What sort of pre-1993 PODs would be required to facilitate much larger nos. of American servicemen serving as UN peacekeepers in troublespots around the world ? I remember reading that until BHD in 1993, Clinton was very enthusiastic about facilitating a greater role for US forces in UN PKOs, besides the 300 blue beret-wearing 101st Airborne troopers in Macedonia with UNPREDEP and the 3000-strong US UNOSOM logistical contingent in Mog under UN command. Since BHD and the wide untrue perception that the UN was responsible for getting Americans killed, US combat troops have only been deployed on PKOs under direct national command in conjunction with an allied coalition of the willing (as per Haiti, Afghanistan and Iraq), or under overall NATO C-and-C (Bosnia, Kosovo), while even US non-combat personnel, besides individual US officers and civilian policemen appointed as observers, serving in UN PKOs have not been directly answerable to the UN chain-of-command, as was the case during the East Timor crisis, with the 300-strong US logistical and communications unit (USSGET- US Support Group East Timor) deployed in Darwin (very frequently seen here a few yrs back) and Dili being under US national command; I think during ET the largest US contribution to direct UN peacekeeping was with CIVPOLs- about a 100 American cops IIRC wore blue berets in Dili and elsewhere. Of course, dating back to the 1960s, USAF and USN strategic lift assets have been responsible for ferrying the vast bulk of UN peacekeeping contingents to trouble spots around the world, from the Congo and West Papua to Rwanda and Sierra Leone. How could this situation of so few US armed forces personnel in blue berets have changed with some sorta POD prior to 1993 ?