Malayan strategy in Vietnam

In the late 1940s and 1950s, British forces fought a war against Communist guerillas in the jungles of Malaya. This Malayan Emergency as it was called was very different from the later american experience in Vietnam.

The Communists in Malaya were recruited mainly from the Chinese who were a large minority. the majority of the population who were Malays did not really support the guerillas.

'In 1949, an intense campaign was mounted against the guerrillas, hundreds of whom were slain or captured. One effect of the jungle warfare was to bring leaders of the various ethnic and religious communities closer together with more mutual understanding. The communists waged a violent and ultimately unsuccessful struggle supported by only a minority of the Chinese community. The British struggled to suppress the insurgency by military means, including an unpopular strategy that the government-implemented entitled Briggs plan (1950) that resettled so-called "squatter" Chinese farmers, who were easy prey for raiding guerrillas, in protected Malay areas, basically a controlled scheme of New Villages. Although this policy isolated villagers from guerrillas, it also increased the government's unpopularity. Also in 1950 Britain, as leader of the Commonwealth, requested Australian and New Zealand assistance in countering the communist terrorists. Unlike the American policy in Vietnam of "search and destroy" and then return to base, the British and Commonwealth soldiers in Malaya played the guerrillas at their own game by living out in the jungle for weeks on end and ambushing them' (1).

In addition to this, the British authorities addressed the concerns of the Malayan people, fighting a propaganda war to claim their hearts and minds.

If the US authorities had followed a pattern something like this might they have been able to win in Vietnam or were the two situations too different?

What would South-East Asia look like today with an existing communist North Vietnam and a democratic South Vietnam?

(1) quoted from http://www.myfareast.org/Malaysia/emergency.html
 
The US actually tried one of the devices the British used, strategic hamlets, and they were an unmitigated disaster. This is probably due to the corruption and unreliability of the South Vietnamese government, who if I recall correctly, were the ones who actually carried out the policy, and not the Americans. Had they been properly defended, armed, fed, etc., the idea probably would have worked as well in Vietnam as in Malaya.
 
The "Strategic Hamlets" idea was from the Phillipines War. It worked against the Filipino freedom fighters because they couldn't get outside assistance.

Strategic hamlets kept the guerrillas from being resupplied by the general population; it worked there because the Phillipines are islands.
 
The real British success in the Malayan emergency was preventing the situation from escalating to an all out war, keeping it to an annoying insurgency. It took the Brits years but they graduly squeezed the life out of the enemy. The British tactics helped ensure that the communist guerilla's were never more than small groups of activists and this stopped them growing in strength.

By the time the US entered the Vietnam war, the Viet Cong were already launching battalion sized attacks against targets, the conflict had already escalated beyond a Malayan type situation, and Malayan type tactics were no use in this "war zone"
 
The Americans tried to 'out guerrilla' the Vietcong as well with Tiger Force.

They became notorious for brutality and warcrimes. Were the British the same?

Also nice bump we got here.
 
The real British success in the Malayan emergency was preventing the situation from escalating to an all out war,
Well to be fair it was a fairly serious military conflict, the main reason that it was called an Emergency rather than Conflict or War was thanks to lobbying on the part of the local planters and land owners - if it was classed as one of those then their insurance premiums would of skyrocketed at best or more likely become void.
 
As much as I'd like to say Britain won their 'Vietnam War', as I have argued on other forums, I now have to point out why the two wars were very different conflicts.

Mainly, the majority of communist insurgents in Malaysia were the ethnic Chinese minority, whilst in Vietnam, the communists had the support of the majority of the population.

Furthermore, aid could flow directly in to North Vietnam (And through it the VC) by China and the USSR. Malaysia had no border with a friendly communist neighbour and so did not have this luxoury.

Finally, Malay insurgents had no 'neutral' friendly nations to flee to, as the Vietnamese did with North Vietnam, that the US had difficulties in spreading conflict over borders.
 
As much as I'd like to say Britain won their 'Vietnam War', as I have argued on other forums, I now have to point out why the two wars were very different conflicts.

Mainly, the majority of communist insurgents in Malaysia were the ethnic Chinese minority, whilst in Vietnam, the communists had the support of the majority of the population.

Furthermore, aid could flow directly in to North Vietnam (And through it the VC) by China and the USSR. Malaysia had no border with a friendly communist neighbour and so did not have this luxoury.

Finally, Malay insurgents had no 'neutral' friendly nations to flee to, as the Vietnamese did with North Vietnam, that the US had difficulties in spreading conflict over borders.

The insurgents were Chinese not Malay.

Your most important point is the fact that the insurgents were drawn from the Chinese minority, not the Malay majority and so didn't really have that much of a base of support.
 
The US did attempt to copy British tactics from the Malayan Emergency, as Zach pointed out, they mostly resulted in disaster because of the incompetence of South Vietnam.

Fundamentally, it's a different conflict though, Vietnam is a bigger country than Malaya, and Malaya had none of the baggage of the North-South divide that Vietnam did.

Fundamentally, "winning" Vietnam as we knew it was next to impossible, South Vietnam was fighting and losing a battle for its own public support.

The insurgents were Chinese not Malay.

Your most important point is the fact that the insurgents were drawn from the Chinese minority, not the Malay majority and so didn't really have that much of a base of support.

I think he was referring to Malays as in "the rebels in Malaya" as opposed to "people of Malayan descent".
 
A thought; perhaps we could play to South Vietnam's strengths as a right wing dictatorship?
If we can push the north more towards the Chinese sphere than the Soviet sphere then perhaps the South could whip up anti-Chinese rhetoric to gain the support of the people. Vietnam has a long history of resisting Chinese occupation...if North Vietnam could be seen as a continuation of this....

The US actually tried one of the devices the British used, strategic hamlets, and they were an unmitigated disaster. This is probably due to the corruption and unreliability of the South Vietnamese government, who if I recall correctly, were the ones who actually carried out the policy, and not the Americans. Had they been properly defended, armed, fed, etc., the idea probably would have worked as well in Vietnam as in Malaya.

On this, the featured article on wikipedia a few days ago was rather interesting. It was about some guy who was one of the leading figures in charge of implementing the strategic hamlets inititive...and who was actually working for North Vietnam.
He forced the plan along in a too rapid, too incompetent fashion, forcing it to fail.
If it had went at a more sustainable pace and with someone who wanted the south to win in charge it may actually have worked.
 
Not just that particular fellow, but the VC had several other assets very high in the RVN Government and military. One of the latter wound up a Corps Commander in 1971-72, and a three-star general. How's that for penetration of an adversary's command structure?

The Malayan insurgency and the insurgency mounted by the VC were two different animals. There was no safe haven the Communists in Malaya had available, while the VC had areas under their control since the early '60s (parts of the Central Highlands, the U-Minh Forest in the Mekong Delta, and other parts of the delta as well), along with their safe havens in Cambodia and Laos-later available to the NVA.
 
I think he was referring to Malays as in "the rebels in Malaya" as opposed to "people of Malayan descent".

Yes I understood at but its important to get the terminology right. Malay is very specifically an ethnic designator. Ethnic Malays include Javanese, the Riau, Filipinos, Boyanese, Balinese etc. The insurgents were mostly Chinese and its probably easier just to call tham Communist insurgents rather than trying to use an ethnic designator. Saying that the insurgents were Malay is like saying that Custer was attacked by Americans at the Little Bighorn

Even in modern Malaysia the national designator is Malaysian not Malay
 

Cook

Banned
Far from being incompetent, the South Vietnamese army was very effective and, after the fundamental change in doctrine and strategy following General Westmoreland’s replacement by General Abrams, able to supress the insurgency and also defeat the initial North Vietnamese conventional invasion in 1972, when the ARVN constituted the sole ground forces involved and American involvement was restricted to air power and logistics support.

The insurgents in the Malaya conflict were just that: insurgents. There were no Main Field Force elements from a neighbouring country involved, no neighbouring country was providing massive logistic support and no long land border easy to cross. Vietnam did not fall to insurgents; it fell to an invasion by North Vietnam’s conventional army consisting of 20 divisions, several of them mechanised. This invasion was only successful following the failure to continue providing support by the US Congress, contrary to US undertakings at the Paris Peace Conference.
 
Correct. Marshal Ky wanted to do away with the corruption, clean out the deadwood in the whole RVNAF (Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces), and bring many ARVN units up to NATO standards. And some of them were: the 1st Infantry, 2nd Infantry, 21st, 22nd, and 23rd Infantry, along with the Marine Division and the Airborne would've made any NATO commander proud.

Cook's thesis is basically sound: the ARVN did all of the ground fighting in the NVA Easter Offensive in 1972, and did very well. Only the U.S. withdrawal of military aid in 1974-75 ensured the ARVN's defeat.
 
Actually, the most notorious communist unit in Malayan Emergency was all- Malay regiment called 10th regiment... :)
 
The insurgents were Chinese not Malay.

Your most important point is the fact that the insurgents were drawn from the Chinese minority, not the Malay majority and so didn't really have that much of a base of support.

Erm, did you even read my post? What was my first point:
Mainly, the majority of communist insurgents in Malaysia were the ethnic Chinese minority, whilst in Vietnam, the communists had the support of the majority of the population

...
I think he was referring to Malays as in "the rebels in Malaya" as opposed to "people of Malayan descent".

Yes, I meant insurgents in Malaysia, if Flocculencio had read my reply, it would have made sense ...

Yes I understood at but its important to get the terminology right. ...

Again, I noted that it was not the ethnic Malaysians that were insurgents, "Malay Insurgents" is the same level of correct English as "Insurgents in Malaysia", just shorter, and more correct then 'Malaysian Insurgents", which would be wrong and looks like what you think I was writing.
 
Erm, did you even read my post? What was my first point:


...


Yes, I meant insurgents in Malaysia, if Flocculencio had read my reply, it would have made sense ...



Again, I noted that it was not the ethnic Malaysians that were insurgents, "Malay Insurgents" is the same level of correct English as "Insurgents in Malaysia", just shorter, and more correct then 'Malaysian Insurgents", which would be wrong and looks like what you think I was writing.

Ethnic Malays. There's no such thing as an ethnic Malaysian. It's incorrect because Malay is specifically an ethnic designator. You could be Chinese and Malayan (or currently Malaysian) but not Chinese and Malay (unless you were of mixed blood of course)

I read your reply. I was correcting your terminology not your point. They were not Malay insurgents (for the most part), they were Malayan insurgents, if you want a more accurate term- they called themselves the MPLA (Malayan Peoples Liberation Army).
 
Far from being incompetent, the South Vietnamese army was very effective and, after the fundamental change in doctrine and strategy following General Westmoreland’s replacement by General Abrams, able to supress the insurgency and also defeat the initial North Vietnamese conventional invasion in 1972, when the ARVN constituted the sole ground forces involved and American involvement was restricted to air power and logistics support.

The insurgents in the Malaya conflict were just that: insurgents. There were no Main Field Force elements from a neighbouring country involved, no neighbouring country was providing massive logistic support and no long land border easy to cross. Vietnam did not fall to insurgents; it fell to an invasion by North Vietnam’s conventional army consisting of 20 divisions, several of them mechanised. This invasion was only successful following the failure to continue providing support by the US Congress, contrary to US undertakings at the Paris Peace Conference.

Exactly. Center mass is the North Vietnamese Army. as long as it is a viable fighting force, the South is under threat. Force it, or a large portion thereof into open battle, on US terms, and you can destroy it.

i have always thought (admittedly without detailed knowledge of the NVA forces involved) that a good US strategy would be to park two US divisions on the Ho Chi Minh Trail. This WILL disrupt supplies going South and get the NVA's attention. Then a multi-division attack on the NVA force in Cambodia with the goal of surrounding and destroying it. (To quote Colin Powell "first we're going to cut it off, and then we're going to kill it".)

Do that and the North Vetnamese government is going to have to seriously rethink the goal of reuniting the country under themselves.
 

Faeelin

Banned
I read your reply. I was correcting your terminology not your point. They were not Malay insurgents (for the most part), they were Malayan insurgents, if you want a more accurate term- they called themselves the MPLA (Malayan Peoples Liberation Army).

Wasn't the MPLA predominantly Chinese? This suggests another reason the Malayan strategy may not work in Vietnam.

Edit: As you said. Apologies.

One of the thigns I find weird about these debates is that it ignores that the US spent enormous amounts of money and lost sixty thousand men. North Vietnam lost far more men. This suggests changing the outcome isn't as simple as flicking some on off switch on the Ho Chi Minh trail.
 
Ethnic Malays. There's no such thing as an ethnic Malaysian. It's incorrect because Malay is specifically an ethnic designator. You could be Chinese and Malayan (or currently Malaysian) but not Chinese and Malay (unless you were of mixed blood of course)

Jeez, are you being serious? Ok, I made a mistake in semantics there, but only in a reply to which I made none. Sure, I made that mistake there, but only after I was forced to reply on a moot point.

I read your reply. I was correcting your terminology not your point. They were not Malay insurgents (for the most part), they were Malayan insurgents, if you want a more accurate term- they called themselves the MPLA (Malayan Peoples Liberation Army).

I have read my comment over and over, and I simply cannot find the semantic error in 'Malay insurgents' ... It has two meanings, yes, the incorrect one and the correct one. I obviously (Because of my first point) meant the correct one. I cannot believe the detail into 'terminology you are getting into when we fundamentally agree on the exact point. But fine, I agree my sentence was ambiguous and did hint at me suggesting the wrong thing and would have greatly benefited from adding an 'n' on the end, but after the actual content of the message, does it really matter that much? Considering that the correction you gave me, was the man and not exactly hidden focal point of my comment ...
 
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