raharris1973
Gone Fishin'
Comparing certain periods of alternate Russophobia and Russophilia in Britain's foreign policy, it seems to me that British policy zigged when it should have zagged and zagged when it should have zigged.
Let's look at three eras:
1) Post Congress of Vienna Europe through the Crimean War - Russophobic
2) Early 20th century before the Great War - Russophilic
3) Middle and late 1930s before the Second World War -Russophobic
1) I think Castlereagh and his successors were unnecessarilly oppositional and hostile to Russia, a phenomenon that peaked with Palmerston and the Crimean War.
All things being equal, Alexander I used his international power responsibly from the last war of Napoleon onward. Of course at home, Tsarist Russia was a backward, illiberal and arbitrary state, but for a country that marched armies all the way to Paris, it was pretty good about going home afterwards (even if Poland was made into an extension of that home).
The British treated the Holy Alliance with a sinister-ness that just wasn't there, I guess mainly because it wasn't their idea, and anything not their idea was automatically bad. It supported the territorial status quo in Europe, much like the later League of Nations and United Nations were to do.
The British were primed to see all Russian collaboration proposals as a trap.
And British policy went from being sullenly negative towards Russia towards being positively irresponsible towards Russia by the 1850s. Louis Napoleon deliberately stirred the pot in the Ottoman Empire, Russia responded with predictable counter-measures that fit within recent parameters of Russian behavior, and as a result, Britain ended up declaring war on Russia in alliance with the Ottoman Empire, which declared the war, and France, which stirred the pot in the first place.
It ended up with the Crimean War, which had no permanent positive results, ushered in an era of instability lasting until 1878. Notably, Russia was much more irresponsible and aggressive in the years 1856-1914 than in the years before the Crimean War.
2) Britain aligned with Russia from 1907 and deepened military and naval cooperation over the following years until 1914. This had the effect of encouraging irresponsible Russian behavior in the Balkans. Of course, domestically, Russia was becoming a freer society at this time, and less repressive internally than earlier (though they still had pogroms). But internationally, Russian foreign policy was increasingly adventuristic and aided/abetted pan-slavic revisionism in those years. In the years leading up to the alliance, Russia's adventurism had been a little more omni-directional, heading towards the Far East and Central Asia and even Africa a little bit as well as Europe.
The British alignment with Russia helped make France and Russia overconfident, and made Britain hostage to the desires of Serbian extremists linked to Russia. Britain (and others) ended up with the Great War after that.
The Great War Britain did have in France and Belgium with the Germans escalated into a far costlier affair than whatever Turkish or Persian or Afghan or Chinese frontier skirmishes against Tsarist Russia could have turned into in the absence of the Anglo-Russian Entente.
3) Britain was quite uncooperative with the 1930s Soviet attempts at coalitions to contain aggressors. Granted, internally the Soviet Union was nightmare regime, but the Soviets from joining the League of Nations in 1934 and the start of their promotion of Popular Fronts encompassing everyone from the non-Fascist conservatives to the far left had become a status quo power internationally and a necessary element of any restraint on Germany. As a result of this excessive Russophobia, the position of Hitler was strengthened and France was weakened. Britain ended up with a world war starting over a commitment to Poland, with the Soviets more cooperative with her German archenemy than with herself.
So, in summary, Britain was overly negative towards two Russias it could have done good business with, and ended up over-investing in appeasement of French, Ottomans and Nazi. In the third, contrasting, period when they chose to cooperate with Russia, they over-invested in appeasement of Russia and encouraged a collision in western Europe in the process.
...of course if I scrutinize any particular other great power's foreign policy over similar periods, I could probably identify similar patterns of maladroitness. International politics before the end of World War II was quite the moshpit of colliding bodies. But that is a tale for another time...
Let's look at three eras:
1) Post Congress of Vienna Europe through the Crimean War - Russophobic
2) Early 20th century before the Great War - Russophilic
3) Middle and late 1930s before the Second World War -Russophobic
1) I think Castlereagh and his successors were unnecessarilly oppositional and hostile to Russia, a phenomenon that peaked with Palmerston and the Crimean War.
All things being equal, Alexander I used his international power responsibly from the last war of Napoleon onward. Of course at home, Tsarist Russia was a backward, illiberal and arbitrary state, but for a country that marched armies all the way to Paris, it was pretty good about going home afterwards (even if Poland was made into an extension of that home).
The British treated the Holy Alliance with a sinister-ness that just wasn't there, I guess mainly because it wasn't their idea, and anything not their idea was automatically bad. It supported the territorial status quo in Europe, much like the later League of Nations and United Nations were to do.
The British were primed to see all Russian collaboration proposals as a trap.
And British policy went from being sullenly negative towards Russia towards being positively irresponsible towards Russia by the 1850s. Louis Napoleon deliberately stirred the pot in the Ottoman Empire, Russia responded with predictable counter-measures that fit within recent parameters of Russian behavior, and as a result, Britain ended up declaring war on Russia in alliance with the Ottoman Empire, which declared the war, and France, which stirred the pot in the first place.
It ended up with the Crimean War, which had no permanent positive results, ushered in an era of instability lasting until 1878. Notably, Russia was much more irresponsible and aggressive in the years 1856-1914 than in the years before the Crimean War.
2) Britain aligned with Russia from 1907 and deepened military and naval cooperation over the following years until 1914. This had the effect of encouraging irresponsible Russian behavior in the Balkans. Of course, domestically, Russia was becoming a freer society at this time, and less repressive internally than earlier (though they still had pogroms). But internationally, Russian foreign policy was increasingly adventuristic and aided/abetted pan-slavic revisionism in those years. In the years leading up to the alliance, Russia's adventurism had been a little more omni-directional, heading towards the Far East and Central Asia and even Africa a little bit as well as Europe.
The British alignment with Russia helped make France and Russia overconfident, and made Britain hostage to the desires of Serbian extremists linked to Russia. Britain (and others) ended up with the Great War after that.
The Great War Britain did have in France and Belgium with the Germans escalated into a far costlier affair than whatever Turkish or Persian or Afghan or Chinese frontier skirmishes against Tsarist Russia could have turned into in the absence of the Anglo-Russian Entente.
3) Britain was quite uncooperative with the 1930s Soviet attempts at coalitions to contain aggressors. Granted, internally the Soviet Union was nightmare regime, but the Soviets from joining the League of Nations in 1934 and the start of their promotion of Popular Fronts encompassing everyone from the non-Fascist conservatives to the far left had become a status quo power internationally and a necessary element of any restraint on Germany. As a result of this excessive Russophobia, the position of Hitler was strengthened and France was weakened. Britain ended up with a world war starting over a commitment to Poland, with the Soviets more cooperative with her German archenemy than with herself.
So, in summary, Britain was overly negative towards two Russias it could have done good business with, and ended up over-investing in appeasement of French, Ottomans and Nazi. In the third, contrasting, period when they chose to cooperate with Russia, they over-invested in appeasement of Russia and encouraged a collision in western Europe in the process.
...of course if I scrutinize any particular other great power's foreign policy over similar periods, I could probably identify similar patterns of maladroitness. International politics before the end of World War II was quite the moshpit of colliding bodies. But that is a tale for another time...