What if the US did not stop in Iraq in 1991 and took Baghdad

What if the US didn't stop in the Persian Gulf War, and took Baghdad and all of Iraq? How would the rest of the 90s turn out?

The real question is whether the coalition would do a better job of managing the peace .... managing the country after conquering Iraq?
Would they keep the least-corrupt Bathist administrators?
Would the least-corrupt Iraqi policemen be kept on patrol?
Would honest Iraqi border guards remain on duty?
How could WALLIES distinguish between honest and dishonest Iraqi civil servants?
Would WALLIES immediately seize all weapons?
Would some form of reconciliation courts mediate grievances between Shias and Sunnis and Kurds and ....?
How long would WALLIE troops continue to occupy Iraq?
How many civilian security contractors (e.g. Blackwater) would WALLIES hire? .... to cook? ... to ship in supplies? ... to fly in supplies?
... to provide medical care?
... to guard prisoners?
... to interrogate prisoners?
..... to truck in supplies? .... to guard the Green Zone? ... to escort supply convoys? .... to guard VIPs? ... to train Iraqi police? ... to arrest the worst troublemakers? ... to assassinate the worst troublemakers?

Follow the money.

riggerrob said:

The real question is whether the coalition would do a better job of managing the peace .... managing the country after conquering Iraq?
Would they keep the least-corrupt Bathist administrators?
Would the least-corrupt Iraqi policemen be kept on patrol?
Would honest Iraqi border guards remain on duty?
How could WALLIES distinguish between honest and dishonest Iraqi civil servants?
Would WALLIES immediately seize all weapons?
Would some form of reconciliation courts mediate grievances between Shias and Sunnis and Kurds and ....?
How long would WALLIE troops continue to occupy Iraq?
How many civilian security contractors (e.g. Blackwater) would WALLIES hire? .... to cook? ... to ship in supplies? ... to fly in supplies?
... to provide medical care?
... to guard prisoners?
... to interrogate prisoners?
..... to truck in supplies? .... to guard the Green Zone? ... to escort supply convoys? .... to guard VIPs? ... to train Iraqi police? ... to arrest the worst troublemakers? ... to assassinate the worst troublemakers?

Follow the money.

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Considering pretty much everybody will say "Hey, we didn't sign up for this!" the bigger question is how quickly will coalition fall apart and when will non-US troops stop.

We say the same situation in Iraq ITTL in 1991 -1992 as we did after the OTL invasion in 2003. That is real trouble for Bush in 1992. Clinton begins the withdrawal process.

It will largely depend on two things:
1) How fast they move in and take Baghdad
2) What they do after they take out all the Iraqi Army in the way and capture as many of Saddam's cronies as possible

If US/coalition forces move fast enough, it could prevent too many UN/coalition members from saying, "Hey, this wasn't the plan." If they take too long, opposition will flair.

If they just kick Saddam out (killing/capturing him or destroying his main mechanisms of power) and then leave, you'd have some level of chaos but things might settle down under some other strong man. He wouldn't be a friend to the US, but he'd know that he'd better not bother us and his overall hold on power (and ability to bother neighbors) would be lower.

If, on the other hand, we decide that we need to "national build", then things probably go somewhat similar to how they did a decade later.

KaiserWilhelm said:

What if the US didn't stop in the Persian Gulf War, and took Baghdad and all of Iraq? How would the rest of the 90s turn out?

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Disaster all around. The Bush(I) Administration did a masterful job of diplomacy in marshaling almost total global support for the 1991 war to free Kuwait from Iraqi occupation. This support was absolutely contingent on limited war aims for the coalition: defeating the Iraqi military and evicting Iraq from Kuwait. Although this required an air offensive throughout Iraq and an invasion of southern Iraq, it did not require the removal of Saddam Hussein. If the US went on to Bagdad with the aim of overthrowing Saddam, international support would completely evaporate, far worse than the criticism the US faced in 2003. Then, the US would be faced with the same issues that it faced in 2003, urban resistance, the collapse of basic services in Iraq, factional battles, and all the rest. Bush I had it right. Bush II screwed it up.

100% agree with Zoomar.

Bush Sen did a fantastic job in getting the coalition together and holding it together for those months.

It is not often we see that US is taking a back-seat and letting a coalition getting a word in.

The Arab world united behind the US/Saudi initiative and I for one believe that Saddam had never anticipated that to happen.

When Saddam hurled Scuds at Israel in the hope that Israel would retaliate, he again got out-foxed by Bush.

The limited war goals might have felt restricting, but it was probably the common denominator.

If Bush had decided to carry on to Baghdad the coalition would have collapsed and the Arab nations might have turned against US.

Remember, Saudi backing was achieved insofar as the Saudi King had been lied to by Saddam. That turned the tables. It is not 'cricket' to do that in the ME.

If the coalition would not be in on a move on Baghdad, then US would have to go it alone (Europe would also have bailed, I believe).

If Saudi had asked US to go home when they tried to go for Baghdad then 'messy' is not even starting to describe it.

Ivan

The best strategy would have been to include firm instructions in regards to WMDs, protection of the Kurds and Marsh Arabs as part of any armistice. The actual agreement was poorly constructed. Also, to let the government in Baghdad know that the war will continue unless Saddam is no longer in power (either dead or turned over), but that if he was, the coalition would not remove the Baathist government itself.

I think the most likely result is a palace coup against Saddam who is either killed or turned over. Someone less maniacal would have stayed in charge, and he would not have continued to defy the armistice agreement.

An actual occupation of Baghdad would not be necessary to achieve these aims.

The Bush administration handled the Gulf War very well until the end, and then flubbed it bad. He had made commitments to people to keep Iraq as a bulwark against Iran, but the end of the war was badly done and kept the US involved in Iraq for a decade longer which resulted in the second war.

Blackfox5 said:

The Bush administration handled the Gulf War very well until the end, and then flubbed it bad. He had made commitments to people to keep Iraq as a bulwark against Iran, but the end of the war was badly done and kept the US involved in Iraq for a decade longer which resulted in the second war.

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Yup, and I don't think many people fully apprecate how much more radicalized religiously Sunni society was and beaten down the Shia were with all their best minds and decent leaders killed or in exile from 1991 to 2003.

The 12 years between 1991 and 2003 that the U.S. and Iraq were in a low grade continuous military conflict, back to faith religious crazy and harsh UN sanctions turned Iraq into the kind of fertile ground for the likes of Zarqawi it wouldn't have been if the regime fell in 1991. The CIA told Bush in 2003 that the Sunnis of Iraq wouldn't throw in with al-Qaeda as they are secular. It shows how much they didn't have any idea how Iraq changed for the worse from 1991 to 2003.

We didn't even need to 'go to Baghdad' to end Saddam in 1991. We just needed about 48 hours more of ground war to end the Republican Guard and then no bullshit No Fly Zone which allows for helicopter gunships to slaughter the rebels. We either needed to do that or not tell Iraqis to rise up and then to have a real peace with Saddam after the war not a cease fire with conditions that kept the U.S. and Iraq in a endless military conflict.

True, however, stopping after 100 hours was a very arbitrary point -- it wasn't that the objectives had been specifically met then and not before. We could have kept going for another few days without too many raised eyebrows.

After that point, we could either have told our allies:
1) "Hey, we see that most of the objectives are met, but not all so we're going to keep beating back some key Iraqi troops were for a few days for stability sake -- you can stop if you wish." That could have worked for a few more days, which might have been enough to take Baghdad.

2) "It's become clear that just meeting the minimal objectives won't ensure a lasting peace. That being the case, we feel we must destroy the key instruments of power in Baghdad to really meet the UN mandate, then the UN can oversee the peace however they wish. Will you join us?" The UN might have balked and some allies might have refused, but they wouldn't necessarily have opposed us vigorously. Meanwhile, while the discussions in the UN went on for a few days, we could take Baghdad.

In either case, we'd have less support, but we could probably have maneuvered the seizure of Baghdad without pissing off too many people. Then, it comes down to how we (and/or the UN) try to pursue the peace. Again, if we try to do it like in 2003, we're likely as screwed as then, but we might try to force the UN to take the ball and just be humble supporters of UN plans.

ivanotter said:

100% agree with Zoomar.
Bush Sen did a fantastic job in getting the coalition together and holding it together for those months.

It is not often we see that US is taking a back-seat and letting a coalition getting a word in.

The Arab world united behind the US/Saudi initiative and I for one believe that Saddam had never anticipated that to happen.

When Saddam hurled Scuds at Israel in the hope that Israel would retaliate, he again got out-foxed by Bush.

The limited war goals might have felt restricting, but it was probably the common denominator.

If Bush had decided to carry on to Baghdad the coalition would have collapsed and the Arab nations might have turned against US.

Remember, Saudi backing was achieved insofar as the Saudi King had been lied to by Saddam. That turned the tables. It is not 'cricket' to do that in the ME.

If the coalition would not be in on a move on Baghdad, then US would have to go it alone (Europe would also have bailed, I believe).

If Saudi had asked US to go home when they tried to go for Baghdad then 'messy' is not even starting to describe it.
Ivan

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jahenders said:

True, however, stopping after 100 hours was a very arbitrary point -- it wasn't that the objectives had been specifically met then and not before. We could have kept going for another few days without too many raised eyebrows.

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IIRC, Bush called a halt after seeing footage of the devastated Iraqi convoy. He was concerned that military action seen as gratuitous would have serious negative repercussions in the US and throughout the world. In hindsight that seems unlikely but it's easier to judge that now than at the time.

Still convinced that someone came up with the '100 hour war'.

It sounds better than '123 hour war and some 20 minutes'

or

'day 5, shortly after tea'

On a serious note:

There are two factors in a drive towards Baghdad which might be key:

1) Arab League and Saudi approval.
Saudi is the main factor. If the King does not agree with a drive towards Baghdad, it cannot happen.

Why would the King object to it? maybe toppling a fellow Arab will be too much for the Palestine population in Saudi. That might be seen as (a) support for Israel and/or (b) US colonialism.

2) Iran
Iran is in many ways the joker in the pack. What will/can they do.

UN support is essential and I think it is where 2003 went terrible bad.

A quick raid on Baghdad, killing Saddam and his sons and then?

Give the keys to an unwilling UN delegation?
Give the keys to Saudi? Arab League?

Iraq had the distinct possibility of dragging US into a year-long commitment whichever way the coin would fall.

Somehow, although 'unfinished business' 1991 it provided a way out.

It is like Afghanistan. Any occupation force have come to a sticky end (British/Soviet/...).

As one said, the only two thing which Afghanistan can grow are angry men and rocks.

Ivan

From a military point of view the Iraqi army was pretty much defeated. Another day would have seen 7th Corps and 18th Airborne complete the defeat of thhe Republican Guard and encircle what was left of the Iraqi Army in Northern Kuwait. Within three of four days at most Basra would have fallen and the Iraqi army in Southern Iraq destroyed.

The British might well have gone with a US advance on Baghdad bu the US had more than enough to do the mililitary job on their own.

The difficult part would have been the post war occupation and keeping Iraq together.

Agree. It is the post-war scenario which is scary.

Could US have occupied Iraq with the forces in theatre? Probably.

Could it have been a quick raid on Baghdad? probably not. Without a fully-fledged invasion and occupation, it might be a rather wasted effort.

So what was the difference between 1991 and 2003?

1) 1991 did not have any planning for a post-war Iraq. Whether Bush Jr really had a plan is debatable.

2) Was the Sunni/Shia difference going to cause problems in 1991?

3) ????

Ivan

KaiserWilhelm said:

What if the US didn't stop in the Persian Gulf War, and took Baghdad and all of Iraq? How would the rest of the 90s turn out?

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IIRC a number of the Republican Guard divisions where hours away from being exterminated.
The only thing on the planet that could stop this from happening was an order from President Bush.

Had this order been delayed / ignored for a few hours......?

For example as soon as he heard that the war was to end Gen S immediately stopped Combat ops (and quite rightly IMO) - had he allowed current operations to continue up until the actual ceasefire then those Rep Guard Units would have been totally smashed.

This...would have seriously weakened Saddam and the Bathist Parties hold over Iraq - Particularly over the Sothern (Basra) region and the North (The Kurds).

Certainly the Uprisings would have been more successful and far more likely to succeed.

If this happens then you don't need M1A1's trundling through Down town Bagdad to topple the regime.

Probably....(He was a wily lad that Saddam!)

ivanotter said:

Agree. It is the post-war scenario which is scary.

Could US have occupied Iraq with the forces in theatre? Probably.

Could it have been a quick raid on Baghdad? probably not. Without a fully-fledged invasion and occupation, it might be a rather wasted effort.

So what was the difference between 1991 and 2003?

1) 1991 did not have any planning for a post-war Iraq. Whether Bush Jr really had a plan is debatable.

2) Was the Sunni/Shia difference going to cause problems in 1991?

3) ????

Ivan

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There were two plans for the post 2003 war the army/Rummy's which would have kept the army and Ba'athists in their jobs and the Bremer's, but Bush let too many cooks in the kitchen with all of their hands in the pot derail the post war plans he signed up for.

So it was as bad as having no plan.

Honestly the policy was in 1991 regime change as recently released documents show, but it was regime change by killing enough of the Republican Guard and then when that didn't work putting on sanctions and a No Fly Zone and other things to try to force it. The problem is we ended the war about two days early so more then half the Republican Guard escaped.

Then Saddam played us by allowing the No Fly Zone to have helicopters and they used massive amounts of helicopter gunships on the hundreds of thousands of people we asked to rise up against him.

End result a situation worse then the Korea cease fire where we are enforcing a No Fly Zone and weapons inspections that Saddam didn't accept and sanctions were killing hundreds of thousands of Iraqis while Saddam religiously radicalized Sunnis. Thus, the end of the 1991 war kept us at a low level war with Iraq punctuated with the occasional heavy bombing for years.

America was eventually going to become angry enough to finish the job and I think even under a Gore Presidency Saddam's response to 911 and in the view of the U.S. and our allies harboring Zarqawi would have lead to his downfall and Gore would have probably had a lot more international backing for it, just not UNSC approval as Putin wouldn't give him that.

People don't remember but in 1992 Gore hammed George H.W. Bush for not being tough enough on Saddam and downplaying his links to terrorism and his threat to our allies.

Iran likely ends up with a satellite neighbor following 3-5 years of a US puppet/Pinochet-esque leader on place. Restoring the monarchy would upset Jordan, a military strongman upsets Saudi Arabia if they do not get to give the nod, a Kurdistani state angers Jordan, and anything else potentially leads to religious civil war. Iran might also be emboldened and begin to eye post-Soviet Afghanistan, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, and possibly Uzbekistan and Tajikistan. Pray they do not head for Kyrgyzstan under that scenario.

zoomar said:

If the US went on to Bagdad with the aim of overthrowing Saddam, international support would completely evaporate, far worse than the criticism the US faced in 2003.

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Why exactly would international support collapse? There was a much clearer casus belli in 1991 than in 2003 what with Saddam having just invaded a fellow Arab country. And anyway the only country the US absolutely has to have on-board is Saudi Arabia. The Coalition will survive just fine if Egypt or Syria or even Britain pulls out. (The US alone contributed 700,000 troops to the Coalition. That's nearly three times the total number of Coalition forces used in 2003, so the US has more than enough troops to take and secure Iraq on its own, so long as it can get the necessary bases from the Saudis and Kuwaitis to keep our forces supplied.)

Then, the US would be faced with the same issues that it faced in 2003, urban resistance, the collapse of basic services in Iraq, factional battles, and all the rest. Bush I had it right. Bush II screwed it up.

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But in 1991, the US had a much, much larger army (both in theater and in total) than it had in 2003, a clearer justification for the occupation (no WMD mess here to sap public support), and we hadn't angered the Shiites in Iraq by encouraging them to rise up and then letting them get slaughtered while we did nothing. al-Qaeda was also a lot smaller and less well organized in 1991 than it would be by 2003, so it is less well situated to stir up sectarian conflict, and Iran in 1991 was weak from just having come out of the Iran-Iraq War.

Blackfox5 said:

He had made commitments to people to keep Iraq as a bulwark against Iran, but the end of the war was badly done and kept the US involved in Iraq for a decade longer which resulted in the second war.

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from what I remember reading way back then, it seems that the main idea was to keep Iraq with a big infantry army and little or no armor... so they would be able to fight a defensive war in the case that Iran went nuts (more than usual), but not be able to really invade anyone else... not sure just how logical that is...

Michael Gordon and Bernard Trainor's book "Cobra II" goes into great detail in terms of the planning phase on Iraq after the war of 2003.

It is correct to say that it was a messy thing to begin with.

The main thinking seemed to be that after Saddam is kicked out, the Iraqis will bow down in awe and embrace democracy and we can all live happily ever after.

Naïve and ignorant of facts are not good combinations.

One of the main points (pointed out by the military leaders) was the lack of troops. Rumsfeld wanted it on the cheap.

If we look at the huge build-up in 1990/, the global determination of having had enough of Saddam, the fellow Arabic revulsion of Saddam lying to the Saudi King, etc. etc. it could have been the golden opportunity.

Cruising to Baghdad just to kill Saddam is not a solution.

It would have been a real occupation and a real regime change.

The amount of troops on the ground and the military leadership could have done it. No doubt there.

I still doubt that any other Arabic country would have been involved in an occupation. It is apparently not the way of doing it.

It would then have to have been with the tacit approval of Saudi.

Maybe the best option would have been to cut Iraq up in its three constituent parts:

Shia South goes to Iran
Sunni heartland
Kurdish North as a separate republic.

That, however, will set the entire project on a collision course with Iran and Turkey where a Kurdish state is not on the agenda.

If Iraq should disappear would it leave a vacuum? or would everybody in ME be rather happy about it?

Ivan