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#1
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KGV Battleships built as carriers
WI the RN KGV Class Battleship had been built as Aircraft Carriers- i recall hearing contary to popular misconception, most RN top brass in the 30's believed in the future of airpower and carriers and that a few luddites incl Churchill were obsessed by the battleships.
WI in the mid 30's or so the modernists had won and the KGV class incl Vanguard had been designed as Carriers- prehaps as better versions of Illustruious and Ark Royal classes. |
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#2
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However the big problem with this idea is that it is just dim witted... the Germans have two "Battlecruisers" in service and will soon have two Fast Battleships on the slips; the Italians have three plus their modernised vessels; the Japs have two on the slips plus the Kongo class BCs and Nagato class BBs -both of which have sufficient speed to avoid an oncoming sqaudron of QEs and Rs- while the yanks are getting ready to mass produce fast Battleships. In this situation the Royal Navy's three fast captial ships -the Battlecruisers Hood, Repulse and Renown- are left to counter much larger numbers of ships that the Battleline are incapable of catching. Hence it is logical for the poms to build their own fast Battleships to counter these vessels.
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#3
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well probably true- |
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#4
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There is also the fact that for a lot of the year, the North Atlantic is not really suitable for carier operations, while battleships suffer far less limitations.
Case in point: Glorious getting sunk by Scharnhorst and Gneisenau. And as WWII showed, there were quite a few naval battles in that region. |
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#5
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well to be honest, i was thinking the bigger effect would be against Italy and Japan- hmm would having Carriers rather then battleships actually be worse for the british in the North Atlantic against the German battleships. btw when i posted this thread- i was thinking more British effort into carriers might also mean greater effort at desiginging better FAA planes. |
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#6
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#7
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Why not? If it had been a battleship, it would have had a much better chance of survival.
Examples: Malaya (non-upgraded QE class) scaring of Scharnhorst and Gneisenau during Operation Berlin and the inconclusive engagement with HMS Renown. |
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#8
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By the 1930s the carrier wasn't that obvious as the major naval weapon system.
First good and reliable radar to have one of the main assets of the carrier - the Combat Air Patrol (CAP) - be practical. You simply couldn't detect the enemy soon enough to have your interceptors in the air at altitude. Next the North Atlantic for much of the time was unsuitable for flying. Had Duke of York at North Cape in 1943 been a carrier Scharnhorst probably would have gotten away after making mincemeat of some of the pursuing British cruisers and destroyers. IMHO the Royal Navy's main problem in naval aviation was the FAA (and its predecessors) having been a step child for decades. Well into WWII the already small British aircomplements were often understrength because neither crews nor aircraft were available. But imagine the RN carriers by early WWII having modern fighters (say a navalised Hurricane called the Hawker Blizzard), a divebomber (a Skua with gradually improving engines and better bombload, or the Hawker Henley - a "twinseat Hurricane") and enough torpedobombers (The Swordfish/Albacore actually did OK). If next the Glorious and Courageous are not wasted in 1939/40 (or Ark Royal in 1941), operations in the Mediterranean and the Indian Ocean might begin to take a different cause. BTW it is often overseen that the FAA for most of WWII was the only naval airforce capable of substantial nightstrikes. This was due to intense training which was greatly enhanced by the introduction of reliable airborne radar in 1941. In April 1942 Somerville had intercepted the expected arrival time of the Japanese fleet at Colombo and had set up a trap made up of a carrier launched night strike. The Japanese were late however and Somerville called off the strike to get away before dawn. By 1942 the IJN was practically defenceless against night strikes and very far away from repair facilities. (I will make a thread with a PoD letting the IJN be on schedule). Regards Steffen Redbeard |
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