. The US was the leading international trading power at the end of WW I. At a minimum, wanted parity with the UK to protect its greatly increased foreign trade and foreign interests. Both texts set out in detail that UK was willing to settle for this and that he G3s were going forward only as a hedge if the US would not settle for parity at level below the US Navy's 1916 plan, which the US showed every sign of completing.

O'Brien's book specifically notes that the anti-naval forces tried to stop the US Navy's post war expansion based on the 1916 plan but failed to secure enough support to do so. The Navy had strong backing among most Republicans except in some of the less populous western states. (Burton K. Wheeler--not to be confused with Burton K Wheeler--from Montana was one of the few Republican opponents. Borah from Idaho was another.) The Democrats, particularly southern Democrats, tended to be against the naval expansion. The Republican support was great enough to prevent cuts. Thus, the US Navy's expansion continued, with work proceeding on the South Dakotas and Lexingtons.

The NavWeapons article does blame the weight savings for a lot of the problems.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-059.htm
Some of the major changes during the transition of the design from the "G3" Battlecruisers to the "O3" Battleships that became the Nelson's are as follows;


1. The hydraulic mains (normally water in Royal Navy ships), were switched to oil, to allow the use of steel piping as opposed to the heavy duty brass pipes in previous classes. This gave a reasonable weight saving, and was less costly. However, the steel pipes were never felt to be as good as the earlier brass ones and seem to have suffered from leaks more frequently.


2. The independent shell bogies for each gun were abandoned to save weight and due to the difficulty in co-ordination. The three fixed position bogies were lighter than three independent ones would have been, but this caused the loading cycle to be slowed considerably. This was due to the fact that all the guns had to be loaded together, whilst due dispersal problems, it was desirable to fire the wing guns separate from the center guns in each turret.


3. The cordite bogies (similar to the shell bogies) were replaced by cordite hoppers in the final design. This led to a requirement for more men in the turret crew.


4. The supply rate of cordite to the turret also caused problems, as whilst the shells took 35-45 seconds to reach the guns, the cordite took 45-55 seconds to reach the same point. This was partly due to the greater distance the cordite had to travel, and partly due to the safety interlocks reducing any chance of speeding up the process. Initially, there was a lesser degree of automation in the mountings, and less interlocks also. These were added during the design process, as ways of saving weight and reducing manpower became more important, especially after changes 2 and 3 were adopted.


5. The roller paths that caused problems in 1928, were 18 inches less in diameter than those for the "G3" design, and indeed the corrective measure of a set of vertical rollers, was already allowed for in the initial designs. Again, this feature seems to have been changed in an attempt to save weight.


6. The turrets for the "G3" design were to weigh 1830-1900 tons (though a figure of 1730 is also quoted, though this seems a little light), whilst those for the Nelson's were 1464-1485 tons. This difference was due (other than the slightly smaller size of the mounting) to the replacement of various pieces of machinery with the lighter and mostly more fragile versions that later caused so many problems. It can be seen that in the 1939 Lion design, the turrets are heavier than those of Nelson, whilst having a slightly reduced scale of protection.

These are the major changes to the gun mountings and were certainly the ones that caused most problems for the designers and for the crews once in service.



In terms of the state of the economy and the ability to repay money...probably no worse than America's for the past few decades.

Let the US build the South Dakotas and Lexingtons, they are either going to be slower (South Dokotas) or fragile (Lexingtons) and the support classes they need are not up to much.

[PhilKearny]

This seems pretty close to what I have read.

While individuals in the UK such as Jellicoe and Churchill favored having the UK try to match the US 1916 program, cooler heads prevailed. Similarly, Sec. Hughes in the US saw continuing the 1916 plan as a waste if the US could end up through negotiations with a fleet equal to the UK and greater than Japan.

I have read that Wilson argued for planning a bigger fleet to bring about disarmament, as it did. Likewise, I have read various sources that state that the G3s and N3s were attempts to bring about a treaty limiting the US fleet, as the UK could not afford to actually have a naval race.

Hence, the idea of G3s (and even more so the N3s) is very unlikely.

As our time reveals, due to budget cuts the UK had enough trouble in maintaining the ships it had over the next 15 years. Moretz goes into this in great detail.

Originally Posted by AdA

Britain was not really in a race with anybody. The US would however soon be in a real race with Japan. The treaty was probably the best thing that could have happened to the RN, that had 10 15'' BB and 3 15''BC and didn't really need the Nelsons.
The G3 and N3 were probably only meant as paper designs, only ordered to give Britain a good bargaining position for the oncoming treaty.

[AdA]

No Washinton treaty leads to:
G3 and N3 are never ordered, no need to bluff other countries making their price the deciding factor.
Carrier program goes much as OTL.
Tiger, Lion and Princess Royal are rebuilt. Q turret is removed, protection improved, secondary battery rebuilt along Hood lines. They become near Renowns.
Australia and New Zeland get their nominal BC plus indomitable and Inflexible.
The 4 KGV and 4 Iron Duke are rebuilt much along the lines of Tiger.
Two Orion class BB are rebuilt like the 8 BB above and sold to Holland with the provision that they will deploy to the Pacific. The other two are sold two France on the same basis.
The RN reaches the 30s with 10 near first class BB (the QE and R) classes and 8 second class BB (the rebuilds) plus six excellent BC and the worlds most capable carrier fleet (no Lexingtons converted, no Akagi converted)
Having the worlds best Cruiser and Destroyer Force, money saved on new BB and BC goes to carrier aviation, the RN trump card in the 20s. An improved Hermes class is built, slightly bigger, giving 6 real carriers.
The USN battle line of South Dakotas is of course unbeatable, and the Lexingtons are impressived if vulnerable, but the prospect of war with the US is unlikely and the colapse of imperial Japan after its naval race with the US ruins it's economy leaves the Pacific safe in US ( and Dutch, Australian and New Zelander hands)

[ModernKiwi]

I couldn't see the French buying the leftover Orions. They have their own shipbuilding industries. And why would they buy ships where everything is built to imperial measure (rather than metric) and so they'd be entirely dependent upon the British for support/spares/ammunition?

[PhilKearny]

That article blames primarily the unreliability on the weight savings in the NelRods. It does not address the inaccuracy of the guns. The inaccuracy was inherent in the design as made clear from the article I cited. The combination of lighter shell and increased velocity yielded a less accurate gun with shorter barrel life. Thus, the G3s would have been armed with a weapon that would have been less accurate and with a very limited barrel life.

Further, some of what is in that article not supported by the sources that the article cites, most of which I have purchased. (I do admit that I have not been to Imperial War Museum or National Maritime Musem to review original documents. I do have copies the other sources.) For example, Campbell notes that the switch from water to oil hydraulics was done to decrease maintenance, not to save weight. Campbell also notes that the slower loading was endemic to British turrets of the period. Thus, given the heavy shell, the fact at best only part of the slow rate of fire is accounted for by weight savings, and the performance of the turrets that were actually built, odds are the rate of fire would have been an issue for the G3s.

Bottom line is that the turret and guns as finally built did not work well. Given the history of the NelRods, along with numerous problems with the later KG V turrets, there is little to suggest that the G3 turrets would have been much better.

I would go on but I have a 4 hour drive I need to make. That is all until next weekend.

Originally Posted by PMN1

The NavWeapons article does blame the weight savings for a lot of the problems.

http://www.navweaps.com/index_tech/tech-059.htm
Some of the major changes during the transition of the design from the "G3" Battlecruisers to the "O3" Battleships that became the Nelson's are as follows;


1. The hydraulic mains (normally water in Royal Navy ships), were switched to oil, to allow the use of steel piping as opposed to the heavy duty brass pipes in previous classes. This gave a reasonable weight saving, and was less costly. However, the steel pipes were never felt to be as good as the earlier brass ones and seem to have suffered from leaks more frequently.


2. The independent shell bogies for each gun were abandoned to save weight and due to the difficulty in co-ordination. The three fixed position bogies were lighter than three independent ones would have been, but this caused the loading cycle to be slowed considerably. This was due to the fact that all the guns had to be loaded together, whilst due dispersal problems, it was desirable to fire the wing guns separate from the center guns in each turret.


3. The cordite bogies (similar to the shell bogies) were replaced by cordite hoppers in the final design. This led to a requirement for more men in the turret crew.


4. The supply rate of cordite to the turret also caused problems, as whilst the shells took 35-45 seconds to reach the guns, the cordite took 45-55 seconds to reach the same point. This was partly due to the greater distance the cordite had to travel, and partly due to the safety interlocks reducing any chance of speeding up the process. Initially, there was a lesser degree of automation in the mountings, and less interlocks also. These were added during the design process, as ways of saving weight and reducing manpower became more important, especially after changes 2 and 3 were adopted.


5. The roller paths that caused problems in 1928, were 18 inches less in diameter than those for the "G3" design, and indeed the corrective measure of a set of vertical rollers, was already allowed for in the initial designs. Again, this feature seems to have been changed in an attempt to save weight.


6. The turrets for the "G3" design were to weigh 1830-1900 tons (though a figure of 1730 is also quoted, though this seems a little light), whilst those for the Nelson's were 1464-1485 tons. This difference was due (other than the slightly smaller size of the mounting) to the replacement of various pieces of machinery with the lighter and mostly more fragile versions that later caused so many problems. It can be seen that in the 1939 Lion design, the turrets are heavier than those of Nelson, whilst having a slightly reduced scale of protection.

These are the major changes to the gun mountings and were certainly the ones that caused most problems for the designers and for the crews once in service.



In terms of the state of the economy and the ability to repay money...probably no worse than America's for the past few decades.

Let the US build the South Dakotas and Lexingtons, they are either going to be slower (South Dokotas) or fragile (Lexingtons) and the support classes they need are not up to much.

[stevep]

Originally Posted by AdA

No Washinton treaty leads to:
G3 and N3 are never ordered, no need to bluff other countries making their price the deciding factor.
Carrier program goes much as OTL.
Tiger, Lion and Princess Royal are rebuilt. Q turret is removed, protection improved, secondary battery rebuilt along Hood lines. They become near Renowns.
Australia and New Zeland get their nominal BC plus indomitable and Inflexible.
The 4 KGV and 4 Iron Duke are rebuilt much along the lines of Tiger.
Two Orion class BB are rebuilt like the 8 BB above and sold to Holland with the provision that they will deploy to the Pacific. The other two are sold two France on the same basis.
The RN reaches the 30s with 10 near first class BB (the QE and R) classes and 8 second class BB (the rebuilds) plus six excellent BC and the worlds most capable carrier fleet (no Lexingtons converted, no Akagi converted)
Having the worlds best Cruiser and Destroyer Force, money saved on new BB and BC goes to carrier aviation, the RN trump card in the 20s. An improved Hermes class is built, slightly bigger, giving 6 real carriers.
The USN battle line of South Dakotas is of course unbeatable, and the Lexingtons are impressived if vulnerable, but the prospect of war with the US is unlikely and the colapse of imperial Japan after its naval race with the US ruins it's economy leaves the Pacific safe in US ( and Dutch, Australian and New Zelander hands)

AdA

So you're basically saying that Britain finds it cheaper and better to maintain and upgrade 10BB and 6BCs that are effectively obsolete rather than a smaller number of new ships? I could see Australia keeping its BC for prestige reasons plus some suggestion that with an extensive rebuild it might make a efficient cruiser killer. However, while that might be effective I doubt the RN would be interested in any of the other three I class. [New Zealand paid for her BC but didn't have the resources to maintain it so left it to the RN to man and maintain]. Can't see Lion or Princess Royal being worthwhile upgrading significantly and definitely not the old coal-fired BBs.

I agree that the balanced fleet with a decent force of cruisers and DDs would be the RN's saving grace. Even more so than OTL as with no treaty Britain wouldn't have its cruiser and DD strength artificially restrained.

Not sure the US carrier forces would be that much weaker as pretty certain the US wouldn't be building more than the 4 Washington's as willingness was exhausted, so suspect they would still convert a couple of BCs. Not sure what Japan would do as they would probably seek at least 4BB, including the Nagato and Mutsu to match the US and also what Britain would almost certainly build. [There might be doubt about the G3s in political circles, but with both the US and Japan producing major new ships I think public pressure would outweigh the desire to cut costs further.

If somehow the US built all their 1916 programme then their fleet is going to be in deep trouble as its going to be highly unbalanced and very short of funding for any updates. If it does do this then the Japanese could well bankrupt themselves to try and compete and Britain will build something additional to the 4G3s.

Steve

[AdA]

Originally Posted by ModernKiwi

I couldn't see the French buying the leftover Orions. They have their own shipbuilding industries. And why would they buy ships where everything is built to imperial measure (rather than metric) and so they'd be entirely dependent upon the British for support/spares/ammunition?

For compability with the Dutch in a combined low cost force with British support to give some political weight to the "we're not totally dependent on the US" argument. The French would still build ships, but for the Atlantic and the Med.