WI: D-Day Landings Fail?

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by jmc247

It would reqire alot going wrong for the Western Allies to happen. The question becomes do the Western Allies resign themselves to a Soviet controlled central Europe or are they willing to play ball with the Field Marshal's in the West for something other then unconditional surrender and Plan Morgenthau.

It could have gone alot of ways depending on exactly how the Western Allies lose and what happens in London, Washington, and the battlefield. Does FDR have a stroke a few months early under the stress? How many Anglo-American troops die/are captured. Does Rommel win over the loyalty of the divisional commanders by leading them to short term victory? How damaged is the German Army in the West?

There are alot of variables to consider.

Well, given that the most the Germans could do would be to contain the bridgeheads to a narrower and shallower base for longer than IOTL, this is actually the kind of POD that sees the Soviet Empire pushing further west than IOTL. The Soviets getting too much further than they did was never really in the cards, IMHO.

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by Joyeux

Maybe Hitler releases the panzers earlier, maybe Germany isn't decieved by the Allies, it doesn't matter why they fail.
The landings fail, thousands of troops are killed and the Allies are forced back to Britain with at least 40% casualties.

How will the war's outcome be affected if the D-Day landings were to fail?
Will the Allies throw together another force and try again? Or will they not bother and focus on Italy?
What about united communist Germany?

Like of lot of these unlikely POD, it matters a lot what the POD is. For example, if it is just a bad weather forecast, the the Allies may be able to try again in 1944. If it is because the Nazi's have a vast store of jet fighters and precision guided anti-ship missiles, then it will not be tried again, maybe ever.

Ok, now to what can be generalized. You seem to want the Allies to fail catastrophically, then it mid 1945 until they can try again. The Nazi's will have minor amount of forces to send east. The Soviets still crush the Nazi in the summer battles, but maybe not as badly. The war will last a few months longer. The nuclear weapons might be used on Germany. Stalin likely capitalize on the failed invasion and gain an additional concession. Maybe Greece goes communist, or Austria is Stalin Zone of Control. The impact will be mostly to make cold war much harder on the USA/UK/France.

[jmc247]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

Well, given that the most the Germans could do would be to contain the bridgeheads to a narrower and shallower base for longer than IOTL, this is actually the kind of POD that sees the Soviet Empire pushing further west than IOTL. The Soviets getting too much further than they did was never really in the cards, IMHO.

Yes, the Soviet Union was limited by logistics and was getting worn out toward the end. They could have gotten further then they did OTL, but probably not alot further.

This thread reminds me I watched online a pretty good you tube inteview with Manfred Rommel two nights ago that mainly focused on the battle for France and the overall strategic situation.

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=hDAxuExWOXg

[BlondieBC]

Originally Posted by MarshalBraginsky

So even with the German deployment of the Me-262 fighter planes, it certainly won't blunt the Allied landings, right?

Fighters alone can't blunt it, just make it bloodier for the Allies, mainly in the Air units. You have to stop the transports with the infantry to win the battle.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by jmc247

Yes, the Soviet Union was limited by logistics and was getting worn out toward the end. They could have gotten further then they did OTL, but probably not alot further.

This thread reminds me I watched online a pretty good you tube inteview with Manfred Rommel two nights ago that mainly focused on the battle for France and the overall strategic situation.

http://m.youtube.com/watch?v=hDAxuExWOXg

Just as the WAllies being more limited by logistics in an inverse sense would start to favor the USSR after a certain point. Hitler may decide to overplay his hand and reinforce the West too much, leading to the East caving in faster and relatively more bloodlessly for the USSR ITTL.

[hairysamarian]

Originally Posted by MarshalBraginsky

So even with the German deployment of the Me-262 fighter planes, it certainly won't blunt the Allied landings, right?

Nope. Shortages of fuel and production, as well as shortcomings in what was, after all, a technology in its infancy meant that the 262 was not going to alter the war. It came too late. Apparently it had engine problems too, but I'm not up on that particular detail.

[b12ox]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

There's a number of problems here, not least of them that if the landings are that likely to fail, the Allies just postpone them to 1945. The second issue here is that Bagration was going to kill the Nazis strategically with or without the establishment of the Third Front. The democracies have a freedom the USSR does not: a great ability to choose the time and the place of their attacks. If they're too likely to lose in a particular place, they won't attack there.

Thw W Allies could not wait any longer. it was quite obvious that if the Soviets arrive in Berlin with no WAllies in sight they will keep walking. German resistnce would have been tougher with more eqipment moved over to the East but the Soviets were ahead of schedule in OTL anyway. I am not sure if the US knew that Bagration was planned, but, even if not, it was easy to predict stuff on massive scale was goint to start rolling westwards the very summer and it was not easy to predict with what speed it will be heading. The Germans were done for in the big plan. Even if the Soviets subsequently witthdraw from Western Europe there would have been a hell of problems at the table. The spring of 1944 means the Soviets expected in Berlin even before Winter. 1945 may well have been too late. it looked like that in the spring of 1944 even more so. Postponment was not an issue. The relative late end of the war was the outcome of the first pulls of cold war and so was the mandatory date for Overlord set in stone. Failure was not an option.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by b12ox

Thw W Allies could not wait any longer. it was quite obvious that if the Soviets arrive in Berlin with no WAllies in sight they will keep walking. German resistnce would have been tougher with more eqipment moved over to the East but the Soviets were ahead of schedule in OTL anyway. I am not sure if the US knew that Bagration was planned, but, even if not, it was easy to predict stuff on massive scale was goint to start rolling westwards the very summer and it was not easy to predict with what speed it will be heading. The Germans were done for in the big plan. Even if the Soviets subsequently witthdraw from Western Europe there would have been a hell of problems at the table. The spring of 1944 means the Soviets expected in Berlin even before Winter. 1945 may well have been too late. it looked like that in the spring of 1944 even more so. Postponment was not an issue. The relative late end of the war was the outcome of the first pulls of cold war and so was the mandatory date for Overlord set in stone. Failure was not an option.

It's not obvious at all, as the Soviets didn't have the logistical capability to push all that much further than they did IOTL, and this with Lend-Lease. The other problem with Bagration itself doing all this is that the Soviets were planning the second Jhassy-Kishinev Offensive, and it's *that* one that is really the fatal element for the Wehrmacht in the 1944 offensives even moreso than in the case of Bagration. When Ploesti falls with it goes 99% of German capability in mechanized warfare even at the tactical level.

[b12ox]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

It's not obvious at all, as the Soviets didn't have the logistical capability to push all that much further than they did IOTL, and this with Lend-Lease. The other problem with Bagration itself doing all this is that the Soviets were planning the second Jhassy-Kishinev Offensive, and it's *that* one that is really the fatal element for the Wehrmacht in the 1944 offensives even moreso than in the case of Bagration. When Ploesti falls with it goes 99% of German capability in mechanized warfare even at the tactical level.

even more so it should have pressed the US to launch Overloard. In the spring of '44. The road through Belarus and Poland was the qickest,and no mountains. They stopped twice, in Warsew, and then at the Oder. Five months went missing.

[CalBear]

Actually, naval gunfire is almost ideal for close support. It tends to be remarkably accurate with the proper spotting (recall that it is meant to hit a ship, a target that is, at most, 1,000 feet long by 150 feet wide and maneuvering at 30 knots). The methodology for calling in artillery support had also been established long since. In 1944 you were probably better off calling in gunfire from a warship 15 miles away (or an artillery battery 8 miles away) than having a fighter bomber drop a 1,000 pound bomb from 2,000 feet altitude.

Originally Posted by Basileus444

I'm wondering what would happen if a perfect storm hit the Allies. They attack Normandy as in OTL, but the Germans know about it and are ready, so at best every beach looks like Omaha at best. And then the weather gets nasty, so nasty that planes can't fly and destroyers are too busy trying not to sink to provide fire support. Battleships are still available for fire support, but radar isn't going to help pick out panzers in the countryside, and they can't provide what's needed most, close-in fire support. Friendly fire from fourteen-inch shells is not something the Allies need. If the German reserves (who would be ready unlike OTL) hit the Allies now, with the air forces unavailable and the navy weakened, the Allied soldiers will get flattened, and the weather means they can't be evaced.

Something that might make it worse for the Allies is to have the German reserves almost in position, but not quite, so the Allies get 3-4 days to pour men and equipment into the beaches. And then the weather gets nasty just as the reserves are ready.

How plausible/possible is this?

[CalBear]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

There's a number of problems here, not least of them that if the landings are that likely to fail, the Allies just postpone them to 1945. The second issue here is that Bagration was going to kill the Nazis strategically with or without the establishment of the Third Front. The democracies have a freedom the USSR does not: a great ability to choose the time and the place of their attacks. If they're too likely to lose in a particular place, they won't attack there.

This is one of the points that is generally forgotten. The Allies chose when and where to strike. They spent the better part of a year shaping the battlefield. They didn't attack until the had air supremacy over the battle space (not superiority, supremacy to the point that the Luftwaffe may as well have not existed), sufficient men and material to overwhelm the enemy at the point of attack, and through knowledge of the enemy's deployment at the strategic level.

They were not going to be defeated because they waited until they couldn't be defeated. (Of course, by mid 1944, the Red Army was able to choose when and where to launch major offensives, and for many of the same reasons.)

[Anaxagoras]

For all their logistical complexity, I think it's important to note that most major amphibious operations in history have succeeded. IIRC, the only amphibious landing to fail in the Pacific War on either side was the first Japanese landing on Wake Island.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by b12ox

even more so it should have pressed the US to launch Overloard. In the spring of '44. The road through Belarus and Poland was the qickest,and no mountains. They stopped twice, in Warsew, and then at the Oder. Five months went missing.

The Soviets stopped at Warsaw so they could launch Jhassy-Kishinev, as part of their broader plan of staggered offensives (the reduction of the Polish Home Army was a side-benefit for the Soviets, as that meant the Nazis took care of what might otherwise have been a very unpleasant task for the Soviets for them), and on the Oder due to a sequence of little flank attacks.

Originally Posted by CalBear

This is one of the points that is generally forgotten. The Allies chose when and where to strike. They spent the better part of a year shaping the battlefield. They didn't attack until the had air supremacy over the battle space (not superiority, supremacy to the point that the Luftwaffe may as well have not existed), sufficient men and material to overwhelm the enemy at the point of attack, and through knowledge of the enemy's deployment at the strategic level.

They were not going to be defeated because they waited until they couldn't be defeated. (Of course, by mid 1944, the Red Army was able to choose when and where to launch major offensives, and for many of the same reasons.)

Well, it's also worth reflecting that the Soviets planned a sequence of staggered offensives all along the line, in a methodical process and actually carried this out in a methodical, effective fashion, doing what the Germans never managed to do in either world war in that process. The democracies did have the relative advantage over the Soviets in that they were able to mass a great many men and firepower in precise areas chosen purely to play for their strengths, in the Soviet case politics and the contingent nature of the battlefield denied them this freedom at individual occasions in 1944 (but only in a sense of postponing the inevitable).

A major difference between the Allies and the Axis is that the former were able to work together in terms of setting up major joint offensives and joint strategies, even in the case of the Soviets with the Anglo-Americans, while ensuring these strategies were both adhered to and given sufficient resources to work. The Axis didn't often even have a strategy so much as lurching from one opportunistic moment to the next.

[b12ox]

Originally Posted by Snake Featherston

The Soviets stopped at Warsaw so they could launch Jhassy-Kishinev, as part of their broader plan of staggered offensives (the reduction of the Polish Home Army was a side-benefit for the Soviets, as that meant the Nazis took care of what might otherwise have been a very unpleasant task for the Soviets for them), and on the Oder due to a sequence of little flank attacks.

or more likely to secure the southern satellite zone for themselves in the post war TL. They could not let those lil countries in eastern Europe to let themselves free of the Nazis after all the hard job the Red Army does. Take Poland for example and the Warsaw Uprising. It was the message to take care of the buisness.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by Anaxagoras

For all their logistical complexity, I think it's important to note that most major amphibious operations in history have succeeded. IIRC, the only amphibious landing to fail in the Pacific War on either side was the first Japanese landing on Wake Island.

Sure, but in modern times they've always been rather chancy. Norway, Anzio, the Dodecanese, all are WWII-vintage amphibious disasters.

[Julian]

It's interesting to note that Hitler, the Abwehr and Heer completely misunderstood Soviet strategic intentions in late 1944 and early 1945. All major German reserves were shifted not to bolster the line along the Vistula, but instead to relieve Budapest and restore the situation there. Thus any forces which can be shfited from west-east because of a failed D-Day will just end up being ground up in the winter of 1944-45 around Budapest. Vistula-Oder will still occur as IOTL, and by that point no matter how many reserves are shifted around Soviet victory by May is guaranteed.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by Julian

It's interesting to note that Hitler, the Abwehr and Heer completely misunderstood Soviet strategic intentions in late 1944 and early 1945. All major German reserves were shifted not to bolster the line along the Vistula, but instead to relieve Budapest and restore the situation there. Thus any forces which can be shfited from west-east because of a failed D-Day will just end up being ground up in the winter of 1944-45 around Budapest. Vistula-Oder will still occur as IOTL, and by that point no matter how many reserves are shifted around Soviet victory by May is guaranteed.

It's also worth noting that the German reliance on the hoary old ghost of the Stab in the Back Legend targeting the Romanians has been invalidated by comparing Soviet and German sources. The Soviets outgeneraled the Germans very totally in that timeframe, more German soldiers sent East just means more inmates for the Gulag Archipleago.

[CalBear]

Originally Posted by Julian

It's interesting to note that Hitler, the Abwehr and Heer completely misunderstood Soviet strategic intentions in late 1944 and early 1945. All major German reserves were shifted not to bolster the line along the Vistula, but instead to relieve Budapest and restore the situation there. Thus any forces which can be shfited from west-east because of a failed D-Day will just end up being ground up in the winter of 1944-45 around Budapest. Vistula-Oder will still occur as IOTL, and by that point no matter how many reserves are shifted around Soviet victory by May is guaranteed.

This was less a mis-understanding than a simple case of utter strategic stupidity.

A reasonably well informed 10 year old could have figured out that the Red Army had Berlin as their destination by September of 1944.

[Snake Featherston]

Originally Posted by CalBear

This was less a mis-understanding than a simple case of utter strategic stupidity.

A reasonably well informed 10 year old could have figured out that the Red Army had Berlin as their destination by September of 1944.

OTOH, a reasonable strategist would see that losing *all* the remaining sources of oil in Ploesti and then in Balaton was going to guarantee that Berlin would fall sooner, rather than later.....

[AdA]

Originally Posted by CalBear

This is one of the points that is generally forgotten. The Allies chose when and where to strike. They spent the better part of a year shaping the battlefield. They didn't attack until the had air supremacy over the battle space (not superiority, supremacy to the point that the Luftwaffe may as well have not existed), sufficient men and material to overwhelm the enemy at the point of attack, and through knowledge of the enemy's deployment at the strategic level.

They were not going to be defeated because they waited until they couldn't be defeated. (Of course, by mid 1944, the Red Army was able to choose when and where to launch major offensives, and for many of the same reasons.)

Precisely. D day is pure "taking a F1 to a FFord race" material. The level of superiory was huge and the worst that could happen actually hapenned. They got stuck in the beachhead and the german lines held a lot longer then they should have.