No ACW leads to Anglo-American conflict?

This is an econ idea, with strategic implications.

First, something prevents the ACW. I don't really care what but, in the spirit of the ATL, let's say real US economic growth takes a slightly different pattern than in OTL: instead of decline for about the first quarter of the 18th century, followed by a sharp rise, everything gets pushed forward. Growth begins to slow later and does so more gradually, so that a trough is reached in the early-1850's rather than the late 1820's. The ensuing take-off is sharper than in OTL so that, by 1860, the nation is well into a sustained and powerful upturn. Despite prolonged tension from the economic problems of the 1840's, no one wants to risk the current prosperity with a war and some sort of compromise is drafted limiting slavery over both space and time. The willingness of Southern plantation owners to compromise over the peculiar institution is enhanced by their feelings that the current boom will never end.

Whatever you think of that, here's the point: without the ACW, the US becomes the world's top economy even faster than it did. In OTL, the US passes the UK up on most measures around 1890. No ACW pushes that back about 15 years. So here we go:

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Accepting the concession speech of his opponent Tilden (elected in 1872 due to disenchantment over Republican corruption toward the end of the long period of prosperity), Garfield notes that,

"In one century of freedom from the British empire, we have already eclipsed her. In the next century, we will leave her in the dust."

The point is made in passing, mostly as a matter of national pride that the US could already be compared to the world's leading power, Britain. But it isn't taken that way in London.

More important, over the next decade American merchants become increasingly aggressive in competition with their British peers. With the relative decline of Holland, Britain had become accustomed to being the only truly global economic presence. No longer. Any region not formally part of the British empire (and a few which are) sees trade with America displacing trade with Britain. The magnitude of the displacement is not that large but the trend is clear. British investment in the American economy -- a potential reason for amity between the two countries -- has been unneeded since the early 1860's.

British fear and resentment grow progressively through the rest of the 1870's and 1880's. In truth, the damage to Britain's international economic position is minor. But this fact is lost in the face of the ever-widening gap between US manufacturing capacity and British. American ships seem to be everywhere and, while they are unarmed trading vessels, the potential for a serious challenge to the Royal Navy is obvious. Concerted and costly British efforts at conciliation in the 1830's and 1840's, when the American economy was struggling, are seemingly forgotten on the western side of the Atlantic. In 1889, minor celebrations in a few parts of the US of the victorious battle of New Orleans 75 years earlier are given extensive coverage in the English press.

The Conservaties find and invent enough inflammatory material to convince Queen Victoria to dismiss Gladstone early in 1890. Salisbury takes the reins of government calling the rise of the US the premier threat to the British empire and initiating a variety of programs to meet that threat, including a search for new alliances. The US is blissfully ignorant, though not for long.

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Any major screw-ups?

British government enmity for US

The British government (not the British people) hated democracy in general and Yankees in particular. All through the last third of the 1700s and the first two thirds of the 1800s the British did everything they could to weaken America. 1865 is when they finally gave up and accepted America independence and power.
Mostly because we made it plain that if they didn't shut up and sit down we would support Birmingham and the other middle class cities in a revolt against the upper class twits running Britain, and support the Irish revolutionaries, and invade Canada and liberate Quebec, and raid their commercial shipping, and maybe have a go at supporting and independent India, too. Britain gave up and backed down.
Later, they realized that we could help them against Imperial Germany, and we did, and against Communist Russia, and we did. The Bush family has always been Anglophiliac. Something about the class system they used to have, where knowwho is more important than knowhow.

so you're saying

I can safely run with this?

wkwillis said:

The British government (not the British people) hated democracy in general and Yankees in particular. All through the last third of the 1700s and the first two thirds of the 1800s the British did everything they could to weaken America. 1865 is when they finally gave up and accepted America independence and power.
Mostly because we made it plain that if they didn't shut up and sit down we would support Birmingham and the other middle class cities in a revolt against the upper class twits running Britain, and support the Irish revolutionaries, and invade Canada and liberate Quebec, and raid their commercial shipping, and maybe have a go at supporting and independent India, too. Britain gave up and backed down.
Later, they realized that we could help them against Imperial Germany, and we did, and against Communist Russia, and we did. The Bush family has always been Anglophiliac. Something about the class system they used to have, where knowwho is more important than knowhow.

Click to expand...

CIA

How good was the US intelligence community in the 1880's. I Know that Lincoln had a pretty good Service run by the Pickertons.

Actually, the exploitation of the West would still take up a huge amount of America's effort and interest. The expansion of markets in the Midwest, where the British can virtually not compete, will done first. The French would probably feel the pinch first before the British do with American merchantile expansion. With the state of world trade and markets being virtually wide open thru till the 1870s and 1880s, I don't think there will be any real cause for any Anglo-American conflict over trade. One should always keep in mind the continued point that Britain is dependent on American grain.

partly disagree

"Actually, the exploitation of the West would still take up a huge amount of America's effort and interest. The expansion of markets in the Midwest, where the British can virtually not compete, will done first."

Both true, though I'm pre-supposing the process is more vigorous and more advanced by 1890 than in OTL. In OTL, US trade begins to expand from its very low historic levels after the depression that decade and, thus, would begin to expand earlier in the ATL. In OTL, the British isles are the top partner; here that won't be true.

"The French would probably feel the pinch first before the British do with American merchantile expansion."

Perhaps (that would require some specifics), but the French wouldn't take it the same way. I've already stipulated that there is no serious, immediate threat to the British economy from the initial US expansion.

"With the state of world trade and markets being virtually wide open thru till the 1870s and 1880s, I don't think there will be any real cause for any Anglo-American conflict over trade."

No serious conflict has started yet. It is merely that trade trends have shifted.

"One should always keep in mind the continued point that Britain is dependent on American grain."

Dependent is too strong - there are other sources of grain, if Britain is willing to spend more. Also, this point reinforces my theme about British insecurity.

In OTL, a clear German threat to Britain began to arise while the US was stuck in ACW, Reconstruction, recovery, serious contraction. I am heading to a point where the US threat is just in advance of the German one.

I don't get it.

So why are the British hostile to the USA?

reply

They consider their growing inferiority in manufacturing, rising US trade pressure, and the potential for a huge navy to be a major threat to British preeminence in 1890, just as they considered their growing inferiority in manufacturing, German pressure for colonies, and the potential for a large navy to be a major threat in 1905.

European Monroe Doctrine

The English would also not appreciate the fact that Germany and the US would be 'natural allies'.

Along these lines, they could take the position that what is 'good for the goose is good for the gander', and declare a sort of European Monroe Doctrine, seeking to hold the influence of the US to a minimum.

This would put them automatically up against the US if the US attepts to aid any of its European allies.

OK, time for part II

I'm sure the development will alienate all those people not already put off by part I. The premise / POD (see the first post) is no ACW leading to still faster US economic expansion.

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Part I (repeat)

Accepting the concession speech of his opponent Tilden (elected in 1872 due to disenchantment over Republican corruption toward the end of the long period of prosperity), Garfield notes that,

"In one century of freedom from the British empire, we have already eclipsed her. In the next century, we will leave her in the dust."

The point is made in passing, mostly as a matter of national pride that the US could already be compared to the world's leading power, Britain. But it isn't taken that way in London.

More important, over the next decade American merchants become increasingly aggressive in competition with their British peers. With the relative decline of Holland, Britain had become accustomed to being the only truly global economic presence. No longer. Any region not formally part of the British empire (and a few which are) sees trade with America displacing trade with Britain. The magnitude of the displacement is not that large but the trend is clear. British investment in the American economy -- a potential reason for amity between the two countries -- has been unneeded since the early 1860's.

British fear and resentment grow progressively through the rest of the 1870's and 1880's. In truth, the damage to Britain's international economic position is minor. But this fact is lost in the face of the ever-widening gap between US manufacturing capacity and British. American ships seem to be everywhere and, while they are unarmed trading vessels, the potential for a serious challenge to the Royal Navy is obvious. Concerted and costly British efforts at conciliation in the 1830's and 1840's, when the American economy was struggling, are seemingly forgotten on the western side of the Atlantic. In 1889, minor celebrations in a few parts of the US of the victorious battle of New Orleans 75 years earlier are given extensive coverage in the English press.

The Conservaties find and invent enough inflammatory material to convince Queen Victoria to dismiss Gladstone early in 1890. Salisbury takes the reins of government calling the rise of the US the premier threat to the British empire and initiating a variety of programs to meet that threat, including a search for new alliances. The US is blissfully ignorant, though not for long.

Part II (new)

Salisbury sets up his Cabinet only to find that it is far easier to whip up sentiment in London about the supposed American threat than to respond effectively to it. The most frightening development is growing American industrial superiority but no action short of war will alter this trend, and war may not do it either.

That means the dangerously high American naval potential is essentially untouchable. Of course, Britain can take some action. Shipyards are enlarged and upgraded and more money plowed into research into making more effective warships. The program to modernize older ships of the Royal Navy and introduce new types of vessels is called "Fear None" - an ironic label since it is motivated precisely by fear of the US.

By itself, this would leave the Conservatives in an unsatisfactory position - the British advantage in existing naval capability has gone from very large to very, very large but the future would look no less troublesome. The second element of the Conservative response is on the trade front. Britain's partners all over the world receive pointed communiques from Her Majesty's government. Smaller partners are given a choice of trade with Britain or the US; nearly all chose the more sizable trade with Britain. Larger partners are offered inducements to improve the terms of their trade with the Empire if they will in turn reduce exchanges with the US either directly or through trade barriers. Thus by the beginning of 1891, Salisbury can already point to a one-sided arms race and restricted American trade reach as brightening British prospects.

Naturally, once set in motion, events do not proceed entirely as projected. Weaker states retaliate in their own way against British bullying with increased smuggling, a ploy which fits well US trade behavior bypassing government involvement in favor of company-to-company deals. Another irritated party is the small American political class which, out of pique, faddish interest in "manifest destiny," and the somewhat sudden realization that shipbuilding creates jobs has become far more interested in building a navy than it was in 1889. Congressional disputes over where the construction will occur and even the names of the vessels are resolved by logrolling - everyone gets their project. By the summer of 1892, the arms race is becoming two-sided (albeit with one side starting miles ahead). The relatively few American merchant ships along traditional British trading routes have been replaced by unflagged vessels manned by crews of various nationalities, but the customers are still the same.

American elections loom but there is little disagreement over the desire for a larger navy. On the other side of the Atlantic, the setbacks to Salisbury's initiatives become apparent in London over a period of several months in 1892, leaving Conservatives with the choice of backing away from their claims that Britain must meet the American challenge or taking further steps. One may be strategically sensible, the other is politically expedient.

Is America the same size as OTL, or are there any increased territories?

Very good TL so far. Has slavery ended yet? Or is it still being used in the Deep South?

reply

US is the same size as in OTL, but more of the land is in use for agriculture or industry (unless you see some reason for this to be different).

good question

Slavery was not allowed to extend to states or territories beyond where it was practiced as of 1860. To reassure the southern states the deal would not later be rewritten by a free state super-majority, it was further agreed that no (free) territories would be granted Congressional representation or electoral votes for 20 years, at which time they could be admitted only by a two-thirds Congressional majority.

The phase-out of slavery was to occur within 20 years in MO, KY, MD, DE ("union slave" states) and Kansas, which is admitted at the last second. It was to occur within 40 years in TX, AK, LA, FL, and TN. The core southern states were to get the obvious 60 years but insisted on 65, or a 1925 end to slavery. Again, economic expansion made this more palatable to all than in OTL.

On one hand the rapid pace of industrialization, technological change, and development of new land makes slave labor less lucrative. TX, for example, is virtually slave-free by 1885, well ahead of schedule. Large parts of Virginia are, as well (there is no West Virginia).

On the other, (this is an econ pod , some plantation owners refuse to follow the law, keeping slaves or slaves by any other name in small enclaves past the phase-out period. There is abolitionist violence, especially in KY, followed by retaliation by rich slave owners and mercenaries they hire from all over the country, but especially GA and AL. On the whole, though, the country is not interested in enforcing the letter of the law when slavery appears to be on its way out (except if you are black in a slave area).

Nor is the matter pushed at the national political level, in light of the desire to admit more states. Appeals of the Dred Scott decision are finessed. In 1880, Colorado, Nebraska, and Nevada are admitted with riders restating the Congressional commitment to the 1860 agreement and postponing any more decisions for another 15 years. The objections of the rapidly developing northwestern states are muted when their representatives are deliberately not notified of key debate and vote times.

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I realize this is a bit pie-in-the-sky and am willing to have unrest in the US from 1860 into the early 20th century if that seems more realistic. The unrest can have important political and even military effects. I don't want it to interfere with the faster econ expansion which is the key change here from OTL.

I'll add this to the TL as an addendum.

Derek said:

"Actually, the exploitation of the West would still take up a huge amount of America's effort and interest. The expansion of markets in the Midwest, where the British can virtually not compete, will done first."

Both true, though I'm pre-supposing the process is more vigorous and more advanced by 1890 than in OTL. In OTL, US trade begins to expand from its very low historic levels after the depression that decade and, thus, would begin to expand earlier in the ATL. In OTL, the British isles are the top partner; here that won't be true.

"The French would probably feel the pinch first before the British do with American merchantile expansion."

Perhaps (that would require some specifics), but the French wouldn't take it the same way. I've already stipulated that there is no serious, immediate threat to the British economy from the initial US expansion.

"With the state of world trade and markets being virtually wide open thru till the 1870s and 1880s, I don't think there will be any real cause for any Anglo-American conflict over trade."

No serious conflict has started yet. It is merely that trade trends have shifted.

"One should always keep in mind the continued point that Britain is dependent on American grain."

Dependent is too strong - there are other sources of grain, if Britain is willing to spend more. Also, this point reinforces my theme about British insecurity.

In OTL, a clear German threat to Britain began to arise while the US was stuck in ACW, Reconstruction, recovery, serious contraction. I am heading to a point where the US threat is just in advance of the German one.

Click to expand...

The only country that had a very large food surplus was Russia which was pro-Union in OTL due to the fact it considered the US a good counterweight to the GB. For that reason it would not be a good idea for Britian to become dependent on Russian grain shipments. The only other ways to cope with it is to pay sky high prices for grain and risk food riots or try to squeeze it out of the colonies and risk rebellions.

Derek said:

They consider their growing inferiority in manufacturing, rising US trade pressure, and the potential for a huge navy to be a major threat to British preeminence in 1890, just as they considered their growing inferiority in manufacturing, German pressure for colonies, and the potential for a large navy to be a major threat in 1905.

Click to expand...

Germany was never as big a market for British goods as the US. The British merchant class would start screaming bloody murder if they start taking major hits to their pocketbook due to the large cutback on American trade. The workers of GB at the time weren't paid much attention to at the time but merchants certainly were!

two replies to BL

"The only country that had a very large food surplus was Russia which was pro-Union in OTL due to the fact it considered the US a good counterweight to the GB."

We may be arguing about timeframes. The "break" with the US is 1890, not 1860 as you seem to imply with the comment that Russia is pro-Union.

As for food surpluses, are you saying that only the US and Russia are sources of ag exports in the late 19th century? Because that isn't true.

I'm not dismissing your comment/correction but I'm not sure I understand it.


"Germany was never as big a market for British goods as the US."

In OTL. In this ATL, the different pattern of US economic development starting in the 1830's first capped, then reduced trans-Atlantic trade and, to a lesser extent, investment. It is not as much of a political counterweight.

Derek said:

"The only country that had a very large food surplus was Russia which was pro-Union in OTL due to the fact it considered the US a good counterweight to the GB."

We may be arguing about timeframes. The "break" with the US is 1890, not 1860 as you seem to imply with the comment that Russia is pro-Union.

As for food surpluses, are you saying that only the US and Russia are sources of ag exports in the late 19th century? Because that isn't true.

I'm not dismissing your comment/correction but I'm not sure I understand it.


"Germany was never as big a market for British goods as the US."

In OTL. In this ATL, the different pattern of US economic development starting in the 1830's first capped, then reduced trans-Atlantic trade and, to a lesser extent, investment. It is not as much of a political counterweight.

Click to expand...

Not the only sources but by far the two biggest sources of food was the US and Russia, all others are far behind. I don't know what Russia's policy was with the US in the 1890s. When the US economy rebounded almost certainly result in trade with GB going back up again. GB was the largest market in the world and shared a common language along with some cultural simularities. All of which means that Americans had advantages in the British marketplace that the other great powers did not and vice versa.

good point

"When the US economy rebounded almost certainly result in trade with GB going back up again. GB was the largest market in the world and shared a common language along with some cultural simularities."

True, but there was also considerable political hostility, even in OTL.

This ATL has a different pattern to the boom and contraction cycle starting in the late 1840's. Until then, there are notable trans-Atlantic trade and investment links. US economic expansion in the 1850's reduces these in importance a bit, as domestic purchasing power and fund-raising potential rises.

No ACW means far more in the way of both disposable income and capital to invest than in OTL. By 1870, the US has a large, well-developed manufacturing area, is agriculturally self-reliant, has a "hinterland" to serve, and significantly higher per capita disposable income than in OTL. It is much more self-sufficient. Then political hostility between the two countries starts to rise.

Derek said:

"When the US economy rebounded almost certainly result in trade with GB going back up again. GB was the largest market in the world and shared a common language along with some cultural simularities."

True, but there was also considerable political hostility, even in OTL.

This ATL has a different pattern to the boom and contraction cycle starting in the late 1840's. Until then, there are notable trans-Atlantic trade and investment links. US economic expansion in the 1850's reduces these in importance a bit, as domestic purchasing power and fund-raising potential rises.

No ACW means far more in the way of both disposable income and capital to invest than in OTL. By 1870, the US has a large, well-developed manufacturing area, is agriculturally self-reliant, has a "hinterland" to serve, and significantly higher per capita disposable income than in OTL. It is much more self-sufficient. Then political hostility between the two countries starts to rise.

Click to expand...

I still don't see Britian getting into another war in America. It already had done so twice with nothing but casualties and great expenses to show for it when the US was much weaker.