Demographic and emigration patterns in a Post-Napoleonic Victory World

Alt History Buff

Question all:

Assume that the Napoleonic Wars end roughly in an OTL 1810ish status quo with the Napoleonic Code ranging from France to Italy, Germany and Poland. Either Napoleon dies early or, for some reason, ceases his constant warfare leaving his Empire intact without a Peninsular War or Russian Invasion that destroyed it.

In OTL, much of the Napoleonic reforms were repealed by reactionary monarchs in France, Italy, Germany, etc. These included justice reform, land distribution, breaking down of guild and other labor barriers, immigration limits, etc.

What if the reforms held and the new monarchs were expected to maintain them?

How would this affect demographics?

My interest is in the number of people who would/could emigrate to America over the next half-century.

Note a couple of points:
1. In OTL, not all people could simply get on a ship for America. They had to get permission from many areas (like parts of Germany) from their Duke/King/etc. The Napoleonic code eliminated many of these barriers.
2. On the other hand, the land distribution of the French Revolution has been suggested as a possible cause of the largely unexplained drop in French fertility in the early 19th Century. If these reforms were extended (permanently) to the rest of Europe, is it possible that the demographic growth of the rest of Europe would slow as well (maybe Germany doesn't become the dominant demographic power)?
3. Would keeping these reforms alter the "wealth effect" and reduce the desire to emigrate due to better economic conditions at home? Or would urbanization actually INCREASE the emigration?

I'm going to be doing Quasi-War III (I just finished Quasi-war II today) shortly and a very different Europe is part of my TL. I want to know what would be the affects of a longer lasting Napoleonic Code would be directly on European and indirectly on American demographics.

Thanks.
 

Shevek23

I've never seen much of an attempt to flesh out a surviving Napoleonic Europe TL anywhere on this site nor for that matter anywhere in literature!:eek: I have to wonder why that is; I'd guess there is a consensus that like Hitler's Europe or Alexander's empire the thing is just too unstable; that it could only be acquired via a mad rush of military exertion that presumably leaves a society too geared to war, too undermined by its wartime expedients, having been thrown together too fast to mind creating properly stable local coalitions for it to be held together other than by main strength--a strength too sure to be dissipated in unending military ventures and challenged by strong powers outside it can never conquer and subdue, powers keen to exploit the many centrifugal forces desiring to tear it apart.

I can see the strength of such arguments but it still strikes me as a remarkable failure of imagination that no one ventures to spell out how and why the majority of Napoleon's conquests might in fact be stabilized as a going concern. The arguments against are many, I suppose, but consider the arguments for:

1) That having settled borders very far away from most populations and harmonizing all deep differences between component states should lead to a Pax Napoleonica; war being eliminated between the numerous former states of Europe, military force can be recruited and supplied on an Empire-wide basis and concentrated along relatively short borders (vast compared to any prior state but short divided by the area within them I mean). Not only is bloodshed greatly reduced, but the economic cost of provisioning an army of overwhelming power along those borders is much reduced versus the Old Regime era cost of provisioning an order of magnitude more soldiers to defend fractal borders two orders of magnitude longer! Or, since the Old Regime 18th century warfare tended to be in a phase where relatively small professional armies were moved like chessmen in a set-piece opera of conventionalized warfare, and thus by a sort of gentleman's agreement the burden of sufficiently large armies was mitigated, an army of truly Napoleonic scale, a far greater share of the population, can be maintained at costs per subject comparable to or a bit lower than the Old Regimes' levies for the purpose.

By related logic, a consolidated Napoleonic system should have the resources to devote to developing a Navy of skill and size sufficient to at any rate punch through the RN blockade and open up world oceans to trade, even if the British persist in unrelenting hostility. More likely, at some point the British throw in the towel, recognize that there exists a continental hegemon they can't dislodge try as they might, and get down to dealing with one another on a peacetime basis--either allowing Empire shipping to develop to compete with British, or undertaking to trade in Imperial ports so the Empire can at any rate purchase globally produced goods, if at something of a disadvantage in terms of trade.


2) That while most of the old regime monarchs and nobility had deep grievances against the Napoleonic system, and there are doubtless many regions where one can point to hostility throughout the populace, other regions were places where Napoleon's forces and schemes were welcomed with some gratitude. The best example that comes to my mind is Poland, but i imagine there must have been others and that sufficiently astute post-conquest era policy could cultivate still more. With enough regions that have a stake in the Napoleonic system providing people on all levels--soldiers, agricultural, mining and industrial workers, and leaders--who support it, the centrifugal tendencies of others can be checked.

3) Although Hitler certainly liked to compare himself to Napoleon, I think we can assume if the downtime conqueror could familiarize himself with the Corporal's biography and nature, he'd angrily reject the comparison, despite his autocratic tendencies. As you note, the Napoleonic system spread a whole slew of Enlightenment projects more or less perfected to workable form by the French revolutionaries and their more conservative successors, mainly Napoleon himself. He is know the continent over as the liberator of Jews for instance, an example that Herr Hitler seems to have overlooked.:rolleyes: On the whole as a modernist I certainly like a continued Napoleonic system better than the Ancient Regime restorations that were attempted afterward in reaction--though it is an open question whether 50 or 60 years on Europe would be better or worse off; the age of reaction did not last all that long before being drowned again in yet other waves of revolution and compromises to head off still others. Might a successful Napoleonic regime early in the century lead to a more effective dead hand of reaction in later generations? Or would progress be facilitated? One would have to game out a detailed ATL to be sure. But there is no doubt in the immediate timeframe of the first couple decades, that the Code Napoleon was preferable in many ways over the old ways or what the disgruntled reactionaries would wish to restore. Politically then it should be the basis of much consensus-building, and economically the many reductions in barriers to trade, assisted by positive visionary development schemes and with the likely negative consequences, foreseen and otherwise, mitigated by Imperial intervention and ad hoc rulings and settlements, should lead to snowballing development, a rising standard of living and thus still more consensus for the Empire.

So your very specific question is hard to answer because while I think as sketched out above that a successful and lasting Napoleonic empire is conceivable enough, still for whatever reason no one has done the homework for us of imagining it in detail, so our speculations as to what the imperial subjects get up to in bed and then where their more or less numerous children wind up going to work and live out their lives is pretty much a wild guess. It sure would be nice if we had some other industrializing European country that also adopted Napoleonic countryside reforms comparable to those that persisted in France (despite the obvious hostility of restored Bourbons and the unclear interests of the Orleanists) and we could thus better judge if French 19th century demographic trends really did stem mainly from their reformed interests as small landholders afraid to have too many children and thus dilute the holdings down below sustainable levels, versus perhaps peculiar French responses and issues. It does seem likely that if the reforms of the French countryside, which bought Napoleon (and whether they appreciated it or not, other French monarchies) considerable stability and loyalty) were replicated systematically all over Europe (the parts Napoleon controlled anyway, which was most of it) that the countryside population growth would slow somewhat, since those landholding considerations are powerful ones. But we can hardly be sure, and how sure are we that the system would in fact be instituted universally? The Empire was in fact not monolithic but a system of large kingdoms and duchies entrusted to Napoleonic supporters under his direction; different kingdoms might adopt different policies according to local circumstances. Such inconsistency is against the unifying and simplifying spirt of the French expansion to be sure, but also a pragmatic privilege of monarchs who don't have to claim legitimacy from an alleged universal will as shown by the polls.

We'd really have to sketch out in some detail exactly how the persistent system survives, whether and to what extent and where it prospers, how stable or unstable it is, and how it is situated in the world as a whole. I haven't looked into your "Quasi-War" installments yet for instance, but I gather the point is that the USA, under stronger Federalist hegemony, turns more sharply than I'd have guessed likely against the French, despite democratic sentiments (muted under Napoleon's dictatorship to be sure) favoring the revolutionary people who also aided our own revolution. If this hostility persists long enough without some U-turn, and the USA remains traditionally hostile to France and hence its Empire, I suppose the upshot is that the world outside of Europe is more dominated even than OTL by the UK, while OTL seems like quite enough of a Brit-Wank as it is! Then again, if the British can't trade with Europe they are worse off in ways that even a complete domination of global trade might not fully compensate.

Realistically, I'd think that the USA would find the Napoleonic empire a natural trade partner and a good counterbalance to British power, which much more immediately threatened the US. Perhaps in a period where Napoleon and his successors keep bidding to reestablish themselves on a global stage this would seem less safe to be sure, but the French will surely still be the underdog away from Europe and American policy ought to therefore favor them as being more willing to make favorable deals for access.

I suppose a possible stable settlement of the European conflict is that the British, still supreme on the seas but uneasily aware that the Empire's resources could construct a war fleet that could overwhelm even the RN, and a merchant fleet to displace the British from their livelihood as merchants to the world, cut their deals with France so as to allow a token face-saving share of both trade and seapower to the continental giant, while reserving the lion's share to themselves, in return for allowing that token to rove the seas in peace, for British trade to dominate but on a fair basis, and perhaps even return some of the colonial holdings France and other conquered powers (the Dutch for instance) held before 1800. Under those circumstances I suspect Yankee policy would favor France to the limit the treaty permitted (still leaving plenty of trade for the British to carry) and welcome Imperial investment in US development (as neither they nor the British could extort more return than contract allowed, nor guarantee their failed investments by force on US soil).

As a first guess, I daresay that emigration from the European continent under the Empire would indeed slow down and be at lower levels, because the Empire would not only produce fewer offspring but also find roles for a greater share of those who are born there. The relative attraction of America would indeed diminish and also, Imperial policy might favor sending more of those who do emigrate to either colonies or chosen client states that might veer to an Imperial alliance in defiance of British power in Latin America.

Britain on the other hand might well be a more repressive, less democratic realm than it developed to be OTL, with the police state mobilized OTL against Nappy persisting and with democratic movements all the more tarred with the brush of foreign subversion. The British "surplus population" might be both larger and more desperate and all the more keen to escape to the USA, or accept a place in the colonies such as Canada--or be transported to Australia.

Certainly, unless we envision the Napoleonic system breaking down (as it might well, unfortunately perhaps) in the later 19th century, there won't be the wave of political immigration fleeing the reactionary backlash to the revolutions of 1848. In particular Germans in that wave were influential in helping found the Republican Party.

To be sure the whole course of the USA, including the slavery question, will probably be much butterflied in a Napoleonic unified Europe TL.

I hope my response will at least provoke someone with stronger views on just what would happen to European demographics and politics to join in, if only to naysay the both of us! Or that you might perhaps (if there aren't lots of Napoleonic victory TLs that I am just ignorant of) pioneer on this site a serious look at what such an ATL might look like.

Honestly, in all of fiction the only ATL with a persisting Napoleonic empire lasting long after Bonaparte's own death I have ever read is found only in Keith Laumer's Worlds of the Imperium, written in the early '60s. Laumer assumed, on I don't know what basis, that in such a world (achieved by Napoleon invading and conquering Britain, which I think is pretty unlikely) technical progress would slow down to a crawl, so that Europe of the 1960s would have a technical level comparable to OTL 1870s.:eek: I see no reason for such extreme pessimism as that!

And so I encourage you to go ahead and show us Bonapartist Europe as you think it might really be, even if we do already disagree on the question of the US relationship with it.
 

Alt History Buff

Shevek23 said:
I've never seen much of an attempt to flesh out a surviving Napoleonic Europe TL anywhere on this site nor for that matter anywhere in literature!:eek: I have to wonder why that is; I'd guess there is a consensus that like Hitler's Europe or Alexander's empire the thing is just too unstable; that it could only be acquired via a mad rush of military exertion that presumably leaves a society too geared to war, too undermined by its wartime expedients, having been thrown together too fast to mind creating properly stable local coalitions for it to be held together other than by main strength--a strength too sure to be dissipated in unending military ventures and challenged by strong powers outside it can never conquer and subdue, powers keen to exploit the many centrifugal forces desiring to tear it apart.

I can see the strength of such arguments but it still strikes me as a remarkable failure of imagination that no one ventures to spell out how and why the majority of Napoleon's conquests might in fact be stabilized as a going concern. The arguments against are many, I suppose, but consider the arguments for:

1) That having settled borders very far away from most populations and harmonizing all deep differences between component states should lead to a Pax Napoleonica; war being eliminated between the numerous former states of Europe, military force can be recruited and supplied on an Empire-wide basis and concentrated along relatively short borders (vast compared to any prior state but short divided by the area within them I mean). Not only is bloodshed greatly reduced, but the economic cost of provisioning an army of overwhelming power along those borders is much reduced versus the Old Regime era cost of provisioning an order of magnitude more soldiers to defend fractal borders two orders of magnitude longer! Or, since the Old Regime 18th century warfare tended to be in a phase where relatively small professional armies were moved like chessmen in a set-piece opera of conventionalized warfare, and thus by a sort of gentleman's agreement the burden of sufficiently large armies was mitigated, an army of truly Napoleonic scale, a far greater share of the population, can be maintained at costs per subject comparable to or a bit lower than the Old Regimes' levies for the purpose.

By related logic, a consolidated Napoleonic system should have the resources to devote to developing a Navy of skill and size sufficient to at any rate punch through the RN blockade and open up world oceans to trade, even if the British persist in unrelenting hostility. More likely, at some point the British throw in the towel, recognize that there exists a continental hegemon they can't dislodge try as they might, and get down to dealing with one another on a peacetime basis--either allowing Empire shipping to develop to compete with British, or undertaking to trade in Imperial ports so the Empire can at any rate purchase globally produced goods, if at something of a disadvantage in terms of trade.


2) That while most of the old regime monarchs and nobility had deep grievances against the Napoleonic system, and there are doubtless many regions where one can point to hostility throughout the populace, other regions were places where Napoleon's forces and schemes were welcomed with some gratitude. The best example that comes to my mind is Poland, but i imagine there must have been others and that sufficiently astute post-conquest era policy could cultivate still more. With enough regions that have a stake in the Napoleonic system providing people on all levels--soldiers, agricultural, mining and industrial workers, and leaders--who support it, the centrifugal tendencies of others can be checked.

3) Although Hitler certainly liked to compare himself to Napoleon, I think we can assume if the downtime conqueror could familiarize himself with the Corporal's biography and nature, he'd angrily reject the comparison, despite his autocratic tendencies. As you note, the Napoleonic system spread a whole slew of Enlightenment projects more or less perfected to workable form by the French revolutionaries and their more conservative successors, mainly Napoleon himself. He is know the continent over as the liberator of Jews for instance, an example that Herr Hitler seems to have overlooked.:rolleyes: On the whole as a modernist I certainly like a continued Napoleonic system better than the Ancient Regime restorations that were attempted afterward in reaction--though it is an open question whether 50 or 60 years on Europe would be better or worse off; the age of reaction did not last all that long before being drowned again in yet other waves of revolution and compromises to head off still others. Might a successful Napoleonic regime early in the century lead to a more effective dead hand of reaction in later generations? Or would progress be facilitated? One would have to game out a detailed ATL to be sure. But there is no doubt in the immediate timeframe of the first couple decades, that the Code Napoleon was preferable in many ways over the old ways or what the disgruntled reactionaries would wish to restore. Politically then it should be the basis of much consensus-building, and economically the many reductions in barriers to trade, assisted by positive visionary development schemes and with the likely negative consequences, foreseen and otherwise, mitigated by Imperial intervention and ad hoc rulings and settlements, should lead to snowballing development, a rising standard of living and thus still more consensus for the Empire.

So your very specific question is hard to answer because while I think as sketched out above that a successful and lasting Napoleonic empire is conceivable enough, still for whatever reason no one has done the homework for us of imagining it in detail, so our speculations as to what the imperial subjects get up to in bed and then where their more or less numerous children wind up going to work and live out their lives is pretty much a wild guess. It sure would be nice if we had some other industrializing European country that also adopted Napoleonic countryside reforms comparable to those that persisted in France (despite the obvious hostility of restored Bourbons and the unclear interests of the Orleanists) and we could thus better judge if French 19th century demographic trends really did stem mainly from their reformed interests as small landholders afraid to have too many children and thus dilute the holdings down below sustainable levels, versus perhaps peculiar French responses and issues. It does seem likely that if the reforms of the French countryside, which bought Napoleon (and whether they appreciated it or not, other French monarchies) considerable stability and loyalty) were replicated systematically all over Europe (the parts Napoleon controlled anyway, which was most of it) that the countryside population growth would slow somewhat, since those landholding considerations are powerful ones. But we can hardly be sure, and how sure are we that the system would in fact be instituted universally? The Empire was in fact not monolithic but a system of large kingdoms and duchies entrusted to Napoleonic supporters under his direction; different kingdoms might adopt different policies according to local circumstances. Such inconsistency is against the unifying and simplifying spirt of the French expansion to be sure, but also a pragmatic privilege of monarchs who don't have to claim legitimacy from an alleged universal will as shown by the polls.

We'd really have to sketch out in some detail exactly how the persistent system survives, whether and to what extent and where it prospers, how stable or unstable it is, and how it is situated in the world as a whole. I haven't looked into your "Quasi-War" installments yet for instance, but I gather the point is that the USA, under stronger Federalist hegemony, turns more sharply than I'd have guessed likely against the French, despite democratic sentiments (muted under Napoleon's dictatorship to be sure) favoring the revolutionary people who also aided our own revolution. If this hostility persists long enough without some U-turn, and the USA remains traditionally hostile to France and hence its Empire, I suppose the upshot is that the world outside of Europe is more dominated even than OTL by the UK, while OTL seems like quite enough of a Brit-Wank as it is! Then again, if the British can't trade with Europe they are worse off in ways that even a complete domination of global trade might not fully compensate.

Realistically, I'd think that the USA would find the Napoleonic empire a natural trade partner and a good counterbalance to British power, which much more immediately threatened the US. Perhaps in a period where Napoleon and his successors keep bidding to reestablish themselves on a global stage this would seem less safe to be sure, but the French will surely still be the underdog away from Europe and American policy ought to therefore favor them as being more willing to make favorable deals for access.

I suppose a possible stable settlement of the European conflict is that the British, still supreme on the seas but uneasily aware that the Empire's resources could construct a war fleet that could overwhelm even the RN, and a merchant fleet to displace the British from their livelihood as merchants to the world, cut their deals with France so as to allow a token face-saving share of both trade and seapower to the continental giant, while reserving the lion's share to themselves, in return for allowing that token to rove the seas in peace, for British trade to dominate but on a fair basis, and perhaps even return some of the colonial holdings France and other conquered powers (the Dutch for instance) held before 1800. Under those circumstances I suspect Yankee policy would favor France to the limit the treaty permitted (still leaving plenty of trade for the British to carry) and welcome Imperial investment in US development (as neither they nor the British could extort more return than contract allowed, nor guarantee their failed investments by force on US soil).

As a first guess, I daresay that emigration from the European continent under the Empire would indeed slow down and be at lower levels, because the Empire would not only produce fewer offspring but also find roles for a greater share of those who are born there. The relative attraction of America would indeed diminish and also, Imperial policy might favor sending more of those who do emigrate to either colonies or chosen client states that might veer to an Imperial alliance in defiance of British power in Latin America.

Britain on the other hand might well be a more repressive, less democratic realm than it developed to be OTL, with the police state mobilized OTL against Nappy persisting and with democratic movements all the more tarred with the brush of foreign subversion. The British "surplus population" might be both larger and more desperate and all the more keen to escape to the USA, or accept a place in the colonies such as Canada--or be transported to Australia.

Certainly, unless we envision the Napoleonic system breaking down (as it might well, unfortunately perhaps) in the later 19th century, there won't be the wave of political immigration fleeing the reactionary backlash to the revolutions of 1848. In particular Germans in that wave were influential in helping found the Republican Party.

To be sure the whole course of the USA, including the slavery question, will probably be much butterflied in a Napoleonic unified Europe TL.

I hope my response will at least provoke someone with stronger views on just what would happen to European demographics and politics to join in, if only to naysay the both of us! Or that you might perhaps (if there aren't lots of Napoleonic victory TLs that I am just ignorant of) pioneer on this site a serious look at what such an ATL might look like.

Honestly, in all of fiction the only ATL with a persisting Napoleonic empire lasting long after Bonaparte's own death I have ever read is found only in Keith Laumer's Worlds of the Imperium, written in the early '60s. Laumer assumed, on I don't know what basis, that in such a world (achieved by Napoleon invading and conquering Britain, which I think is pretty unlikely) technical progress would slow down to a crawl, so that Europe of the 1960s would have a technical level comparable to OTL 1870s.:eek: I see no reason for such extreme pessimism as that!

And so I encourage you to go ahead and show us Bonapartist Europe as you think it might really be, even if we do already disagree on the question of the US relationship with it.
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Thanks for the well thought-out response.

I've been trying to figure out if there was any direct and agreed-upon correlation between the French land distribution of 1800ish and the subsequent drop in fertility.

At the moment, we can only say, "we don't know".
 

Monter

One question, the French Revolution exported the concept of nationalism to all Europe.

In the case of Napoleonic victory, what happens in Germany and Italy, considering half of the nations are parts of France.
 

Matteo

Monter said:
One question, the French Revolution exported the concept of nationalism to all Europe.

In the case of Napoleonic victory, what happens in Germany and Italy, considering half of the nations are parts of France.
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Half ?

What is a part of a nation being part of another ?

I suppose you are refering to the fact that some italian speaking and german speaking regions were included in the borders of napoleonic France. But this does not necessarily make them forever feel part of the italian or german nation since this common feeling was, to a large extent, the result of government policies.

France had a long tradition of building one nation with people of different origins and cultures.
 

Faeelin

Banned
IMO the reason this is hard to explore is that Napoleon was very Janus-like. There was widespread poverty in Berg and Westphalia due to Napoleon's demands for taxes and the effect of the Continental System (which functioned to keep Europe as a one-way common market for France as much as an embargo of Britain).
 

Shevek23

Faeelin said:
IMO the reason this is hard to explore is that Napoleon was very Janus-like. There was widespread poverty in Berg and Westphalia due to Napoleon's demands for taxes and the effect of the Continental System (which functioned to keep Europe as a one-way common market for France as much as an embargo of Britain).
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So, we can add Napoleon being less than perfectly astute to the gradually rising tide of nationalism and all the other reasons I guessed at as factors explaining why people consider a surviving Empire as a long shot, such a long shot apparently no one wants to take a serious stab at it.

Nationalism certainly would be a thing, notably as a reaction to gratingly insufferable French chauvinism. I've pointed out some opportunities Napoleon and his satraps would have to try and counteract that, but the best example (Poland) would be of limited application, and I'm hardly enough of a student of Imperial policies--which held, after all, quite briefly--to judge how well Napoleon and his minions even were handling them.

That Napoleon would sacrifice good will in the conquered non-French zones in order to favor the French core is all too predictable of course; it might have been superhuman of him to do otherwise. One does not have to be a total Utopian to imagine him taking advice to balance the Continental System as a step toward imperial consolidation, since it would be in his interest to spread the sentiment that his Empire was about more than the welfare of France, as the Emperor of all--more glory for him, and after all as a Frenchman he was peripheral, from Corsica--he just might empathize with people whom the French consider foreign, a little bit anyway. Of course it often doesn't work that way; though Stalin never lost his Georgian accent, the longer he held power in the USSR the more he wanted to be accepted as Russian and the less indulgence he gave the non-Russian Soviet citizens; I don't know if Napoleon suffered a similar passion to be accepted as French.

Anyway, any French courtiers and cronies would have to be advisors of exceptionally cool and long views to remind him to balance the terms of his system, and I have no doubt that to a man they would answer protests of its injustice by saying their critics should be blaming the British, not the French.

Obviously if the Empire could last long enough for the British to give up their blockade and either allow Imperial trade onto the seas or anyway trade on bearable terms with the Empire themselves, there would be opportunities for the system to be adjusted to be more balanced--it would be very telling, just what Napoleon's court would do along those lines at that point--grab yet more advantage for the French core, or even things up for the greater Empire.

Heavy taxes of course followed from his continual state of military emergency; on paper a big empire should cut per capita military costs (or in this case, maintain them at a bearable level while wielding really huge forces) but I would guess his actual policies involved a whole bunch of ad hoc arrangements, rewarding some regions with leniency while coming down hard on others.

Alt History Buff, you have to bear in mind we can imagine a few different ways for the Empire to survive in some form. I think we both went for the most high-minded interpretation of what it might mean and become, and I also think that a more selfishly French above all sort of Empire would obviously be poorer and more costly to sustain, and quite vulnerable to subversion. But we should consider it might go that way, that the Empire becomes a mere machine for squeezing wealth out of the conquered peoples (or rather continues to be and develops itself still more along these lines) but maybe survives if it so enriches the French that they can pay the costs of maintaining it despite great dissidence. Obviously in such an Empire, all the "enlightenment" of the sweeping reforms and nobly rational institutions will appear as rank hypocrisy at best, and to large numbers of people will never outgrow the aura of foreign strangeness, and fully realize their worst fears that change is for the worse. Then of course we can hardly expect any Imperial reforms to have the sorts of impact their good intentions hoped for; there's no telling (without gaming it out in detail) just how grotesquely it all might backfire.

As I say, I think that tendency merely underscores all the reasons one would doubt the thing could survive longer than it did OTL, not even as long as the shortened life of its supreme dictator. And perhaps we can recognize that to an extent, this sort of hubristic fall and a generation of revulsion against both Napoleon and the revolutionary France he came from is pretty much what did happen OTL.

But the legacy was mixed; even the reactionaries could not roll back everything and another revolutionary generation followed pretty soon after. So I don't think it is entirely vain to imagine the Empire finding its footing, and even finding it on a basis of widening and deepening enlightenment.

It is still a heck of a homework assignment trying to figure out a plausible sequence of events to lead to that.:p
 

Faeelin

Banned
Shevek23 said:
Nationalism certainly would be a thing, notably as a reaction to gratingly insufferable French chauvinism. I've pointed out some opportunities Napoleon and his satraps would have to try and counteract that, but the best example (Poland) would be of limited application, and I'm hardly enough of a student of Imperial policies--which held, after all, quite briefly--to judge how well Napoleon and his minions even were handling them.
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It honestly depends, and I think it depends on when Napoleon stops. As late as Tilsit there were plenty of people who rallied to Napoleon; Westphalia was seen by some as a model for all of Germany. The problem was that the Napoleonic project (which I think did perceive itself as having a civilizing mission) was also highly extractive and designed to fund the war against Britain.

I've always wanted to do a TL where Bonaparte stops after Tilsit. West Germany, Northern Italy, and France tied into an economic zone and ruled by liberal technocrats from Paris...we could have avoided a lot of bloodshed to get to where we ended up anyway!

Napoleon wrote on St. Helena that he wanted to create a European people; you can view this as romanticizing and propaganda by an old man in his dotage, but I do think he saw it as true, to some degree.

I admit to having a soft spot for the Corsican; after all, unlike Hitler, his armies went in to break up the ghettoes.
 

Alt History Buff

Shevek23 and Faeelin,

You both make valid points. My biggest POD on my Quisi-War trilogy is when Napoleon dies before the Peninsular War (no invasion of Spain) and no Russian Campaign.

His brother Joseph takes over as the Empire is at its greatest peak as Napoleon II's regent. Naturally Joseph isn't the domineering personality
as Napoleon I but is not interested in further conquest. He maintains a pseudo-alliance with Russia, Austria Emperor Francis has no interest in warring against his own Grandson Napoleon II's country, and France's allies remain as such due to personal interest (Spain, Warsaw, the German States, the Italian states) and dynastic reasons. Eventually, they pull away in time but there isn't a spark of war.

Britain would want to continue the fight but likely only Prussia would want to assist at that point.

Note that I made two other POD's that support the French state's strength and prevent a reconciliation of European countries with Britain:

1. Infante Ferdinand attempts a coup d'Etat, which Britain supports. He fails and is exiled to Britain, making an enemy of Charles IV/Godoy and Carlos III.

2. Russia's war with the Ottoman escalates and France further divides Britain from her potential allies by ordering many of the soldiers from his Russian Campaign (though not all, of course, perhaps 150,000 Europeans) to assist Russia in freeing the Balkans, including Constantinople) from the Ottoman. For many reasons, Britain opposes this and this provides a rift between Russia and Britain for years to come.
 

HunterX

Alt History Buff said:
Shevek23 and Faeelin,

You both make valid points. My biggest POD on my Quisi-War trilogy is when Napoleon dies before the Peninsular War (no invasion of Spain) and no Russian Campaign.

His brother Joseph takes over as the Empire is at its greatest peak as Napoleon II's regent. Naturally Joseph isn't the domineering personality
as Napoleon I but is not interested in further conquest. He maintains a pseudo-alliance with Russia, Austria Emperor Francis has no interest in warring against his own Grandson Napoleon II's country, and France's allies remain as such due to personal interest (Spain, Warsaw, the German States, the Italian states) and dynastic reasons. Eventually, they pull away in time but there isn't a spark of war.

Britain would want to continue the fight but likely only Prussia would want to assist at that point.

Note that I made two other POD's that support the French state's strength and prevent a reconciliation of European countries with Britain:

1. Infante Ferdinand attempts a coup d'Etat, which Britain supports. He fails and is exiled to Britain, making an enemy of Charles IV/Godoy and Carlos III.

2. Russia's war with the Ottoman escalates and France further divides Britain from her potential allies by ordering many of the soldiers from his Russian Campaign (though not all, of course, perhaps 150,000 Europeans) to assist Russia in freeing the Balkans, including Constantinople) from the Ottoman. For many reasons, Britain opposes this and this provides a rift between Russia and Britain for years to come.
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Post-Tilsit I don't think France can achieve those diplomatic goals, even with Napoleon dead. The Russian alliance isn't maintainable, Prussia and Britain are already mortal enemies, and Austria has enough to gain to join another coalition if the opportunity is right, and a France that looks weakened without Napoleon is such an opportunity.
 

Faeelin

Banned
HunterX said:
Post-Tilsit I don't think France can achieve those diplomatic goals, even with Napoleon dead. The Russian alliance isn't maintainable, Prussia and Britain are already mortal enemies, and Austria has enough to gain to join another coalition if the opportunity is right, and a France that looks weakened without Napoleon is such an opportunity.
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I think you overstate Austrian hostility; as late as 1813, they were open to a peace with France restored to its "natural" borders. Austria was in particular worried about the Russians and the Prussians, who had posed threats to Austria on several occassions.
 

tenthring

Banned
One thing I've always wanted to find, but could only glance in bits and pieces, is what the economic situation of France was both in the revolutionary and napoleonic eras. Was France during this time a broken economy reliant of looting Europe to stay afloat. Or if not France, then maybe whoever the ruling party was needed funds and glory to pay people off.

There seems to be a mix of hope and discontent with the French. People like the enlightenment, but there is also the sentiment that this is merely used to sell French occupation, conscription, taxes, and theft. Obviously, Napoleon settle that debate himself but sending hundreds of thousands of his German allies to die in the Russian snows for his own glory. And that was already the second such incident (Spain being equally stupid and having nothing to do with the Enlightenment).

It would be nice to have some hard figures from that time to make my own judgements, rather then have to weigh various propaganda about the state of things without much to evaluate objectively.
 

Alt History Buff

HunterX said:
Post-Tilsit I don't think France can achieve those diplomatic goals, even with Napoleon dead. The Russian alliance isn't maintainable, Prussia and Britain are already mortal enemies, and Austria has enough to gain to join another coalition if the opportunity is right, and a France that looks weakened without Napoleon is such an opportunity.
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My POD refers to Russia busy with the Ottoman.

Did you mean Prussia and France were mortal enemies? Yes, I would agree but Prussia isn't going to challenge France and allies alone.

Remember that Austrian Emperor Francis was the grandfather of Napoleon II. He is unlikely to want to unseat his own grandson even without a war. Note that Austria's losses in the war in Bavaria and Italy were largely made good by gaining Venice and some other border territories.
 

Alt History Buff

tenthring said:
One thing I've always wanted to find, but could only glance in bits and pieces, is what the economic situation of France was both in the revolutionary and napoleonic eras. Was France during this time a broken economy reliant of looting Europe to stay afloat. Or if not France, then maybe whoever the ruling party was needed funds and glory to pay people off.

There seems to be a mix of hope and discontent with the French. People like the enlightenment, but there is also the sentiment that this is merely used to sell French occupation, conscription, taxes, and theft. Obviously, Napoleon settle that debate himself but sending hundreds of thousands of his German allies to die in the Russian snows for his own glory. And that was already the second such incident (Spain being equally stupid and having nothing to do with the Enlightenment).

It would be nice to have some hard figures from that time to make my own judgements, rather then have to weigh various propaganda about the state of things without much to evaluate objectively.
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Yes, note that my POD's in the Quasi-War had Napoleon dying before the Russian and Spanish invasions, when France was at the height of her power.
 

HunterX

Faeelin said:
I think you overstate Austrian hostility; as late as 1813, they were open to a peace with France restored to its "natural" borders. Austria was in particular worried about the Russians and the Prussians, who had posed threats to Austria on several occassions.
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That offer didn't include Austria accepting its post-Austerlitz role and borders. I don't really see Austria meekly conceding the Tyrol, Istria, and the like when opportunities to reverse their losses emerge. By 1807 France had already overstepped the bounds which could have been smoothed over with diplomacy in the long run.

Alt History Buff said:
My POD refers to Russia busy with the Ottoman.

Did you mean Prussia and France were mortal enemies? Yes, I would agree but Prussia isn't going to challenge France and allies alone.

Remember that Austrian Emperor Francis was the grandfather of Napoleon II. He is unlikely to want to unseat his own grandson even without a war. Note that Austria's losses in the war in Bavaria and Italy were largely made good by gaining Venice and some other border territories.
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Unless I misunderstood, you mentioned a POD from right before the Peninsular War, which would put it after the Peace of Pressburg which stripped Austria of territories that were far from minor. Venetia, Istria, and Dalmatia were given to Napoleon's Italian Kingdom and Bavaria gained the Tyrol.
 
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Matteo

tenthring said:
One thing I've always wanted to find, but could only glance in bits and pieces, is what the economic situation of France was both in the revolutionary and napoleonic eras. Was France during this time a broken economy reliant of looting Europe to stay afloat. Or if not France, then maybe whoever the ruling party was needed funds and glory to pay people off.

There seems to be a mix of hope and discontent with the French. People like the enlightenment, but there is also the sentiment that this is merely used to sell French occupation, conscription, taxes, and theft. Obviously, Napoleon settle that debate himself but sending hundreds of thousands of his German allies to die in the Russian snows for his own glory. And that was already the second such incident (Spain being equally stupid and having nothing to do with the Enlightenment).

It would be nice to have some hard figures from that time to make my own judgements, rather then have to weigh various propaganda about the state of things without much to evaluate objectively.
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A quick answer without many figures. The chaos of the revolutionary years is estimated to have caused a massive drop of France's GDP. Some scholars put forward the figure of a 50% drop.

And what is quite sure is that in just a few years, Napoleon and all the brillant people who rallied under his leadership (most whom were already on the stage since the revolution) put the french economy back on its feet thanks to the restoration of security and order and to massive public works. Only harbours suffered of the naval blockade from 1803 on.

This is an explanation of Napoleon's lasting popularity in the french opinion.

The war looting, from 1800 on, was just an additional boost that made war almost painless in financial terms. But looting was not a french exception. It is basically what Britain did with India to increase its capital gains.

All countries that had an opportunity of looting did it. The point was : did they use the benefits of looting cleverly like Britain or did they waste the benefits of looting like Spain ?
 

Faeelin

Banned
HunterX said:
That offer didn't include Austria accepting its post-Austerlitz role and borders. I don't really see Austria meekly conceding the Tyrol, Istria, and the like when opportunities to reverse their losses emerge. By 1807 France had already overstepped the bounds which could have been smoothed over with diplomacy in the long run.
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The option, which Talleyrand favored, would have been to encourage Austria to go east, e.g., the Danubian principalities or the Balkans. Another option would be to compensate Austria by restoring Silesia to it.
 

Admiral Matt

Alt History Buff said:
Thanks for the well thought-out response.

I've been trying to figure out if there was any direct and agreed-upon correlation between the French land distribution of 1800ish and the subsequent drop in fertility.

At the moment, we can only say, "we don't know".
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There absolutely was a correlation, and there seems to have been some causation at work as well. With France.

The trouble with that was that France was demographically unique in Europe. It had reached very close to the limits of what could be supported with the agriculture of the time, while in much of Europe there was a lot more room for growth and change.
 
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