The Kaiser's Toy Fleet and the Real German Army

[The Sandman]

Originally Posted by wiking

With an earlier army league and the replacement of the naval law of 1912 with an earlier, full army bill of 1913, then what I have suggested is very possible. Of course this would mean the victory of the technocrats, which changes the army and training substantially. No more bayonet charges, but rather open order manuever and fire superiority. Falkenhayn would have to rise earlier and Ludendorff, one of the major proponents of modernization and expansion, who incidentally was demoted for his efforts on the 1913 bill, would have to be promoted too.

Of course the effects would be huge and a major boon for the German army.

As a particular point, any chance that the Germans make an effort to more thoroughly motorize their logistics and artillery ITTL?

As to the preparations for a blockade, Germany did start planning with the famous Walther Rathenau pre-war (he headed up German economic planning during the war), but his recommendations were rejected because stockpiling resources was seen as a provocation and that Germany was planning on launching a war soon. It would have to be clandestine, but that is going to be hard to hide...

Why not just announce it openly, in the form of a strategic reserve to be released to German industry in times of supply disruption a la the OTL US Strategic Oil Reserve? Make as much effort as possible to depict it as just a sort of insurance against disaster, intended for the civilian economy, and it becomes more difficult for the British and French to fulminate against it as a militarily provocative act. If you can purchase as much of it as possible from British and French sources, even better; the companies you buy from will protest any action that might cut off their new source of revenue.

Originally Posted by Monty Burns

This, again, brings us back to the major factor to be considered here: Britain. Only Britain can impose a blockade on either side. With Britain allied to the central powers, France will be blocked without Haber-Bosch. With Britain neutral neither side will be effectively blocked.

As long as Germany has to move through Belgium to deal with France, they have to plan on the British coming in on the side of the Entente. And Britain has made it a very consistent piece of policy for centuries (essentially, for as long as they've had the power to uphold it) that no one nation should ever be allowed to gain control of continental Europe.

Also, the British can still use any German ships to claim that the Germans are threatening British dominance of the seas; a sizable jeune ecole navy could conceivably shut down shipping traffic to London, for instance, and the fact that any German capital ships that are built are likely to be designed as the absolute state-of-the-art in naval warfare won't help matters.

[wiking]

Originally Posted by The Sandman

As a particular point, any chance that the Germans make an effort to more thoroughly motorize their logistics and artillery ITTL?

Probably not due to the lack of a sustainable oil resource and the quick wearing out that automotives experienced at this point. Germany had 83 trucks in their army in 1914, only to watch them all break down going through Belgium.

Originally Posted by The Sandman

Why not just announce it openly, in the form of a strategic reserve to be released to German industry in times of supply disruption a la the OTL US Strategic Oil Reserve? Make as much effort as possible to depict it as just a sort of insurance against disaster, intended for the civilian economy, and it becomes more difficult for the British and French to fulminate against it as a militarily provocative act. If you can purchase as much of it as possible from British and French sources, even better; the companies you buy from will protest any action that might cut off their new source of revenue.

The only problem was that this would still be seen as a provocation given the attitudes at the time. If Britain thought their weapon of blockade would be taken away, it would be just as dangerous as building up the fleet. Each nation during the continued to clandestinely trade with one another. The German war ministry wasn't able to get the German industrialists to stop selling steel to the French until 1917!

Originally Posted by The Sandman

As long as Germany has to move through Belgium to deal with France, they have to plan on the British coming in on the side of the Entente. And Britain has made it a very consistent piece of policy for centuries (essentially, for as long as they've had the power to uphold it) that no one nation should ever be allowed to gain control of continental Europe.

If the Germans can knock France out of the equation, then Britain is irrelevant. There are just too many benefits to going after France hard. As it was, it just didn't make sense to risk not doing so, especially after the British were not willing to abandon the Russian-France Entente.

[The Sandman]

Originally Posted by wiking

Probably not due to the lack of a sustainable oil resource and the quick wearing out that automotives experienced at this point. Germany had 83 trucks in their army in 1914, only to watch them all break down going through Belgium.

This would be a reason for closer German-Ottoman ties prewar: access to Ottoman oil reserves.

The only problem was that this would still be seen as a provocation given the attitudes at the time. If Britain thought their weapon of blockade would be taken away, it would be just as dangerous as building up the fleet. Each nation during the continued to clandestinely trade with one another. The German war ministry wasn't able to get the German industrialists to stop selling steel to the French until 1917!

On the other hand, it would be far more useful to Germany than building up the fleet was, for about the same amount of provocation. Which leads into the next bit.

If the Germans can knock France out of the equation, then Britain is irrelevant. There are just too many benefits to going after France hard. As it was, it just didn't make sense to risk not doing so, especially after the British were not willing to abandon the Russian-France Entente.

Certainly, and I wasn't disagreeing with this point. But that means that Germany should take as a given that war with France means war with Britain, and plan accordingly. In particular, it means that appeasing the British diplomatically is only necessary in so far as to avoid having the British start the war themselves; therefore, the British furor over a German strategic materials reserve can safely be ignored.

The Germans might also consider diplomatic overtures to Japan. It doesn't cost them anything in terms of their interests in the Pacific (likely slim to non-existent ITTL), and anything that forces the British and Russians to divert any troops or ships east "just in case" is a net gain for the Germans.

[wiking]

That only works if the German government wants war. Historically they felt backed into a corner and needed war to get out of it. The military had their own theories and were actively trying to provoke war, but the ignorant diplomats in the German foreign office were actually dithering quite hard on the issue of war. Historically, the German government was actually working toward detente in 1912 and the end of the naval arms race really created the feeling that war was a thing of the past.

No one expected or really wanted war; it was bad for business. Germany was trying to ease tensions, which is why they did not go for the strategic resource reserve (SRR if you will). Here, without the naval increase, tensions and a continental arms race will still be occurring as the German army expands. If, as I suspect the best way to get the expansion of the army in a rather historical scenario, Germany just channels the 1912 and 1908 are canceled/heavily curtailed with the extra funds going to the army instead, the French and Russians won't really be able to react in time. They had too many issues with their own politics to really react in a timely fashion, as you can notice by the rather belated French response to continuing expansion of the German army with the 3 year conscription law passed in 1913. It still created large political problems when it was passes, as the French already conscripted 83% of available recruits anyway. Germany only took in about 50% of the yearly recruit class.

The Russians couldn't really afford to put any more money into their armies either. But the British will notice what is going on and respond. The arms race will continue, but be in another realm. It may mean a large BEF come 1914, but it will not be nearly as experienced as the "old contemptibles" as their experience would be diluted with the addition of many new recruits. Also, it would be hard to introduce conscription in a country without a recent history of it and no obvious need for it. The British army took in just about all volunteers as it was, which means their expansion may indeed be quite small if anything at all in done. It may also just mean that the British armed forces don't spend all that much money as the did in the naval arms race and never tax the money out of its people.

The SRR is still going to inflame tensions, which is exactly what the German government was trying to avoid by 1912-1914. So it probably won't happen anyway...

[The Sandman]

If a resource reserve in Germany itself is unworkable, then what about the Germans keeping more foreign exchange on hand with which to buy materials from neutral nations (in particular, the USA), and combining that with a more coherent strategy to move the purchases in through neutral nations? The Germans might actually, for example, explicitly pay off the Ottomans to remain neutral in order to keep Ottoman ports open for this purpose, or use the Italians, Dutch, Danes, Swedes and Norwegians to launder their purchases.

Heck, they might even try a false flag strategy in wartime, which would have their agents claim to be making purchases for, say, Russia, and then have those ships be "confiscated" by the German Navy instead.

[Monty Burns]

Originally Posted by The Sandman

If a resource reserve in Germany itself is unworkable, then what about the Germans keeping more foreign exchange on hand with which to buy materials from neutral nations (in particular, the USA), and combining that with a more coherent strategy to move the purchases in through neutral nations? The Germans might actually, for example, explicitly pay off the Ottomans to remain neutral in order to keep Ottoman ports open for this purpose, or use the Italians, Dutch, Danes, Swedes and Norwegians to launder their purchases.

Heck, they might even try a false flag strategy in wartime, which would have their agents claim to be making purchases for, say, Russia, and then have those ships be "confiscated" by the German Navy instead.

These are some interesting ideas.

I think it was mentioned in this thread earlier that the Germans did not invade the Netherlands to keep them open for trade. What about a secret economic invasion of the Netherlands? German companies holding an oil reserve in Dutch ports, holding Dutch railways, sealines and the like? Orchestrated by Rathenau?

[wiking]

Read Hew Strachan's "to arms" which covers all this in detail. The Germans did much of what has been suggested, but obviously it wasn't enough. The Brits expanded the blockade to neutrals too and worked out a system to let them import only enough for their citizens.

[Catspoke]

This is interesting. If the Germans had two extra armies on the eastern front it would open a bunch of diplomatic / limited war options short of the all out war against everybody she actually did in OTL.

Germany would not have to launch an attack in the west as soon as Russia starts mobilizing. They could mobilize as well and wait on events, knowing they could defend against a fully mobilized Russian army while launching an attack in the west whenever they wanted.

So everybody mobilizes, The Austrians would finally get around to launching their attack on Serbia (the OTL army sent to Galacia would be kept there so progress could be made). Germany threatens Russia that if they actually attack into Austria they will respond.

Germany could respond by sending both extra armies into Galacia to help the Austrians, but not attacking across the border herself. (kind of like China into North Korea). What does Russia do about that? Attack into Germany, not without the French, but then the French and Russian are the aggressors in this situation, Germany waits a few weeks, builds up stratgic supplies, feels out what Britain will let her get away with before launching her attack in the west.

[wiking]

Originally Posted by Catspoke

This is interesting. If the Germans had two extra armies on the eastern front it would open a bunch of diplomatic / limited war options short of the all out war against everybody she actually did in OTL.

Germany would not have to launch an attack in the west as soon as Russia starts mobilizing. They could mobilize as well and wait on events, knowing they could defend against a fully mobilized Russian army while launching an attack in the west whenever they wanted.

So everybody mobilizes, The Austrians would finally get around to launching their attack on Serbia (the OTL army sent to Galacia would be kept there so progress could be made). Germany threatens Russia that if they actually attack into Austria they will respond.

Germany could respond by sending both extra armies into Galacia to help the Austrians, but not attacking across the border herself. (kind of like China into North Korea). What does Russia do about that? Attack into Germany, not without the French, but then the French and Russian are the aggressors in this situation, Germany waits a few weeks, builds up stratgic supplies, feels out what Britain will let her get away with before launching her attack in the west.

The German General Staff (GGS) could not allow themselves to sit and wait in the west, even with 3 armies in Prussia. They had overestimated Russian capabilities, but even beyond that, thought that giving the Entente time to mobilize their resources, would mean that they are then able to overwhelm the more limited Central Power resources.

Make no mistake, the German armies would be deployed to Prussia and not to the Galician front. But this is better for Austria, as it will draw off the Russians against them. However, this is exactly what the Germans were trying to launch their attack in the West to avoid. They were afraid that the Russians would concentrate their forces against Germany and overwhelm them with the Steamroller style attack. This is why they were so adament that the Austrians attack from Galicia, so that they don't have to worry about the Russians attacking them.

Everyone was surprised that the Russians concentrated against Austria, but the Germans were pretty happy about that, enough so that they lied to the Austrians that they would attack to support them, which they had no intention of doing after the initial success at Tannenberg.

Here though, it would be different, because the Russians would concentrate against the Germans. The Russian 4th army would be deployed in the north, leaving 3 Russian armies to the south. Historically the Austrians had to deal with 5 Russian armies, so this means that they are much better off, and can seize Lublin without resistance before turning on the Russian 5th army with their own 1st and 4th. This would have all kinds of knock on effects for the Galician front, mostly benefiting the Austrians.

Now, up north the situation is different: 3 on 3, but with the Russians able to bring in another 2 armies in the coming weeks, as well as reinforcements from across the empire. The Germans only have what they have on hand. But the Germans have substantial advantages, namely better rail lines, but also competent generals and technical staff, advantages that were crucial.

The Russians would be attacking, as they are obligated to do so to support the beleagured French. But they will run into all the same problems that led to Tannenberg and the Masurian lakes. The Russians are going to get shredded and fall back on their forts, which are going to hold up the Germans from really exploiting their successes. This gives the Russians time to reinforce, further drawing forces from Galicia, and switch to the defensive. But the Austrians are going to be sending their 305mm mortars to the Germans, which means that the Russian forts are going to experience their historical fates, but sooner. I don't see a major Russian collapse though; they will be able to pull out of the German attacks anyway, but Poland is going to fall at some point in 1914.

Serbia is still going to hold out, but Galicia won't fall, setting up a weird situation for the Balkan states and Italy. I don't think they will be convinced that the Austrians are weak enough to attack, as they will be able to win in Galicia, mainly because the Russians will be ruthlessly stripping forces to serve against the Germans. The Austrian 2nd army is still going East no matter what. Conrad von Hötzendorff considered this the main front and is going to concentrate his forces there. It is the right decision and hopefully he will be able to convince Potiorek not to continuing launching his wasteful offensives.

[Catspoke]

Your probably right (and any of these scenerios seems good for the Central Powers). But it is still hard to understand Greman paranoia about being out resourced if England is effectively neutral, Austria and Germany's combined population and industrial resources available aren't too shabby compared with France and Russia alone. One would think if Russia got real strong in the future, Rommania and Sweeden would soon be wanting a binding alliance too with Germany.

You would think any competent effort at diplomacy could have gotten a Navaly Holiday, Haldane agreement, non aggression pact, etc. with England if Germany was just willing to stop building ships.

[wiking]

Originally Posted by Catspoke

Your probably right (and any of these scenerios seems good for the Central Powers). But it is still hard to understand Greman paranoia about being out resourced if England is effectively neutral, Austria and Germany's combined population and industrial resources available aren't too shabby compared with France and Russia alone. One would think if Russia got real strong in the future, Rommania and Sweeden would soon be wanting a binding alliance too with Germany.

You would think any competent effort at diplomacy could have gotten a Navaly Holiday, Haldane agreement, non aggression pact, etc. with England if Germany was just willing to stop building ships.

That would make sense, if there were not the competitions for colonies and economic markets. Germany saw Britain as the number one competitor and the Entente as a tool of Perfidious Albion. There were several incompetent efforts at detente with the British, and I suppose we can assume here that the Germans became somewhat more realistic and realize earlier that the naval building efforts were pointless. Instead the funds and manpower get funneled into the army, while also forcing modernization thanks to the bourgeois-ment of the officer corps and the earlier creation of army league.

However, Germany is still going to be cut out of the British colonial and dominion markets, which are going to predispose the Kaiser and the Junkers against the Brits. Furthermore, come 1914, invading Belgium is going to bring the British in. Germany won't want to maintain a two front war, and can't be sure that the British will stay out forever. They need a knock out punch, which was the entire reason they felt that war was necessary. It would be quick and cheap, or so they told the civilian government. In reality, they planned on a long war, and even if the British were not part of it officially, they would have to expect that they would supply the French and Russians to maintain the balance of power. What is more appropriate to maintain the balance of power than letting your enemies kill each other while sitting back and profiting off of the war?

[Campbell1004]

Would the Germans capturing Paris force the French to surrender? Or would they just move the capital to the coast?

Also, when France is out of the war and surrenders, whats going to happen the thousands of British troops on the continent? Keep fighting until supplies run out?

[wiking]

Originally Posted by Campbell1004

Would the Germans capturing Paris force the French to surrender? Or would they just move the capital to the coast?

Also, when France is out of the war and surrenders, whats going to happen the thousands of British troops on the continent? Keep fighting until supplies run out?

France won't surrender because Paris falls, but even here the Germans cannot take Paris. It is a fortified city with a garrison. They needed 250,000 to besiege it in addition to whatever forces were necessary to fight the French field armies. But the plan was never to take Paris, it was to crush the field armies. They very nearly succeeded historically, but were forced to pull back from their victories thanks to the retreat after the entry of the French 6th army into the battle on the flank of the exposed German 1st. Here they are not as likely to have to pull back, but if they do, it is going to only be to the Marne itself.

I don't think that the first thrust is going to knock of the French. They were better prepared emotionally to keep in the fight after the last round in 1870. No one was willing to just give up. They would have to lose several armies and Paris, which was just not going to happen by September. Its more likely the French just lose more territory than historically and the Race to the Sea is more successful, but not a knock out blow. The Somme river is likely to be the right flank after the Race to the Sea and Belgium/North Eastern France are going to be lost. Its going to be a hard war for the French, but I don't see them negotiating until 1916 at the earliest.

[Monty Burns]

Originally Posted by wiking

What is more appropriate to maintain the balance of power than letting your enemies kill each other while sitting back and profiting off of the war?

That is true.

However, even if Britain covertly helps the French and Russians, no blockade means that Germany can trade and Germans won't starve. This plus no British troops in France should allow for an early peace treaty on the status quo at the very least.

Now this probably seems favourable for Germany only in the aftermath of OTL...

[stevep]

Originally Posted by wiking

That would make sense, if there were not the competitions for colonies and economic markets. Germany saw Britain as the number one competitor and the Entente as a tool of Perfidious Albion. There were several incompetent efforts at detente with the British, and I suppose we can assume here that the Germans became somewhat more realistic and realize earlier that the naval building efforts were pointless. Instead the funds and manpower get funneled into the army, while also forcing modernization thanks to the bourgeois-ment of the officer corps and the earlier creation of army league.

However, Germany is still going to be cut out of the British colonial and dominion markets, which are going to predispose the Kaiser and the Junkers against the Brits. Furthermore, come 1914, invading Belgium is going to bring the British in. Germany won't want to maintain a two front war, and can't be sure that the British will stay out forever. They need a knock out punch, which was the entire reason they felt that war was necessary. It would be quick and cheap, or so they told the civilian government. In reality, they planned on a long war, and even if the British were not part of it officially, they would have to expect that they would supply the French and Russians to maintain the balance of power. What is more appropriate to maintain the balance of power than letting your enemies kill each other while sitting back and profiting off of the war?

Why is Germany going to get cut out of British markets? WWI aside, for obvious reasons, it wasn't until 1931 that Britain finally gave up on free trade. Unless you presume that political changes means that Britain goes protectionist earlier, in which case all powers are going to lose the free ride they had from the British empire.

Also, I think your arguing in a circle. They only need to attack Belgium if they need to avoid a long war. However a long war is only really likely if Britain is in the opposing camp, as without it the entente is too weak to seriously threaten the central powers. And the only way of getting Britain into the war, without the naval threat, was to attack Belgium and threaten military domination of the continent.

As you say, if Britain is not allied to either block it has a strong interest, provided their reasonably balanced, not to intervene and trade with both sides. Germany gains far more from this situation that the entente, both because Britain is not hostile and because they get access to British and other external markets, which would be far more difficult for them than for the better placed - for external trade - France and Russia.

Steve

[wiking]

Originally Posted by stevep

Why is Germany going to get cut out of British markets? WWI aside, for obvious reasons, it wasn't until 1931 that Britain finally gave up on free trade. Unless you presume that political changes means that Britain goes protectionist earlier, in which case all powers are going to lose the free ride they had from the British empire.

Also, I think your arguing in a circle. They only need to attack Belgium if they need to avoid a long war. However a long war is only really likely if Britain is in the opposing camp, as without it the entente is too weak to seriously threaten the central powers. And the only way of getting Britain into the war, without the naval threat, was to attack Belgium and threaten military domination of the continent.

As you say, if Britain is not allied to either block it has a strong interest, provided their reasonably balanced, not to intervene and trade with both sides. Germany gains far more from this situation that the entente, both because Britain is not hostile and because they get access to British and other external markets, which would be far more difficult for them than for the better placed - for external trade - France and Russia.

Steve

The problem ultimately is that German industry is more efficient and produces better quality goods than British industry. As a result, prior to 1914, Germany was cutting into traditional British markets at home and abroad. This set up the rivalry, which was exacerbated by the German need to be powerful and influential like Britain. It was the big brother-little brother scenario where Germany was the bigger, stronger little brother, but had an inferiority complex and fewer cool toys like colonies and battleships. Add in the Kaiser who thought that Britain and its monarch, his cousin, were trying to keep Germany out of its place in the sun, while having severe inferiority complex himself and the situation gets tense. Britain was also very frustrated by being outclassed by its continental cousin, who had been a series of weak, easily manipulated states just a few decades prior. So the rivalry was born and stoked by every Germany gain at the expense of Britain.

Germany expected that Britain would be involved in any war against them anyway, because in all colonial disputes they had taken the side of the French, despite the French being in the wrong. This was also mainly because the British and French had cut a deal after Fashoda and Germany stood in the way, as it tried to muscle in on the colonial party.

The economic situation was more troubling to Germany, as much of the dominion had protective tariffs against Germany, especially Canada. Britain itself also had these tariffs, but it was partly in response to German protective tariffs to support the Junkers agriculture prices. Germany was locked in to these tariffs due to the nature of the government, while the industrialists demanded access that they felt was unjustly denied. So, Germany essentially blamed the British colonial system for denying them access to important markets, which was much the complaint of the US anti-imperialists (though they had South America in their pocket). Germany did not have profitable colonies and yearned to be treated as their economic might should suggest. But this meant upsetting the established power and business model that the British had come to enjoy. So they resented Germany for attempting to compete. Free trade was not really in existence in 1914 thanks to the closed colonial systems of the Entente, which pissed the Germans off, because they assumed they were being unfairly denied prosperity.

So come wartime, even without the naval rivalry, Germany and Britain are not friends. Britain has buddied up with the Entente and Germany has no way of knowing the Britain won't join them against Germany. Historically the July crisis was marked by British evasion of the neutrality question, which convinced them that Britain was trying to strong arm them into peace, whereas any backing down at this point would mean a loss of face and a decrease in respect at home and abroad, especially when Russia had mobilized despite pleas not to.

The long war issue is still relevant without the British joining in. Moltke and the German General Staff (GGS) still expected it to take years to defeat Russia, if at all and didn't expect the public would stand for it. They were afraid of the Napoleon paradox, especially while the French are attacking them with their full power. The GGS didn't appreciate the power of defense and assumed that the French would breakthrough eventually if left to attack at their leisure. Russia could not be knocked out quickly, while France could. It would then mean a one front war, with the British locked out of the continent and France no longer a threat to Germany after the war, nor recognized as a great power. Though it was assumed the British would be hostile regardless of German defense in the West, if the Germans could knock the French out, it would not matter if they were or weren't. Russia could be humbled at leisure, as they were not expected to last long politically if the French were out of the war, while the British would be reduced to kicking their heels in the channel.

Now if Germany left France alone and the British stance is assumed to be anti-German, likely that they are to join the war regardless, this would be a major strategic blunder to head east in the first place. Britain can blockade the Germans anyway, which they partly did in 1914 before Germany went after Belgium by denying them access to the Channel. So much assumption of British belligerency in case of war was based on their actions per-war. Even without the naval race, which is still likely to partly happen (it cannot really be butterflied away without completely removing Germany as a great power), Britain is still going to be hostile to Germany, though less so. But this means that the GGS still is going to assume that Britain is going to be a belligerent for the Entente, which makes Britain an enemy to be accounted for in pre-war planning. That makes invading Belgium necessary as a preemptive measure, because the Germans thought that it would be violated by the Entente anyway, but also because leaving France alone would be to invite the British also join in and backstab Germany while she is committed to the Eastern Front.

[stevep]

Originally Posted by wiking

The problem ultimately is that German industry is more efficient and produces better quality goods than British industry. As a result, prior to 1914, Germany was cutting into traditional British markets at home and abroad. This set up the rivalry, which was exacerbated by the German need to be powerful and influential like Britain. It was the big brother-little brother scenario where Germany was the bigger, stronger little brother, but had an inferiority complex and fewer cool toys like colonies and battleships. Add in the Kaiser who thought that Britain and its monarch, his cousin, were trying to keep Germany out of its place in the sun, while having severe inferiority complex himself and the situation gets tense. Britain was also very frustrated by being outclassed by its continental cousin, who had been a series of weak, easily manipulated states just a few decades prior. So the rivalry was born and stoked by every Germany gain at the expense of Britain.

Germany was more efficient in many areas compared to Britain, although not all. Partly because there was still some validity in Smith's ideas about relative economic advantage but largely because Germany had an interventionist government that supported education and industry far more than Britain. This was also true of most of the other major powers. There was no reason for extra antagonism between Britain and Germany because of this. You could equally argue that Britain would be antagonistic to the US, which was vastly more protectionist than Germany and also a major competitor, or France for that matter.

As you say OTL there were serious personal problems with Wilhelm II and the reaction against this by Edward VII. However the POD is that Wilhelm doesn't have that chip on his shoulder. Providing the Germans don't go the route they did OTL of total security by making everybody else insecure there is no great reason for the two to be at odds. In fact, if it still took the Bismarckian approach of Germany viewing itself as a sated power satisfying itself with economical and industrial expansion the vast likihood would be an Anglo-German alliance to maintain security against Franco-Russian attempts to disrupt the existing balance of power.

Germany expected that Britain would be involved in any war against them anyway, because in all colonial disputes they had taken the side of the French, despite the French being in the wrong. This was also mainly because the British and French had cut a deal after Fashoda and Germany stood in the way, as it tried to muscle in on the colonial party.

What disputes are you referring to here? The near conflict at Fashoda and then again over the Dogger Bank incident made both Britain and France draw back from conflict but it was the military threat - perceived or otherwise from Germany - that ultimately persuaded Britain to bury its numerous differences with France and then later with Russia. Even so there was also concerns rising again about Russia in the last years before WWI and despite the German attack on Belgium and threat to totally upset the balance of power in Europe, an extremely threatening situation for Britain, it took a lot of argument and several resignations before the government decided to join the war. Without such strong incentives I could easily see Britain staying neutral in a central power v entente conflict, just as Germany may well stay neutral in a conflict between Britain and the entente under different circumstances.

I'm not aware of any case where Germany supported France during this period but after the entente agreement Britain generally supported France, such as during the Morocco crisis.

The economic situation was more troubling to Germany, as much of the dominion had protective tariffs against Germany, especially Canada. Britain itself also had these tariffs, but it was partly in response to German protective tariffs to support the Junkers agriculture prices. Germany was locked in to these tariffs due to the nature of the government, while the industrialists demanded access that they felt was unjustly denied. So, Germany essentially blamed the British colonial system for denying them access to important markets, which was much the complaint of the US anti-imperialists (though they had South America in their pocket). Germany did not have profitable colonies and yearned to be treated as their economic might should suggest. But this meant upsetting the established power and business model that the British had come to enjoy. So they resented Germany for attempting to compete. Free trade was not really in existence in 1914 thanks to the closed colonial systems of the Entente, which pissed the Germans off, because they assumed they were being unfairly denied prosperity.

The dominions were self-governing and as such had tariffs against everybody, including Britain itself! I think, by this point of a bit later, the government of India even had tariffs against imports, including from Britain. Industrialists from Germany may have wanted even greater access to British markets but like American ones they were being hypercritical as you say since their own markets were protected. Personally I would have preferred Britain to have imposed its own tariffs prior to WWI but unfortunately that did not occur.

Hence it is pointless to argue that Germany was being discriminated against as it was not. Furthermore it was blantently obvious to all. I think your falling into the trap of some of the post-1931 US propaganda that tried to blame Britain for problems with free-trade.

So come wartime, even without the naval rivalry, Germany and Britain are not friends. Britain has buddied up with the Entente and Germany has no way of knowing the Britain won't join them against Germany. Historically the July crisis was marked by British evasion of the neutrality question, which convinced them that Britain was trying to strong arm them into peace, whereas any backing down at this point would mean a loss of face and a decrease in respect at home and abroad, especially when Russia had mobilized despite pleas not to.

Britain buddied up to the entente because it wanted security and the Germans insisted on being hostile. Remove the naval threat and not only do both powers gain economically but there is no significant reason for conflict between the two. The only exception would be if you get a situation where Germany seeks sole hegemonic power over Europe. [I use that phrase to differentiate from the period after 1871 when Germany effectively dominated the continent, in part because of its military and growing economic strength but also because it had friendly relations with both Austria and Russia. This was less threatening to Britain because it meant power was split over multiple centres and as Britain showed it could live with that. Germany using naked military force to seized vast areas and defeat any competitors would be a different matter].

Britain was evasive about its commitments in the run up to war because it basically didn't have any formal ones but was seeking to avoid a major conflict. I fail to see how such an attitude could be said to "strong arm" Germany into anything, let alone peace. Which is an interesting thing to say itself as you suggest that you accept Britain wanted to obtain a peaceful solution to the problem but think Germany does not. If Britain had said it would support France, come what may, that might have been said to have tried to strong-arm Germany but also would be argued by some to have given France a green light.

Also what do you mean by backing down? Given the threats that Germany had made about Russian moblisation - not pleas - plus Austria's stance OTL as Germany's only remaining ally it would have been difficult not to support Austria if the attack on Serbia triggered a conflict in the east but even avoiding that other options were available. All out attack on multiple neighbours was the choice of the German leadership, not the only option.

The long war issue is still relevant without the British joining in. Moltke and the German General Staff (GGS) still expected it to take years to defeat Russia, if at all and didn't expect the public would stand for it. They were afraid of the Napoleon paradox, especially while the French are attacking them with their full power. The GGS didn't appreciate the power of defense and assumed that the French would breakthrough eventually if left to attack at their leisure. Russia could not be knocked out quickly, while France could. It would then mean a one front war, with the British locked out of the continent and France no longer a threat to Germany after the war, nor recognized as a great power. Though it was assumed the British would be hostile regardless of German defense in the West, if the Germans could knock the French out, it would not matter if they were or weren't. Russia could be humbled at leisure, as they were not expected to last long politically if the French were out of the war, while the British would be reduced to kicking their heels in the channel.

What you mean is that the German leadership mis-judged the situation very badly. Assuming that they couldn't survive a long war even with Britain neutral. That they could knock out France quickly, which I think you have said elsewhere on this thread was impractical. Mis-judging the power of the defencive as well. That only makes a major war and a German attack through Belgium a factor if the German leadership make those same mistakes and decide to take those risks. If they do something otherwise then they face other risks and opportunities.

Also they defeated Russia in 1914 and 1915 OTL. It was only in 1917 that they totally defeated Russia and caused a collapse of its government. Therefore it depends on what you mean by defeating Russia. If looking for a limited war and limited victory they would have a decent chance of doing that quickly and relatively cheaply. Its only if you decide to go for a total, overwhelming victory that a long war really becomes likely.

Now if Germany left France alone and the British stance is assumed to be anti-German, likely that they are to join the war regardless, this would be a major strategic blunder to head east in the first place. Britain can blockade the Germans anyway, which they partly did in 1914 before Germany went after Belgium by denying them access to the Channel. So much assumption of British belligerency in case of war was based on their actions per-war. Even without the naval race, which is still likely to partly happen (it cannot really be butterflied away without completely removing Germany as a great power), Britain is still going to be hostile to Germany, though less so. But this means that the GGS still is going to assume that Britain is going to be a belligerent for the Entente, which makes Britain an enemy to be accounted for in pre-war planning. That makes invading Belgium necessary as a preemptive measure, because the Germans thought that it would be violated by the Entente anyway, but also because leaving France alone would be to invite the British also join in and backstab Germany while she is committed to the Eastern Front.

Desperate attempts here to excuse the mess the GGS and general leadership made of the entire situation. Lets looks at the details.

a) If we assume that Germany ignores Tirpitz's insanity and doesn't seek to threaten the British homeland then there is very little reason for tension between the two powers unless the Germans make a bid for total dominance of the continent. If their putting their resources into their army and economy then its likely that the 2nd and 3rd powers in terms of naval strength will probably still be France and Russia. [The latter not for a while possibly if we get an OTL Russo-Japanese war with the same result but given the number of coasts the Russians have to consider they will want a major fleet. In that case its very likely - otherwise known in less cautious pundits as an absolute certainty that British attention is on the entente powers and in any major war on the continent Britain will be cheering Germany on. This may change if the Germans do something like the lunge through Belgium, both for political reasons and because of the inherent threat to Britain that would pose. Other than this Britain may ultimately join the war or simply have a neutrality shaded to a greater or lesser degree to the central powers.

Britain did show favour towards France in the run up to OTL WWI but that was because of the existing political situation. The one semi-firm commitment that was made was that Britain would guard the northern seas and France the Med, in large part to allow the RN to concentrate against the growing threat from the HSF. This was a direct response to the naval race and there would be no reason for it to occur otherwise. With the large amount of traffic through the waters Britain would have been concerned about major fighting causing disruption to its trade but it was only the existing relationship, because of the HSF that the commitment to France was made on this issue. Therefore without the HSF in the form we had OTL that will not occur.

I don't see why you say a naval race between Britain and Germany was unavoidable. As you point out Germany have relatively few colonies, mostly economically irrelevant. Similarly it didn't have a massive commerce outside Europe or a long and exposed coastline. Therefore it didn't need a massive fleet challenging Britain. If Germany keeps to a fleet say about the same size or slightly bigger than the larger of the French Atlantic or Russian Baltic fleet the RN is going to be far more worried about the entente powers. In fact they would probably welcome such a German fleet as a counter to the Russians in the Baltic.

I think the GGS [and associated political figures] assumed Britain would be hostile largely because they were hostile to Britain. They seemed to be significantly lacking in any degree of empathy for others and ability to see how their actions affect others. Repeatedly you see references to threatening Britain until it gives the sort of alliance Germany wanted. Also, like all the great continental powers of the time they were obsessed with the idea of a short war and the advantage of the offensive. I think that's the true reason why Luddendorf went for the desperate offensives in 1918. He couldn't consider that a strategic defensive might serve Germany better. As such they went for the attack on Belgium because they were not prepared to consider the interests of other nations and having backed themselves into a desperate corner gambled on an all out lunge. Even without British intervention, if the French had had a more rational plan than the insane Plan 17 Germany could have suffered a very bloody nose in their historical attack.

Steve

[NothingNow]

TTL's Kaiserliche Marine really should be a Jeune Ecole sort of Navy, with a Number of Battleships built in the same sort of manner that the USN did it (Only one or two a year, state of the art design, and Insane operational ranges) and a few light Cruisers for service in the Colonies and as Commerce Raiders (OTL's Dresdens Really).

It might Piss Off the Brits, but it probably won't, and it would be the best compromise between having a Huge Army and a Vent for the Middle class.
It would go over better if the German Government makes it clear to the Brits that the Navy isn't intended to be used against them or their colonies, and that the Navy isn't really capable of it to begin with.

[Campbell1004]

Alright, could Germany win with these two conditions?:

First, Germany never develops a navy that is any better than being able to patrol the coast. Instead, all the money that went into battleships and dreadnoughts goes into the Army. The result is more artillery pieces and more ammunition for these pieces. Also, the Army is enlarged to include two more armies and existing armies are provided with additional corps. This larger army is more professionally trained than Germany’s would have originally been.


Second, Germany has the foresight to store a decade’s worth of foodstuffs and other supplies within its borders in preparation of a British blockade of their sea trade routes. Although Unrestricted Submarine Warfare is still enacted by the German navy, the Lusitania is never sunk and the Germans do not admit to sending the Zimmermann Telegram. The United States never becomes involved with, “Europe’s War.”

[stevep]

Originally Posted by Campbell1004

Alright, could Germany win with these two conditions?:

First, Germany never develops a navy that is any better than being able to patrol the coast. Instead, all the money that went into battleships and dreadnoughts goes into the Army. The result is more artillery pieces and more ammunition for these pieces. Also, the Army is enlarged to include two more armies and existing armies are provided with additional corps. This larger army is more professionally trained than Germany’s would have originally been.

I would say it would want a small fleet, something to protect its coastlines and contest the Baltic with the Russians. However once the Russian lose their Baltic fleet, presuming we have a Russo-Japanese war along OTL lines, this could be fairly small while light vessels could be a sizeable part of it.

This would be a much better use of resources. Both because the army would be stronger and most of all because you have more chance of having Britain as at least a friendly neutral. Still a problem here if the army leadership insists on the attack through Belgium but a lot less need for that under those circumstances.

Second, Germany has the foresight to store a decade’s worth of foodstuffs and other supplies within its borders in preparation of a British blockade of their sea trade routes. Although Unrestricted Submarine Warfare is still enacted by the German navy, the Lusitania is never sunk and the Germans do not admit to sending the Zimmermann Telegram. The United States never becomes involved with, “Europe’s War.”

I think stockpiling a decades worth of supplies is highly unlikely. Largely because virtually no one expected any future conflict to last more than a year or so or even thought a full scale conflict would be able to last that long. That probably even more than such moves being seen as provocative or more likely as massively wasteful is likely to sink the idea. As I say, if Germany doesn't seek to make Britain an enemy its unlikely to face a blockage - if for no other reason than that Britain can take American's role as see the combatants as valuable markets. [Britain would have the advantage here of being able to sell to both sides and I doubt either side would be stupid enough to seek to antagonise the RN].

If for whatever reason Britain does end up at war with the central powers Germany is definitely still better off not doing something stupid like unrestricted U-boat warfare or the insane Zimmerman telegraph. Much better would be actually allocating resources more efficiently and making the military less dominant but that might be ASB without hindsight.

Its possible for the central powers to win a war with the OTL entente, including Britain but they need to be better lead or very lucky. I think Germany might even have a chance of getting a draw post the US entry into the war but they would need much better leadership and a good measure of luck.

Steve