WI: US Marines used as Army replacements WW1?

Inspired by this thread https://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=350690 about US Army troops being used as replacements in Allied armies in WW1.

WI the US Marines did not form the 4th Brigade, under command of BG Doyen? Instead their companies or battalions were scattered throughout Army units, perhaps a rationale being to spread the Marines combat experience more widely?

A related question: what happens to Marine Generals who commanded at the brigade and divisional levels?

Had this happened the Marine officers would hae served in the appropriate billets anyway. the AEF was to short of trained officers to turn any away. Specific commanders may have done so, but the General, or Major would have been snatched up by another commanders with more good sense.

Would have been out of character in the ranks. The US Army did not mix soldiers much other than regular army officers. Even that caused trouble. On the shelf here is a book by the commander of a Indiana militia regiment, the 4th, taken into the army. While training three recent graduates of West Point appeared in the Adjutants office with orders to the regiment. The little group made it known serving with militia was beneath their station & they were refusing their orders. The Colonel had to threaten them with court martial to get their attention to the facts.

Another example was the assignment of a Colored Regiment to the 42d 'Rainbow' Division. That threatened trouble with two of the three other regiments in the division, particularly the White Alabama Regiment. Replacements fit in not as well when distributed & some officers assigning them attempted to match them with the regiments. ie: sending Irishmen from New York or Native Americans from South Dakota to the appropriate National Guard Regiment.

There were quite a few USMC officers serving outside the Marine Corps with the AEF during WW1...I was quite surprised when I saw this while doing some research...

In fact, both Charles Doyen and

In fact, both Charles Doyen and John A. Lejeune commanded the 2nd Division in France as major generals; Lejeune led the division for much of 1918.

Best,

It is common practice for an 'outsider' to command a unit when their forces make up a major portion of the unit strength. So in broad terms it is not very unusual that Legeune commanded the 2nd division given the major marine contingent but it would be close to unthinkable for him or Doyen to command a division with few to no marines.

I have no doubt that these men would have been given jobs commensurate with their rank if the brigade had not been formed but most likely in staff positions rather than outright field commands.

Riain said:

It is common practice for an 'outsider' to command a unit when their forces make up a major portion of the unit strength. So in broad terms it is not very unusual that Legeune commanded the 2nd division given the major marine contingent but it would be close to unthinkable for him or Doyen to command a division with few to no marines.

I have no doubt that these men would have been given jobs commensurate with their rank if the brigade had not been formed but most likely in staff positions rather than outright field commands.

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The infantry strength of the 2d Division was 50% Marine, but the artillery was all Army IIRC. The other service units were predominately Army as well. So, the Marines did not dominate the 2d Div strength.

Lejeunes commands in France included a brigade of the 32 Division first, then the 4th Marine Brigade. I've not found any evidence of Marine regiments or battalions in the 32 Div at the time Lejeune commanded that brigade. It was formed from National Guard regiments from Wisconson & adjacent states.

Lejeune's ww1 tl is:

8 June 1918 arrived in France
13 June Reported to AEF
19 June TDY observer 35th Division
5 July given command of 64th brigade, 32nd division (3 French regts as well as the US bde)
26 July given command of 4th marine brigade
28 July given command of 2nd division
28 August promoted to Major General, backdated to 1 July

That compressed tl leads me to believe that he was slated to command the division with the big marine contingent before he even arrived in France.

To bump this again.

WI the Marines didn't have to conform to the Army's organisation, and were allowed to form their own division?

Staff in the AEF are further anoyed by press releases that refer to "Marines". I can see any thing else of much significance.

One more division in the AEF;

1) One more division in the AEF, with (presumably) USMC and USN personnel providing the necessary artillery, engineers, medical, and service units (or it is a CAM-type organization, with Marine infantry and MG units and Army artillery, etc, but they still have to come from somewhere);

2) The Marine garrisons in the Caribbean (Haiti et al) are presumably reduced significantly to help make up the numbers, and the local constabularies are stood up that much sooner;

3) The Naval civil engineering brigade raised for the war (proto-Seabees) goes overseas, presumably serving in France;

4) Divisional experience in the AEF means the FMF is stood up sooner in the interwar period, perhaps as a single division with a brigade on each coast;

There could be some ripples, honestly...

Best,

Some of the lessons of Vera Cruz in 1914 were that the Marines needed some Brigadier Generals and lacked sustainability in longer campaigns. A full division would allow the Marines to use their own artillery and probably even some bigger guns like 155mm as well as their own aviation element. It would also give them practice in a longer campaign against much tougher opponents.

I was thinking also that the fixed defense regiment could form the basis of the division artillery.

TFSmith121 said:

1) One more division in the AEF, with (presumably) USMC and USN personnel providing the necessary artillery, engineers, medical, and service units (or it is a CAM-type organization, with Marine infantry and MG units and Army artillery, etc, but they still have to come from somewhere);

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The 2d Div was not a combined army Marine organization?

TFSmith121 said:

2) The Marine garrisons in the Caribbean (Haiti et al) are presumably reduced significantly to help make up the numbers, and the local constabularies are stood up that much sooner;

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That was attempted. Its argued the results were not 'positive'.

TFSmith121 said:

3) The Naval civil engineering brigade raised for the war (proto-Seabees) goes overseas, presumably serving in France;

4) Divisional experience in the AEF means the FMF is stood up sooner in the interwar period, perhaps as a single division with a brigade on each coast;

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OTL two combined arms expeditionary brigades were formed in the 1920s. One was deployed to Shanghai 1927-28. The equivalent to a third was gradually built up in Nicaragua, then drawn down post 1931. Proposals for a division HQ were tabled until the 1930s, the Army was to provide all larger expeditionary forces, and it did participate in traning for that in the 1920s. That was cut back to nothing in the Depression years & did not resume until the very late 1930s. During that haitus a study of how to use a Marine Div HQ was continued, but with force reduction budgeted there was no money for manning such a thing or training it.

TFSmith121 said:

There could be some ripples, honestly...

Best,

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The Army used its shrinking budget of the 1930s for other development. ie: the heavy bomber project. There was also a argument the Army had very little interest in amphibious or littoral warfare. The Joint Operations board or study group of Army/Navy officers declined in size & activity & Army participation in updating plans for War Plan Orange in that era has been criticized. The biggest ripple might have been the squabble over the $50,000 or $100,000 anual cost of standing up a new flag rank HQ. In either the 1920s or through 1938 that would have required something else be eliminated.

Riain said:

Some of the lessons of Vera Cruz in 1914 were that the Marines needed some Brigadier Generals

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There were some of those pre 1917. The Army did provide a brigade HQ for the Vera Cruz occupation, tho it seems to have spent a lot of time in the US.

Riain said:

... and lacked sustainability in longer campaigns.

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A Marine/Navy occupation force had been operating in Hati for three years.

Riain said:

A full division would allow the Marines to use their own artillery and probably even some bigger guns like 155mm as well as their own aviation element.

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Marine aviation predated 1917

Riain said:

It would also give them practice in a longer campaign against much tougher opponents.

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Slightly different from the Marine officers in assorted staff poistions in the AEF, but not a lot.

Riain said:

I was thinking also that the fixed defense regiment could form the basis of the division artillery.

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Those were battalions, & some Marines were drawn from those to fill out the USN personel manning heavy artillery battierys in the AEF.

If there is a "Marine Division" in the AEF

Carl Schwamberger;10622848 - The 2d Div was not a combined army Marine organization?.[/QUOTE]

If there is a "Marine Division" in the AEF, beyond the 2nd - presumably the 4th (5th and 6th Marines, 6th Marine MG btn) and 5th Marine brigades (11th and 13th Marines, 5th Marine MG btn) are joined, according to the OP - then said division needs (to match the AEF TO&E) at least a field artillery brigade headqaurters, three artillery regiments (2 btns each), a third MG battalion, an engineer regiment, a signals btn, etc. The 2nd Division presumably gets an infantry brigade and MG btn made up of RA elements from the US, drawn from one or more of the 1918 divisions...

My take on the 2nd Division as it was historically is it was an army division with (at times) a USMC CG and six Marine rifle battalions (of 12) and one Marine MG battalion (of 3).

The suggested "Marine" division would be something less than an army division with Marine attachments and more a Marine division with Army and/or Navy attachments, in terms of organizational culture - not unlike the various French "Division Bleus" over the years...

Thinking about it, presumably the CEC could provide the engineer regiment, and the USN could (probably) come up with enough men for a 155 regiment (of two battalions; maybe they are USN-manned 152s?); the third MG btn and the four battalions of 75s (or 76s, I guess) would be challenging, but a mix of marines, sailors, and soldiers might be enough to get it into the line by the time of a spring 1919 offensive - seems well-positioned to be the vanguard unit across the Rhine, certainly.

Presumably Lejeune commands the division, Neville and Cole the infantry brigades...

Couple that with the 1st Division converted to paratroops idea, and its VARSITY, circa-1919...Patton has to command the tanks, of course.

Interestingly enough, there's an official history of the Marines in WWI, in which the following is included:

November 11, 1918 - The US Marine Corps totalled 72,920 officers and men, of whom 24,555 were serving with the American Expeditionary Force in Europe, with 2,073 on sea duty. The rest were serving in the Azores, China, Guam, Haiti, Hawaiian Islands, Nicaragua, Philippine Islands, Porto Rico, Santo Domingo, Virgin Islands, with 37,043 in the United States.

Presumably could get a division out of that by the spring of 1919, plus additional recruiting...

Here's the link - at least two USMC officers commanded army infantry regiments in the AEF, beyond those of the 4th Brigade, as well...

http://www.naval-history.net/WW1NavyUSMC-aChronology.htm

Best,

Apparently the Commandant of the Marines was keen to create a Marine division but encountered difficulties put forward by the Army. For example they wanted to send the 10th Rgt, the artillery rgt, but the Army vetoed this because there wasn't enough 75s to give them and they didn't want the supply problems with the 3" guns the Marines used. The Marines/Navy were developing a tracked 7" ex-naval gun artillery unit but finished this too late for it to be shipped to France.

It would certainly be doable, but I think

It would certainly be doable, but I think it would take until the planned 1919 spring offensive ... Which would have increased the size of the AEF by (at least) half again, probably ~65+ divisions, all of them at the full "square" TO&E, other than (presumably) the Cavalry Division and the Philippine Division, which - if it had made it to France - probably would have been used in a "very" quiet sector.

The Cavalry Division, however, presumably would have been kept mounted for the hoped-for breakout, and if a Marine Division had been formed, and the 1st Division reorganized and trained as parachute troops, there's certainly an obvious case for the spearhead of the Rhine crossing in the AEF's sector - presumably south of the Ruhr, with the British and French massed to the north, and a secondary French-manned sector south of the AEF and north of the Swiss border...

A race to Berlin in 1919 would be interesting.

Best,

1919 would be the tl for a division organised along army lines, but what if the Marines could create their own division along their own lines? Would they have triangular brigades and smaller companies?

I doubt it; the AEF organized the square divisions for

Riain said:

1919 would be the tl for a division organised along army lines, but what if the Marines could create their own division along their own lines? Would they have triangular brigades and smaller companies?

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I doubt it; the AEF's divisions were organized as they were for a reason, and the 12 maneuver battalions, three engineer battalions, nine fire support battalions (plus the equivalent of a tenth in the separate mortar batteries) gave them tremendous staying power, on the defensive or offensive - the U.S. division was roughly twice the numbers as the typical British or French division by 1918, and it would have been even more so by 1919.

And given that all the armies were still dependent on foot mobility, I don't think the critique of the square divisions as unwieldy is all that significant; the vast majority of the AEF divisions moved as well as the vast majority of the Allied divisions in the offensives in the summer-autumn of 1918, so that doesn't seem to have been all that much of an issue.

And at the most, the Marines would have had one division; they'd be assigned to a corps with three or so Army divisions, being supported by AUS corps, army, army group, and theater organizations, getting AUS units of fire and supply, etc...

A "light" (very relative) TO&E would make sense for the cavalry division and for one or more of the 1st Division's brigades if trained and equipped for air mobility, but this putative Marine Divsion won't be landing on a beach somewhere, it will be grinding through French and German countryside and - maybe - making a river crossing or three...

Best,

The European armies would also be considered light if the measure is rifle strength, however their divisions, Corps and Armies were bristling with artillery and machine guns by 1917. Even if a Marine division used an expansion of their 100 or so man company and created triangular divisions if they had enough artillery they wouldn't be considered 'light'.

"Light" in comparison to the AEF standard

Riain said:

The European armies would also be considered light if the measure is rifle strength, however their divisions, Corps and Armies were bristling with artillery and machine guns by 1917. Even if a Marine division used an expansion of their 100 or so man company and created triangular divisions if they had enough artillery they wouldn't be considered 'light'.

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"Light" in comparison to the AEF standard "square" divisions, which numbered more than 24,000 men at full TO&E, and with more artillery (7) and MG (3) battalions than their allied counteparts.

Best,

TFSmith121 said:

"Light" in comparison to the AEF standard "square" divisions, which numbered more than 24,000 men at full TO&E, and with more artillery (7) and MGs (3) than their allied counteparts.

Best,

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Was the us army tactically and doctrinally up with the British, French or Germans in 1917? Because these armies had abandoned such huge divisions.