Was not breaking out of Stalingrad the right decision?

Was not breaking out of Stalingrad the right decision?

  • Yes, stay put

    Votes: 26 30.6%
  • No, breakout

    Votes: 59 69.4%

  • Total voters
    85
Was Hitler's decision not to have the 6th Army breakout of Stalingrad the right move?

Obssessednuker summarized this perfectly in one of my other threads:

"A German retreat from Stalingrad would...

Result in the 6th Army getting ripped to shreds in the open. They were already suffering from shortages of food, ammunition, and fuel even before the Soviet pincers had swung shut. The vast majority of the army's draft animals had been sent to Rostov in order to reduce the strain of shipping their fodder east, which effectively immobilized their artillery. And their armor was bogged down in the midst of fighting inside the city. By the time they were extricated from the city and ready for a breakout attempt, the Soviets had consolidated their gains and set-up defenses.

You are asking half-starved men to wade through a hundred+ kilometer of waist high snow in sub-zero temperatures carrying somewhere between 50-100 pounds of weapons, ammunition, clothing, and supplies with no artillery or air support while being fully exposed to the full force of Soviet firepower. They would not have made it.

Even worse, a more rapid destruction of the 6th Army would free up the five Soviet armies that were tied down having to destroy it in the ruins of Stalingrad. With those forces, the Soviets could then have proceeded with the full-scale Operation Saturn."
 
Any breakout had to be fully coordinated with attacks to enable this to occur . The traditional idea of a breakout being along the shortest route is a bad idea , what they needed to do is have the breakout occur along the old soviet front lines and their fore through the rear areas of the surrounding formations . they need an attack along the expected axis to occur 24 hours earlier , and it is still probably going to fail , Stalingrad was a mistake in itself , the city was not as important as controlling access to it .
 
Any breakout had to be fully coordinated with attacks to enable this to occur . The traditional idea of a breakout being along the shortest route is a bad idea , what they needed to do is have the breakout occur along the old soviet front lines

The only place there are "old Soviet frontlines" is deep within Soviet controlled territory. Anywhere they try to advance, they are going to be advancing into Soviet defensive positions, in waist high snow, in sub-zero temperatures, with little-to-nothing in the way of air, artillery, or armored support. And even once they get through the Soviet defensive positions facing inwards to the pocket, they are going to be continuously assailed by counterattacks from Soviet armored forces which they will be horribly vulnerable too strung out on the open steppe. And we are talking having to walk at least a distance of 65 km (the closest Manstein ever managed to get). This is something men who are dropping dead from starvation in increasing numbers are going to have quite a bit of difficulty doing.

Anyone who claims the 6th Army could have broken out of Stalingrad should try the following: first, starve yourself half-to-death. Second, outfit yourself with the dozens of pounds of gear a soldier is expected to carry. Third, attempt to hike 65 kilometers in waist high snow. In all probability, you'll collapse and die before you even make it a kilometer.

Now consider that, unlike the 6th Army in this hypothetical scenario, you don't have the issue of people shooting at you from fortified positions or shelling you with artillery or trying to run you down in tanks...

After November 19th, 1942, even if they didn't recognize it at the time and refused to do so later, the Germans had effectively two choices in the death of the 6th Army: a slow death or a fast one. The OTL choice, a slow death, means 5 Soviet armies get tied down. A fast death that would accompany an attempted breakout means those Soviet armies are able to be unleashed against the Italo-Hungarian armies on the Don and power through to Rostov before the Germans can get Army Group A out of the Caucasus. And if that happens, then you can forget about the Germans even hoping to mount something like Kursk or even a semi-successful fighting withdrawal in the summer of 1943.
 
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By the time the Germans were in a position to be asking that question it was already too late. A more serious breakout attempt might save more men and equipment and there's no way the Germans could lose worse than they already did. The only thing staying put gets is holding down the Soviets for longer during the period where weather limited their capacity for action and if they do take out the 6th Army during its breakout those troops still won't be fit for immediate deployment to exploit that.
 
A more serious breakout attempt might save more men and equipment and there's no way the Germans could lose worse than they already did.

Four words: full-scale Operation Saturn.

and if they do take out the 6th Army during its breakout those troops still won't be fit for immediate deployment to exploit that.
This is not supported IOTL: the forces that were used in Operation Ring were immediately redeployed to the Orel-Kursk-Kharkov axis once the 6th Army's pocket had been crushed. If 6th Army is destroyed in December, then ATL those forces would be redeployed to the Don River for use in Saturn. With at least five extra armies, the Soviet will shatter the Italo-Hungarian forces much faster and roll over the German forces Von Manstein scratched up to stall them. Once that is done, there is nothing between them, the Black Sea, and the effective encirclement of a half-million Germans.
 
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sharlin

Banned
Not breaking out doomed them to a far slower and more painful death than would have been granted if they had tried, but as folks have said, breaking out, getting annihilated whilst doing so then frees up massive numbers of Soviet troops and kit for operations elsewhere.

So sadly, sitting and staying put was the best of two terrible options which was basically. "Lick a belt sander or put your junk against it."
 
Four words: full-scale Operation Saturn.

This is not supported IOTL: the forces that were used in Operation Ring were immediately redeployed to the Orel-Kursk-Kharkov axis once the 6th Army's pocket had been crushed. If 6th Army is destroyed in December, then ATL those forces would be redeployed to the Don River for use in Saturn. With at least five extra armies, the Soviet will shatter the Italo-Hungarian forces much faster and roll over the German forces Von Manstein scratched up to stall them. Once that is done, there is nothing between them, the Black Sea, and the effective encirclement of a half-million Germans.

Could not the axis troops then move to the Black sea and be evacuated to Ukraine?
 

marathag

Banned
Dying with a gun in your hand sounds better than being worked to death in Siberia.

5% survival rate

An attempted breakout is better odds
 
The question is "when".

Breaking out in February would be a doomed operation.

Breaking out in December in conjuction with the Manstein-led operation or even better breaking out in November, once it became clear, how dangerous the situation had become would probably fare alot better.

It would however have bern a huge gamble. Were the Germans to be routed during their retreat, then the entire Army Group A in the Caucasus may have been cut off.
 
I voted to Breakout - but As far as I can recall their was no strategic purpose in capturing Stalingrad so they should not have been there in the first place

The Goal for the German Army in 1942 was the Oil in the Caucasus - the Stalingrad and other Volga based operations where intended to guard the flank of this operation.

I think the Battle Of Stalingrad was a case of unnecessary Mission Creep upon which the German High command and Hitler became fixated.

Basically they should not have been there in the first place and when it became apparent that the Battle was lost (or even stalemated) the Germans should have pulled back.
 

Result in the 6th Army getting ripped to shreds in the open. They were already suffering from shortages of food, ammunition, and fuel even before the Soviet pincers had swung shut.

only a hand full of them survived being POWs in siberia, i fail to see how it can get any worse.

in fact more might survive "getting ripped to shreds in the open" simply by getting lost and finding themselves on the other side of the front and retreating from there.
 
By the time the Germans were in a position to be asking that question it was already too late.

A skilled general with some nads would have and could have read the situation and pulled out before the end regardless of what Hitler thought.

If anything the situation was more dire in El Alamein in November 1942, but where there is a will there is a way to get the hell out as long as you figure out the position can't be held in a reasonable time frame.
 
only a hand full of them survived being POWs in siberia, i fail to see how it can get any worse.

in fact more might survive "getting ripped to shreds in the open" simply by getting lost and finding themselves on the other side of the front and retreating from there.

As other pointed out, 6th Army dying on the steppe in December instead of in Stalingrad in February releases a fuckton of Soviet troops which could then wreak havoc elsewhere, as was Soviet intent to begin with. Taking Rostov, for example.

Is it worse for 6th army? Probably not. Is it worse for german ary overall? Yes.
 

marathag

Banned
Is it better to die in 1943 than to be released in 1955? Is the 5 % survival valid for both choices?

We know that only 5% lived to that point.

We don't know how many would get killed/recaptured in a breakout attempt.

Can't see it being 95% fatalities. Those recaptured get the 5% in 1955 odds

what about the rest, killed outright vs escaped?

How many US troops were able to evade capture in the Ardennes when cut off in December 1944?
 
Dying with a gun in your hand sounds better than being worked to death in Siberia.

That about sums it up. Either stay put, surrender and freeze or try to break out. A certain death vs. a probable death. Better to die trying to do something than just giving up and waiting for that bum Death to come get you. Who knows, the breakout might even be marginally successful.
 
We know that only 5% lived to that point.

We don't know how many would get killed/recaptured in a breakout attempt.

Can't see it being 95% fatalities. Those recaptured get the 5% in 1955 odds

what about the rest, killed outright vs escaped?

How many US troops were able to evade capture in the Ardennes when cut off in December 1944?

I read somewere that tens of thousands POWs died before they got to a POW camp since they had to march to the nearest raillines and many axis soldiers were to weak to be able to do that.
 

Deleted member 1487

Dying with a gun in your hand sounds better than being worked to death in Siberia.

5% survival rate

An attempted breakout is better odds

Some tried after the surrender, but it didn't end well and they ended up mostly surrendering in the end:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Battle_of_Stalingrad#Aftermath
According to the German documentary film Stalingrad (1993), over 11,000 soldiers refused to lay down their arms at the official surrender. Some have presumed that they were motivated by a belief that fighting on was better than a slow death in Soviet captivity. The Israeli historian Omer Bartov claims they were motivated by National Socialism. He studied 11,237 letters sent by soldiers inside of Stalingrad between 20 December 1942 and 16 January 1943 to their families in Germany. Almost every letter expressed belief in Germany's ultimate victory and their willingness to fight and die at Stalingrad to achieve that victory.[78] Bartov reported that a great many of the soldiers were well aware that they would not be able to escape from Stalingrad, but in their letters to their families boasted that they were proud to "sacrifice themselves for the Führer".[78]

The remaining forces continued to resist, hiding in cellars and sewers, but by early March 1943, the remaining small and isolated pockets of resistance had surrendered. According to Soviet intelligence documents shown in the documentary, a remarkable NKVD report from March 1943 is available showing the tenacity of some of these German groups:
The mopping-up of counter-revolutionary elements in the city of Stalingrad proceeded. The German soldiers - who had hidden themselves in huts and trenches - offered armed resistance after combat actions had already ended. This armed resistance continued until 15 February and in a few areas until 20 February. Most of the armed groups were liquidated by March ... During this period of armed conflict with the Germans, the brigade's units killed 2,418 soldiers and officers and captured 8,646 soldiers and officers, escorting them to POW camps and handing them over.

The operative report of the Don Front's staff issued on 5 February 1943, 22.00 said:
The 64th Army was putting itself in order, being in previously occupied regions. Location of army's units is as it was previously. In the region of location of the 38 Motorized Rifle Brigade in a basement 18 armed SS-men (sic) were found, who refused to surrender, the Germans found were destroyed.[79]
 
Perhaps a coordinated breakout attempt to light up with a stronger Wintergewitter? You'd have to have the Sixth Army break out before Saturn is completed. By the time Saturn finishes, the Sixth Army is doomed.
 
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