Better German preparations for Op. Barbarossa?

Cmyers1980

Banned
What could the Nazis have done to better prepare their military in the chance that their invasion of the Soviet Union didn't succeed in knocking them out in a series of swift blows before winter as it happened IOTL?

I know winter clothing is something that gets brought up a lot. What could they have done to better prepare the Wehrmacht in the case of Barbarossa's failure both long term and short term measures?
 
The Germans operated on the assumption they could knock out the Soviet Union in a swift blow because they could not win a long war with the USSR. In essence, for Germany to prepare for a pro-longed struggle with the Soviet Union requires Germany to know that they are going to lose against the Soviets and decide to invade anyway.

And why the hell would they do that?
 
That is exactly the thing: If it would be a long war, Germany would lose.

If you plan for losing a war, it is a rather crazy idea to start it.

My take on it: The major thing to do different would be transport

Rather pedestrian, but preparing and training railway crews (and a lot of them!) to rapidly do new railway lines.

To have engineers to rapidly build new roads -> autobahn is a good thing.

It should have been THE key thing. A massive and thorough investment into transport. Nearly to the point where any development in Germany would be second prize.

... But even that might have been seen as planning for a long war. As with the Polish campaign, it was supposed to be operations in the border regions. When the armies had been defeated in the border regions, the rest would be a walk in the park.

Ivan
 

Riain

Banned
It isn't admitting defeat to acknowledge that you might be in Russia for the winter, it's simply prudent.

I'd also go for transport, as well as increasing war production as much as practical and increasing the lethality of units so that they win more actions more quickly to foster faster progress.
 
It isn't admitting defeat to acknowledge that you might be in Russia for the winter, it's simply prudent.

I'd also go for transport, as well as increasing war production as much as practical and increasing the lethality of units so that they win more actions more quickly to foster faster progress.

It may be prudent, but it is also admitting defeat. Germany's situation was such that if they didn't defeat the Soviet Union by October (when rains turned the roads to mud), the Soviets would be able to marshal the manpower and industrial power to defeat them. Past that point the best they can hope for is something akin to Brest-Litvosk, but that would take someone other than Hitler.
 

Riain

Banned
It may be prudent, but it is also admitting defeat. Germany's situation was such that if they didn't defeat the Soviet Union by October (when rains turned the roads to mud), the Soviets would be able to marshal the manpower and industrial power to defeat them. Past that point the best they can hope for is something akin to Brest-Litvosk, but that would take someone other than Hitler.

I'd suggest that not providing clothing and other gear for a garrison force that could number a million men is admitting defeat rather than the other way around. The lack of these preparations shows how little thought was put into the largest military operation of all time, it is merely one tiny aspect of a general lack of preparation.
 
It is a horrible dilemma.

IF Hitler had asked the generals to prepare for a long war in the East, preparing for a winter campaign and starting to prepare the population at large, he might not have lasted that long.

A lot of the generals (and the older population) had some experience in Russia from 1914-18.

I am not suggesting a 'German Spring', but with a population not interested (in 1941 where it was still possible to stop), a prolonged war might have been avoided.

IF Germany had been put on a war-footing from 1938/9 AND focused on producing transport infra-structure to be used in the East, it might have had some attraction in the population.

It would have been possible to see that everything possible was done to make the war short.

Germany was still more interested in consumer goods, women in the house and not in factories, etc etc right up to 1943.

It was one way of placating the population.

HOWEVER, if Germany had prepared to this extent, maybe Stalin would have smelled a rat.

Ivan
 

Riain

Banned
Increased war production could be explained away by fighting with the British, besides I don't think Germany could make the big leaps in production it made from 1943 due to a lack of factories and other things, so increases would be incremental rather than orders of magnitude.
 
Many opinions exist on this question. I think the major aim for the Barbarossa plan was the Moscow-city as itself. So, they needed as quick as possible to take Moscow. Until the winter of 1941-1942
 
It may be prudent, but it is also admitting defeat. Germany's situation was such that if they didn't defeat the Soviet Union by October (when rains turned the roads to mud), the Soviets would be able to marshal the manpower and industrial power to defeat them. Past that point the best they can hope for is something akin to Brest-Litvosk, but that would take someone other than Hitler.
And if they did knock out the Soviets, they'd have hundreds of thousands in Russia on occupation duty, so winter gear would be a necessity anyway. Not packing stuff wasn't a matter of expectation, it was a matter or stupidity.
 
And if they did knock out the Soviets, they'd have hundreds of thousands in Russia on occupation duty, so winter gear would be a necessity anyway. Not packing stuff wasn't a matter of expectation, it was a matter or stupidity.

True, but preparations is more than just packing stuff. It's having alternate plans in case of failure as well. And that would mean admitting defeat.
 
That, Matt, is the other part of Barbarossa.

Barbarossa was a military plan. Not a plan for the occupation thereafter.

Packing for winter was therefore not a part of the overall picture.

... But a bit left-field nevertheless.

Ivan
 
The Germans operated on the assumption they could knock out the Soviet Union in a swift blow because they could not win a long war with the USSR. In essence, for Germany to prepare for a pro-longed struggle with the Soviet Union requires Germany to know that they are going to lose against the Soviets and decide to invade anyway.

And why the hell would they do that?

I would beg to differ. They would just have to prepare themselves for a series of campaigns instead of one swift blow.

In essence this would mean:

a) No overstretching but consolidation after taking Baltics, Ukraine and Belorussia and in process destroying Soviet first line troops

b) Taking Leningrad as logistic support base

c) Preparing to defeat Soviet counter-attacks by manouver warfare while
preparing the troops for summer campaign in 1942.
 
Indeed. If nothing else, they could hardly expect there to be many homes with decent heating of such size to hold all the colonists they wanted to flood the area with anyways. They would need both them and upwards of a million soldiers if they intended on deporting or enslaving tens of millions of people.


As for what I think the Germans could do to win... Begin recognizing the independence of many areas. Find where their are minorities and recognize them, but not for all the land. The Soviets will probably depopulate lots of areas if they thought the minorities might help the Germans (which they had already done most of before they even had a war or risk of war.) so the Germans can easilly colonize those areas afterwards too.
 
True, but preparations is more than just packing stuff. It's having alternate plans in case of failure as well. And that would mean admitting defeat.
Whether or not you expect it to be a walkover, winter gear is all but essential, at least for AGN and AGC.
 
Better coopeartion with the Finns in the period between the Winter War and Barbarossa could have helped; IIRC the Finns captured a lot of Soviet gear, including a few KV tanks. This would have revealed a lot to the Germans, and maybe it would have made giving their tanks better guns a priority.

Making more tanks would have been prudent for the Germans because if they hand enough in AGS then AGC wouldn't have to halt to support it.
 
Having to divert forces tpo destroy Soviet army groupings around Smlensk and then Kiev cost Germany the time needed to drive o Moscow before the auumn mud season and the winter snow. But had those Soviet forces not been destroyed they would have been on Army Croup Centre's flank and rear during the fight for Moscow itself. Had the Red Army fought for Moscow itslf as would likely have bben the case a Sovie counteroffensive against the german communications would have mos likely led to a German failure.
 
railgauge

i was thinking: Al lot of the troubles of supply came from the soviet union´s use of different track gauge of their trains. What if the axis had prepared a rolling stock of trains that could use the soviet´s tracks right from the beginning? The tracks of the rail in the axis zone before barbarossa could have been prepared to be mixed gauge from major rail hubs leading towards the front. If prepared this way, the axis could have a working railsystem to use in the front area, without the need to wait until it is converted (it can be converted later when major forward railhubs in enemy territory are captured and secured).

Would that have been feasible?
 
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