How to end the war in '44
- Thread starter Proctol
- Start date
Yes there is & long before Arnhem. Instead of playing politics Ike should have gone for the one front policy rather than the broad front one. So either Monty or Patton would have had their nose out of joint, but if one of them got most of the resources they could have continied the charge into Germany before the Germans could recover from their collapse in France.
Now I'll be fair here & say either one, because both had good ideas. For Patton, it was simply an advance through Lorraine into Southern Germany & then onto Berlin. For Monty, it was to advance to Arnhem then turn east, to the north of the Rhineland, & then on to Berlin. Either would have worked & finish off Germany by late 1944 as there was little in the west that Germany had to stop such an advance.
Hitler, to be fair, could move units from the Eastern front, but in reality he had none to move as Bagration had eliminated Army Group Centre & the Germany army was hanging on by a thread. Furthermore, the few operational German "Home Army" units around had no chance of holding back one such advance let alone two or three. Having said that, however, if the Allies wait for a few weeks, akin to the OTL, they will run into a dogged German defence once again. The Western Allies must, thus, keep advancing no matter what.
More to the point, if the Western Allies are successful, then in the post-war period all of Germany (or at least 95%) would have been in the Anglo-American zone, whilst Russia would have missed out. Come the cold war & the Wall doesn't divide Germany, but runs somewhere around the German-Poland border (or there abouts). This makes for an 'interesting' Cold War as there's no hostages in Berlin for the Americans to worry about. Thus there could be serious ramifications further down the road say with the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Now I'll be fair here & say either one, because both had good ideas. For Patton, it was simply an advance through Lorraine into Southern Germany & then onto Berlin. For Monty, it was to advance to Arnhem then turn east, to the north of the Rhineland, & then on to Berlin. Either would have worked & finish off Germany by late 1944 as there was little in the west that Germany had to stop such an advance.
Hitler, to be fair, could move units from the Eastern front, but in reality he had none to move as Bagration had eliminated Army Group Centre & the Germany army was hanging on by a thread. Furthermore, the few operational German "Home Army" units around had no chance of holding back one such advance let alone two or three. Having said that, however, if the Allies wait for a few weeks, akin to the OTL, they will run into a dogged German defence once again. The Western Allies must, thus, keep advancing no matter what.
More to the point, if the Western Allies are successful, then in the post-war period all of Germany (or at least 95%) would have been in the Anglo-American zone, whilst Russia would have missed out. Come the cold war & the Wall doesn't divide Germany, but runs somewhere around the German-Poland border (or there abouts). This makes for an 'interesting' Cold War as there's no hostages in Berlin for the Americans to worry about. Thus there could be serious ramifications further down the road say with the Cuban Missile Crisis.
Build fewer heavy bombers in Britain and the USA- build more tactical support aircraft, tanks and possibly landing craft.
This could have meant D-Day could have been in May rather than June. Perhaps with invasion of Southern France starting at the same time
This could have meant D-Day could have been in May rather than June. Perhaps with invasion of Southern France starting at the same time
A sustained campaign against Germany in Western Europe is all about supply & logisitics. It has nothing to do with more or fewer tanks. The bombing campaign is, however, essential in, not only destroying German war industries, but also limiting its military capacity to produce armour etc. Furthermore, by bombing German industry you force Germany to use precisous resources rebuilding that which has been destroyed. As a result you get two results for the price of one.
The Anglo-Americans thus have two options. Either:
1) Increase the amount of resources coming into France in order to support their armies on a broad front, or;
2) Limit the advance to a single front & thus provide most of their resources to this front.
The problem with point (1) is that they have to, not only have the cargo ships & planes to achieve this, but they have to have the ports available for this to happen. This wasn't possible as the Germans did an excellent job of destroying all of the ports that the Allies would have used. Furthermore, the supply ships & planes that they did have were somewhat stretched just trying to keep up with the OTL military policy of Ike's "broad front" stratergy &, as a result, the Allies have to stop on all fronts from September 1944. As a result, the initiative was lost by the Allies & gained by the Germans at a very crucial point in the war.
So that leaves point (2). This is the one I outlined above in my first posting. The most important part of this stratergy is that the Allied army chosen to attack must keep advancing before the Germans can regroup & offer a determined defence. The other Allied armies can only offer support as they won't get the resources to be on the offensive. Nonetheless, these "support armies" can keep other German units preoccupied in order for the "offensive Allied army" to advance with little opposition.
So because of the supply situation, more than anything else, realistically there's only one option which ensures an ending to WW2 by Christmas 1944: that is either British 2nd Army or the American 3rd Army continues it's advance onward to Berlin without stopping & in doing so gets priority over all supplies.
The Anglo-Americans thus have two options. Either:
1) Increase the amount of resources coming into France in order to support their armies on a broad front, or;
2) Limit the advance to a single front & thus provide most of their resources to this front.
The problem with point (1) is that they have to, not only have the cargo ships & planes to achieve this, but they have to have the ports available for this to happen. This wasn't possible as the Germans did an excellent job of destroying all of the ports that the Allies would have used. Furthermore, the supply ships & planes that they did have were somewhat stretched just trying to keep up with the OTL military policy of Ike's "broad front" stratergy &, as a result, the Allies have to stop on all fronts from September 1944. As a result, the initiative was lost by the Allies & gained by the Germans at a very crucial point in the war.
So that leaves point (2). This is the one I outlined above in my first posting. The most important part of this stratergy is that the Allied army chosen to attack must keep advancing before the Germans can regroup & offer a determined defence. The other Allied armies can only offer support as they won't get the resources to be on the offensive. Nonetheless, these "support armies" can keep other German units preoccupied in order for the "offensive Allied army" to advance with little opposition.
So because of the supply situation, more than anything else, realistically there's only one option which ensures an ending to WW2 by Christmas 1944: that is either British 2nd Army or the American 3rd Army continues it's advance onward to Berlin without stopping & in doing so gets priority over all supplies.
Redbeard
Banned
DMA’s point about putting all bets on one horse (the narrow front) is generally a good rule (in love and war you must focus on where the battle is and forget the rest), and it might be a way for the allies to win WWII in 44. The big question is however, if it is worth the risk? By sending ahead a general, even a very good one like Patton, you also by a big factor increase the risk of that general being caught out on a limp. Seen from a 1943/44 point of view the impression was a German warfare extremely mobile and flexible – simply specialised for utilising every opportunity and catching any opponent out on a limp. If the allies on the other hand kept the front close together and never exposed themselves seriously the continual deployment of the increasing material superiority would secure the allied the victory – sooner or later – but no doubt about it. Having a main thrust defeated would however seriously jeopardise the political consensus about not stopping before unconditional surrender was achieved.
But could the allies have any interest in nevertheless taking the risk? Not if unconditional surrender was the main priority, but the British might have had the strongest interest in ending the war in Europe as soon as possible, as they by late WWII simply did not have the resources to wage a major campaign in both Europe and the Far East. So if the British are to play a decisive role in liberating their Empire, the war in Europe has to be over before the Americans have done most of the job themselves. British staff studies concluded that the war in Europe had to be over by October 44 and December 44 latest in order to be sure to launch a major campaign against Malaya/Singapore/DEI (from India/Burma). I think Market Garden must much be seen in that perspective, and was more an example of trying to utilise a possible opportunity than going out on a limp.
That the British generally favoured the cautious broad front approach is IMO another proof of their WWII priorities – they wanted Hitler done with – no matter what – even if it cost an Empire!
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
But could the allies have any interest in nevertheless taking the risk? Not if unconditional surrender was the main priority, but the British might have had the strongest interest in ending the war in Europe as soon as possible, as they by late WWII simply did not have the resources to wage a major campaign in both Europe and the Far East. So if the British are to play a decisive role in liberating their Empire, the war in Europe has to be over before the Americans have done most of the job themselves. British staff studies concluded that the war in Europe had to be over by October 44 and December 44 latest in order to be sure to launch a major campaign against Malaya/Singapore/DEI (from India/Burma). I think Market Garden must much be seen in that perspective, and was more an example of trying to utilise a possible opportunity than going out on a limp.
That the British generally favoured the cautious broad front approach is IMO another proof of their WWII priorities – they wanted Hitler done with – no matter what – even if it cost an Empire!
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
Stauffenberg and Canaris and Rommel could kill Hitler, then...
1) Full-on civil war between them and Nazi loyalists led by Himmler. Prunesquallor and I discussed this in the past and he believes that the anti-Hitler plotters were too weak to be able to seize and hold onto power (and IIRC they weren't the most politically astute group anyway). However, assuming Himmler doesn't nix them immediately, Rommel and some others still have their armies. That distraction would probably enable large advances, esp. if the coup plotters start losing really badly and throw in with the Allies (like in "Fox at the Front," where Rommel brings his entire army over to Eisenhower).
2) The plotters do manage to seize power (perhaps they kill Himmler too, in a separate plot). The instability from that sort of thing alone would weaken Germany. Plus there's whatever they decide to do militarily...throw themselves on the West's mercy, throw all the armies into the East and allow the Western forces to advance unopposed, or something else entirely.
Here's another idea to end the war earlier. What if Market Garden had succeeded?
1) Full-on civil war between them and Nazi loyalists led by Himmler. Prunesquallor and I discussed this in the past and he believes that the anti-Hitler plotters were too weak to be able to seize and hold onto power (and IIRC they weren't the most politically astute group anyway). However, assuming Himmler doesn't nix them immediately, Rommel and some others still have their armies. That distraction would probably enable large advances, esp. if the coup plotters start losing really badly and throw in with the Allies (like in "Fox at the Front," where Rommel brings his entire army over to Eisenhower).
2) The plotters do manage to seize power (perhaps they kill Himmler too, in a separate plot). The instability from that sort of thing alone would weaken Germany. Plus there's whatever they decide to do militarily...throw themselves on the West's mercy, throw all the armies into the East and allow the Western forces to advance unopposed, or something else entirely.
Here's another idea to end the war earlier. What if Market Garden had succeeded?
Abdul Hadi Pasha
Banned
Torqumada said:
No, because the bombing didn't do as much to reduce German industrial potential as it wasted ours on building bombers. All that metal and fuel could have gone toward ground forces, which is what wins wars, not bombing.
Abdul Hadi Pasha
Banned
The most serious limiting factor in the Anglo-American advance was fuel. There were two sources of collossal fuel wastage, which could have been eliminated:
1. The pointless strategic bombing campaign. Limit this two critical industrial targets (mostly fuel production, which is easier to destroy and harder to repair or hide) and logistical targets, and perhaps supporting partisan efforts. terror bombing cities was a huge waste of resources and lives.
2. Bypass Paris. The plan was in fact to do this, but fear of a communist takeover led to Allied occupation of the city and the consequent expenditure of fuel to heat the city. The down side of this would have been a communist France until the war was over, and God knows how badly the city would have suffered, but ending the war earlier would have been worth it.
1. The pointless strategic bombing campaign. Limit this two critical industrial targets (mostly fuel production, which is easier to destroy and harder to repair or hide) and logistical targets, and perhaps supporting partisan efforts. terror bombing cities was a huge waste of resources and lives.
2. Bypass Paris. The plan was in fact to do this, but fear of a communist takeover led to Allied occupation of the city and the consequent expenditure of fuel to heat the city. The down side of this would have been a communist France until the war was over, and God knows how badly the city would have suffered, but ending the war earlier would have been worth it.
First off - yes surrender is the first answer. Ironically enough, Von Rundstedt suggested this to Hitler several days after D-Day & was sacked for doing so. As a result, I'd dare say that a German surrender wasn't an option.
The broad verse single front was a serious discussion point that took place just after the breakout from Normandy. Everyone knew that, due to the supply situation, the broad front approach could not be sustained forever. Everyone knew, come September, the Allied armies would come to a halt. Yet there were many good reasons to continue the broad front, some of which Redbeard has mentioned. But Monty & Patton were wanting to continue their advances for different & personal reasons. For Monty, he was under pressure to rid Britain of the V1 & V2 rocket sites. In doing so, this meant a drive up the coast & into Holland. This also suited Monty's plan for a right-hand turn in Holland into northern Germany & a drive to Berlin.
Patton, meanwhile, saw a drive west as a way to trap the two German armies in southern France & a chance to get into Germany before the West Wall could be turned into a fortress. Furthermore, Patton's plan would also liberate much of France. This worked well for the Americans as they had taken on equiping & organising the Free French forces. Furthermore, Patton's ideas meant that the Allies had the shortest route into German territory, even if it meant southern Germany which could mean tough going for any advance. Nonetheless, Patton could have been in Berlin before December. Furthermore, Hitler couldn't retreat to his mountain hideout as this territory would likely be in American hands.
The hassle, though, with the go slow & methodical broad front approach is that it played right into the German defensive plans. By stopping, as the Allies had to in OTL, the Germans were given a breathing space which ensured that they could regroup. Then when limitded Allied advances were attempted, the Allies found it hard going. As a result, crazy ideas like Markert Garden were attempted which were disasters. It cost a lot of men, equipment & resources that could have been used better a few weeks before. Furthermore, it ensured that the Germans gained even more time to organise a defence & then put the British army in a dangerous position which the Germans tried to exploit by conducting the Battle of the Bulge. Luckily for the British the US 1st Army (with help from US 3rd Army) defeated the German attack.
But in early September, the Germans had little in the way of stopping a determined Allied attack into germany itself. The battles around Lorraine in September showed this, where even with limited resources, Patton's 3rd Army was able to defeat the German counterattacks in this region. Now give Patton all the resources & support that he wanted & the Germans would have had no hope, first in repeating their counterattacks in Lorraine & secondly, stopping any offensive which Patton would have launched around the same time. As I said, Germany had few, if any, reinforcements to stop any major Allied attack coming from the West. But the time between September & November was greatly used by the Germans in building up numbers, whilst the Allies wasted this time "consolidating" due to their broad front strategy which, it must be remembered, was really a political decision made by Ike to keep both Monty & Patton happy. Well Monty & Patton might have been happy (actually neither was), but the war was extended by at least 6 months with thousands of extra casualities as a result.
The broad verse single front was a serious discussion point that took place just after the breakout from Normandy. Everyone knew that, due to the supply situation, the broad front approach could not be sustained forever. Everyone knew, come September, the Allied armies would come to a halt. Yet there were many good reasons to continue the broad front, some of which Redbeard has mentioned. But Monty & Patton were wanting to continue their advances for different & personal reasons. For Monty, he was under pressure to rid Britain of the V1 & V2 rocket sites. In doing so, this meant a drive up the coast & into Holland. This also suited Monty's plan for a right-hand turn in Holland into northern Germany & a drive to Berlin.
Patton, meanwhile, saw a drive west as a way to trap the two German armies in southern France & a chance to get into Germany before the West Wall could be turned into a fortress. Furthermore, Patton's plan would also liberate much of France. This worked well for the Americans as they had taken on equiping & organising the Free French forces. Furthermore, Patton's ideas meant that the Allies had the shortest route into German territory, even if it meant southern Germany which could mean tough going for any advance. Nonetheless, Patton could have been in Berlin before December. Furthermore, Hitler couldn't retreat to his mountain hideout as this territory would likely be in American hands.
The hassle, though, with the go slow & methodical broad front approach is that it played right into the German defensive plans. By stopping, as the Allies had to in OTL, the Germans were given a breathing space which ensured that they could regroup. Then when limitded Allied advances were attempted, the Allies found it hard going. As a result, crazy ideas like Markert Garden were attempted which were disasters. It cost a lot of men, equipment & resources that could have been used better a few weeks before. Furthermore, it ensured that the Germans gained even more time to organise a defence & then put the British army in a dangerous position which the Germans tried to exploit by conducting the Battle of the Bulge. Luckily for the British the US 1st Army (with help from US 3rd Army) defeated the German attack.
But in early September, the Germans had little in the way of stopping a determined Allied attack into germany itself. The battles around Lorraine in September showed this, where even with limited resources, Patton's 3rd Army was able to defeat the German counterattacks in this region. Now give Patton all the resources & support that he wanted & the Germans would have had no hope, first in repeating their counterattacks in Lorraine & secondly, stopping any offensive which Patton would have launched around the same time. As I said, Germany had few, if any, reinforcements to stop any major Allied attack coming from the West. But the time between September & November was greatly used by the Germans in building up numbers, whilst the Allies wasted this time "consolidating" due to their broad front strategy which, it must be remembered, was really a political decision made by Ike to keep both Monty & Patton happy. Well Monty & Patton might have been happy (actually neither was), but the war was extended by at least 6 months with thousands of extra casualities as a result.
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
This first point here does have some merit, but the great destruction of German cities ensures that precious German resources are diverted from the front to support the civilians. Another reason is to distrupt German transportation systems. As most of the rail & road networks go from city to city, destroying the cities also ensures that the German rail & road networks become a mess, which in turn slows down the number of reinforcments which the Germans can move from sector to sector. Killing off the civilians also reduces, not only the workforce, but potential recruits of the German army.
Abdul Hadi Pasha said:
Yes I agree with this, but the Free French would have never have gone along with it for long. The other thing is, the Allies don't need a strong point in the middle of their rear area full of Germans. Furthermore, a large number of Allies would have to cordon off Paris anyway who, in turn, would ensure that a corps of troops, plus all the resources etc that a corps would use, would be taken out of the front line. Either way, the Allies have little choice other than take Paris. As it was, 1st Canadian Army & 2nd UK Army was stuck in a situation where they had to lay siege to several German forts along the coast which also took up troops & resources. In fact, if anything, investing these places took much longer than attacking them outright. I can see the same problem occuring with Paris. As a result, in the long run, it was indeed better to liberate Paris rather than by-pass it.
"This first point here does have some merit, but the great destruction of German cities ensures that precious German resources are diverted from the front to support the civilians. Another reason is to distrupt German transportation systems. As most of the rail & road networks go from city to city, destroying the cities also ensures that the German rail & road networks become a mess, which in turn slows down the number of reinforcments which the Germans can move from sector to sector. Killing off the civilians also reduces, not only the workforce, but potential recruits of the German army."
Well of course strategic bombing had an effect on the Germans! The point is that the effect was not anywhere near enough to justify the amount that was spent to achieve it. I would note that killing masses of civilians turned out to be a rather poor strategy for the Germans, or did I miss any mass calls for surrender during the Blitz?
Well of course strategic bombing had an effect on the Germans! The point is that the effect was not anywhere near enough to justify the amount that was spent to achieve it. I would note that killing masses of civilians turned out to be a rather poor strategy for the Germans, or did I miss any mass calls for surrender during the Blitz?
Admiral Matt said:
I think you're missing the point - it was effective although maybe not in the areas which was originally planned. There are, however, two undeniable effects on the Germans:
1) Precious resources are taken away from the German military industries in order to support the civilians, &;
2) The Laffwaffe is, not only stretched to the point of breaking, but far more importantly it was kept away from the Allied Armies. Thus the Allies have air superiority over the battlefields & the Herr pays dearly as a result.
For these two reasons alone, apart from the fact that German industrial production was reduced, is enough to continue the massive bombing campaign. But wait - there's much more!
There's also the political aspect - in keeping up the bombing campaign the Western Allies were able to placidate Stalin somewhat & that's besides the fact that the public on the home front could see, if somewhat manipulated by the media, that the Germans were taking a huge hammering.
So the actual damage done to Germany may indeed, not be materially as high as the military planners initially wanted, but the actual overall effects, albeit not intended, actually do justify the bombing campaign.
Yet, once again, there's more - especially from the British aspect as seen personified in Park's Carpet Bombing tactic. Now the German bombing campaign in the Blitz maybe a poor strategy, & well yes this is obviously true, but from 1942 onwards for the Allies, no-one really cared whether a similar bombing campaign on Germany would make them surrender. It was all about taking revenge for all those British cities which suffered so much from the German bombing. And the German bombing didn't stop merely with the Blitz, of course, but continued with the V1 & V2 rockets. Welcome to the unsavoury aspects of total war, where thoughts about whether the Allied bombing campaign were only justified on gaining significant strategic materiel gains.
Overall, though, it really doesn't matter what happens in the Allied bombing campaign. As I said in an earlier posting, all all about supply & logistics. This aspect of the Allied plans had nothing to do with the bombing campaign as it was completely independent. There was only so much the Allies could bring into France at any one time. And fundamentally, this was limited to the ships, plans &, above all, the ports that could be used. Now I can't see where changes can be made there, so the Allies must implement a plan were supplies are used to the maximum efficiency. And that means a single front offensive by either Monty or Patton.
DMA said:
Dammit! I've been trying to edit this sentence, but couldn't. Anyways... what I wanted to say was:
Welcome to the unsavoury aspects of total war, where thoughts about whether the Allied bombing campaign were not only justified on gaining significant strategic materiel gains.
Amazing the difference what one word can make to ones entire rationale!
We've been through this several times actually! Germany had to disperse its industry, which alone gave them a lot of trouble and ate resources that could have been used elsewhere. Cement, concrete, FlaK, man-power (both as workforce and Luftwaffe personel in FlaK units, air-defence installations etc etc), fighthers, early air warning sites build all over Europe at great cost, trains, rails, reconstruction effort and a looot of other things have to be taken into consideration! All in all the bombing campaing damaged the Germans severely - could have been conducted more efficiently, yes, but it did work nonetheless!!Albidoom said:
And another very important point, besides the lack of landing crafts, the Allies had plenty of equipment, what would they need more for? The didn't lack tanks, certainly not tactical bombers, guns or ammunition, nor anything else!
Another PoD could be the naming of SHAEF. Originally Churchill wanted Fieldmarshall Alanbrook, or just Brook at the time. How about Alanbrook as SHAEF and Patton as his number two man? The combination of Eisenhower and Monty was in my humble, as always, view somewhat counter-productive (broad front, strange ideas, egos to be nourished and what have)!
Best regards!
- Bluenote.
DMA: I pretty much agree with that. And the revenge aspect certainly means that the bombing campaigns were nearly inevitable, regardless of their value. But I do think air superiority could have been better achieved by simply building more planes to contest it, instead of going the indirect route.
Admiral Matt said:
With the benefit of hindsight, I don't disagree with you. The only thing is, though, was anyone at the time arguing successfully for such a change in strategy? As far as the RAF is concerned, I'd highly doubt it. Similarly the US Army Air Force seemed determind to bomb Germany 24 hours a day regardless of their own casualities which were rather substancial in 1943.
I came across an english translation of the Goebbels diaries recently. Most interesting. It just deals with 1945. To show how out of touch with reality the Nazis were, in February 45, they were discussing at length a reform of the taxation system. Goebbels thought that income taxes were too high. Now, I would contend that in February 45 taxation was pretty damned irrelevant. But they thought it was important.
They also did other pointless things. Like, one of the SS Divisions in Hungary peformed badly in battle. So Hitler had Himmler fly out there personally to tell them to remove their SS insignia, convert them to a regular army unit.
Now, one interesting thing Goebbels said was that he and others, while preparing for the Night of the Long Knives (the purge of the SA and Rohm in '34) had at the time urged Hitler to purge the officer corps in the same way. Wipe out a few thousand senior officers, all those who weren't members of the Nazi party. Hitler had refused.
Now, let's suppose a more persuasive Goebbels. Von Rundestedt and Guderian and Rommel and all those guys end up in Dachau.
So, you end up with Hitler going to war sooner, and the general performance of the Wehrmacht worsening, since you've less competent people. Not that the Nazis were intrinsically incompetent (I'd argue they were, but let's set that aside for the moment), but that a person appointed to a position for political reasons is less likely to be competent than a person appointed purely for merit.
So, if you want a quicker war, you can have a point of divergence in '34. The SA is purged, and so is the officer corps.
They also did other pointless things. Like, one of the SS Divisions in Hungary peformed badly in battle. So Hitler had Himmler fly out there personally to tell them to remove their SS insignia, convert them to a regular army unit.
Now, one interesting thing Goebbels said was that he and others, while preparing for the Night of the Long Knives (the purge of the SA and Rohm in '34) had at the time urged Hitler to purge the officer corps in the same way. Wipe out a few thousand senior officers, all those who weren't members of the Nazi party. Hitler had refused.
Now, let's suppose a more persuasive Goebbels. Von Rundestedt and Guderian and Rommel and all those guys end up in Dachau.
So, you end up with Hitler going to war sooner, and the general performance of the Wehrmacht worsening, since you've less competent people. Not that the Nazis were intrinsically incompetent (I'd argue they were, but let's set that aside for the moment), but that a person appointed to a position for political reasons is less likely to be competent than a person appointed purely for merit.
So, if you want a quicker war, you can have a point of divergence in '34. The SA is purged, and so is the officer corps.