Americans intercept Japanese
- Thread starter Michael
- Start date
David S Poepoe
Banned
The Americans won't do anything if their battleline crossed the Japanese in the North Pacific. However, for that really to work the US Pacific Fleet has to be out in force with its carriers. The Japanese still have the advantage, and theres no way that the US battleships will suddenly blunder into the Japanese - the Japanese had scouts out.
If the Japanese attack then the first year or two of the Pacific campaign looks extremely bad for the Americans. When those battleships sink they are going only in one direction and can never be salvaged for later use. It would be a major disaster.
If the Japanese attack then the first year or two of the Pacific campaign looks extremely bad for the Americans. When those battleships sink they are going only in one direction and can never be salvaged for later use. It would be a major disaster.
Redbeard
Banned
Michael said:
The USN only had two carriers with the Pacific Fleet in Dec. 1941 (Lexington and Enterprise) while the PH attack force the IJN sent had six carriers, and having what at the time was the best trained and equipped naval air force.
The US Pacific Fleet had 8 battleships opposed to two Japanese with the PH strike force, but the USN battleships were 8-9 knots slower than the IJN force, and would never have had a chance of catching the IJN. The US Pacific fleet of 1941 would have fitted well into the battleline of Jutland 1916, but wasn't of much use in a modern war.
In total the IJN in late 1941 had 11 battleships all faster (25-30 knots) than the US BB's and 10 carriers. The USN had 15 slow battleships (19-21knots) and 8 carriers (but a lot more on the slips - in bundles of five).
Apart from the loss of thousands of young Americans that Sunday morning, the loss of most of the USN Pacific battleline really was of great benefit to the USN, as it gave them no choice but very fast to learn how to wage naval war with carriers as the main weapon.
I seriuosly fear that an intact USN Pacific Fleet would have entered the Pacific crossing when logistically ready (appr. six months) and not have had the political option of waiting for the Essex class carriers in 1943-44. Such a crossing with the "old" US Pacific Fleet would have fitted much better into the strategy and tactics which the IJN had perfected.
Regards
Steffen Redbeard
David S Poepoe
Banned
Michael said:
Well Michael, your dad is wrong - to a degree. Had the Japanese retreated when detected thats all fine and dandy. However, he's wrong about "sinking warships on the move is a lot harder". I'll just refer him to take a look at actions involving Prince of Wales and Repulse, Yamato and Musashi, just to name the more wellknown incidents. The pilots trained for such events. The US Pacific Fleet of December 1941 would not have been ready, in a general sense, for an out and out battle if attacked by torpedo planes. The antiaircraft armament of the warships were woefully inadequate.
Catching the Battleline in Deep Water!
If the Japanese had delivered their "message" in Washington earlier, and the intercepts had been know earleir, perhaps an effective warning could have been delivered to Kimmel and Short.
Perhaps Admiral Kimmel could have had his forces deployed at see in time.
If so, it is still posssible that the Japanese Fleet would be able to locate them. Even with warning, the USN Batttleline couldn't get very far out to sea, just far enough so that they'd be floating in water 25,000 feet deep.
Ask Admiral Tom Phillips what happens to battleships caught at see, without aircover.
Of course, with adequate warning, general Short could have his P40s up. If so, the Japanese wouldn't be able to blow them all up while parked wingtip to wingtip. The P40s could provide cover to the Battleline, BUT---the probability is that a larger number of ships would be sunk (and total losses) than the two lost historically!
Would we be "Remembering Pearl Harbor" with the same fervor if the Japanese attack had come some hours later than delivery of their Declaration Of War?
If the Japanese had delivered their "message" in Washington earlier, and the intercepts had been know earleir, perhaps an effective warning could have been delivered to Kimmel and Short.
Perhaps Admiral Kimmel could have had his forces deployed at see in time.
If so, it is still posssible that the Japanese Fleet would be able to locate them. Even with warning, the USN Batttleline couldn't get very far out to sea, just far enough so that they'd be floating in water 25,000 feet deep.
Ask Admiral Tom Phillips what happens to battleships caught at see, without aircover.
Of course, with adequate warning, general Short could have his P40s up. If so, the Japanese wouldn't be able to blow them all up while parked wingtip to wingtip. The P40s could provide cover to the Battleline, BUT---the probability is that a larger number of ships would be sunk (and total losses) than the two lost historically!
Would we be "Remembering Pearl Harbor" with the same fervor if the Japanese attack had come some hours later than delivery of their Declaration Of War?
My dad replys
How many times in history particulary in warfare when a superior force in speed and firepower has come undone against an opponet who should have been defeated. Warfare is not a computer game where it is all balanced up and results occur to a set result. The Japanese made a lot of mistakes only beaten by Britains mistakes ie: the prince of wales with no aircover and in range of land based bombers etc. A large force detecting a suprise group commanded by a wimp of an admiral, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, would of led to a turn of events that may have suprised everyone
How many times in history particulary in warfare when a superior force in speed and firepower has come undone against an opponet who should have been defeated. Warfare is not a computer game where it is all balanced up and results occur to a set result. The Japanese made a lot of mistakes only beaten by Britains mistakes ie: the prince of wales with no aircover and in range of land based bombers etc. A large force detecting a suprise group commanded by a wimp of an admiral, Vice Admiral Chuichi Nagumo, would of led to a turn of events that may have suprised everyone
jgack
Banned
I don't think that the U.S. could have won a battle against the Combined Fleet with what they had at Pearl Harbor then. With a couple more carriers to provide air cover and a fleet of modern battleships (North Carolinas and Iowas to name a couple of classes) the U.S. could have hurt the Japanese bad. So maybe if Pearl Harbor had occured in 1943 or 44 the U.S. could have pounded the Japanese. Of course, I don't know when most of our modern battleships and carriers were ordered, so maybe without PH we still wouldn't have them. The point I guess I'm trying to make is that the U.S. didn't NEED to change their fleet from battleships to carriers but merely have a fleet with more modern ships. Don't get me wrong, I think carriers are great and all, I'm just saying that I don't think that they needed to bypass the battleship as THE capital ship of modern fleets. I just think that people don't really give the Battleship it's due.
David S Poepoe
Banned
Michael said:
Okay, those are fine statements, and true (to an extent). Here is a link to the Order of Battle for the Japanese and Americans for Pearl Harbor.
http://www.warships1.com/index_oob/OOB_WWII_Pacific/OOB_WWII_Pearl_Harbor.htm
You can also find it through the www.warships1.com website if the direct link fails.
If the Japanese were to fight at the US with the forces listed it would appear that they would come out on the short end of the stick. Actually, the entire force wouldn't be dispatched from Pearl either, some portion would have remained behind. So discount the tugs and various auxiliary ships and probably a few destroyers. Also not all of the US warships would been out at sea with the battlegroup, USS Shaw was in drydock December 7th, for example. Those forces that the Japanese threw against Hickam AFB and Wheeler would have be entirely directed at the US battlefleet. In the end, going by historical numbers, the Japanese would have unleashed some 350 aircraft against the American battleline.
I don't quite get what your talking about with the "A large force detecting a suprise group", for surprise still seems to rest with the Japanese and they're the one's that would be sending forth scouts with the mission to find other ships.
Given all the other operations already underway it is simply not possible that the IJN could have abandoned the Pearl Harbor strike. Pearl Harbor was not a single operation but part of a concentrated plan. Abandonment would have left Japan's entire war plan in chaos, with ships assigned to an entire series of operations suddenly unavailable until they determined what the US Pacific Fleet was planning AND dealt with it.
Further I might raise a few points:
Japan EXPECTED massive losses at Pearl Harbor, with two or three carriers lost being seen as quite reasonable. In fact, this may have backfired on them. One reason further strikes on the oil farms and other facilities were canceled were Nagumo's relief at accomplishing 90% of what he wanted at a small fraction of what he anticipated losing. Given that Nagumo had already suffered almost 30% losses in aircraft, the thought of an all-out strike on Pearl Harbor a fourth time, when the carriers under Halsey might already be stalking him, gave him concern. (They had sighted and shot down several aircraft existing only on US carriers, he KNEW Halsey was nearby).
The sinking of battleships underway and able to defend themselves is far more difficult than unprepared and partially crewed in port. Repulse and Prince of Wales were without fighter escort or adequate support. An American force of 8 battleships with dozens of cruisers and destroyers, two carriers, and any land-based aircraft would have been a different matter.
The US actually had 17 battleships, including two new ones capable of matching the Japanese in speed, and 3 carriers in the Pacific. Given the inconvenience and time it took Japan to deal with our own tiny Asiatic Fleet, with a single 8" cruiser(Houston) as flagship, along with the allied forces, the arrival of 2-4 battleships could not have done anything but distract powerful Japanese forces for weeks, if not months. The attacks on India, as an example, might never have happened.
Three interesting possibilities could arise from this:
The US Navy pulls out in the night of December 6th. When the Japanese pilots arrive they suffer massive losses from fully alerted Army Air Corps units and anti-aircraft, and radio screaming reports that the port is empty! There are NO American warships there. Nagumo, having put Japan at war with the US is forced to run without doing harm. The war continues with the US taking advantage of interior lines around Indonesia, deploying 100-200 fighters for support following the loss of Repulse and Prince of Wales.
The US Navy sorties and attempts to engage the Japanese, is sighted in time, and suffers crippling losses in battle. However, with 20-25% of the fighters and probably the large majority of the bomber classes destroyed in battle, the Army Air Corps:
A) Smashes the first strikes, Nagumo retreats
B) Is never tested as Nagumo, having lost at least half his planes, sees no hope against a fully alerted Pearl Harbor.
C) Smashes the first strike, while most of the bombers, circling around the Japanese attack, hits Nagumo's force and sinks or damages most of his carriers.
Or how about this one? The US Navy sorties, moves in darkness under cover of radar, and gets BEHIND the Japanese fleet. Pinned between the fleet and Pearl Harbor, the US destroys Nagumo's force. A gun battle of two 'fast' battleships against eight is no contest.
Further I might raise a few points:
Japan EXPECTED massive losses at Pearl Harbor, with two or three carriers lost being seen as quite reasonable. In fact, this may have backfired on them. One reason further strikes on the oil farms and other facilities were canceled were Nagumo's relief at accomplishing 90% of what he wanted at a small fraction of what he anticipated losing. Given that Nagumo had already suffered almost 30% losses in aircraft, the thought of an all-out strike on Pearl Harbor a fourth time, when the carriers under Halsey might already be stalking him, gave him concern. (They had sighted and shot down several aircraft existing only on US carriers, he KNEW Halsey was nearby).
The sinking of battleships underway and able to defend themselves is far more difficult than unprepared and partially crewed in port. Repulse and Prince of Wales were without fighter escort or adequate support. An American force of 8 battleships with dozens of cruisers and destroyers, two carriers, and any land-based aircraft would have been a different matter.
The US actually had 17 battleships, including two new ones capable of matching the Japanese in speed, and 3 carriers in the Pacific. Given the inconvenience and time it took Japan to deal with our own tiny Asiatic Fleet, with a single 8" cruiser(Houston) as flagship, along with the allied forces, the arrival of 2-4 battleships could not have done anything but distract powerful Japanese forces for weeks, if not months. The attacks on India, as an example, might never have happened.
Three interesting possibilities could arise from this:
The US Navy pulls out in the night of December 6th. When the Japanese pilots arrive they suffer massive losses from fully alerted Army Air Corps units and anti-aircraft, and radio screaming reports that the port is empty! There are NO American warships there. Nagumo, having put Japan at war with the US is forced to run without doing harm. The war continues with the US taking advantage of interior lines around Indonesia, deploying 100-200 fighters for support following the loss of Repulse and Prince of Wales.
The US Navy sorties and attempts to engage the Japanese, is sighted in time, and suffers crippling losses in battle. However, with 20-25% of the fighters and probably the large majority of the bomber classes destroyed in battle, the Army Air Corps:
A) Smashes the first strikes, Nagumo retreats
B) Is never tested as Nagumo, having lost at least half his planes, sees no hope against a fully alerted Pearl Harbor.
C) Smashes the first strike, while most of the bombers, circling around the Japanese attack, hits Nagumo's force and sinks or damages most of his carriers.
Or how about this one? The US Navy sorties, moves in darkness under cover of radar, and gets BEHIND the Japanese fleet. Pinned between the fleet and Pearl Harbor, the US destroys Nagumo's force. A gun battle of two 'fast' battleships against eight is no contest.
I see the point your Dad is trying to make, but lets look at things on the balance of probabilities. Given that the Japanese have spent plenty of time preparing for an attack on the US fleet, that they had faster battleships and arguably superior gunnery, that the Zero pissed all over the P-40, how likely is it that the USN would have won?Michael said:
Paolo, if they were caught between the US Pacific Fleet and Army Air Corps on Hawaii, extremely likely. Note that Japan only brought TWO battleships along to Pearl, and the US had eight there. A surface action would have been extremely bad for the Japanese.
There are some interesting points here.
Firstly, I agree that a drawback fot the US forces would have been that any ships sunk would have been lost forever, whereas in Pearl, they could be salvaged and repaired.
Secondly, I agree that the IJN had a big advantage in seaborne air power. However, depending on the time of the day and the exact place of the fleet battle, there might be some other issues. For example, in a night battle, air power would have been useless. Similarly, the USN might have called in air support from land based planes. There were plenty of aircraft on the islands.
The third issue is that a battle-ready squadron has an advantage when being attacked. At Pearl, the navy was surprised. Most ships were not ready for battle, water-tight doors were open, AA guns are not manned, etc. It is much more difficult to destroy a task force that is prepared. So even if the Japanese had succeeded with air attacks (350 planes is a lot), they probably would have suffered much higher losses in terms of planes and trained pilots.
A fourth point, this in favor of the Japanese, is that there torpedoes, especially the LongLance, were much better than the US ones.
So it is really difficult to judge who would have won. By the way, if I recall correctly, the IJN had more than 2 battleships out, as they had some covering task forces as well. But I would have to look that up...
Finally, I agree to those that said that the psychological effect would have been different. Pearl meant "The USA has been attacked without declaration of war, on their soil, and our boys were slaughtered by the evil Japs". A naval battle of Pearl would have been different, I think, meaning that public opinion would have been far less pro-war.
Firstly, I agree that a drawback fot the US forces would have been that any ships sunk would have been lost forever, whereas in Pearl, they could be salvaged and repaired.
Secondly, I agree that the IJN had a big advantage in seaborne air power. However, depending on the time of the day and the exact place of the fleet battle, there might be some other issues. For example, in a night battle, air power would have been useless. Similarly, the USN might have called in air support from land based planes. There were plenty of aircraft on the islands.
The third issue is that a battle-ready squadron has an advantage when being attacked. At Pearl, the navy was surprised. Most ships were not ready for battle, water-tight doors were open, AA guns are not manned, etc. It is much more difficult to destroy a task force that is prepared. So even if the Japanese had succeeded with air attacks (350 planes is a lot), they probably would have suffered much higher losses in terms of planes and trained pilots.
A fourth point, this in favor of the Japanese, is that there torpedoes, especially the LongLance, were much better than the US ones.
So it is really difficult to judge who would have won. By the way, if I recall correctly, the IJN had more than 2 battleships out, as they had some covering task forces as well. But I would have to look that up...
Finally, I agree to those that said that the psychological effect would have been different. Pearl meant "The USA has been attacked without declaration of war, on their soil, and our boys were slaughtered by the evil Japs". A naval battle of Pearl would have been different, I think, meaning that public opinion would have been far less pro-war.
I read in Geoffrey Robertson's 2nd ed of CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY (2002) that IIRC the US Pacific Fleet would've been justified under the law of (anticipatory) self-defence in attacking Yamamoto's fleet while they were steaming towards Pearl Harbour, but would've been unjustified in sinking the Japs while they were still in port, despite the suspicion that these Jap ships would be on their way to attack American territory.
BTW, on a separate point, WI the YAMATO, MUSASHI and their escorts ahdn't been caught and sunk by USN attack planes on their way to attack US invasion forces off Okinawa April 1945, and ended up in a duel with some of the USN's most modern battleships like an IOWA-class or 2, or the SOUTH DAKOTA, WASHINGTON, or NORTH CAROLINA ? What would've been the outcome of such a battlewagon duel ?
BTW, on a separate point, WI the YAMATO, MUSASHI and their escorts ahdn't been caught and sunk by USN attack planes on their way to attack US invasion forces off Okinawa April 1945, and ended up in a duel with some of the USN's most modern battleships like an IOWA-class or 2, or the SOUTH DAKOTA, WASHINGTON, or NORTH CAROLINA ? What would've been the outcome of such a battlewagon duel ?
weren't America's three carriers in the Pacific all away from PH on various duties? Even if for some reason the US's battleship force at PH sortied and attacked the Combined Fleet, without carrier cover, wouldn't they be pretty much screwed? Unless they stayed close to the islands and it's land based aircraft....
Musashi was not with Yamato at Okinawa, she had already been sunk at the Battle of Leyte Gulf in october 1944. 6 old BBs were waiting for Yamato at Okinawa if need be, but it was decided it would be more sensible to sink her uisng aircraft. Thankfully, they did, since a naval battle would have claimed far more lives, even though Yamato would still have been sunk facing those BBs and all their escorts, but might have got a couple of kills before she was deep sixed.
The opportunity for Yamato to face off against the US fast BBs would have been at Leyte Gulf, had Halsey not taken his BBs north after Ozawa's decoy force, leaving the transports relatively undefended save for the Taffy CVE groups. Musashi would not have factored, having already been sunk by air attack the previous day. You would have had a combat weary Yamato, Nagato, Haruna and Kongo, plus escorting CAs, CLs and DDs facing off against some of the best BBs in the USN, along with loads of escorts. Superior fire control and fresher crews would have ensured a USN victory, although the Japanese could have caused some mauling with their BBS and Long Lances.
Don't get me wrong, I am not panning the Japanese, I am merely saying that by this stage of the war, they were outclassed in fire control and especially in damage control. And after hours of air attacks, they would be tired, and this explains their poor performance at Samar in OTL. Regarding OTL preformance, I think any force that had been ravaged by submarine attacks, suffered hours of heavy airstrikes, and believing they were under attack from heavy carriers, trying to manoeuver to avoid air attacks, as well as surface fire and very tired into the bargain would have been hard pressed to perform much better.
A very interesting match up would have been the (remote) possibility of Yamato mixing it up with BBs at Guadalcanal in 1942. She wasn't risked OTL not just because of her value, but also because she was a mighty fuel hog.
Sargon
The opportunity for Yamato to face off against the US fast BBs would have been at Leyte Gulf, had Halsey not taken his BBs north after Ozawa's decoy force, leaving the transports relatively undefended save for the Taffy CVE groups. Musashi would not have factored, having already been sunk by air attack the previous day. You would have had a combat weary Yamato, Nagato, Haruna and Kongo, plus escorting CAs, CLs and DDs facing off against some of the best BBs in the USN, along with loads of escorts. Superior fire control and fresher crews would have ensured a USN victory, although the Japanese could have caused some mauling with their BBS and Long Lances.
Don't get me wrong, I am not panning the Japanese, I am merely saying that by this stage of the war, they were outclassed in fire control and especially in damage control. And after hours of air attacks, they would be tired, and this explains their poor performance at Samar in OTL. Regarding OTL preformance, I think any force that had been ravaged by submarine attacks, suffered hours of heavy airstrikes, and believing they were under attack from heavy carriers, trying to manoeuver to avoid air attacks, as well as surface fire and very tired into the bargain would have been hard pressed to perform much better.
A very interesting match up would have been the (remote) possibility of Yamato mixing it up with BBs at Guadalcanal in 1942. She wasn't risked OTL not just because of her value, but also because she was a mighty fuel hog.
Sargon