raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
George Kennan, author of the containment doctrine is still alive and had his hundreth birthday on February 16th. He offered up some reasonably lucid comments during the run-up to the invasion of Iraq.
Here's a centennary WI for him:
According to John Lewis Gaddis's "Strategies of Containtment", George
Kennan originally proposed that it was a vital US interest to keep the
following centers of industrial production outside of Soviet control:
North America, Western Europe, Britain and Japan. Because so much
industry and skilled manpower was there, they ranked head and
shoulders above the rest of the world in terms of strategic
importance.
Gaddis, representing the historiographical tendency of
"post-revisionism", agreed that this was correct, and tended to
interpret US actions in the industrial core areas of Europe and Japan
as necessary and moral, while US policy towards the periphery was more
often foolish, unnecessary or immoral. Steven Van Evera was also part
of this school.
According to Gaddis's book, Kennan listed some non-industrial areas
that were also vital for western defense because of their location or
petroleum resources. All together, he though the following parts of
the world "mattered":
1. North America
2. Britain
3. Western Europe
4. The Soviet Union
5. Japan
6. the Middle East, from Iran to Morrocco
7. The West Coast of Africa
8. the eastern and northern coasts of South America
9. Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean
10. The Philippines
11. Australia and New Zealand
The rest, according to his thinking, could go hang.1
Notable among these "leftovers" are:
China (including Taiwan), Korea, the Indian subcontinent to include
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia (except for the Philippines)
It wasn't worth fighting over, and would not be easy for any outside
power to control in Kennan's view.
Ironically the Cold War's Hot Wars were fought in the non-vital
regions of Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan.
So, here the challenge, create a *plausible* scenario for the US to
adopt a firm, selective strategy of containment for the vital regions,
while keeping as low a profile for the US as possible in the
peripheral regions. Highest score goes to the lowest possible US
profile, but certainly no US armed forces can end up fighting wars in
the periphery. Also, what knock-on consequences can you think of as a
result of whatever changes you make.
1 While he soon became a dove by Cold War standards, Kennan was no
fan of anti-American third world diatribes, and suggested that the
thrid world should be ignored diplomatically by "serious" powers until
they "grew up".
He also had no problem with the idea of supporting nondemocratic regimes if it was necessary for US interests, although he was later a supporter of many dovish positions, like a nuclear freeze.
Here's a centennary WI for him:
According to John Lewis Gaddis's "Strategies of Containtment", George
Kennan originally proposed that it was a vital US interest to keep the
following centers of industrial production outside of Soviet control:
North America, Western Europe, Britain and Japan. Because so much
industry and skilled manpower was there, they ranked head and
shoulders above the rest of the world in terms of strategic
importance.
Gaddis, representing the historiographical tendency of
"post-revisionism", agreed that this was correct, and tended to
interpret US actions in the industrial core areas of Europe and Japan
as necessary and moral, while US policy towards the periphery was more
often foolish, unnecessary or immoral. Steven Van Evera was also part
of this school.
According to Gaddis's book, Kennan listed some non-industrial areas
that were also vital for western defense because of their location or
petroleum resources. All together, he though the following parts of
the world "mattered":
1. North America
2. Britain
3. Western Europe
4. The Soviet Union
5. Japan
6. the Middle East, from Iran to Morrocco
7. The West Coast of Africa
8. the eastern and northern coasts of South America
9. Mexico, Central America and the Caribbean
10. The Philippines
11. Australia and New Zealand
The rest, according to his thinking, could go hang.1
Notable among these "leftovers" are:
China (including Taiwan), Korea, the Indian subcontinent to include
Afghanistan and Southeast Asia (except for the Philippines)
It wasn't worth fighting over, and would not be easy for any outside
power to control in Kennan's view.
Ironically the Cold War's Hot Wars were fought in the non-vital
regions of Korea, Vietnam and Afghanistan.
So, here the challenge, create a *plausible* scenario for the US to
adopt a firm, selective strategy of containment for the vital regions,
while keeping as low a profile for the US as possible in the
peripheral regions. Highest score goes to the lowest possible US
profile, but certainly no US armed forces can end up fighting wars in
the periphery. Also, what knock-on consequences can you think of as a
result of whatever changes you make.
1 While he soon became a dove by Cold War standards, Kennan was no
fan of anti-American third world diatribes, and suggested that the
thrid world should be ignored diplomatically by "serious" powers until
they "grew up".
He also had no problem with the idea of supporting nondemocratic regimes if it was necessary for US interests, although he was later a supporter of many dovish positions, like a nuclear freeze.