feasibility of any part of Algeria being French

Can anyone provide details, or better a map, of the different populations of French Algeria in the post-WWII period?


I know that approximately 1 million pied-noirs are about 10% of the French Algerian population. That they make up 1/3 of Algiers and a majority of Oran, and that their greatest settlement was in the plains of Mitijda (outside Algiers).


But I am looking for specifics, particularly concentrations.


I am wondering if under different circumstances, some part of French Algeria could be retained by France. Such an area would require the bulk of pied-noirs population to live there, and the remaining native Algerian population to be friendly, pro-French, or at least accomodating of continued French rule. Ideally, the area would allow pied-noir population to be near an actual majority (although perhaps only when the pied-noirs outside the region migrate to it when the rest of Algeria becomes independent).


Most of the country would still become independent, and the wisdom of retaining part of it as metropolitan France could be debateable. However, I am interested in whether such an area is even feasible. It would need to be populated largely by pro-French, small enough to be defensible, but large enough to be economically viable. I'm not sure if it is feasible, but am interested in learning more.
 
I would think that Oran and its environs could have been retained. The French military could have gathered its forces in Oran and hunkered down there. The FLN might not have been happy with this, but it probably couldn't have prevented it. In this scenario, I could see there being a lot of ethnic cleansing, with pieds-noirs moving into Oran and Algerians being driven out. But this would have required a lot of political will on the part of de Gaulle to hang on to the territory. The war might have continued awhile longer (and it was pretty nasty, with a lot of civilian deaths) before the FLN would accept the terms. There would probably also have to be no OAS around to complicate matters.
 
Last edited:
There was something along those lines considered in our timeline.

It has actually been envisionned by either proeminent Gaullists (namely Alain Peyrefitte) and OAS members, who even discussed it, AFAIK, with moderates from the provisional Algerian Government in mid-1962, before the Pied-Noir exodus.

The idea, born after the failure of the 1961 putsch, was to "Israelise" not all of Algeria, but the Oranais zone (Oran being a city with a European majority). The Pieds-Noirs and Algerian Jews (who were French citizens by law, unlike the Muslims), were to gather in the Oran-Tlemcen-Sidi-Bel-Abbès zone, esure they would have a demographic majority, and organise themselves as a European stronghold, either within France proper (it was Peyrefitte's idea) or, more probably after a solid majority in France favored Algerian independance, as an independant country.

Actually, Oran was a rather industrialized zone (less that Algiers, arguably) and one of the more prosperous agricultural area in Algeria and, economically, the idea was not totally stupid. I also suppose that the leaders of the Oranian solution would have been reinforced by rebel officers, either condemned or ousted from the French army after the Putsch, and some right-wing radicals from France (and maby a few French colonists from Subsaharian Africa). Oh, and Harkis, too.

This said, a White rump Algeria would probably survive only for a few years, and probably not after 1975.

The country is bound to maintain a large, standing army to protect itself from a probably very hostile Algeria, from Muslim dissent within the country (assuming, of course, The Oranais didn't expelled, or worse, non-loyaist Muslims). Relations with France will be horrible. I'm pretty sure that the Oranais would back every Anti-Gaullist terroist organisation in France proper, and France, shifting to the 1960's industrial and European policies, would do everthing to distance from people who would be as popular ad the radical Afrikaners in South Africa. The Oranais would have no support from the Socialist Bloc (duh), but, aside from ultra-conservative circles, I doubt the US would do anything favorable to a colonialist regime who would arguably be a troublesome element for Western strategy in the Middle East and the Mediterranean. The only help the Oranais could hope for would come from Francoist Spain, Portugal, South Africa and probably Israel (and maybe military dictaroships in Greece and latin America). Marocco, having very bad relations with algeria, might be a favourable neutral.

However, deprived from real economic perspectives, being a pariah state with, I suppose, few democratic features, under the permanent pressure of hostile neighbors and without any real, powerful ally to balance it (not to mention any legitimacy), especially after the Carnation Revolution in Portugal and Franco's death in Spain, I guess the country would collapse. You would have, either a transitional French mandate to set everything ready for retrocession to Algeria, or a violent collapse, the Oranais fleeing either to Isreal (for the Jewish population), Spain, maybe South Africa. I doubt many would reach France, given the hostiliy between the two countries.
 
Reagent - very interesting. Regarding ethnic cleansing, I wasn't suggesting that it would be a formal governmental policy, but more something that would just end up happening in the midst of the conflict.

One question: would the people of Metropolitan France definitely have rejected an Oranais enclave? We know they voted for the whole of Algeria to become independent, but if presented with a separate option to keep a portion while granting independence to the rest, can we safely say they'd have turned it down? I know it wasn't seriously considered by de Gaulle, but I'd curious if it had been.
 
Not remotly possible with a post-1900 PoD. Algerian independence movement was very keen about independence for the whole of Algeria.

If such thing would have been tried, Oran would have become a mix between Gaza and North Ireland, a financial gap with quite an important exile flux (that began in the 50's to France) and eventually inhabited mostly by Army, Arabs and Pieds-Noirs of all Algeria that didn't went in France and overcrowd a small area that would rely essentially on metropolitain ravitail.

Strategically, economically, politically, it would be a nightmare.

POD 1: Have France stop the conquest of Algeria
Conquest of the hinterland was eventually a strategical necessity, would it be only to prevent raiding.
Furthermore, the Army at this point had a very important political role in French Algeria (more than colonists), and they were very motivated about continuing the conquest southwards

POD 2: Have France adopt a more open and incentivized immigration policy to Algeria after 1848
It was tried IOTL, but it failed. Mostly because it wasn't that interesting to settle in Algeria, and that Army wasn't really enthusiast about colonisation in first place (something along the lines of "WE conquered the land, so why these civilians and foreigners come there?"

One question: would the people of Metropolitan France definitely have rejected an Oranais enclave?
Eventually, yes. The whole thing would be a financial disaster, and a political dead end. Would it be only to remove this gap, you'd have a real incitative to get rid of this. As Pieds-Noirs weren't really well seen in metropolitain France to begin with (not really by anti-colonialism : violent anti-arabism was as much widespread, often with the same people), nobody would really mind.
 
Last edited:
November 19, 1961 Alain Peyrefitte, a member of France's national assembly proposed to President Charles de Gaulle a partition plan. The plan involed the following.

The Pieds-Noirs and loyal Muslims were to given the territory between Algiers and Oran. The sparsely population Sahara territory would remain French. Another idea proposed was having everything from the Moroccan border to Algiers remain French.

Algiers would be partitioned in that the Casbah would remain part of the new Islamic state run by the FLN.
 

Redhand

Banned
Keeping Oran is doable, provided you get the PiedNoirs there and have a military presence that keeps the FLN out. The Muslims there might be more loyal if given rights that were previously denied.
 
The point is that Ceuta and Melilla were thoroughly Spanish centuries ago.
Ceuta and Melilla have a long established European majority and a sizeable Muslim minority due to migration. I think the comparison is fair.

The historical right to the real estate is another question entirely.
 
Thanks. This is excellent information, especially from Reagent and Simon (courtesy of Captain Poplar).

It seems if France wanted to retain any part of French Algeria, it would be a coastal territory around Oran including the port of Mers-el-Kebir but stretching to Algiers (and the plain of Mitijda) to include as much of the French settlers as possible to minimize population transfers of the pieds-noirs. However, because the two main centers of French population are apart (Oran and Algiers), it looks like one of them will need to be sacrificed, and Algiers is the one most likely to be abandoned.

Does anyone know the economic activites of Oran and the surrounding area? It seems like it would be mainly agricultural and light manufacturing. The major mining and petroleoum areas would be given to Algeria. I'm wondering if the economic activity and tax base would be large enough so that such a remnant state could pay for its own administration expenses, or if it would just be a sinkhole for French finances.

The strategic wisdom of holding onto such an area in the face of longstanding Algerian revanchism is doubtful, but political considerations can make states do "stupid" things. I think the real question as to its viability is whether its economic activity could pay for its administration. Economic sinkholes are eventually abandoned because they are not sustainable. If it can pay for itself, viability becomes a matter of political will.
 
Reagent, I agree that France holding onto Algiers itself is even more problematic than Oran because of the namesake issue. It's why I quickly discounted that area.

I wonder if any of the heavy industrial plant could be moved to Oran if that area was held. That could boost its economic viability.

The political viability is all dependent on the will of Paris versus the FLN (or whatever splinter group) to control Oran.

I think it might be possible for Paris to get the FLN to initially agree to a rump state given certain circumstances (which never happened IOTL). The Evian Accords envisioned religious freedom and transition period for the pro-French population. Those ended up being a farce, but if the French really wanted to ensure that the part of the population was truly protected, then some kind of framework might be possible. Perhaps an Oran department operated under the framework of a condominium between France and Algeria for the protection of pied-noirs and Harkis? Perhaps with the provision that the status would be periodically confirmed in consultation with the two governments and/or democratic referendum in order to ensure the protection of rights of its inhabitants? In the short term, something could be worked out given certain PODs and political imagination (even if plausibility is thrown out the window). The issue is a long term terrorism and hostility.

However, I think the FLN will have plenty of trouble after independence. There are the issues of one party rule versus multiparty democracy; Arab nationalism versus the Berber population; and that Algerians may have wanted the French out of Algeria, but did want to continue cooperation and trade. As internal politics becomes more important, waving the flag over Oran might not be as important as some other issues - especially if France can manipulate some of the divisions behind the scenes. That may cause Oran to become less of an issue over time, at least to the Falklands level and not as a West Bank or even a Hong Kong issue.

But I admit the viability is doubtful.

Some very good information, were do your maps come from?
 
Since France is going to experience massive hostility and terrorism from the Algerians for decades, probably centuries for keeping either Oran
Why? It's not that Spain faces Moroccan terrorism due to Ceuta and Melilla...

If you're just proposing a French Mers-el-Kébir there's no need for a meaningful population transfer thus no displaced people with grievences that would justify an aggression level higher than OTL Morocco vis-à-vis Spain. Even if it's Mers-el-Kébir and its contiguous Oran, do they really need to expel the Arabs? Couldn't they just offer this smaller group full citizenship rights?

The maps come from a declassified CIA Document regarding the potential impact of partitioning Algeria
This will be interesting to read, thanks for sharing.
 
Why? It's not that Spain faces Moroccan terrorism due to Ceuta and Melilla...

I agree with you, though I wouldn't discard the possibility of extreme tenssions and acts of violence in the years after the independence. The independence of Algeria was reached through a violent, destructive and mercyless war. There was a lot of bitterness and a lot of pain after the war, not to mention a strong nationalist élan that I wouldn't be sure was that powerful in Morocco (in part, perhaps, precissely by the lack of a conflict like the Algerian) Compared to this, the Ifni War was a skirmish. Also, Mohamed V and his son Mohamed VI had good personal relations with Franco (dog doesn't eat dog) and Mahmed VI had certainly very good relations with Juan Carlos I, treating each other as "brother" in their diplomatic and personal relations. And finally, Rabat had doubts about the loyalty of the Rifean amazigh population (not without a reason), so the idea of making the area a source of active conflict with a third party wouldn't be exactly attractive. Summarizing, there are some different circumstances to consider.
 
I think the difference between Ceuta and Mellilla and Algeria was as mentioned before, Ceuta was Portuguese between 1415-1640 and stayed loyal to the Spanish Crown when the Portuguese revolted, so it has been under European rule longer than parts of Andalusia. Melilla too was conquered by Spain in 1492.

The Spanish ruled Oran and Mers el Kbir for a longer period than the French up until 1792, so Spanish culture was predominant in that area. Perhaps if Algeria had been Spanish this area could have been easily integrated into Spain. In many towns in Oran, people of Spanish descent outnumbered others 5 to 1. Have a pod to make Algeria French and at least this region could be part of Spain.

The lack of Frenchness, underlies one of the issues with French Algeria. There were few binding ties to Metropolitan France. By 1954, 79% of the Pieds-Noirs were born in Algeria and. During the depression there were already those pieds noirs who sought employment in Metropolitan France or elsewhere. Few French were willing to move there and indeed most of those from the Paris region were either convicts or administrators.

Net European Migration to Algeria
1921-1926 3,948
1926-1931 13,360
1931-1936 24,106
1936-1948 -104,100
1948-1954 2,000
1958-1961 -150,000
1962 -800,000 (June -328,434)
1963 -80,000
1964 -30,000

Total Non-Muslim Population
1876 311,439
1886 422,796
1896 530,137
1901 583,637
1906 615,618
1911 681,772
1921 717,186
1926 795,857
1931 881,584
1936 946,013
1948 922,272
1954 984,048
1959 1,025,000

Culturally speaking, the largest contingent of immigrants were from southern Spain, the last large numbers European immigrants to Algeria were Spaniards. The pieds noirs were a heterogeneous mix of Mediterranean peoples looked down upon by many French from Metropolitan France. The only thing that bound this group to the French state was their status as a privileged minority needing the protection of the French government.

Below is a breakdown of the ancestry of the non-Muslim population of Algeria.
40% Spanish (Alicante, Murcia, Valencia and Menorca)
25% mainland France (mostly Languedoc and Provence and to a lesser extent Paris)
20% Italian (mostly Naples and Sicliy), Corsican and Maltese
12% Naturalised Jews (Granted in 1870 by the Crémieux Decree)
3% German (German, Swiss, Alsatian)

The above could illustrate why few French would want to risk their lives for a territory they had few ties to. This especially became problematic once the terrorism spilled over to Metropolitan France.
 
the first President of Algeria, Ben Bella, said after the war that if the French/pieds-noirs hadn't been so hard line on holding all of Algeria, the French likely could have held onto some of Algeria, take that for what its worth
 
Reagent makes some excellent points, but I have doubts that France holding onto Oran and some territory around it would lead to hostility and terrorism for decades and centuries.

1) Algeria still gets 90%+ of the country. The FLN can definitely say they won the war and achieved their national aspirations.

2) Unlike some nationalist groups, the FLN was clearly looking towards the future of governing the country. They knew good relations with France would be needed. They were not a group who wanted all or nothing, the future be damned.

3) The question of the safety of the pied-noirs, Algerian Jews, and Harkis is a legitimate issue, and having some kind of safe haven is reasonable.

4) Not all countries with territorial disputes lead to ongoing terrorism and wars. In fact, most don't. The situation in Israel is not usually seen in these cases. Much depends on the actions between the governments, and the governance of the disputed territory. If the Protestants in Northern Ireland stopped discrimination against Catholics, the Provisional IRA might never have existed. Argentina only brings up the Falklands when an unpopular government hopes to score some popular support. The Kashmir conflict between India and Pakistan is another worse case scenario, but even here most of the time it is quiet. Singapore was able to leave Malaysia without incident. So while a French Algerian exclave would be an ongoing flash point, it could be a manageable one depending on the negotiations that originally created it.

5) Having a French Algerian enclave might even benefit Algeria in the same sense that Hong Kong benefited the PRC and even Nationalist China before it. It serves as a potential entrepot and source of French financing. A very advantageous economic situation could develop.

6) While a small group of extremists might still be willing to fight France, it can only do so provided the new Algeria government supports it. Otherwise, it will be suppressed so that the conflict is manageable. Continuing to fight France over an Oranian enclave also costs Algeria as well. Governments tend to balance costs and benefits.

Besides, even though Oran is the second city in Algeria, the city was actually hot held by Algerians for a long time. Spain controlled it from 1509-1708 and 1732 to 1792. France captured it in 1831. In between these times, the Ottoman Turks ruled the city, not native Algerians. That is almost 400 years of European rule. Given its majority of French population, one can reasonably argue that the city and area around it is a special status compared to the rest of Algeria.

In such a situation, forced population transfers might not even be needed. Presumably most of the pied noirs, Harkis, and Algerian Jews would choose to leave Algeria anyway, and the Oran area might be preferred as a destination to France. As for the Algerians in the area, they could choose to become citizens of France, Algerian citizens with permanent residency, or decide to move to Algeria. As long as the exclave improves its conduct towards native Algerians there (and the entire idea is that this could be done because the truncated area is specifically selected to ensure a pro-French majority), it could become acceptable to the Algerians, perhaps not liked, but at least tolerable.

I think its viability depends on the terms under which it was negotiated, and the subsequent cooperation between Paris and Algiers. If they were done well, I think tensions would be manageable. If handled badly, a bad situation could develop.

I think this is an issue that reasonable people can disagree on. There is a lot of useful information here. Thanks to everyone.
 
the first President of Algeria, Ben Bella, said after the war that if the French/pieds-noirs hadn't been so hard line on holding all of Algeria, the French likely could have held onto some of Algeria, take that for what its worth

That is very interesting. Do you have a source, whether primary or secondary?
 
the first President of Algeria, Ben Bella, said after the war that if the French/pieds-noirs hadn't been so hard line on holding all of Algeria, the French likely could have held onto some of Algeria, take that for what its worth

Ben Bella is as credbible when he talks about Algeria Independence history than a 3$ bill. FLN stance about territorial integrity of Algeria, as an Arab state, was present since the beggining.
There's no way that they would have accepted that, as they totally rejected the agreement about Saharian départements remaining under french administration.

The only thing that would have happened would have been a more important slaughter of pied-noir population, would it be only to prevent their very presence to serve as pretext to a territorial divide.
 
Top