If Amherst had not refused command in the ARW...

[Nytram01]

What if Jeffrey Amherst, 1st Baron Amherst, had not refused a field command in the American Revolutionary War? Could his presence in the field make any difference to the outcome?

This Jeffrey Amherst - http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Jeffrey..._Baron_Amherst

[Melvin Loh]

Hmmm, well even if Amherst had accepted field command, the war would've probably proceeded in a similarly detrimental way to the British as OTL- heck, the Howe brothers were quite pro-American in their sympathies too, which was, due to William Howe's decision to not pursue, a main reason why Washington's army wasn't destroyed in the field early in the yrs 1776-78. With Amherst in charge, that reluctance factor would've been probably multiplied much further, maybe entailing an earlier victory for the colonials without as much bloodshed...

[Nytram01]

Revisiting Jeffery Amherst recently I thought I'd bump this. Online biographies have given me a clearer picture of the man, and I have requested at least one of the two biographies on him for my birthday next month, so, anyway, in the hopes of sparking a bit of a debate:

Amherst was not a tactical wizard, nor in truth a strategic genius (though he wasn't bad at that), his expertese lay instead in the world of logistics. His modus operandi was to build up his supplies, to build up a large and irresistable force, to aim to take strategic points and to keep hold of them once he had done so. He planned thoroughly and he kept on top of events as they unfolded, and he left nothing to chance when it came to supplies and transport. Glacial though his movements may have been he was the man responsible for the conquest of French North America and he had never suffered a major defeat - though some will, uncharitably, say that's because he fought no battles outside seiges. His campaign to take Montreal is a brilliant piece of administrative generalship, what is more is was conducted with, what is termed as, an America Army consisting of British regulars, Colonist troops and Native Americans, showing that he could work with people he had a low opinion for if needed.

Amherst's approach to war was ideal for America at the time. A large untamed continent could not be dealt with by just marching hither and thither with little planning put into logistics. If you marched into the North American interior you had to be sure that you were going to have everything you needed and weren't going to get cut off from friendly forces elsewhere. By relying on overwhelming numbers and firepower, and advancing only on important strategic targets within easy reach of his base of operations, and fortifying the positions once he took them before moving on, he ensured that his advance, no matter how slow, was unstoppable.

Between the fall from favour of Duke of Marlborough and rise of the Duke of Wellington, Amherst was probably the most able administrator at the highest level of command that the British had.

If Amherst had commanded in the American Revolutionary War, and done so with full commitment to the British/Loyalist Cause, then there is little doubt in my mind that he would manage to gain control of a number of Colonies/Statesand be immovable from them, regardless of whether he did this by coming down from Canada into the New England States or by taking control of Middle America from the loyalist territories in that region like New York.

Having said that, he might be defeated in open battle and forced to surrender, since we have no real way of knowing how astute his tactical mind was, but on that subject, the way Amherst allowed the tactically highly capable Wolfe to handle such matters at Louisbourg would suggest that Amherst was able to recognize the abilities of his subordinates and prepared to delegate such responsibilities to them so as to make up for any of his own failings.

[Flubber]

Originally Posted by Nytram01

Revisiting Jeffery Amherst recently I thought I'd bump this. Online biographies have given me a clearer picture of the man, and I have requested at least one of the two biographies on him for my birthday next month, so, anyway, in the hopes of sparking a bit of a debate...

Thank you for that "thumbnail" description of the man. Amherst was a fascinating man.

IIRC, wasn't it his opinion that substantial reinforcements were necessary one of the reasons Amherst wasn't made the overall commander in North America during the ARW?

[Elfwine]

Originally Posted by Nytram01

Amherst's approach to war was ideal for America at the time. A large untamed continent could not be dealt with by just marching hither and thither with little planning put into logistics. If you marched into the North American interior you had to be sure that you were going to have everything you needed and weren't going to get cut off from friendly forces elsewhere. By relying on overwhelming numbers and firepower, and advancing only on important strategic targets within easy reach of his base of operations, and fortifying the positions once he took them before moving on, he ensured that his advance, no matter how slow, was unstoppable.

The problem, and this is looking at the thirteen colonies, that sort of approach would also mean something like Howe's campaigns - which is to say, taking "important strategic targets" but not actually landing crippling blows.

In Canada, there are only a few places to take, in the Thirteen Colonies, you eventually wind up with too few forces to continue advancing if you attempt this - for example, how much do you put in Boston? New York? Philadelphia?

And with a continued Continental Army in the field, what's to stop it from recapturing the cities at the thin end of things?

I think having him in the position of overall command would be a good thing , but I don't see much appreciable difference to the gain between him and Howe in the field.

[TheKnightIrish]

I often think Clive is the more interesting AH opportunity as he turned down the command as well shortly before his suicide.

If Amherst accepted the command I suspect he would have had to make a decision to commit to war. Unlike the Howe brothers he appeared a man of clear principles. He refused to fight because of principle. If he agreed to fight he would, I think, commit to the principle.

So unlike General Howe I suspect he would fight without reserve. Also, he planned/approved multiple attacks during the French & Indian War. I believe he would co-ordinate with his other commanders better - Amherst in Howe's shoes wouldn't have left Burgoyne in the lurch...

[Nytram01]

Originally Posted by Elfwine

The problem, and this is looking at the thirteen colonies, that sort of approach would also mean something like Howe's campaigns - which is to say, taking "important strategic targets" but not actually landing crippling blows.

In Canada, there are only a few places to take, in the Thirteen Colonies, you eventually wind up with too few forces to continue advancing if you attempt this - for example, how much do you put in Boston? New York? Philadelphia?

And with a continued Continental Army in the field, what's to stop it from recapturing the cities at the thin end of things?

I think having him in the position of overall command would be a good thing , but I don't see much appreciable difference to the gain between him and Howe in the field.

Perhaps its a matter of recognizing the restrictions. Amherst did believe that there would need to be 75,000 British troops to properly quell the rebellion and he was refused that on the ground the it was more than British could spare, which is one of the reasons he refused command.

If he had taken command anyway I would imagine such a cautious general would rather have taken control of a state or two and just secure his hold on it than go out seeking to find the Colonist's armies and destroy them. He would probably spend time building up fortification around that area he controlled, and comandeering local production facilities for food and supplies to suplement the supplies coming in from abroad, while fending off attacks from the continental army or whatnot, while also sending raiding parties out into the the rebelling territories to cause mischief. He would also require a close working relationship with the Royal Navy and need them to at least cripple supplies coming in from France.

It would, I think, be a matter of who could outlast the other and the outcome would still be far from clear, but Amherst would certainly bring a greater level of cohesion at the highest level to the British/Loyalist efforts, which could only be beneficial to them.

[Elfwine]

Originally Posted by Nytram01

Perhaps its a matter of recognizing the restrictions. Amherst did believe that there would need to be 75,000 British troops to properly quell the rebellion and he was refused that on the ground the it was more than British could spare, which is one of the reasons he refused command.

Makes sense. And that figure sounds appropriate for the scale of the task.

If he had taken command anyway I would imagine such a cautious general would rather have taken control of a state or two and just secure his hold on it than go out seeking to find the Colonist's armies and destroy them. He would probably spend time building up fortification around that area he controlled, and comandeering local production facilities for food and supplies to suplement the supplies coming in from abroad, while fending off attacks from the continental army or whatnot, while also sending raiding parties out into the the rebelling territories to cause mischief. He would also require a close working relationship with the Royal Navy and need them to at least cripple supplies coming in from France.

It would, I think, be a matter of who could outlast the other and the outcome would still be far from clear, but Amherst would certainly bring a greater level of cohesion at the highest level to the British/Loyalist efforts, which could only be beneficial to them.

This is true. But I am not sure that simply holding say, Massachusetts (as where the British Army was entangled early on) would have been enough to significantly harm the rebellion.

But yeah, someone like him coordinating things would have been a very good thing - and he seems like someone who could get good work out of his subordinates, which is also to the good.

No one says the Overall North American Theater Commander (whatever the term used is) has to be able to ensure routed armies never reform, but if he can direct operations, that severely hinders the ability of the rebels to take advantage of any openings.

Howe and Burgoyne operating as they did should still have hindered Washington and Schuyler/Gates, but it seems to have failed there for reasons Amherest might have been able to address (subject to the limits of 18th century communications, obviously).