Terence Zuber- delay of WWI past 1914 helps *Germany* more

This is a novel interpretation. The near universal POV is that with the Russian armament program, each successive year after 1914 the Entente would have been stronger. Terence Zuber argues the opposite, below.

Thoughts?


The Real German War Plan – 1904-14, Terence Zuber pp176-177, whole section in the Conclusion chaper titled, “If War Had Not Come in 1914”

Had war not broken out in 1914, the European military arms race would have continued with increased intensity. The Three Years’ Law was the last gasp for the French army; no further French manpower increases were possible. In fact, there was significant opposition to the Three Years’ Law and the German 1914 intelligence estimate speculated that the French might not be able to maintain it. The Russian Great Programme would have increased the size of their peacetime army and its deployment speed.

The Austro-Germans had lost the arms race to this point, but there was every indication that they recognized the danger of their position, and the Austro-Germans had plenty of room for improvement. Between mid-August and mid-October 1914 the Germans had enough untrained manpower to easily raise six new reserve corps (about 180,000 men). What the Germans lacked was the time and cadres to train them adequately. If the Germans were given the opportunity in peacetime to add just six more trained corps to their order of battle—and the passing of the Russian Great Programme in June 1914 would surely have forced the Germans to do so (even the German socialists hated and feared the Tsarist government) – then the strategic situation would have been radically altered. The addition of six corps (12 divisions) would have fundamentally changed the German strategic calculus, which in 1914 was based on the fact the Germans would be outnumbered on both fronts. The Germans would have been able to deploy eighty divisions in the west against some sixty-three French. The French would not have been able to convince themselves – as they did in 1914 – that they at least had a numerical parity and that it was practical to launch an offensive.

The French might have been forced to adopt a strategic defensive outright; if the French had attacked, there was a good chance it would be a spectacular failure. A German attack would have had a far greater chance of quick success. Under these circumstances, the Russians would have been far from enthusiastic for an attack on East Prussia. Six more German corps would have derailed the Franco-Russian plan for simultaneous attacks on Germany. The Germans would have gained the strategic initiative. Due to Germany’s interior position and rail net, they would have been frrr to mass at one front or another, at the time and place of their choosing. Giving the German army thee initiative was the recipe for a Franco=Russian catastrophe.

The strategic situation in 1914 was optimal for the Entente. The German position was nearing a ‘worst possible case’ scenario. It was very much in the Franco-Russian interest to fight in 1914, when Germany was still faced with the prospect of being outnumbered on both fronts. In the near future that might no longer have been true.

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I would consider that Zuber's essay is strictly the military distillation of events circa 1914. When writing a book one has to limit one's self to a workable scope. In the big picture, I believe that political events outside the military sphere would have changed things and taken control out of the militaries' hands.

I'd have to agree with the overall assessment though for non-military reasons. namely in that while yes the Russians would have improved their military, I've seen no interest in improving everything they need to (drastically) fix. namely the endemic kleptocracy and corruption problems the military faces as well as the gross incompetence of the government and the tsar, to say nothing of the growing discontent from the general populace with the current state of affairs.

As such I say that a later war might cause all the internal issues to actually become worse. In fact as many other threads have said it might butterfly the whole war away altogether since Russia might just explode before it can happen.

raharris1973 said:

This is a novel interpretation. The near universal POV is that with the Russian armament program, each successive year after 1914 the Entente would have been stronger. Terence Zuber argues the opposite, below.

Thoughts?


The Real German War Plan – 1904-14, Terence Zuber pp176-177, whole section in the Conclusion chaper titled, “If War Had Not Come in 1914”

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It seems that Zuber is ignoring the fact that during a competition, action always spurs counter-action. Russia would have responded by strengthening her own military.

The most the Germans would've bought was a brief (year or so) window when they were stronger than OTL in relation to the Entente.

And while the Three Year Law was controversial in France, it was passed, and did prove workable.

I think its right, that Germany still had the potential to strenghten his army, But there were three political Problems for this.

1. A greater army means more officers and that would further limit the influence of the prussian aristocraty. In the end it could have mean you have to make JEEEEWWWS and Liberals officers.

2. It would also mean, that you have to draft more men from the working class, People tainted with Social Democratic ideology, which propably wouldn´t shot on the canaille, if the Kaiser order them to do it.

3. You will have to give the Reichtstag more and more controll about the finances.

The unintended consequence of an apparently stronger Russia might be a strategic German defensive posture in the West which might prevent the UK from actively participating in the ensuing bloodbath on the Western Front.

Then it would be down to how well the Germans and Austrians perform against the Russians. I'm not convinced that the Russians would be able to win against the main strength of the Germans even if their logistics are better. Whether they would collapse as per OTL is an interesting question.

His conclusion does not follow. So defensive posture by French and Russians does benefit Germany? In OTL Entente offensives resulted in disasters )apart from Galician one, but he does not touch A-H), so how lack of them is going to benefit CP is something i do not get.

Maur said:

His conclusion does not follow. So defensive posture by French and Russians does benefit Germany? In OTL Entente offensives resulted in disasters )apart from Galician one, but he does not touch A-H), so how lack of them is going to benefit CP is something i do not get.

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Germany had internal lines of supply, which enables it to focus on a point of its choosing. The French/Russian counter was to attack simultaneously. So, if the Entente adopts a defensive posture, the initiative is gifted to Germany. German offensives were generally not so dire as the Entente - particularly in the East.

In respect of A-H, it spent proportionately much less on its military than any other 'great power' and had the lowest proportion of its population under arms. Redl had also passed on its war plans to the Russians. If A-H could navigate Hungarian intransience, there was substantial room for improvement.

David S Poepoe said:

I would consider that Zuber's essay is strictly the military distillation of events circa 1914. When writing a book one has to limit one's self to a workable scope. In the big picture, I believe that political events outside the military sphere would have changed things and taken control out of the militaries' hands.

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On occasion Zuber expands beyond the strictly military distillation of events (politics, diplomacy etc) without providing much in the way of support.

He seems to focus (at least in the quoted part) entirely on a military pov, which ignores some political circumstances, the important ones already mentioned by Freivolk.

That said while it was not apparent at the time in hindsight it is possible that Germany´s odds would have improved over the next years for several reasons.

The Russian progress makes them more dangerous, but the reforms ignored several key problems which would be problematic in a war, both organisational mistakes in the military and the (in hindsight) obvious political instability.

Germany would be in a better diplomatic situation a few years later. The race for colonies had already ended at the time and they had essentially given up on the naval arms race. Both will reduce tensions with Britain while a seemingly stronger Russia will be seen as a major threat again in Britain.

In Asia the relations between Germany and China were steadily improving again from the low after the taking of Tsingtau and the Boxer rising. Together with the US they would probably have been its main partner, in some fields even the main partner. While diplomatically and militarily of no immediate use it will be economically advantagous, And in the long term, who knows? At the same time the conflicting interests of Britain and Japan might weaken that alliance as otl over the next decade. At the time Germany is the great power with the least conflicting interests and already a fairly good relationship with Japan.

Militarily the Schlieffen plan as Zuber notes will be scrapped in the next few years for a focus on the East which has military and diplomatic advantages.

All of that means that a delayed beginning may result in a better German situation. Then again if the act stupidly the Germans can blow their chances. And they also have a number of factors working against them. Within Germany some political changes will be demanded in the next few years, but without the war strengthening the reformists (and whom the defeat made revolutionaries they did not want to be) its difficult to say how the desire for reform would turn out. In AH the next Ausgleich-negotiations were upcoming and they would have been interesting to say the least. And of course the Russians a few years later will be in some ways stronger than otl.

So without the Sarajevo murders and Germany avoiding great power wars through the teens, how does Germany resolve the 3 political problems Freivolk cites:

1. A greater army means more officers and that would further limit the influence of the prussian aristocraty. In the end it could have mean you have to make JEEEEWWWS and Liberals officers.

2. It would also mean, that you have to draft more men from the working class, People tainted with Social Democratic ideology, which propably wouldn´t shot on the canaille, if the Kaiser order them to do it.

3. You will have to give the Reichtstag more and more controll about the finances.

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So the Russian army and industry is growing throughout the teens, and German conservatives and reactionaries have a dilemma--

Do they grow the army even if it means: a) broadening the officer candidate base, b) conscripting more workers and c) increasing taxes on wealth and possibly legalizing direct Reich taxes.

Or do they let the Russian manpower/firepower advantage grow?

Getting an income tax in Europe wasn't really easier than in America until WWI.

If the Reichstag is too demanding in exchange for desired military outlays, do the Kaiser, military and cabinet launch a coup against the Reichstag & set up a military regime?

Suppose Europe makes it into the 1920s with tenuous great power peace persisting, and then in 1921 Tsarist Russia collapses into revolution- a) Is Germany more likely breath a sigh of relief and leverage the situation for diplomatic gains well short of war, b) Go for a one-front war against the west while it has a chance or c) think yippee, the land arms balance has been righted, let's start the Navy Race again ?

why would russia collapse in a revolution?

-uprising of the minorities? i dont think russian soldiers would have much problems shooting them into submission.
-military coup? worst case scenario for the central powers.
-workers revolt? those things dont come out of the blue.

russia is walking steadily towards super power status - by 1925-30 they wouldnt need the enente any more, meanwhile germany and france are limited by their size and austria-hungary, germanys most important ally, is slowly collapsing.

freivolk said:

I think its right, that Germany still had the potential to strenghten his army, But there were three political Problems for this.

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Of course Germany had the potential (page 149). Of the year group 1911 less than 50% were called up for active duty. 261000 out of 563000.
(If you´d reduce the naval budget somewhat you could easily finance a larger army.)

freivolk said:

1. A greater army means more officers and that would further limit the influence of the prussian aristocraty. In the end it could have mean you have to make JEEEEWWWS and Liberals officers.

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True.
But first it happened in 1912 anyway (enlargement of the army). And second the German army was a federal army. With the Prussian one the largest to be sure. But Bavaria, Saxony and Wuertemberg still had their own armies. So Jewish and liberal officers existed anyway.

Not to mention that in 1913 "almost 46% of all Jewish soldiers were one-year volunteers" (page 154). A privileged position and giving you a very good chance to become a reserve officer or NCO.

freivolk said:

2. It would also mean, that you have to draft more men from the working class, People tainted with Social Democratic ideology, which propably wouldn´t shot on the canaille, if the Kaiser order them to do it.

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Already started in 1892 (page 146).
Chancellor Caprivi shortened conscription from three to two years to gain support from the Social Democrats for a rearmament program. Cutting conscription time by 50% means that more "urban, working class" youths had to be conscripted.

freivolk said:

3. You will have to give the Reichtstag more and more controll about the finances.

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The Reichstag already has to approve the yearly federal budget. And part of the yearly budget is the Imperial navy and (federal) armies budget.
The constitution from 1871 demanded that the military burden was to be distributed fairly between the German states. So the Reichstag had to approve the armies budget.

I´m not quite sure how you want to increase control "about the finances" even farther?

why would russia collapse in a revolution?

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One option is that accumulating social tensions over labor, nationality, *laaaannnnd* and political participation simmer for more years as popular expectations and political realities get more divergent in a time of rapid industrialization and migration. Plus embarrassing shenanigans in court and with ministerial politics.

It is not an open-and-shut case that a revolution would happen without WWI on schedule, but neither is it an open-and-shut case that revolution would definitely *not* happen without WWI.

Many argue that social tensions and a revolutionary situation were rising as early as 1914. Some argue that the war actually diverted these for a couple years.

In my August 14th post I am simply splitting the difference between the no war = no revolution theory and the war postponed revolution theory. So I mentioned the possibility of revolution in 1921 or so, social tensions climax into a revolution of some sort, but this takes twice as long to happen without WWI.

-uprising of the minorities? i dont think russian soldiers would have much problems shooting them into submission.

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If that is all that is going on, I would agree, but multiple crises could easily occur.

-military coup? worst case scenario for the central powers.

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Maybe, maybe not - Sure the military could get an even greater claim on resources this way, but they might not use the resources wisely. In the absence of a war, it's harder to justify. Military dictatorships tend to be corrupted by distractions of governing and not be as effective as militaries restricted to their own sphere.

Plus, it pushes many politically active people underground, planting seeds of a reaction against the reactionaries, and in case of eventual war, leaving a chunk of the citizenry rooting for military defeat.

-workers revolt? those things dont come out of the blue.

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No they don't, but, they can be driven by business cycle crashes, financial panics, or a reduction in emigration opportunities, all of which could occur.

We're also forgetting the agrarian crisis and rural land hunger, that could be the biggest single factor in a 1920s revolutionary situation.

A steep drop in grain prices at any time could wreak havoc on the Russian agricultural economy.

russia is walking steadily towards super power status - by 1925-30 they wouldnt need the enente any more, meanwhile germany and france are limited by their size and austria-hungary, germanys most important ally, is slowly collapsing.

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Being relatively more powerful than other countries is not a universal preventive cure-all for revolution. France was more powerful than it's neighbors and unengaged in a war when it had its revolution. The Shah's Iran likewise was prospering and undefeated when it's revolution came. The Mexican revolution of 1910 and Young Turk revolution of 1908 both happened in times of peace. In Mexico's case, infrastructure, GDP and power status had increased in prior decades. In the Ottoman case, it had been 30 years since the last defeat in war, and the empire had won its last war with Greece in 1897.

Sure, Russian Imperial power would be steadily increasing, but Russia would have a large debt burden and a high dependency on rising prices for agricultural exports and had benefitted from emigration opportunities for the frustrated and emigrant remittances. You mess with these and the situation could go pear-shaped. Russia was advancing into greater power status, but it was not necessarily going to be smooth sailing all the way there, even with international peace.

An interesting analysis and the Franco-German balance was definitely going the Germans way but several points should be raised:

1) The French Three Year Law was probably doomed but the opposition to it wasn't anti-military. It was felt that France should rely more on her reserves. Abolishing the three year law was seen as strengthening the French Army


2) The French had also begun adopting modern uniforms. This is a huge development. Italian tests on their new uniforms showed that a soldier was six times more likely to be hit in the old ones. The red pants was a major factor in France's dismal performance in 1914

3) Anything that convinces the French that an offensive is doomed would do the French a world of good. Their insane offensive caused huge losses. The correct strategy for the French would have been to stand on the defensive and let the German attacks break while the Russians mobilized for the death blow

Turning to the other powers, Russia's power versus Austria-Germany was growing immensely. Not only would the Russians have the new railroads, the increased manpower but better and more artillery. Any increased German might is likely to be devoted to the Eastern rather than the Western Fronts

Meanwhile, Austria's position is collapsing. The additional Russian forces that would have been immediately available would have equaled about the entire Austrian army and the Russians wouldn't have needed to devote too much more to destroy Austria.

Italy was also growing as it rebuilt its reserves following the Ottoman war. Romania was drifting out of the Central Powers orbit and King Carol's death is likely to have ended it. Romania added to Serbia would have created a very formidable southern front

A side note- the Russians were also growing immensely at sea. They would have had 11 Dreadnaughts and Battlecruisers built by 1917 up from one and likely to hold the naval balance of power between Germany and Great Britain.


All in all, while Germany may have gained against France, those gains are likely to be more than offset by her decline in the East

LordKalvert said:

2) The French had also begun adopting modern uniforms. This is a huge development. Italian tests on their new uniforms showed that a soldier was six times more likely to be hit in the old ones. The red pants was a major factor in France's dismal performance in 1914

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Yep - I wouldn't want to be seen dead in red pants!

LordKalvert said:

3) Anything that convinces the French that an offensive is doomed would do the French a world of good. Their insane offensive caused huge losses. The correct strategy for the French would have been to stand on the defensive and let the German attacks break while the Russians mobilized for the death blow

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In the first instance, I don't think the French would easily part with its obsession with 'elan' v common sense. I understand the POD is the Germans facing East, so a German attack on the French is unlikely to come any time soon.

LordKalvert said:

Turning to the other powers, Russia's power versus Austria-Germany was growing immensely. Not only would the Russians have the new railroads, the increased manpower but better and more artillery. Any increased German might is likely to be devoted to the Eastern rather than the Western Fronts

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In respect of 'other powers', a key ingredient is the allegiance of Britain to the Entente or lack thereof - by most accounts British and Russian relations were becoming increasingly strained and were unlikely to be improved much by on going Russian belligerence.

In contrast, Germany had more-or-less lost the naval race and Anglo-German relations were on the improve. Anglo-German antipathy was increasingly dependent on the Grey-Crowe-Churchill combo. Vague commitments to the Entente would become non-committal - at best.

LordKalvert said:

Meanwhile, Austria's position is collapsing. The additional Russian forces that would have been immediately available would have equaled about the entire Austrian army and the Russians wouldn't have needed to devote too much more to destroy Austria.

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A-H had a rapidly growing economy and probably had the greatest room for improvement with the smallest level of military spending and the lowest portion of its population under arms. Similarly, if FF removed Conrad it is likely A-H would have enjoyed better relations and co-ordination with the German military (kryptonite to any steamroller).

LordKalvert said:

Italy was also growing as it rebuilt its reserves following the Ottoman war. Romania was drifting out of the Central Powers orbit and King Carol's death is likely to have ended it. Romania added to Serbia would have created a very formidable southern front

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Italy, for what its worth, would likely follow the British lead due to extensive and exposed coastline. The Serbian army punched above its weight, but its economy was a basket case and increasing burden for its friends - the Romanian army was rubbish - unlike Bulgaria.

LordKalvert said:

A side note- the Russians were also growing immensely at sea. They would have had 11 Dreadnaughts and Battlecruisers built by 1917 up from one and likely to hold the naval balance of power between Germany and Great Britain.

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This alone illustrates the block-headed leadership of Imperial Russia in the lead up to WW1. By 1914 Russian naval expenditure (all of it borrowed) exceeded that of Germany. By 1917 on-going Russian belligerence would have ensured it was on the opposite side of the table to both Britain and Germany.

LordKalvert said:

All in all, while Germany may have gained against France, those gains are likely to be more than offset by her decline in the East

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Probably, but Russia would have likely found itself increasingly isolated diplomatically.

BooNZ said:

Yep - I wouldn't want to be seen dead in red pants!

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Well the new uniforms still had a red flair but they would have cut French casualties dramatically

In the first instance, I don't think the French would easily part with its obsession with 'elan' v common sense. I understand the POD is the Germans facing East, so a German attack on the French is unlikely to come any time soon.

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The POD of departure was who was growing stronger Germany or the Entente. A German attack east introduces a whole series of somewhat complicated issues. How well the Russians do is open to question.

For one, they would have been standing on the defensive and not launching a premature attack into East Prussia. This would have helped them and they extract themselves quite well in 1915

In respect of 'other powers', a key ingredient is the allegiance of Britain to the Entente or lack thereof - by most accounts British and Russian relations were becoming increasingly strained and were unlikely to be improved much by on going Russian belligerence.

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Yes there were strains in Anglo-Russian relations as the English over Persia. However, the English are still stuck with the problem of Europe. German domination of the continent represents an existential threat to the Home Islands. The English are sort of stuck with the Russians even though they don't like them. A breakdown is possible but unlikely for a few more years as the Russians would probably still want to buy time

In contrast, Germany had more-or-less lost the naval race and Anglo-German relations were on the improve. Anglo-German antipathy was increasingly dependent on the Grey-Crowe-Churchill combo. Vague commitments to the Entente would become non-committal - at best.

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Perhaps, perhaps not. If England moved towards neutrality, she ran the very real risk of Continental reconciliation which she feared most of all

A-H had a rapidly growing economy and probably had the greatest room for improvement with the smallest level of military spending and the lowest portion of its population under arms. Similarly, if FF removed Conrad it is likely A-H would have enjoyed better relations and co-ordination with the German military (kryptonite to any steamroller).

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Franz Ferdinand wanted peace above anything and really desired reconciliation with the Russians. He's likely to let the Russians have the straits. As for large scale increases in her defense spending, that had long been politically impossible for Austria and diverting larger sums to the army would have strained the ethnic tensions within the Empire. Besides, Austria's defense spending was so low that it would have to double to make much of a difference.

Austria growth was fast but her economy was small compared to the Russians who would need much smaller increases to deal with growing Austrian expenditures. Nothing would compensate if Romania turned belligerent which she was fast doing

Italy, for what its worth, would likely follow the British lead due to extensive and exposed coastline. The Serbian army punched above its weight, but its economy was a basket case and increasing burden for its friends - the Romanian army was rubbish - unlike Bulgaria.

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Italy wouldn't fight England but that doesn't mean she would follow England's lead. She could remain neutral like she did at first waiting to see who won or she could join Germany and Austria if she thought they would win or France and Russia to take out Austria. Given the rapid increase in Russian might, the latter is the most likely by 1917

This alone illustrates the block-headed leadership of Imperial Russia in the lead up to WW1. By 1914 Russian naval expenditure (all of it borrowed) exceeded that of Germany. By 1917 on-going Russian belligerence would have ensured it was on the opposite side of the table to both Britain and Germany.

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This actually demonstrates how complicated the game was. Russia didn't expect war with the Austro-Germans. They had always managed to avoid it and expected to be able to continue to do so.

Meanwhile, the Russians didn't really trust the English and were aching for a war of revenge against Japan or at least rectifying the balance of power out there. A strong Russian navy would have a lot of uses but of above all it would force good behavior on the English. With a sizable navy, shecould tilt the navy balance in favor of Germany if she wanted. England's fear of a Russo-German accord would force England to be more accomadating of Russian interests

The arms buildup was seen more as a way to increase bargaining power

Probably, but Russia would have likely found itself increasingly isolated diplomatically.

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Isolated from whom? France was tied to her and Italy certainly needed her as a counterweight to Austria. She might become isolated from England at which point, reconciliation with Austria and Germany would be possible

LordKalvert said:

With a sizable navy, she could tilt the navy balance in favor of Germany if she wanted. England's fear of a Russo-German accord would force England to be more accomadating of Russian interests

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So the Tirpitz risk theory works! (it just needed a couple of more years for it to play out).

Catspoke said:

So the Tirpitz risk theory works! (it just needed a couple of more years for it to play out).

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Tirpitz risk theory hinges on the hostility of England to Russia and France. Without it, the German Navy makes little sense but with it does. Unfortunately for Tirpitz, a strong German Navy works more to the advantage of Russia than Germany but he never figured it out

Tirpitz risk theory hinges on the hostility of England to Russia and France. Without it, the German Navy makes little sense but with it does. Unfortunately for Tirpitz, a strong German Navy works more to the advantage of Russia than Germany but he never figured it out

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Taking away the benefit of hindsight, LordKalvert, should the Germans have predicted the Risk Navy was more likely to succeed or backfire ? Without the benefit of hindsight, should the Russians have predicted success for the naval rebuilding in the teens, or have anticipated it backfiring? why?

raharris1973 said:

Taking away the benefit of hindsight, LordKalvert, should the Germans have predicted the Risk Navy was more likely to succeed or backfire ? Without the benefit of hindsight, should the Russians have predicted success for the naval rebuilding in the teens, or have anticipated it backfiring? why?

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Without hindsight- the Germans plan before the Japanese War makes a lot of sense. They see their Navy as needed to protect her colonial aspirations and also as a bargaining chip with England. England would both have reason to fear a German Navy and bargain for its aid. The alliance talks by Chamberlain would seem to bear this out.

The Germans would also legitimately need a navy against France and Russia. First to blockade Russia and draw off French forces from Italy. But most importantly, they would need the navy to reap the full benefits from a victory over France.

The Seven Years War seems to have been in the forefront of their thought. Then, Prussia fought in Europe for its very existence while the English used the Prussians to distract France and grab India and Canada.

Not a pleasant prospective from Germany's point of view.

They might have needed to change course after the formation of the Entente but that seems to have occured around 1910 A bit late but the shift from the naval race to the land race is what let Germany achieve what she did in WWI


For the Russians, the issue is a bit more complicated. They saw their Navy as a way to keep England honest- maintain the Entente or Russia might move towards Germany and truly threaten English domination of the seas.

The mistake would be building the navy before the army had been fully restored. However, Nicholas never anticipated war with Germany figuring if the Germans wanted war, they would have seized the chance of 1905 This would be Nicholas' greatest mistake but it requires hindsight to foresee it clearly

The increase navy spending in 1912-14 would have gone a long way to equipping the field army. For the cost of one dreadnaught the Russians could have increased their 3 inch shell reserve by around a thousand shells per gun.