Why would France aid the CSA against the USA?

So I have been reading Turtledove's TL 191 books and I am trying to figure out why Great Britain and France would help the Confederates. There's quite a lengthy thread elsewhere on this site about Britain, but what about France? What incentives would France have to help the Confederacy? Does the South's agricultural trade have anything to do with it? If they're reservations against slavery are so strong, why would they not help the North?
 
France's support of the Confederacy would probably be more linked to Napoleon III's foreign policies in the America. The Emperor wanted to see a strong power emerge in the Americas to counter the US' rise. That's why he supported the Mexican Empire of Maximilian for example.

Supporting the Confederacy to win independance would certainly weaken the US, which would be ideal for Napoleon III.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
It's on record that they seriously considered it OTL. Of the two British intervention is harder - all you really need for French intervention is British approval of the intended French intervention of OTL.
 

shiftygiant

Gone Fishin'
The Union was opposed to Napoleon III's ambitions in Central America regarding his planned Mexican Empire, whilst the Confederacy Tolerated them. Additionally, the French Textile industry was suffering thanks to the Union blockade, leading to pressure on Napoleon as a Southern Victory would mean cheap cotton. On this, the Confederate delegate sweetened the deal by promising raw cotton to the French if they got involved, however Napoleon recognized this would be suicide if they did it themselves, as it would bring them into conflict with the Union and Prussia, so they needed the UK to join them before they could do anything, however British reluctance to side with the Confederacy pretty much meant a solid 'no'. The capture of New Orleans shot the idea of French Intervention, and Thomas W. Evans' report to Napoleon about the Confederate position at the end of the War killed it.
 
Monopoly of Southern cotton, a captive market for French exports, a close ally in North America (what uncle Nap wanted to do by selling off Louisiana and didn't quite work out) and a free hand to intervene in Latin America (term invented by Nap III himself).
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The Union was opposed to Napoleon III's ambitions in Central America regarding his planned Mexican Empire, whilst the Confederacy Tolerated them. Additionally, the French Textile industry was suffering thanks to the Union blockade, leading to pressure on Napoleon as a Southern Victory would mean cheap cotton. On this, the Confederate delegate sweetened the deal by promising raw cotton to the French if they got involved, however Napoleon recognized this would be suicide if they did it themselves, as it would bring them into conflict with the Union and Prussia, so they needed the UK to join them before they could do anything, however British reluctance to side with the Confederacy pretty much meant a solid 'no'. The capture of New Orleans shot the idea of French Intervention, and Thomas W. Evans' report to Napoleon about the Confederate position at the end of the War killed it.
Sorry, I'm not following - why Prussia?
Why would Prussia jump in? Prussia's busy at this point reorganizing their entire army from what it had been in the first half of the century into what we recognize as the war-winning instrument of 1864-71.
 
Could French support of the Confederacy lead to finding weaknesses in the French army that could make them more competitive in a later Franco-Prussian War?

Could the Confederates introduce a Field Marshal rank due to having a Marshal of France helping out (so we get the Marshal Lee instead of the General Lee?)- would this lead to the US matching suit, and Washington being posthumously promoted by both sides to the highest Field Marshal?
 
Could French support of the Confederacy lead to finding weaknesses in the French army that could make them more competitive in a later Franco-Prussian War?

Unlikely. No French boots would touch the ground in the South (with perhaps the exception of New Orleans) and French aid would be mainly material and naval. The French have 36,000 men in Mexico propping up the Conservative Junta/Second Empire and have commitments in Asia, Africa, and Europe which would keep them from sending more without a major mobilization.

Though French military observers might notice a few things which would cause them to reconsider some presuppositions about modern warfare, there's little which could be reasonably inferred that they could undo all the problems which led them to disaster in the Franco-Prussian war.

Could the Confederates introduce a Field Marshal rank due to having a Marshal of France helping out (so we get the Marshal Lee instead of the General Lee?)- would this lead to the US matching suit, and Washington being posthumously promoted by both sides to the highest Field Marshal?

Also doubtful. The CSA considered itself the true successor to the Revolution, and it is unlikely that they would just start imitating European styles. Tactics, culture, and doctrine yes, but not rank structures.
 
Could French support of the Confederacy lead to finding weaknesses in the French army that could make them more competitive in a later Franco-Prussian War?

I would say no, even if the French army fights on American soil. The reason I say this is because the chief problem the French army had in the Franco-Prussian war was an outdated mobilization system, which allowed the Prussians to deploy their forces before the French armies were even organized. If the French were deploying forces in the Confederacy the outdated nature of the French mobilization system would not become obvious.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
I'd say it's a feasible PoD to have the French do better, but it's an unlikely one - you'd need some unit mobilized and the experience to go horribly, such as the need to send troops back to their home depots and then report to their duty stations meaning that a regiment based in Senegal has to ship out to Senegal and then to America, which pretty much doubles or trebles the travel distance.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
It's interesting to me that speculation about foreign intervention in the American Civil War always centers around Britain rather than France. Napoleon III, after all, was rather well-disposed to the Confederacy and John Slidell was a much more effective diplomat than the walking disaster than was James Mason. France had some actual motivation for supporting the Confederacy in view of its imperial ambitions in the Americas. Moreover, abolitionism was weaker in France and public opinion did not exert the influence on policy in France that it did in Britain. Finally, France did not have to worry about protecting its territory against the Union in the way that Britain had to worry about Canada.
 

Anaxagoras

Banned
Could French support of the Confederacy lead to finding weaknesses in the French army that could make them more competitive in a later Franco-Prussian War?

I don't see French support of the Confederacy involving the dispatch of French troops in any significant numbers. It would involve naval support (while not nearly as strong as the Royal Navy, the French Navy could have broken the Union blockade) and, much more importantly, financial support.
 
Agree, there is little reason for France to fight an expensive war with America. Their support for Maximilian aside, France's resources were limited and they had very little to gain by dispatching tens of thousands more troops to Mexico or the US. They already lost a lot of money on these expeditions and would soon have their own problems with Prussia.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
It's interesting to me that speculation about foreign intervention in the American Civil War always centers around Britain rather than France. Napoleon III, after all, was rather well-disposed to the Confederacy and John Slidell was a much more effective diplomat than the walking disaster than was James Mason. France had some actual motivation for supporting the Confederacy in view of its imperial ambitions in the Americas. Moreover, abolitionism was weaker in France and public opinion did not exert the influence on policy in France that it did in Britain. Finally, France did not have to worry about protecting its territory against the Union in the way that Britain had to worry about Canada.
Maybe it's because the usual plot for foreign intervention (at least in published works) seems to involve the foreign intervener being kicked back and forth across the US before the US counter-take Canada (and, in some cases, Ireland).
France is less satisfying.

Or maybe it's that French interventions are written in French! I don't know... ;)
 
Agree, there is little reason for France to fight an expensive war with America. Their support for Maximilian aside, France's resources were limited and they had very little to gain by dispatching tens of thousands more troops to Mexico or the US. They already lost a lot of money on these expeditions and would soon have their own problems with Prussia.

Assuming France does intervene, she probably won't contribute many troops but will break the blockade at sea and lend some economic support.
 

TFSmith121

Banned
Incentives? None...

So I have been reading Turtledove's TL 191 books and I am trying to figure out why Great Britain and France would help the Confederates. There's quite a lengthy thread elsewhere on this site about Britain, but what about France? What incentives would France have to help the Confederacy? Does the South's agricultural trade have anything to do with it? If they're reservations against slavery are so strong, why would they not help the North?

Incentives? None...

NIII was deluded about Mexico; sending good money after bad after the defeat at 1st Puebla in 1862 is aan obvious illustration of that ... althoigh given that less than 4,000 Mexicans, mostly irregulars and volunteers, defeated 6,500 picked French regulars, one has to wonder about those who insist European intervention in the Western Hemisphere was a magic bullet for the Confederacy's strategic problems.

Even after the year-long effort to build up the French expeditionary force to 31,000 (which, again, suggests something about the ability of a European power to build up an expeditionary force in the Western Hemisphere, IMPERIAL STORM it was not) meant the French took until May 17, 1863, to force the Mexican forces at Puebla to surrender.

They then marched on Mexico City and took the city, although it was another year before Max et al showed up; at the peak of French strength, the entire expeditionary force amounted to 36,000 French, 9,000 mercenaries (Austrians and Belgians), 7,000 Mexican imperialists, and 20,000 guerillas - a grand total of 72,000, giving the French and their proxies all credit.

In 1865, of course, the US moved 50,000 troops to the Texas border, and the French made it clear they would abandon Max and the Mexican conservatives; NIII told Bazaine to negotiate with any Mexican Liberal he could find, other than Juarez, for a transfer of power, and had no takers.

The last French troops withdrew in March, 1867, and Max, Miramon, and Mejia were against the wall on June 19.

Even NIII could figure out it was a losing hand, against Mexico alone, by 1865-66; presumably that would have been made even more apparent, and even earlier, in a conflict with the United States ... as it was historically, since even NIII wasn't suicidal enough to try it.

Best,
 
Incentives? None...

NIII was deluded about Mexico; sending good money after bad after the defeat at 1st Puebla in 1862 is aan obvious illustration of that ... althoigh given that less than 4,000 Mexicans, mostly irregulars and volunteers, defeated 6,500 picked French regulars, one has to wonder about those who insist European intervention in the Western Hemisphere was a magic bullet for the Confederacy's strategic problems.

Even after the year-long effort to build up the French expeditionary force to 31,000 (which, again, suggests something about the ability of a European power to build up an expeditionary force in the Western Hemisphere, IMPERIAL STORM it was not) meant the French took until May 17, 1863, to force the Mexican forces at Puebla to surrender.

They then marched on Mexico City and took the city, although it was another year before Max et al showed up; at the peak of French strength, the entire expeditionary force amounted to 36,000 French, 9,000 mercenaries (Austrians and Belgians), 7,000 Mexican imperialists, and 20,000 guerillas - a grand total of 72,000, giving the French and their proxies all credit.

In 1865, of course, the US moved 50,000 troops to the Texas border, and the French made it clear they would abandon Max and the Mexican conservatives; NIII told Bazaine to negotiate with any Mexican Liberal he could find, other than Juarez, for a transfer of power, and had no takers.

The last French troops withdrew in March, 1867, and Max, Miramon, and Mejia were against the wall on June 19.

Even NIII could figure out it was a losing hand, against Mexico alone, by 1865-66; presumably that would have been made even more apparent, and even earlier, in a conflict with the United States ... as it was historically, since even NIII wasn't suicidal enough to try it.

Best,

Which makes me question how GB and France could possibly defeat the US on its home ground in 1890! The only thing I can see is that the Britwankers are out of their mind.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
Which makes me question how GB and France could possibly defeat the US on its home ground in 1890! The only thing I can see is that the Britwankers are out of their mind.
Would you also say that the SecNav was out of his mind, for urgently arguing for a step up in US military production so they could build weapons themselves?
I mean, the US didn't even have a single battleship until 1895.

Make no mistake, the US' window of vulnerability is closing rapidly, and justly - that's the whole point of what the US was doing in the 1880s and 1890s, closing a window of vulnerability and then building power projection capability.

I'll certainly agree that the US is a much tougher nut in 1890 than it was in 1886, and tougher in 1886 than it was in 1882, but the consequence of decades of neglect is not fixed quickly. That's why it took USS Texas (2 12") six years to go from laying down to commission, whereas it took HMS Resolution (4 13.5") three, and why it took four years to build eight Resolution class ships.
In fact, in the time between the laying down of Texas and Maine and their completions (late 1888 to late 1895) the Royal Navy laid down, built and commissioned about ten superior battleships.


The US could be given a long and costly fight in 1890 navally. It would be in big trouble in 1885.


Anyway, if we want to talk out-of-mindedness, you do know the person you're approvingly quoting is of the opinion it would take about 12 million enemy soldiers to beat the US in the Civil War?
 
Would you also say that the SecNav was out of his mind, for urgently arguing for a step up in US military production so they could build weapons themselves?
I mean, the US didn't even have a single battleship until 1895.

Make no mistake, the US' window of vulnerability is closing rapidly, and justly - that's the whole point of what the US was doing in the 1880s and 1890s, closing a window of vulnerability and then building power projection capability.

I'll certainly agree that the US is a much tougher nut in 1890 than it was in 1886, and tougher in 1886 than it was in 1882, but the consequence of decades of neglect is not fixed quickly. That's why it took USS Texas (2 12") six years to go from laying down to commission, whereas it took HMS Resolution (4 13.5") three, and why it took four years to build eight Resolution class ships.
In fact, in the time between the laying down of Texas and Maine and their completions (late 1888 to late 1895) the Royal Navy laid down, built and commissioned about ten superior battleships.


The US could be given a long and costly fight in 1890 navally. It would be in big trouble in 1885.


Anyway, if we want to talk out-of-mindedness, you do know the person you're approvingly quoting is of the opinion it would take about 12 million enemy soldiers to beat the US in the Civil War?

The fact is navy or no navy France and England combined can not hope to defeat the US on its home turf. The US was just as ill prepared in 1812 and GB couldn't pull it off then when it was weaker, smaller and less populated. The Duke of Wellington told the British government it couldn't get territorial concessions out of the US in 1814. If it can't do that in 1814 it sure the hell can't in the 1880s when it has the largest economy in the world.
 

Saphroneth

Banned
The fact is navy or no navy France and England combined can not hope to defeat the US on its home turf. The US was just as ill prepared in 1812 and GB couldn't pull it off then when it was weaker, smaller and less populated. The Duke of Wellington told the British government it couldn't get territorial concessions out of the US in 1814. If it can't do that in 1814 it sure the hell can't in the 1880s when it has the largest economy in the world.
The heck?

The War of 1812 was a US surprise attack on Britain, mate, and the UK was in the middle of fighting basically most of Europe and blockading the lot. The UK was the epitome of distracted, imagine how the US would do if a not-at-war Mexico tried to get California back in 1862.

Anyway.
It might help us to define "victory" if we're going to have that argument. It might also help if you'd actually contested my point about out-of-mindedness, at least to agree it was if you think I'm right about that.


But it's the wrong thread.



France would aid the USA against the CSA because their leaders wanted to OTL.
 
Top