How to have WW1 with a Anglo-German Alliance

I have seen lots of threads that discuss how to have an Anglo-German Alliance forming in the latter half of the 19th century instead of the Angle-French Entente that formed OTL.

What I haven't seen is a plausible way for an Anglo-German Alliance to form and for there to still be a war on the scale of WW1 in the first half of the 20th century with the British and German Empires fighting side by side.

The POD is obviously at some point during the 19th Century.

So what do you lot think?
 
Best bet would be a Russia that manages to modernise and really start to make Britain and Germany nervous about its intended targets for expansion. If you can somehow neutralise France so it doesn't become an ally to Russia, you'll probably see Britain a lot more comfortable in going in with Germany as well.
 
Best bet would be a Russia that manages to modernise and really start to make Britain and Germany nervous about its intended targets for expansion. If you can somehow neutralise France so it doesn't become an ally to Russia, you'll probably see Britain a lot more comfortable in going in with Germany as well.

Sounds like a good idea but from my knowledge of Russian history they need a shock to their system like a big defeat to get reforms and modernisation going, like the Russian loss in the Russo-Japanese war that caused reforms of the military and partially military industry. Possibly either the UK or Germany(or both) fund and support a independence movement that either successeds or causes large damages.
 
I have seen lots of threads that discuss how to have an Anglo-German Alliance forming in the latter half of the 19th century instead of the Angle-French Entente that formed OTL.

What I haven't seen is a plausible way for an Anglo-German Alliance to form and for there to still be a war on the scale of WW1 in the first half of the 20th century with the British and German Empires fighting side by side.

The POD is obviously at some point during the 19th Century.

So what do you lot think?

Butterflying away the Anglo-German naval arms race would probably be necessary. Maybe also buff France and/or Russia, so that Germany isn't seen as a dangerously strong threat to the European balance of power but as a necessary counterweight to preserve said balance.
 
Sounds like a good idea but from my knowledge of Russian history they need a shock to their system like a big defeat to get reforms and modernisation going, like the Russian loss in the Russo-Japanese war that caused reforms of the military and partially military industry. Possibly either the UK or Germany(or both) fund and support a independence movement that either successeds or causes large damages.

Best bet would possibly be Alexander II surviving as he was a man pushing for reforms. Give him enough years to do so, and you might see Russia stable and able to prosper in the early 20th century.
 
Easy. Have the Fashoda Incident go hot. An Anglo-French colonial war will ruin their relations for years to come. Even the Kaiser is not incompetent enough in foreign policy to not seize that opportunity. If you couple this with a continued Great Game between Russia and Britain then Germany will seem like a logical partner.
 
Here's my post from another thread.

Things go sideways at Fashoda, but not enough to cause outright war. But Britain is still extra leery of France now. The Spanish-American War is delayed a few years so Japan makes a play for the Philippines instead of Korea, this ultimately kicks off the war.

America plays a little more bold in the Venezuelan Crisis, and even though the end result is largely OTL Britain and Germany close ranks when things get heated.

When the Moroccan Crisis breaks out Britain ends up backing Germany (mostly because they're still angry with the French). The Pact of Cartagena never happens, but France and Spain agree to help protect each other's interests in the western Mediterranean. France sends feelers out to Italy knowing Italy wants a piece of the action in Tripoli and offers to turn a blind eye to Italian interests in the region.

The next crisis will be the Bosnian Crisis. There hasn't been an Anglo-Russian Entente yet (both sides are dragging their heels, especially Britain). Britain gets ruffled feathers with over the issue of the straits and this causes more suspicion of Russia in the UK.

We have the Ottoman-Italian War which I outlined earlier.

In the far East during the Mongolian Revolution (1911), Russia makes a big play in China and grabs Mongolia, Dzungaria and parts of Manchuria making Port Arthur contiguous with Russia proper. Britain loses it and is terrified of Russian influences in Tibet and an invasion of India.

This might lead to a neutral but pro CP Britain if a war occurs. The naval race might be butterflied away if Britain can come to some sort of agreement with Germany, and Italy is probably way more pre-France than Germany after the Bosnian Crisis and the alt Ottoman-Italian War.

Thoughts?
 
How would this delay the Spanish-American War? Tensions between the US and Spain were running fairly high, especially with Hearst egging on the US public (remember the quote that ended "...and I'll furnish the war"?). Sorry, but I don't see it. I still maintain that the Maine will go to the bottom of Havana harbor on 15 February 1898 as it did IOTL, and the war will follow with essentially the same results. I say this because Spain was essentially marginal to Great Power politics in Europe by then. True, Spain still sent ambassadors (as opposed to ministers) to nations like Germany and the UK, but that was more out of tradition than anything else.

That would effectively neutralize any Japanese move toward the Phillippines (although I could see Prince Henry being a bit more obdurate with respect to Admiral Dewey--that is, until Dewey fired a warning salvo to back up the "we were here first, so get lost" message). :D Either way you slice it, the SAW winds up with the same bottom line as it did IOTL.

Also I can't see any real impact upon the Venezuelan crisis that led to the Roosevelt Corollary. By this time, the special relationship between the US and the UK was well on its way to solidification, and the UK would probably put pressure on the local German naval command to mind its manners.

Bottom line: a warm / hot Fashoda could well have led to decidedly cooler British / French relations that might have resulted in something resembling an Anglo-German alliance as a function of Morocco. But neither of the intervening events mentioned would seem to be relevant.
 
How would this delay the Spanish-American War? Tensions between the US and Spain were running fairly high, especially with Hearst egging on the US public (remember the quote that ended "...and I'll furnish the war"?). Sorry, but I don't see it. I still maintain that the Maine will go to the bottom of Havana harbor on 15 February 1898 as it did IOTL, and the war will follow with essentially the same results. I say this because Spain was essentially marginal to Great Power politics in Europe by then. True, Spain still sent ambassadors (as opposed to ministers) to nations like Germany and the UK, but that was more out of tradition than anything else.

That would effectively neutralize any Japanese move toward the Phillippines (although I could see Prince Henry being a bit more obdurate with respect to Admiral Dewey--that is, until Dewey fired a warning salvo to back up the "we were here first, so get lost" message). :D Either way you slice it, the SAW winds up with the same bottom line as it did IOTL.

Also I can't see any real impact upon the Venezuelan crisis that led to the Roosevelt Corollary. By this time, the special relationship between the US and the UK was well on its way to solidification, and the UK would probably put pressure on the local German naval command to mind its manners.

Bottom line: a warm / hot Fashoda could well have led to decidedly cooler British / French relations that might have resulted in something resembling an Anglo-German alliance as a function of Morocco. But neither of the intervening events mentioned would seem to be relevant.

The delayed Spanish-American War is mostly to get a Japanese drive south so Russia never gets embarrassed by the Russo-Japanese War and plays a stronger hand in Mongolia in 1911 which 'threatens' India. Even a Russian victory in the Russo-Japanese War is going to show severe Russian weakness and Britain could still be tempted to join the Entente.

I think you need a Britain that's cool towards France but is still genuinely concerned with Russia. One or the other probably won't do it, I think it has to be both.

perhaps I overstated the impact of the Venezuelan Crisis, it would probably play almost identical to OTL
 
Easy. Have the Fashoda Incident go hot. An Anglo-French colonial war will ruin their relations for years to come. Even the Kaiser is not incompetent enough in foreign policy to not seize that opportunity. If you couple this with a continued Great Game between Russia and Britain then Germany will seem like a logical partner.

I largely agree with this post, but I doubt that a more severe Fashoda Incident would ever lead to a full-blown war. It could severely damage Anglo-French relations, however.
 
I largely agree with this post, but I doubt that a more severe Fashoda Incident would ever lead to a full-blown war. It could severely damage Anglo-French relations, however.

Under these circumstances there would still be room for the German Empire to build up a decent navy, which can defend their interests in the Baltic, North Sea, colonially and against France and Russia. Even IOTL the UK didn't deny the German Empire a sizeable navy, as long as the Royal Navy was larger by some degree and IOTL wasn't 'solely aimed against the RN' (due to how the fleet was composed). OTOH IMHO IOTL both sides tended to rather sensitive and hypocritical.

Also Wilhelm II, the eldest grandson of Queen Victoria, to some degree was an Anglophile; or rather he admired and envied the British Empire at the same time.
On a more personal level Tsar Nicholas II and king George V were rather close, in part due to their Danish connection, whereas Wilhelm II was not so popular, yes he had a difficult personality, but the Danish relatives hadn't really forgiven their German/Prussian relatives for the Danish defeats in Schleswig wars either (so any dislike of Wilhelm II based on that, is not something Wilhelm II could do anything about).
 
Would there be a chance of the French being the ones to violate Belgian neutrality from the start or if their attack straight into the jaws of the fortified Franco-German border goes sideways?
 
It's not pre-1900, but I think it would be possible to get a closer Anglo-German rapprochement, leading to alliance, if WWI was delayed for a while longer. By the 1910s the naval race was no longer a real sticking point between Germany and the UK, since the former had been comprehensively crushed in the dreadnought race and even Tirpitz saw the futility of continuing the struggle.

The greater reason for the UK to stick with the Entente was not so much animosity to the Germans so much as a perceived need to strike a 'grand bargain' with the Russians, whose (vastly exaggerated) strength Whitehall could not find a way to counter, at least not without ruinous expense.

But again, by 1914 the Anglo-Russian Entente was showing signs of strain: Russian moves in the Balkans, in Persia and in Central Asia fed the traditional Russophobia of the British elite, and it seems likely that the UK would have pulled out of its obligations and switched towards a 'balancing' alternative, which could involve using German strength to tie down the bulk of Russian forces that would otherwise threaten Germany. It's important not to overexaggerate how committed each nation was to the alliance structure - Italy was only the most drastic defector, the British hemmed and hawed their commitment to France for a few days (mainly due to isolationist sentiment) and were initially OK with Germany stomping through southern Belgium uninvited.

Ultimately in the 1914 Britain, Germany and Austria really shared greater interests in maintaining the European status quo (esp. in the Balkans), while Russia and France (and arguably Italy) were the more revisionist states that sought to commit each other against Germany under a 'Balkan inception scenario', e.g. having some small war involving Austria and some Balkan state spiral out into a general war that would accomplish each party's objectives. So really, the fact that Germany and the UK went to war with each other in 1914 was probably more unlikely than the alternative.
 
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Would there be a chance of the French being the ones to violate Belgian neutrality from the start or if their attack straight into the jaws of the fortified Franco-German border goes sideways?
It depends on what you mean by that question. If you are wondering if in 1914, instead of the Germans, France enters Belgium to attack Germany, after which the UK declares war on France for violating Belgian neutrality (with the rest of history being exactly the same)? Than I can answer that, if that would happen, the Uk would not declare war on France and join Germany (even if France would violate Belgian neutrality). Belgium was just an excuse for the UK. It had already aligned with France against Germany and was looking for an excuse to get involved. The worst thing for France that could happen is that the UK decides to remain completely neutral.

If you question is would France violate Belgian neutrality in the case of an Anglo-German alliance, than the answer is possibly. It depends on the situation, but not terribly likely.
 
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