The Military, Economy, and Politics of a Surviving Imperial Iran?

Before the Iranian Revolution Imperial Iran had one of the largest and most advanced militaries in the world, spending $20 billion on foreign military equipment and support during the 1970s and often receiving military equipment more advanced than the countries they were acquired from. For example, Imperial Iran's order for the Grumman F-14 may have helped it avoid cancellation, and its order for a new tank from the United Kingdom led to the Challenger 1.

The economy was quite diverse as well, especially around energy technology. While most energy exporting nations fuel their economy on whatever source they happen to have enough to export, the Shah had plans for an extensive nuclear power program to provide Iran with its electricity and save petroleum and natural gas for export and/or industrial uses where they would have greater value.

Politically, the Shah had actually made Imperial Iran more autocratic over the years. In foreign politics, there were concerns that he planned to take Iran on its own path, with interests that might not coincide with the United States.

Given this, what changes would have been required for Imperial Iran to have survived, and how would it have developed in terms of its military, economy, and politics after 1979?

Bumpity bump.

The problem here is that Imperial Iran would have to considerably change in the 1960s if the Shah is not one day going to be toppled. The White Revolution, however a good idea it was (it successes still support Iran today) needed to be done with an eye towards improving the population, and as the Shah got more repressive his odds of survival fell.

Without knowing what exactly happened to change the country during that time, guessing at what could have been is impossible, really.

I read an interesting and compelling argument on this site years ago that an Imperial Iran that reformed just enough to survive might actually look a lot like the Islamic Republic, structurally.

The idea was something like this: the Shah would have to step back and let an elected prime minister take on a lot of authority, but would remain titular commander-in-chief and maintain veto power over most policy decisions and be an ideological figure for the regime, a lot like the Supreme Leader. SAVAK and the military establishment would perform a lot of the functions now fulfilled by the Guardian Council, officially or unofficially vetting candidates for parliament based on their "acceptability" to the regime. This could be as some sort of 1970's Turkey-esque politically interventionist national security council or as a....well, 1990's Turkey-esque "deep state" everybody knows is there. There would be an elected parliament and prime minister with probably even greater levels of tension between conservatives and reformers than the modern Islamic Republic.

The poster explained had some interesting manuvers the Shah could have pulled in the 70's to reach this sort of end state, and I find the whole set up dismally plausible. I can't see the political economy of a surviving Imperial Iran being anything other than a pot at a roiling boil- maybe not outright revolution, but probably some Green Movement protest every decade or so and constant tension between those trying to reform as much as is allowed and those wanting to work outside the system.

There's also the possibility that the Shah, in order to survive, might try to Islamicize his brand of Iranian exceptionalist nationalism with a hearty dose of Shi'a identity politics to take the wind out of the Islamist's sails. Although Turkey and Iran are really quite different places, there is a parallel there: the arch-secularist Turkish army did through it's weight behind Islamists in the 1980's to counterbalance leftists and sell nationalism to a wider audience. We might see a surviving Imperial Iran focus it's foreign policy in some of the same areas- although with RADICALLY different motivations and desired outcomes than the Islamic Republic- that Iran has looked at OTL. The policy of an Israel-friendly Imperial Iran *also* anointing itself protector of the Lebanese Shi'a, for example, or stirring up trouble vis a vis Bahrain as it stretches it's regional muscles in the 1980's would make a delightfully incoherent mess.

Wel apart from the Challenger 1 Iran was going to buy more than 100 F-16's. Scroll down to the 'I' section for a brief account, and while that's an artist's impression of how an IIAF F-16 might look I can remember seeing photographs of pre-production aircraft with all the flags of the initial users painted on the side and Iran's flag was amongst them.

Linkwerk said:

I read an interesting and compelling argument on this site years ago that an Imperial Iran that reformed just enough to survive might actually look a lot like the Islamic Republic, structurally.

The idea was something like this: the Shah would have to step back and let an elected prime minister take on a lot of authority, but would remain titular commander-in-chief and maintain veto power over most policy decisions and be an ideological figure for the regime, a lot like the Supreme Leader. SAVAK and the military establishment would perform a lot of the functions now fulfilled by the Guardian Council, officially or unofficially vetting candidates for parliament based on their "acceptability" to the regime. This could be as some sort of 1970's Turkey-esque politically interventionist national security council or as a....well, 1990's Turkey-esque "deep state" everybody knows is there. There would be an elected parliament and prime minister with probably even greater levels of tension between conservatives and reformers than the modern Islamic Republic.

The poster explained had some interesting manuvers the Shah could have pulled in the 70's to reach this sort of end state, and I find the whole set up dismally plausible. I can't see the political economy of a surviving Imperial Iran being anything other than a pot at a roiling boil- maybe not outright revolution, but probably some Green Movement protest every decade or so and constant tension between those trying to reform as much as is allowed and those wanting to work outside the system.

There's also the possibility that the Shah, in order to survive, might try to Islamicize his brand of Iranian exceptionalist nationalism with a hearty dose of Shi'a identity politics to take the wind out of the Islamist's sails. Although Turkey and Iran are really quite different places, there is a parallel there: the arch-secularist Turkish army did through it's weight behind Islamists in the 1980's to counterbalance leftists and sell nationalism to a wider audience. We might see a surviving Imperial Iran focus it's foreign policy in some of the same areas- although with RADICALLY different motivations and desired outcomes than the Islamic Republic- that Iran has looked at OTL. The policy of an Israel-friendly Imperial Iran *also* anointing itself protector of the Lebanese Shi'a, for example, or stirring up trouble vis a vis Bahrain as it stretches it's regional muscles in the 1980's would make a delightfully incoherent mess.

Click to expand...

That seems like a possible course. The Shah seems to have been interested in a role akin to a Prussian monarch or "imperial president". While he wanted to build a base of the middle class and intellectuals, he was unable to do so because many people went abroad for schooling and returned to find that the job they were trained for didn't exist yet in Iran. The military could be a strong base of support, although different from most nations in that the Imperial Iranian Air Force was probably the most prestigious of the services.

Delta Force said:

That seems like a possible course. The Shah seems to have been interested in a role akin to a Prussian monarch or "imperial president". While he wanted to build a base of the middle class and intellectuals, he was unable to do so because many people went abroad for schooling and returned to find that the job they were trained for didn't exist yet in Iran.

Click to expand...

Part of the reason for economic issues was the fluctuating oil prices of the 1970s and the country's huge military spending. Both go down to what I said earlier about stopping problems before they get big. The country (like Saudi Arabia, Nigeria, Mexico and a bunch of other major petroleum exporters) went nuts with their government spending in the mid-1970s after the energy crisis only to have problems later on when their huge grandiose plans didn't end up working as they originally intended. The Shah had long pushed for higher oil prices, but the Yom Kippur War gave them the reason to force the issue and OPEC took that reason and ran with it. Without trimming the military spending down to size and perhaps more wisely investing their oil windfall (though Iran it has to be said did better than Saudi or Nigeria did) could change the country's politics quite dramatically.

Imperial Iran would be very unlikely to have to fight an Iran-Iraq war, which is a big advantage. I do wonder if they might get pulled into the war in Afghanistan more than OTLs Iran was?

Economically, TTL's Iran would probably be 10-20 years ahead of OTL's Iran, most likely with a smaller population than OTL's Iran, since there would be no post-Revolution baby boom.

Militarily, hmm. I would expect Iran to be a bit more dangerous in a short fight and much less dangerous if it ever got in a really long war. The sanctions the Islamic Republic has been under since its beginning encouraged the Iranians to develop their own military industries quite considerably. I have a feeling Imperial Iran would have become a nuclear-armed state at some point in the 90s (possibly when India and Pakistan join the nuclear club).

Politically I think it is much harder to say since it depends on exactly how Iran avoids the Revolution. The latest PoD to head off the Islamic Revolution is for the Shah to be a bit more ruthless and to actually crack down on the strikes and demonstrations in '78. In such a case, we might be looking at a royal dictatorship through the '80s (though I doubt it would be a very dictatorial dictatorship - if the Shah dies on schedule, then the ascension of Reza to the throne would likely result in some climb-down from the emergency state which would be required to survive '78-'79). Likely things would get more representative through the 90s, though I don't see the Shahs becoming complete figureheads even by the present day.

fasquardon

They would have to survive the collapse in oil prices in the 1980s - no sure thing.

Saddam would have been less likely to invade Kuwait with a potent neighbor to his east. Even a secular Iran is likely to remain a threat to Iraq.

No Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Dunning Kruger said:

They would have to survive the collapse in oil prices in the 1980s - no sure thing.

Saddam would have been less likely to invade Kuwait with a potent neighbor to his east. Even a secular Iran is likely to remain a threat to Iraq.

Click to expand...

With Iran still potent, Iraq won't invade it, so won't have a huge army looking to be paid and huge debts to Kuwait, so has no real reason to want to. No Iran-Iraq war means no Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, meaning no Desert Shield/Desert Storm, no major US deployment to Saudi Arabia, a much weaker al Quaeda, and therefore no 9/11 attacks. It's also likely that there's less persecution of the Marsh Arabs.

On the other hand, that also means the Iraqi nuclear program will have fewer disruptions, and Saddam will have a freer hand dealing with the Kurds.

No Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Click to expand...

A more peaceful Lebanon would have interesting consequences. No ongoing South Lebanon conflict and the denial of a base of operations to the PLO will improve Israeli standing. The effect on the First Intifada (or similar grassroots uprising) I can't tell - the PLO may well be undermined by the loss of Lebanon as a base, but the weaker the PLO the more excessive Israeli actions will appear. Any Israeli-Palestinian negotiations will probably dance to the Israeli tune more than in OTL, depending on how favourable the results are for them. Iran might conceivably mediate such negotiations, but then so might anybody.

Other possibilities for Iranian foreign relations are

* Regional interventionism in Yemen, similar to the 1960s/1970s support to the Sultan of Oman in the Dhofar Rebellion.

* Intervention in Somalia, either to keep it from becoming a failed state or (if things get that bad) to suppress piracy.

* Support to the Mujihadeen in Afghanistan is likely, possibly promoting pan-Persian ideology over Sunni Islamism. That would knock the wind out of the Taliban, though they'll remain a major if not dominant force. If a civil war breaks out, expect to see Iranian intervention. This will strain relations between Iran and Pakistan, since the latter backed the Islamists.

* Conflict with Saudi Arabia and Iraq over Gulf hegemony. Early on, the three are equal; as things develop, it will take a grand alliance of the House of Saud and the House of Hussein (I couldn't resist ) to oppose Iran, and eventually not even that will do it. Pakistani support to the Arab states would help swing the balance away from Iran, but make them feel surrounded.

* Assuming the USSR collapses as per OTL, the Nagorno-Karabakh War. Iran might intervene to make and keep peace, or might support Armenia. If they go in shooting on behalf of Armenia, that probably drags Russia and Turkey in. This gets very messy and could conceivably start WW3.

* Iran and South Africa were close. Unlikely that Iran would get involved with any of South Africa's wars in the 1980s, but after the revolution Iran imposed a trade boycott on South Africa. A continuation of the Imerial regime would probably avoid this and maintain close relations. I'm not sure what effect the boycott had, but removing it probably helps South Africa out. Some collaboration on arms between the two (and Israel, of course) is likely. The end of Apartheid is inevitable at some point, the consequences for Iran would be worth looking at.

* As Iran's economy grows, some or all Central Asian countries will look more towards it and away from Russia as the centre of their economic sphere. The old Silk Road will become a major trade route again as this happens. The Russians, of course, won't like this one bit.

RLBH said:

* As Iran's economy grows, some or all Central Asian countries will look more towards it and away from Russia as the centre of their economic sphere. The old Silk Road will become a major trade route again as this happens. The Russians, of course, won't like this one bit.

Click to expand...

China, on the other hand, definitly will like it...

Which will annoy the Russians even more, of course.

Actually, assuming a Soviet collapse again, the growth of the alt-EU, growing Iranian influence in Central Asia, and China's development into a world power will combine to make them very nervous indeed.

Dunning Kruger said:

They would have to survive the collapse in oil prices in the 1980s - no sure thing.

Saddam would have been less likely to invade Kuwait with a potent neighbor to his east. Even a secular Iran is likely to remain a threat to Iraq.

No Hezbollah in Lebanon.

Click to expand...

The petroleum glut of the 1980s might be less severe without the Second Energy Crisis of 1979, which was ironically enough the result of the Iranian Revolution. The First Crisis of 1973 started conservation and the shift in demand curves, but the Second Crisis probably accelerated the trend.

Also, the Middle Eastern nations were under pressure to sell petroleum to finance the Iran-Iraq War.

Delta Force said:

The petroleum glut of the 1980s might be less severe without the Second Energy Crisis of 1979, which was ironically enough the result of the Iranian Revolution. The First Crisis of 1973 started conservation and the shift in demand curves, but the Second Crisis probably accelerated the trend.

Also, the Middle Eastern nations were under pressure to sell petroleum to finance the Iran-Iraq War.

Click to expand...

That's an interesting global consequence. Oil importers - the US, Europe and Japan - would lose out, whilst oil exporters would gain. Possibly Japan has a worse/earlier economic crisis, while oil production in the North Sea, Canada and the US continues to grow. I believe that the OTL oil glut more or less killed oil production in Canada with major political consequences, though I can't comment as to the consequences of butterflying this.

Avoiding the collapse in oil prices would be beneficial to the Soviet Union, propping them up for longer. Unless of course the nonexistence of the 1979 energy crisis accelerates their collapse. It would also butterfly Mexico's default on its' debts in 1982, avoiding the worst of the Latin American debt crisis. Latin America would therefore be a fair bit better off.

Dunning Kruger said:

They would have to survive the collapse in oil prices in the 1980s - no sure thing.

Click to expand...

Without the Iran-Iraq war the price collapse would have been less serious.

It would still be serious enough to put strain on Iran and Russia though, since both countries had invested in a fair pile of military hardware with their petrodollars. In Iran that would likely mean the government would have to become more ruthless to head off protest movements, in Russia, it might actually be a good thing. One of the problems Russia had OTL was the Iranian Revolution led to a price spike just as the first moves were being made towards reform (which encouraged the Soviet leadership to think that they could use oil to bankroll the reform process).

Not sure what a less severe price crash would do to Canada, Mexico and the others mentioned. They would certainly not be completely out of the woods though.

fasquardon

Delta Force said:

The petroleum glut of the 1980s might be less severe without the Second Energy Crisis of 1979, which was ironically enough the result of the Iranian Revolution. The First Crisis of 1973 started conservation and the shift in demand curves, but the Second Crisis probably accelerated the trend.

Also, the Middle Eastern nations were under pressure to sell petroleum to finance the Iran-Iraq War.

Click to expand...

Good point.

Depends on how many reserves were already explored and developed prior to the revolution and what the cost of production was. My guess is that oil prices, pre revolution, were high enough to justify new development in North America, North Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and certainly across the gulf states. With that you probably have more than enough production capacity to slam oil prices although you do miss out on some incremental exploration that occurred during the 79-82 time frame.

Put it this way, by 1986, the world was capable of producing 11mm barrels of oil a day in excess of what was demanded. Today that number is about 1mm barrels per day. Its unlikely that the 8-10mm barrels required oil prices to be at 1980 levels be found and developed.

Wouldn't it clearly take the sparing of the oil coup against PM Mossadegh, for the Iranian Revolution was a natural anti-democratic reaction to, because the try at democracy failed? It's not impossible, because Ike was anti-Imperialist on Egypt.

Iran's an oligarchy, a handful of aristocrats in opposed power; the same thing as Singapore, the former Confederacy, and Communism. The curious can look up Sparta, a mean slaver state that's it's best start. It was also separately invented by India and the Inca.

Our GOP and Canada's and most European conservative parties mostly want oligarchy, mostly for its evil possibilities.

RLBH said:

That's an interesting global consequence. Oil importers - the US, Europe and Japan - would lose out, whilst oil exporters would gain. Possibly Japan has a worse/earlier economic crisis, while oil production in the North Sea, Canada and the US continues to grow. I believe that the OTL oil glut more or less killed oil production in Canada with major political consequences, though I can't comment as to the consequences of butterflying this.

Avoiding the collapse in oil prices would be beneficial to the Soviet Union, propping them up for longer. Unless of course the nonexistence of the 1979 energy crisis accelerates their collapse. It would also butterfly Mexico's default on its' debts in 1982, avoiding the worst of the Latin American debt crisis. Latin America would therefore be a fair bit better off.

Click to expand...

North America isn't energy poor, it just wasn't able to fully compete with energy exports from the Middle East and to some extents South America. With higher prices and/or risk conventional North American fields are profitable options, and with even higher prices and/or more developed technology unconventional options become feasible as well. Twenty years ago the United States was importing large amounts of energy from overseas; it's now projected that twenty years from now the United States will once again be a major exporter of energy of all types.

Dunning Kruger said:

Good point.

Depends on how many reserves were already explored and developed prior to the revolution and what the cost of production was. My guess is that oil prices, pre revolution, were high enough to justify new development in North America, North Sea, Gulf of Mexico, and certainly across the gulf states. With that you probably have more than enough production capacity to slam oil prices although you do miss out on some incremental exploration that occurred during the 79-82 time frame.

Put it this way, by 1986, the world was capable of producing 11mm barrels of oil a day in excess of what was demanded. Today that number is about 1mm barrels per day. Its unlikely that the 8-10mm barrels required oil prices to be at 1980 levels be found and developed.

Click to expand...

Keep in mind that while the 1979 Revolution decreased petroleum consumption, it also led to extensive damage of the Iraqi and Iranian petroleum infrastructure. Three to four decades of exploration and production have been lost from those fields. So things would be somewhat more complicated, as there would be both no 1979 Crisis and more petroleum production relative to our timeline going forwards.

Also, Imperial Iranian production would likely be exported in one form or another. Unlike other governments that use petroleum itself as a subsidy for the public, the Shah planned to export it, especially in the form of chemicals, refined products, and processed goods. Nuclear power was a centerpiece of that initiative, as it would allow booming Iranian energy demand to be met without reducing export potential by much. Electricity consumption always rises faster than GDP, so it's a good area of savings.

Also, since the 1960s and 1970s, there haven't been as many discoveries of giant and supergiant petroleum deposits. However, there have been several discoveries of giant and supergiant natural gas deposits. In fact, the largest natural gas field in the world, South Pars, was discovered in 1990 in waters shared by Qatar and Iran. It holds 51 trillion cubic meters of natural gas, which is equivalent to 300 billion barrels of petroleum (the USGS estimates 170 cubic meters of natural gas equals one barrel of petroleum).

Imperial Iran could move towards exporting natural gas and using it as an industrial feedstock and perhaps transportation fuel as its petroleum fields start to run down. Its fields were heavily developed prior to 1979, and Iran is not as petroleum rich as Iraq or Saudi Arabia.

Delta Force said:

North America isn't energy poor, it just wasn't able to fully compete with energy exports from the Middle East and to some extents South America. With higher prices and/or risk conventional North American fields are profitable options, and with even higher prices and/or more developed technology unconventional options become feasible as well. Twenty years ago the United States was importing large amounts of energy from overseas; it's now projected that twenty years from now the United States will once again be a major exporter of energy of all types.

Click to expand...

They'd be paying more to exploit domestic resources, since if the domestic resources were cheaper they'd have been exploited in OTL. That's an economic hit - money spent on energy can't be spent elsewhere - even if it's relatively modest and offset by increased energy security. The economic hit, though, is probably more than cancelled out by the absence of the '79 oil shock.