WI: Mediterranean Strategy WWI?

What if Mediterranean Strategy WWI?

Lately I've been reading more into Erich Raeder's WWII Mediterranean Strategy and I was wondering if it would be applicable to WWI?

In 1915, Germany switches to the strategic defense on Western Front and maybe Eastern Front. The focus is then put on assisting the Ottoman Empire with the ultimate goal of capturing the Suez Canal.

German forces available would be deployed in increasing numbers to the Palestine Front along with perhaps the Caucasus, Iraq and Salonika. In addition to this naval activity in the Mediterranean would be increased.

Is this strategy at all plausible? Overall results?

Nope, controlling the English Channel in WW1 due to the German fleet and the consequences of beating France would be enough to force the Brits to deal; the war was won and lost in France, so that is where they needed to secure victory

Not really as Italy and the Balkans were supposed to be within the Austro- Hungarian sphere of influence and operations and Italy wasn't going for the Central Powers [and once it joins the Entente by May-June since operational planning wouldn't be known to the Italians and bring a significant impact on the entry]. The Germans and Austro-Hungarians were reeling from the impacts of eastern front offensives against Austria and reduction of the Western Front would permit an Entente breakthrough unless the Germans cancel the Eastern Front offensive. Also, taking Serbia would be necessary before considering plans for the Italian and Ottoman theatres besides crippling Russia [or knocking it out of the war] and stabilizing of the Western Front in the Germans' favour.
Unless both Italy and the Ottomans joined the Central Powers in 1914 or early 1915 simultaneously [note the absence of Goeben and promises of Libya, the Dodecanese, Egypt, East Africa and Greek Islands along with Entente diplomacy and possible violations of Ottoman neutrality or Greek and Bulgarian entrance would keep the Ottomans more favourable to the Entente or neutrality], this scenario is impossible. And even then, the Entente would only need to station an extra army to cover the Italian- French border, Mediterranean islands and North and East Africa if the Ottomans join the Central Powers. Finally, the troops meant for the efforts would be better used on the Eastern or Western Fronts and this means they wouldn't be available for these more important fronts. In any event, this means that the Austro-Hungarian war on the Eastern Front collapses in 1915 and WW1 ends in 1916 or 1917 after Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman surrender. And since Germany wasn't super dominant over Austria in 1915, wasn't interested in such a strategy and had more important things to do, this is not happening. And to reach Salonika and the Ottoman theatres, you need to capture Serbia or use as many ships that could be captured from the Entente or requestioned from neutral countries or Germany, Austria-Hungary and the Ottoman Empire interned in Spain, Italy, Austria-Hungary, Greece or the Ottoman Empire and how many ships do you need to transport the necessary corps, let alone an army? And, there's WW2 all over again for other issues.

No rail connection in Tarsus mountains so you can't just ship extra supply easily south from Istanbul to Palestine (even though the Germans desperately tried to drill through the mountains and succeeded right as the war ended).

So it would be hard to do anything major extra here, more than OTL.

It would be best for the Ottomans to remain on the strategic defense everywhere (no Winter 1914-1915 Caucasus offensive for example) and let the Allies waste resources attacking them.

hasdrubal barca said:

What if Mediterranean Strategy WWI?

Lately I've been reading more into Erich Raeder's WWII Mediterranean Strategy and I was wondering if it would be applicable to WWI?

In 1915, Germany switches to the strategic defense on Western Front and maybe Eastern Front. The focus is then put on assisting the Ottoman Empire with the ultimate goal of capturing the Suez Canal.

German forces available would be deployed in increasing numbers to the Palestine Front along with perhaps the Caucasus, Iraq and Salonika. In addition to this naval activity in the Mediterranean would be increased.

Is this strategy at all plausible? Overall results?

Click to expand...

Axis victory. ANything that allows the Axis to play mostly defense bankrupts their enemies and leads to mutinies in their armies. By 1917, either France or Russia collapses when the Germans make the warfare go mobile.

In WW2 the Med strategy was feasible because Germany was doing nothing big between the defeat of France and Barbarossa. In WW1 Germany was fully occupied with France, Britain and Russia to be able to put many resources into the Med.

I agree with Wiking, if you want Germany to win WW1 have them capture the Channel Ports past Cap Griz Nez.

Palestine ( and Mesopotamia) was one of the places in the war were it was easier to use naval lines of supply rather than railways. since the alllies owned the Med, German forces operating there would be dependent on an extremely long and limited supply line while allied forces could rely on maritime support.

The real opportunity lies in the allied side. With a real effort, what was done in 1917 (in Mesopotamia) and 1918 (in Palestine) could have been done in 1915, which, ideally coordinated with a Russian offensive (within logistical constraints ) could have knocked the Ottomans out of the war in 1916, avoiding a lot o trouble in Russia and possibly in the Middle East.

On the subject: http://www.iesm.pt/cisdi/revista/Artigos/Artigo_45.pdf

hasdrubal barca said:

What if Mediterranean Strategy WWI?

Lately I've been reading more into Erich Raeder's WWII Mediterranean Strategy and I was wondering if it would be applicable to WWI?

In 1915, Germany switches to the strategic defense on Western Front and maybe Eastern Front. The focus is then put on assisting the Ottoman Empire with the ultimate goal of capturing the Suez Canal.

German forces available would be deployed in increasing numbers to the Palestine Front along with perhaps the Caucasus, Iraq and Salonika. In addition to this naval activity in the Mediterranean would be increased.

Is this strategy at all plausible? Overall results?

Click to expand...

Nope, not really practical. And I wrote a German wank where the Ottomans did quite well. Issues with the Ottomans doing better are huge. So among them

1) Lack of Railroad structure. One of the problems I ran into in my TL was the Ottomans avoided Gallipoli, so they had plenty of spare divisions. There is just not easy way to get them to the where they would be most useful. (Southern Iraq, Eastern Turkey, Suez). Strangely enough, Mecca is the easy item to keep.

2) Ok, say the Ottomans had a better railroad network in their empire. You still have to build one across the Suez. Look up what happened IOTL in the Suez attack. The Pasha in charge wrote a book, which is free on google books on the topic.

3) Even if #1 and #2 are fixed, UK can reinforce by ships easier/faster than you can do the very long RR journey.


So for anything in the Corp size or larger range, it will not work with the late POD you suggest. Now I am not saying that some small operations (maybe regimental in size) might have worked, but it is hard to get them to be a game changer.

AdA said:

Palestine ( and Mesopotamia) was one of the places in the war were it was easier to use naval lines of supply rather than railways. since the alllies owned the Med, German forces operating there would be dependent on an extremely long and limited supply line while allied forces could rely on maritime support.

The real opportunity lies in the allied side. With a real effort, what was done in 1917 (in Mesopotamia) and 1918 (in Palestine) could have been done in 1915, which, ideally coordinated with a Russian offensive (within logistical constraints ) could have knocked the Ottomans out of the war in 1916, avoiding a lot o trouble in Russia and possibly in the Middle East.

On the subject: http://www.iesm.pt/cisdi/revista/Artigos/Artigo_45.pdf

Click to expand...

I disagree here. While the Western Entente could have easily moved multiple corps in the east, and it might have crippled the Ottomans, it would come at the cost. There were no spare corps lying around doing nothing in in 1915 for the Entente. We could go into a lot of details, but what happens overall would look something like this.

They UK decides in the Spring of 1915 to attack into modern Iraq and Israel. Four or so corps are tasked for this operation. It will be the fall of 1915 before they are in action in the middle east. This means that the summer offensives are cancelled in the west, at least to a large extent. So instead of the Germans rushing 330 battalions to the west in August, they keep driving on the Russians until the snows fall. Let us call it mid November. IOTL, the Russian army retreated for 100 days. Here, we add another 90 or so days of losses.

Net, Net, the trade is a broken Russia by Christmas 1915 for the POTENTIAL damage to the Ottomans over the winter of 1915/16. Your suggestion is a way to write a German wank.

BlondieBC said:

I disagree here. While the Western Entente could have easily moved multiple corps in the east, and it might have crippled the Ottomans, it would come at the cost. There were no spare corps lying around doing nothing in in 1915 for the Entente. We could go into a lot of details, but what happens overall would look something like this.

They UK decides in the Spring of 1915 to attack into modern Iraq and Israel. Four or so corps are tasked for this operation. It will be the fall of 1915 before they are in action in the middle east. This means that the summer offensives are cancelled in the west, at least to a large extent. So instead of the Germans rushing 330 battalions to the west in August, they keep driving on the Russians until the snows fall. Let us call it mid November. IOTL, the Russian army retreated for 100 days. Here, we add another 90 or so days of losses.

Net, Net, the trade is a broken Russia by Christmas 1915 for the POTENTIAL damage to the Ottomans over the winter of 1915/16. Your suggestion is a way to write a German wank.

Click to expand...

Given the 100 miles from railhead logistic limit of WW1 could the Germans advance for another 90 days?