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#1
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The Strategic and Tactical Implications of The War That Came Early...
...so I was reading West and East (great smooth read, love it to death. they should write more early-WWII stuff) and there was this line in it where this German was thinking about how the Nazis were trying to spin the war: that the Schlieffen Plan had at least worked better with them in charge than it had with the Kaiser.
And that kind of got this thought rolling around in my head: blitzkrieg, in all it's mental glory, is only thought of as such a brilliant amazing awe-inspiring strategy because it yielded such brilliant amazing awe-inspiring results. It clobbered Poland in less than a month. It zinged the Low Countries like the only thing slowing down the Wehrmacht were the hairpin turns in Holland. It beat France. But in West and East, that hasn't happened. There is no amazing strategic victory. You can't point at Wehrmacht soldiers on the English Channel and say, "See? That's what blitzkrieg can do for you. That's what combined arms warfare is about." Because it's not doing that much. It's a sharp sword that's being split into daggers and thrown willy-nilly around Europe. But it's obvious that the tactical doctrine is still there: The Path to Blitzkrieg: Doctrine and Training in the German Army, 1920-1939 by Michael Citino talks about how the idea of what everyone knows as "blitzkrieg" was in people's heads by 1932-33 and being instilled by the mid-30s. So...what will the world take away from the German way of making war in a world where the Wehrmacht and Luftwaffe didn't have any amazing successes to point to? |
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#2
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I think it would require a defensive war for this to happen, so expect tanks to be built slow and heavy (like the Tiger II) putting emphasis on protection and armour rather than mobility. Siege gun technology would probably advance as well. Planes like the Il-2 Sturmovik would take precedent over fast nimble fighters. The Stuka would possibly be upgraded, with heavier armour and better weapons, creating a proto version of the A-10. (IIRC, Rudel had a hand in the A-10's design). Blitzkrieg would be relegated to small unit actions like WW1's Stosstrüpen, useful to get through the lines, but not much else. Or I could be way off...
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#3
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The battle for Poland wasn't what you would necessarily call a blitzkrieg. It was more conventional, now the battle of France, that was blitzkrieg.
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#4
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But imagine the Germans hitting a wall in France, which is a distinct possibility. British reinforcements flow in country, forcing the Germans to retreat, and form defensive lines. The concept of blitzkrieg would be seen as a failure, and technology would reflect this.
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#5
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The invasion of Poland is where the word entered the English language, so it seems a little bit silly to disqualify it as an example of Blitzkrieg. That's like saying Spain in the Peninsular War wasn't an example of guerilla warfare.
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#6
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Of course, thats rhethorical discussions that have nothing to do with MacCaulays question. Now, if the Blitzkrieg concept had not been as successful, I think you would conversely see the conventional French model strengthened - dispersed armoured units in a support role for the infantery. Probably eventually the airforce in a similar model. Which really isnt too bad a concept - I mean, these days everybody raves about combined arms, and the infantery is again the top category supported by the rest. I guess its just that the 30s/40s were not exactly the best time for it, heh... |
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#7
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I don't see how the Germans aren't eating shoes, to be honest. Where are they getting fuel? Munitions? Grain? Even in the winter of 1940, there was almost a coal crisis. In this TL? Umm.
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