Failure On The Somme

After the near destruction of the Royal and German navies at the Battle of Jutland, another battle that would be just as destructive and a pyrrhic German victory would occur in the deep trenches of Northern France. That was the Battle of the Somme, which would be launched within a month of Jutland's outcome.
The Somme was part of the Entente war conference's strategy to defeat the Central Powers in 1916-1917. According the the notes taken during this conference in Chantilly from 6-8 December 1915, simultaneous offensives were to be launched against the Germans by the French and Russians and against the Austrians by the Italians and Russians. The British would take care of the Ottomans and colonies while a small multinational force was to keep Bulgarian forces occupied in Salonika. The offensives were to keep the Germans and Austrians to keep them occupied and deny time for troop movements.
In December, General Sir Douglas Haig, who would prove his 'butcher' reputation, replaced Sir John French as commander in chief of the British Expeditionary Force. Haig favoured an offensive in Flanders to liberate Belgium and drive the Germans from the u boat bases there.

Sorry, your PoD is what? Also, the Somme was in some ways a successful battle. Sure it cost the British more troops (at a ratio of about 3:2), but the British troops were mostly green recruits (before anyway, after they were much more experienced), while the German ones were mostly experienced soldiers.

MattII said:

Sorry, your PoD is what? Also, the Somme was in some ways a successful battle. Sure it cost the British more troops (at a ratio of about 3:2), but the British troops were mostly green recruits (before anyway, after they were much more experienced), while the German ones were mostly experienced soldiers.

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Give it time, maybe he'll elaborate on the next posts. My own TL starts with an "American invasion" of Mexico in 1890, but on the next update I explained what was actually happening.

To ghappy, good luck on your TL, looking forward to the next update

MattII said:

Sorry, your PoD is what? Also, the Somme was in some ways a successful battle. Sure it cost the British more troops (at a ratio of about 3:2), but the British troops were mostly green recruits (before anyway, after they were much more experienced), while the German ones were mostly experienced soldiers.

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I assume a [pyrrhic] German victory at Jutland gives the Germans a victory in the battle, albeit a pyrrhic one as well. In otherwards, about 100,000 more British and French casualties for similar levels of German casualties on the Western Front and a few square miles of France held. The effects still bring the same consequences, except with Romania staying neutral until 1917 changes their mind due to inflated and misinterpreted news from Germany, a less successful Brusilov offensive, greater threat to Petrograd [at that time] and a better Verdun for the Germans.

MattII said:

Sorry, your PoD is what? Also, the Somme was in some ways a successful battle. Sure it cost the British more troops (at a ratio of about 3:2), but the British troops were mostly green recruits (before anyway, after they were much more experienced), while the German ones were mostly experienced soldiers.

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Oh come now next you'll be telling us that the British generals weren't all braying jackasses and that they actually learned lessons about how to fight a war with an army ten times the size of the prewar version. Remember its 'lions led by donkeys' old boy as said by; well no one apparently...

The Generals were butchers for the most part, but developments were made at a lower levels, as evidenced by the development of tanks and mines. However, the significance of the German losses is highlight by the German generals themselves. Rupprecht, crown prince of Bavaria stated afterwards "What remained of the old first-class peace-trained German infantry had been expended on the battlefield".

MattII said:

The Generals were butchers for the most part, but developments were made at a lower levels, as evidenced by the development of tanks and mines.

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Given Haig was enthusiastic about both tanks and airpower, I'm puzzled how you conclude that innovation only came from a lower level. Also the butcher label is ridiculous, the British had 6 divisions in 1914 and 60 in 1916, there were no officers with experience of managing such larges forces on the British side. Given that it is surprising that the massed armies of the French and Germans really did no better in terms of leadership or casualties than the British.

Given their choice the British would not have fought at the Somme but they had to co-operate with the French and after Verdun they had to carry the battle with minimal French help. And of course its interesting how Haig carries the blame for Somme but never recieves any of the credit for the 100 Days.

MattII said:

The Generals were butchers for the most part, but developments were made at a lower levels, as evidenced by the development of tanks and mines. However, the significance of the German losses is highlight by the German generals themselves. Rupprecht, crown prince of Bavaria stated afterwards "What remained of the old first-class peace-trained German infantry had been expended on the battlefield".

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Following the wishes of the politicians who neatly transferred responsibility to the generals after the war......though they did wait until Haig was dead.

It was the politicians who forced close co-operation with the French and anything to keep them in the war on the generals, it was the politicians who forced what were side shows on the generals and it was the politicians who denied reinforcements when they were needed.

PMN1 said:

Following the wishes of the politicians who neatly transferred responsibility to the generals after the war......though they did wait until Haig was dead.

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Lloyd George was a particular culprit, and one who actually helped to feed the 'stabbed in the back' myth in his efforts to downplay the part played by the Western front in winning the war.

Garrison said:

Lloyd George was a particular culprit, and one who actually helped to feed the 'stabbed in the back' myth in his efforts to downplay the part played by the Western front in winning the war.

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Chief culprit from what i've read....and the person most responsible for how far the German Spring Offensive got in 1918 by ordering Haig to spread his forces thinner to cover the French, denying him reinforcements despite everyone telling him there was an offensive on the way and lieing about troop numbers.

Preparations for the Somme Offensive

French and British preparations for the offensive
British intentions evolved as the military situation changed after the Chantilly Conference. French losses at Verdun reduced the contribution available for the offensive on the Somme and increased the urgency for the commencement of operations on the Somme. The major role in the offensive devolved to the British and on 16 June, Haig defined the objectives of the offensive as the relief of pressure on the French at Verdun and the infliction of losses on the Germans. After a five-day artillery bombardment, the British Fourth Army was to capture 27,000 yards (25,000 m) of the German first line, from Montauban to Serre and the Third Army was to mount a diversion at Gommecourt. In a second phase, the Fourth Army was to take the German second position, from Pozières to the Ancre and then the second position south of the Albert–Bapaume road, ready for an attack on the German third position south of the road towards Flers, when the Reserve Army which included three cavalry divisions, would exploit the success to advance east and then north towards Arras. The French Sixth Army, with one corps on the north bank from Maricourt to the Somme and two corps on the south bank southwards to Foucaucourt, would make a subsidiary attack to guard the right flank of the main attack being made by the British.
However, the news of defeat at Jutland and panic over a possible invasion caused the plans to be amended. Two corps had to be transferred to Britain out of fears of a German invasion. In the chaos, the training of several divisions was disrupted, but further delays were impossible. It was an all or nothing effort despite the success of Brusilov [which was reduced compared to reality due to heavier casualties against the Germans]. Later, one of the corps was returned, but one division had to remain in London and another each had to replace units sent to reinforce naval defences and construction yards, where a major acceleration in construction of British dreadnoughts was underway to replace British losses.
The corps that were sent were the VII and XV Corps. The VII Corps was sent because it was the diversionary force. It was feared that the Germans would notice the withdrawal and reinforce more important sectors of the defences, which would threaten the battle with a German victory. Part of the XV Corps was enroute to Britain when news mentioning heavier German losses at Jutland were received and returned to France with its training disrupted. Despite the massive British defeat, they managed to eliminate 4 Battle Divisions of German battleships. However, the British lost every 15 inch and 13.5 inch gunned dreadnought and replacements of pre dreadnoughts and the French Navy from the Mediterranean had to be transferred with consent. It was obvious that these were inferior to the battleships lost.
German defences on the Somme
After the Herbstschlacht [or Autumn Battles) of 1915, a third defence line another 3,000 yards (2,700 m) back from the Stutzpunktlinie was begun in February 1916 and was virtually complete on the Somme front when the battle began. German artillery was organised in a series of sperrfeuerstreifen (barrage sectors); each officer was expected to know the batteries covering his section of the front line and the batteries ready to engage fleeting targets. A telephone system was built, with lines buried 6 feet (1.8 m) deep for 5 miles (8.0 km) behind the front line, to connect the front line to the artillery.
The Somme defences had two inherent problems that the rebuilding had not solved. The front trenches were on a forward slope, lined by white chalk from the subsoil and easily seen by ground observers. The defences were crowded towards the front trench, with a regiment having two battalions near the front-trench system and the reserve battalion divided between the Stutzpunktlinie and the second line, all within 2,000 yards (1,800 m) and most troops within 1,000 yards (910 m) of the front line, accommodated in the new deep dugouts. The concentration of troops at the front line on a forward slope guaranteed that it would face the bulk of an artillery bombardment, directed by ground observers on clearly marked lines. With this in mind, the Germans could be killed before they could get the artillery and troops out into the battle. However, the British had to bombard deep into the trenches and face a strong defence that would hamper their movement. Also, mines were another issue that the British had to negotiate before they could take their attacks into the trenches.
[For the sake of simplicity, most of the information is and will be taken from Wikipedia, plus several reliable book sources.]

What exactly would people have preferred the Western Entente do?

At the end of the day they face a fundamental problem. Russia is going to lose if they don't distract the Germans. If Russia leaves the war they probably lose. Without the offensives they did launch in 1916 that may happen even earlier.

The Americans aren't in the war in 1916, who knows if they will ever join. They need Russia, but they can't get to her. The only way to help Russia is to pound the western front. All attempt to help her in some other way (Gallipoli) were also failures. Entente diplomacy got Italy into the war, but the geography was all off for them being able to do much. What else could they do?

Just imagine Russia bowing out in 1916. War is over, Entente loses. Heck, all that needs to happen is Russia collapses a few months earlier then OTL and Germany doesn't declare USW because they know they don't need too.

The technology of the day means that there will be no breakthrough. It's not a question of generals being stupid, its a question of the material reality of the times. Lots of generals threw themselves at this problem and they all failed. It was only once Germany had every single ounce of its strength drained by attrition that they collapsed.

Debacle on the first day

Introduction
On 24 June 1916, the disastrous battle initiated with an artillery bombardment of the formidable German defences. After a week, the assault began on 1 July with an attack on the town of Albert by 9 corps of the French 6th and British 3rd and 4th Armies on the German 2nd Army of Von Below from Foucaucourt south of the Somme northwards to Serre, north of the Ancre and at Gommecourt, which was 2 miles (3.2 km) beyond, in the Third Army area. The purpose of the attack was to capture the German first and second positions from Serre south to the Albert–Bapaume road and the first position from the road south to Foucaucourt.
The German defence south of the road mostly collapsed and the French had "complete success" on both banks of the Somme, as did the British from Maricourt on the army boundary, where XIII Corps took Montauban and reached all its objectives and XV Corps captured Mametz and isolated Fricourt. The III Corps attack on both sides of the Albert–Bapaume road was a disaster, making only a short advance south of La Boisselle, where the 34th Division had largest number of casualties of any Allied division on 1 July. Further north, the X Corps attack captured the Leipzig Redoubt, failed opposite Thiepval and the success on the left flank was temporary, when the German front line was overrun by the 36th Division, which then captured Schwaben and Stuff redoubts.
German counter-attacks during the afternoon recaptured most of the lost ground north of the Albert–Bapaume road and fresh attacks against Thiepval were stalemated. On the north bank of the Ancre, the attack of VIII Corps was another failure, with large numbers of British troops being shot down in no man's land. The VII Corps diversion at Gommecourt was also costly, with only a partial and temporary advance south of the village. The German defeats from Foucaucourt to the Albert–Bapaume road, left the German defence on the south bank incapable of resisting another attack and a reinforcement of troops began, from the Flaucourt plateau to the west bank of the Somme close to Péronne, while north of the Somme, Fricourt was abandoned overnight to free up the necessary reserve division.
Several truces were observed to recover wounded from no man's land on the British front but were virtually ignored, where the Fourth Army had lost 63,750 casualties, of whom 21,250 men were killed. The French had 2,000 casualties and the German 2nd Army lost 12,000–15,000 men. Orders were issued to the Anglo-French armies to continue the offensive on 2 July and a German counter-attack on the north bank of the Somme by the 12th Division, intended for the night of 1/2 July, took until dawn on 2 July to begin and was destroyed. Since 1 July 1916, the cost of the battle and the "meagre gains" have been a source of grief and controversy in Britain; in German and French writing, the first day of the Battle of the Somme has been little more than a footnote to the mass losses of 1914–1915 and the Battle of Verdun.
The French on the first day
South of the river the XXXV Corps with the 51st and 61st divisions and 20 batteries of heavy artillery, attacked with the 61st Division, two hours after the offensive began on the north bank, as right-flank guard for the colonial divisions near the river. A French attack of any great size had been considered impossible by the German command and the German infantry had been stretched over far wider fronts than on the north bank. The French preliminary bombardment caused severe casualties and equipment losses, many machine-guns and mortars being destroyed. When the attack began concealed by mist, the German defenders were astonished and defeated. The French artillery had c. 10 heavy batteries per 1-kilometre (0.62 mi) of front, numerous aircraft observers, whose pilots flew so low over Estrées that German soldiers could see their faces and 18 observation balloons opposite the German 11th Division. The division had only two field artillery regiments and part of one sent as reinforcement, with no heavy guns for counter-battery fire, except for periodic support from a small number of heavy guns covering all of the south bank.
The German artillery group around Estrées, Soyécourt and Fay, attempted a systematic and coordinated bombardment of the French front line on 30 June and the French replied with 1,600 heavy shells on one German field regiment alone, which knocked out three guns. By the time of the attack of 1 July, German artillery on the south bank had been hit by 12,000 French shells and was almost silent by 11:20 a.m. Only eight heavy batteries were available to the Germans on the south bank and at 9:30 a.m., the French barrage lifted off the German front line and three mines were blown under a redoubt at the village of Fay. A measure of surprise was gained, despite losses to German flanking fire from beyond the southern flank of the attack. Grenadier Regiment 10 had been subjected to a "torrent" of fire overnight, which had forced the German infantry to shelter in mine galleries. A gas bombardment was synchronised with the French infantry attack and the mine explosions at 10:00 a.m. killed many of the sheltering troops. By 3:00 p.m. the German defences had been overwhelmed and the garrisons killed or captured; such reinforcements as existed were moved forward, to occupy the second position south of Assevillers.
On the south bank the I Colonial Corps with the 2nd, 3rd, 16th Colonial and the 99th Territorial divisions and 65 heavy batteries, also attacked two hours after the main assault. The 2nd and 3rd Colonial divisions advanced between XXXV Corps and the river and overran the first line of the German 121st Division, holding the line south from the Somme, in fifteen minutes and took Dompierre and Bequincourt. On the French left flank, Frise held out until the village was re-bombarded and then taken by 12:30 p.m. after a second attack. The 2nd and 3rd Colonial divisions began probing 2,500 metres (2,700 yd) of the German second position held by the III Battalion, Infantry Regiment 60 around Assevillers and Herbécourt, Assevillers falling at 4:00 p.m. Herbécourt was attacked from the north-west at 5:30 p.m. and then recaptured by a German counter-attack. The Colonial divisions took c. 2,000 prisoners for very few French casualties. The attack on the south bank had advanced 2 kilometres (1.2 mi).
North of the Somme, the French XX Corps, with the 11th, 39th, 72nd and 153rd divisions and 32 batteries of heavy artillery, attacked with the 11th and 39th divisions. The assault began at 7.30 a.m., with the commanders of the 1st Liverpool Pals and the French 153rd Infantry Regiment advancing together. At the forward bastion known as Bois Y, north-west of Curlu, which contained many machine-guns and was protected by Menuisiers Trench 200 metres (220 yd) further forward, the attack went "like clockwork". The 79th Regiment, which had a final objective 1,500 metres (1,600 yd) beyond the start line, found that the French bombardment had destroyed much of the German fortifications and that the creeping barrage kept the Germans under cover. Only at Bois Favière in the 39th Division area, where part of the wood was held by the Germans for several days and at Curlu in the 11th Division area on the north bank, were the Germans able to conduct an organised defence.
The 37th Regiment of the 11th Division attacked Curlu and received massed small-arms fire; the regiment was repulsed from the western fringe of the village, before attacks were suspended for a re-bombardment, by which time the village was outflanked on both sides. Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 6 recorded the first attack at 9:00 a.m., after drumfire which began at 6:00 a.m., followed by two more until drumfire fell again at 4:00 p.m. and the remaining garrison was ordered to retire. Most of the Bavarian regiment was thrown in, from the Somme to Montauban and destroyed, having 1,809 casualties. The French were unable to capitalise on their success because the British did not advance to their second objective beyond Montauban. Five counter-attacks from Hardecourt were repulsed, by mid-morning 2,000 prisoners had been taken and an advance of 1.5 kilometres (0.93 mi) had been achieved.

Garrison said:

Given their choice the British would not have fought at the Somme but they had to co-operate with the French and after Verdun they had to carry the battle with minimal French help. And of course its interesting how Haig carries the blame for Somme but never recieves any of the credit for the 100 Days.

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The Somme was actually supposed to be a combined offensive, but then the Germans hit Verdun, and the French had to pull out most of their troops.

MattII said:

The Somme was actually supposed to be a combined offensive, but then the Germans hit Verdun, and the French had to pull out most of their troops.

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The Somme offensive was designed as an offensive with around 2/3 of the troops being French, and against Haig’s assessment that this was not a good area for an offensive. The politicians decided that the attack must go ahead and continue, as the French demanded, and with far fewer French troops than planned for after Verdun started as the French were now bleeding to death at Verdun. Had the British Army sat on its backsdie and let their ally collapse it would have had massive political and military consequences.

MattII said:

The Somme was actually supposed to be a combined offensive, but then the Germans hit Verdun, and the French had to pull out most of their troops.

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So the British army was forced for political reasons to fight a battle the generals knew full well it wasn't ready for in an area they knew was unsuitable but of course the losses taken are all their fault...

PMN1 said:

The Somme offensive was designed as an offensive with around 2/3 of the troops being French, and against Haig’s assessment that this was not a good area for an offensive. The politicians decided that the attack must go ahead and continue, as the French demanded, and with far fewer French troops than planned for after Verdun started as the French were now bleeding to death at Verdun. Had the British Army sat on its backsdie and let their ally collapse it would have had massive political and military consequences.

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Exactly, the first day of the Somme was a tragedy but it was one that was all but inevitable given the limitations of the army, its supplies(especially artillery ammo) and the fact that the politicians in London were so insistent on letting the French set the strategic agenda in the first place. If the British had thrown up their hands after the first day, as so many seem to think they should have done, the German armies that were committed at the Somme would have been sent in against the French at Verdun and that would have been catastrophic. The Somme was the primary reason the Germans withdrew to the Hindenburg Line in 1917, they knew they couldn't take another pounding like the Somme

In fact addressing the OP greater German success at the Somme would probably have worked against them in the longer run. It would have drawn troops away from Verdun as the Germans chased 'success' in the same manner they did in 1918 with the same result; holding a large salient of no strategic value and lacking the well prepared defences they had created over the previous two years.

Garrison said:

Exactly, the first day of the Somme was a tragedy but it was one that was all but inevitable given the limitations of the army, its supplies(especially artillery ammo) and the fact that the politicians in London were so insistent on letting the French set the strategic agenda in the first place. If the British had thrown up their hands after the first day, as so many seem to think they should have done, the German armies that were committed at the Somme would have been sent in against the French at Verdun and that would have been catastrophic. The Somme was the primary reason the Germans withdrew to the Hindenburg Line in 1917, they knew they couldn't take another pounding like the Somme

In fact addressing the OP greater German success at the Somme would probably have worked against them in the longer run. It would have drawn troops away from Verdun as the Germans chased 'success' in the same manner they did in 1918 with the same result; holding a large salient of no strategic value and lacking the well prepared defences they had created over the previous two years.

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These are my intentions, give Germany crushing but pyrrhic victories at Jutland and the Somme against Britain followed by slightly better conditions in 1917 with Romania staying neutral until events that year keep them from joining the Entente and a greater threat to St. Petersburg. The minor differences, however, keep unrestricted submarine warfare out of the picture or reduces it, preserving American neutrality. Germany fights the Western Front with better conditions in 1917 and Italy suffers a bigger defeat at Caporetto and is forced to rely more on foreign help, collapsing in 1918. 1918 is decision year in which the Germans win against Britain and France or suffer defeat as in reality and unrestricted submarine warfare is launched after the failures of 1918. In 1919, if the Entente survives the German offensives to fight with victory, they begin the counterattack, with American support in 1920. Germany finally surrenders that year after revolution, defeats and the collapse of Austria Hungary and the Ottoman Empire the previous year.

The British 4th Army on the first day

The southern flank of the British line was held by XIII Corps which attacked Montauban, with the New Army 30th Division and 18th Division. The 30th Division took its objectives by 1:00 p.m. and the 18th Division completed its advance by 3:00 p.m. German defences in the south were far less developed than those north of the Albert–Bapaume road and could be observed from territory held by the British and French. The infantry advanced behind a creeping barrage and had the benefit of the heavy artillery of French XX Corps to the south. Much of the German artillery in the area was put out of action, during the preliminary bombardment and the German second and third lines were unfinished, with no deep dug-outs except in the first trench. On the right of the British attack, most of the German infantry and machine-guns were destroyed before the British advance and a river mist hampered the remaining defenders. In the chaos, Bernafay and Trônes woods were reported lost before midday and all available men, including clerks and cooks were ordered forward to the second position. The 12th Reserve Division, was ordered to prepare a counter-attack from Montauban to Mametz overnight but at midnight the division had only reached the second position. The 30th Division had 3,011 casualties, the 18th Division lost 3,115 and Reserve Infantry Regiment 109 lost 2,147 men; Bavarian Reserve Infantry Regiment 6 had 1,810 casualties.
III Corps
La Boisselle
The 34th Division a New Army division, attacked along the Albert–Bapaume road, which was aided by the blowing of the two largest mines either side of La Boisselle, the assault beginning at 7:30a.m.. Approximately 85% of a battalion was annihillated by machine gun fire. South of the village, infantry from the Grimsby Chums got into the Lochnagar crater where they were pinned down. The Tyneside Scottish Brigade attacked up "Mash Valley" and against La Boisselle at the "Glory Hole". The Tyneside Irish Brigade was in reserve to advance and capture the second objective from Contalmaison to Pozières.
At zero hour, a brigade started its advance from the "Tara–Usna Line", a reserve position behind the British front line, to cross 1-mile (1.6 km) of open ground before they reached no man's land. Many of the German machine-guns were in concealed positions behind the front line and had not been hit by the bombardment. Bullets swept no man's land, which was 200–800 yards (180–730 m) wide at this point and the forward slope of the Tara–Usna ridge, behind the British front line. As soon as the advance of the head of an attacking column was stopped, the rest of the column bunched up behind and made an easy target for the German defenders' guns.
When the barrage lifted, the troops overran the German front trench on the higher part of the slope but German flanking fire from Sausage Valley and La Boisselle, forced the leading companies away from the north-east to due east on the right. The left flanking units of the rear companies and the 16th Royal Scots were shot down as they followed on. Parties of the 15th Royal Scots were left behind to attack Sausage Redoubt and the trenches in the vicinity, as the rest advanced straight up the slope straying into the XV Corps sector, held by the 21st Division. By 7:48 a.m. both battalions were atop the Fricourt Spur and Sausage and Scots redoubts were still occupied by German troops. The infantry advance continued for about 1 mile (1.6 km), before the error in navigation was realised thirty minutes later, at Birch Tree Wood beyond the sunken road into Fricourt, where 21st Division troops were encountered.
Only isolated parties crossed no man's land and those on the right which attacked Sausage Redoubt, were burnt on the parapet by flame throwers. Some troops of the 11th Suffolk managed to advance and join the first brigade column survivors on the Fricourt Spur but most of the first two battalions were unable to cross no man's land and the 24th Northumberland was held back in the British front line, although some troops had set off before the order arrived. The troops took what cover existed in no man's land and some of the men from the three battalions in the column, reached the crater of Lochnagar mine and dug in. A counter-attack from the 4th Company of Reserve Infantry Regiment 110, forced British troops back to the crater by midday. The party from the right-hand column left behind to capture Sausage Redoubt, tried to bomb towards it but were repulsed and two attempts by a Field Company RE and a company of the 18th Northumberland (Pioneers) Battalion to cross no man's land failed and the brigade column had to lie in no man's land and wait for dark to stop the German defenders from shelling them.
Despite machine-gun fire, a party of around 50 men advanced up "Sausage Valley", south of La Boisselle almost to the edge of Contalmaison. The survivors were captured after having made the furthest British advance of the day, about 4,000 yards (3,700 m]. The positions of Reserve Infantry Regiment 110 were severely damaged in the bombardment but the regiment was forewarned of the infantry attack by a Moritz device, which eavesdropped on British telephone signals. The mine at Y Sap caused no casualties as the Germans evacuated the area in time but the mine at Schwaben Höhe (Lochnagar) temporarily trapped German troops in shelters nearby and the position was lost, however another mine wrecked a company and caused further casualties. The 34th Division suffered the worst casualties of the day, losing 6,680 men.
Ovillers
The 8th Division attacked the Ovillers spur, which was north of the Albert–Bapaume road. The division had to cross 750 yards (690 m) of no man's land and advance towards German trenches, which had been sited to exploit spurs running down from the ridge. The only approach to the German lines was up "Mash Valley", under the guns in La Boisselle to the south, Ovillers to the front and the Thiepval spur to the north. All three brigades attacked, the 23rd Brigade up Mash Valley, where c. 200 men reached the German second trench and then held about 300 yards (270 m) of the front trench, until 9:15 a.m. The centre brigade reached the second line, before being forced back to the British front line and the left-hand brigade managed to reach the third trench, while German counter-bombardments and attacks cut off the leading troops from reinforcements and decimated the brigade. The co-ordination of British artillery and infantry failed, the field artillery lifting to the final objective and the heavy artillery lifting an hour before the attack, leaving the German defenders unmolested as they repulsed the infantry. Ovillers was defended by Infantry Regiment 180, which lost 192 casualties in the bombardment. Many of the German fortifications were smashed, except on the right at The Nab. The British advance was met by massed small-arms fire at 100 yards (91 m), which cut down many men, after which a bombing fight began. British penetrations were contained by German troops in communication trenches on the flanks. The two battalions of the regiment in the area lost 280 casualties and the 8th Division losses were 5,421 men.

British 4th Army part 2

Serre
The 4th Division attacked between Serre and Beaumont Hamel and captured the Quadrilateral ("Heidenkopf") but could not exploit the success, because of the repulse by the Germans of the attacks by the flanking divisions. Cross-fire from Beaumont Hamel and Serre and determined counter-attacks held up the division. No other gains were made and German counter-attacks recovered the position early on 2 July, by which time the division had suffered 4,900 casualties. The 31st Division, a New Army division made up of Pals battalions, was to capture Serre and then turn north to form the northern defensive flank of the Fourth Army. The division attacked uphill from several copses and the two attacking brigades were engaged by the Germans with small-arms fire, using 74,000 bullets to repel the attack. Small groups of the Accrington Pals and the Sheffield City Battalion, managed to cross no man's land and reach Serre and a party advanced 1.25 miles (2.01 km) to Pendant Copse, before being cut off and killed or captured. Reserve Infantry Regiment 121 was confronted by the British attack, before all the troops had emerged from their dug-outs and more than three infantry sections were blown up in the mine explosion at Hawthorn Redoubt, the rest of the garrison being trapped until the end of the attack. A counter-attack towards the redoubt by two platoons, gradually bombed the British back and after an hour only the Heidenkopf ("Quadrilateral") remained in British occupation, which was captured in a few hours. Reserve Infantry Regiment 119 lost 342 casualties, Reserve Infantry Regiment 121 lost 600 men and Infantry Regiment 169 lost 392 casualties. The 4th Division ended the day back at its start line, having suffered 3,800 casualties.
VIII Corps
The 29th Division attacked towards Beaumont Hamel. Part of the attack was filmed and showed the detonation of a 40,000-pound (18,000 kg) mine, beneath Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt at 7:20 a.m., ten minutes before the infantry attack began, which alerted the Germans. British troops failed to occupy all of the mine crater before German troops arrived and took over the far lip, while several British troops suffered losses to a mine. Many troops of both brigades were shot down in no man's land, which was dominated by Redan Ridge and then caught by German artillery barrages. German white signal rockets were seen and taken for British success flares, which led the divisional commander Major-General de Lisle, to order the 88th Brigade from reserve, to exploit the success.
The 88th Brigade included the 1st Newfoundland Regiment, which advanced on open ground from reserve trenches 200 yards (180 m) back from the British front line, to avoid the congestion of dead and wounded in communication trenches. Many of the Newfoundlanders became casualties to German small-arms fire while still behind the front line; some of the Newfoundlanders got across no man's land near Y Ravine but were held up by uncut wire. Most of the German shelters and Beaumont Hamel were demolished and shell-craters overlapped. Reserve Infantry Regiment 119, who had been sheltering under the village in Stollen survived and with other units at Leiling Schlucht ("Y Ravine") and the Leiling and Bismarck dug-outs, engaged the British troops from the wreckage of the trenches. The Newfoundland Battalion suffered 750 casualties, a 96% loss second only to that of the 10th Battalion, West Yorkshire Regiment, which lost 753 casualties at Fricourt, south of the Albert–Bapaume road.The 29th Division lost 5,540 casualties.
Hawthorn Ridge
A witness to the detonation of the Hawthorn Ridge mine was British cinematographer Geoffrey Malins who was filming the 29th Division attack. He had his camera set up about 0.5-mile (0.80 km) away, trained on the ridge and waiting for the explosion at 7:20 a.m.:
"The ground where I stood gave a mighty convulsion. It rocked and swayed. I gripped hold of my tripod to steady myself. Then for all the world like a gigantic sponge, the earth rose high in the air to the height of hundreds of feet. Higher and higher it rose, and with a horrible grinding roar the earth settles back upon itself, leaving in its place a mountain of smoke.' - Geoffrey Mallins
As soon as the mine blew, the heavy artillery bombardment on the German front line lifted and Stokes mortars, which had been placed in advanced sites, along with four more in a sunken lane in no man's land, began a hurricane bombardment on the front trench. The regimental history of Reserve Infantry Regiment 119 recorded that there was a terrific explosion which for the moment completely drowned out the thunder of the artillery. A great cloud of smoke rose up from the trenches of No 9 Company, followed by a tremendous shower of stones.... The ground all round was white with the débris of chalk as if it had been snowing and a gigantic crater, over fifty yards in diameter and some sixty feet deep gaped like an open wound in the side of the hill.
The detonation was the signal for the German infantry to stand to, at the shelter entrances. Two platoons of the 2nd Battalion, Royal Fusiliers (86th Brigade, 29th Division) with four machine-guns and four Stokes mortars rushed the crater. As the British troops reached the near lip, they were engaged by machine-gun and rifle fire from the far lip and the flanks. Three sections of German infantry (about thirty men) of the 9th Company were killed in the mine explosion and 1 1⁄2 platoons were trapped in their Unterstände (underground shelters), from which only two sections escaped. The rest of the company in a Stollen (deep mined dug-out) survived but the entrances were blocked and the troops inside were not rescued until after the British attack.
It was swiftly followed by a German counter-barrage and in the next few minutes, German machine-guns opened fire all along the front. The British divisions forming up in no man's land, to reach the jumping-off position 100 yards (91 m) short of the German front line, were caught in the machine-gun fire and suffered many losses. The German troops occupying the far lip of the crater at the Hawthorn Ridge Redoubt, turned their machine-guns and trench mortars to the right and left and fired into the British troops. The attack on the redoubt and the rest of the VIII Corps front was a costly failure. By 8:30 a.m., the only ground held by the 29th Division was the western lip of the crater. A German counter-attack by two platoons, bombed towards the crater from shell-hole to shell-hole and forced the survivors to retire to the British front line. Reserve Infantry Regiment 119 had 332 casualties, most suffered in the mine explosion beneath the redoubt. Casualties in the 86th Brigade were 2,169, of whom 713 were killed and 101 were reported missing.