Fearless Leader
Donor
A True and Better Alamo Redux
Part I: Moreel’s Gambit
(From: “The Rock of the Pacific: Wake Island During World War II” by Arthur Devereaux)
...Most discussions of the pivotal battles of Wake Island focus on the multiple naval engagements that took place around the atoll during the early months of the War in the Pacific. Yet few give adequate mention to the immense efforts that took place from 1939 - 1941 which enabled the island’s defenders to resist the initial attacks and come to pose such a nuisance to the Japanese plans of Pacific mastery…
…Though the strategic usefulness of Wake Atoll had long been recognized by the Americans and the US Navy in particular, work on turning the island into a valuable naval base was continually delayed. As early as 1921 when Hector Bywater in his book Sea-Power in the Pacific wrote
Of considerably more importance [than Midway] is Wake Island which lies 1,300 miles east of the Marianne group on the direct route between Hawaii, Guam, and Manila. The conversion of Wake Island into a well-defended fueling station would materially assist in consolidating this vital line of communications. (1)
Yet due to budget cutbacks and a desire for peace, Bywater’s recommended preparations languished and Wake remained unused until the arrival of Pan-American Air Ways in 1935...
...Though viewed as a militarily provocative act by the Japanese, the establishment of a Pan-American airport for its fleet of flying boats in the summer of 1935 was only partially supported by the American government. Some surveys followed, yet the nation’s strong isolationist sentiment prevented any efforts at fortification or base improvement even after Japan declared that she would no longer abide by the Washington treaty. Despite the efforts of Army, Navy, and nascent Air Force planners to incorporate Wake into America’s defensive plans, for several key years the political will to properly establish Wake as a base simply did not exist. Though not apparent at the time, on December 1st 1938 a board, headed up by the outgoing commander in chief of the U.S. Fleet Arthur J. Hepburn delivered a report commissioned six months early to the Secretary of the Navy and in so doing provided a turning point. In his report Hepburn recommended that the Atoll be fortified and transformed into a base capable of supporting a system of other bases conducive to US Operations in the region...
...Hepburn’s recommendations met with stiff resistance from the isolationist lobby in Congress and a mere month after the submission of the report the battle lines had been drawn in Washington. Initially content with solely excluding Guam from efforts at reinforcements, the isolationist lobby was encouraged by their relatively easy victory and turned their eyes on the planned construction to take place on Wake. It was their hope that by limiting American base construction west of the 180th Meridian they could prevent Roosevelt from “provoking” what was surely to be a costly war with the Japanese. Attacking provisions for Wake in the House Appropriations Committee, they managed to banish “The Wake Project” to military limbo, or so they thought (2)...
...Were it not for the cunning actions of Rear Admiral Ben Moreel, Chief of the Bureau of Yards and Docks, the construction of military facilities on Wake might have languished for months, if not years more. Yet unlike the plethora of isolationists in Congress, Moreel recognized the urgency required to prepare for war. Following the surrender of Japan, Moreel remarked that the race to fulfill Hepburn’s recommendations was “the greatest single construction contract in the history of the world in point of money value, diversity of character, and dispersion over vast distances.” He then continued by stating “I consider it one of my few genuine achievements in life, that in striving to complete this project I contributed to the safety of this nation, its initial victories, and now its ultimate victory over the Japanese.” (3)
...Rather than advocate outright for the fortification of Wake, Moreel instead requested that the Army Corps of Engineers receive a million-dollar authorization to develop ship channels at Wake. He hoped that this kind of routine, peacetime work the corps performed at ports all over the United States would be seen as innocuous enough to escape the ravages of the isolationists. Once Congress had given its consent it would be hard pressed to prevent further construction and would be far more amenable to taking measures that ensured its investment did not fall into Japanese hands (4)...
...Yet even a proposal as innocuous as Moreel’s plan to improve the harbor at Wake faced stiff resistance from those opposed to projecting America’s power too far abroad. Still, through some shrewd politicking, Moreel and by extension the Navy was able to push the proposal past the House Rivers and Harbors Committee by a single vote and get the requisite funding for their project by a similar margin. With the proper permissions in hand, both the Navy and the Corps of Engineers acted before Congress could change its mind, dispatching the 2000 ton dredge Raymond and 150 men to the isolated Atoll to begin work. Little did they know that they would face one of the toughest assignments of their career and that they would be contributing to one of the greatest battles in American history (POINT OF DIVERGENCE. See Footnote #5)...
...Upon arriving at the Atoll on June 3rd 1939 after a long journey, the Engineers and Naval officers found it to be inhospitable to say the least. Though they had familiarized themselves with the reports of Pan-Am’s construction teams to prepare for the project only when they saw and began to experience the Atoll did they realize what they were up against. Needless to say, the complex dredging and demolition operations that followed would be the defining moment of many of the engineers’ careers...
…Before examining the numerous preparations that took place in 1941, it is prudent to reacquaint ourselves with the physical layout of the atoll itself. A “V” shaped atoll, Wake is divided into 3 islands, Wake proper which forms the “body” of the V and upon which the main airbase was built, and Wilkes and Peale Islands that form the tips of the V. The entire atoll is roughly 2600 acres, most of which was covered in low dense brush unlike many other Pacific island atolls. Yet despite being a relatively small atoll, Wake possesses over 21 miles of coastline, itself surrounded by treacherous coral reefs that extend from 30-1100 yards beyond it...
...Prospects for inter-service rivalry on such a project ran high, yet fortunately, early snags were avoided as the Engineers suggestion to alter the Navy’s original plan for a ship channel were accepted quite quickly. Rather than cut through over a thousand of yards of exposed coral reef to put the channel in the mouth of the “V” of the Atoll, it was decided quite early on to focus on an easier route that enlarged the channel between Wilkes Island and Wake Island into the lagoon. This decision proved to be quite fortuitous given the difficulties involved. Had it gone another way, vital harbor facilities might still lay uncompleted as the final preparations took place in 1941 (6)...
...As the Raymond’s cutting bit began to break up the dense coral and limestone table of the Atoll, it soon became apparent that this project was an entirely different ball game. What was a fairly modest project soon ballooned in cost as more spare parts were promptly ordered to deal with the constant breakdowns that were sure to happen, along with hundreds of tons of demolition equipment which would allow personnel to continue the work begun by Pan-Am of clearing the Lagoon of coral heads. Over the next few months, initial breakdowns were overcome and strategies were formed to deal with the harsh terrain and corrosive climate of Wake. By the beginning of Winter 1939 work had reached its expected pace and the soaring costs of the operation were beginning to subside (7)...
...Fortunately for Moreel, the mounting costs of the Wake Project came at the perfect time politically as Hitler’s annexation of Czechoslovakia and invasion of Poland severely weakened the hand of isolationist politicians. Not only were said politicians unable to halt ongoing work at Wake, they also failed to prevent the slough of defense related legislation that soared through Congress in 1940. This legislation saw over ten million dollars allocated to base improvements at Wake that would allow it to host not only seaplanes, but Marine fighters, Army Air Corps bombers, and submarines. News of the additional workload arrived just as the Engineers were finishing their initial project. Though none of them looked forward to yet more months of battle against the Atoll’s seemingly impenetrable coral, all of them recognized the hefty paychecks that awaited them come the conclusion of their contract (8)...
...Fortunately, this new wave of construction required no new learning curve and the experienced men of the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Yards and Docks responded admirably. With remarkable speed they set about completely transforming the Atoll’s lagoon into what it would later become known for. Though they managed to accomplish little else in the six months prior to the arrival of the first contractors in January 1941, their contributions were absolutely foundational to future events. The extensive dredging and demolition work that occurred over the course of June 1939- January 1941 could only have occurred in times of peace. As they packed up and prepared to leave, they left behind not only an exceptional harbor in Wake’s lagoon, but a well-established base camp, dock and logistic system that considerably sped up the construction of other base facilities...
...Surprisingly, the Japanese failed to take into account the extensive nature of the American dredging project, regarding it as little more than a minor, albeit expensive, expansion to the Pan-Am facility on the island. As a result their efforts to expand their bases in the Marshalls continued apace and little was done to account for increased American activity on Wake (9)...
...Arriving on January 9th, the transport William Ward Burrows brought with it, not only more supplies, but 76 civilian contractors under Nathan D. Teters. With the dredging completed these men were to usher in a new era and focus on constructing the airfield, seaplane base, and other vital land based facilities. Over the coming months, the Ward and a few other transports would make the long journey to Wake and unload hundreds more. Taking advantage of the foundational work done by the Corps of Engineers, Teters’ men were able to begin carving a road network and airfield out of the dense brush of the main island almost immediately after landing their supplies and expanding the humble engineers encampment that had been built over a year and a half prior (10)...
...Still, in spite of the millions of dollars already poured into the Atoll and the millions already to come, upon the departure of the Corps of Engineers and the Raymond no real defensive measures were present on the island. In fact, the only real military asset on the island was fifty thousand gallons of aviation gas in a recently constructed storage unit near the Pan-Am base as per Hepburn’s original recommendation. Other than that, nothing but a handful of small arms kept the strategic atoll out of Japanese hands. Though this certainly played a role in preventing the Japanese from reacting too strongly, it nevertheless presented a striking problem to Admiral Husband J. Kimmel when he replaced Richardson as CINCUS in January 1941 (11)...
Footnotes
1. This quote and author is entirely from OTL.
2. All OTL.
3. First half of the quote is from OTL, the second half...
4. Again all OTL.
5. At last we get to the Point of Divergence. In OTL Moreel’s proposal just barely failed to cut the mustard and it was killed by the House Rivers and Harbors Committee by ONE VOTE. Now if that’s not a POD, I don’t know what is!
6. This decision was reached by the civilian contractors for the same reason when their dredging operations began in June 1941. I see no reason why a similar decision wouldn’t be reached in OTL.
7. In OTL Wake presented a number of challenges to construction efforts such as high winds, corrosive sea spray, and effervescent coral dust. In TTL the Engineers have been dealing with these factors for over a year and a half meaning that subsequent construction efforts will be well prepared.
8. Initial plans were for Wake to host six submarines, two dozen PBYs, and one carrier air group. In OTL the plans for the submarine base were only hastily drawn up and assumed that Wake and Midway were identical. In TTL these plans are better thought out and tailored to Wake.
9. Japan didn’t really react to American construction efforts in OTL, seeing their own efforts as satisfactory. I don’t see why it would be different in TTL.
10. Teters’ OTL experience was almost completely different as no dredging work had been done and no base existed at all. As a result, unloading supplies took 19 days and an entirely new base needed to be constructed from scratch. In TTL, Teters has a massive headstart on OTL.
11. Again, similar to OTL in terms of defensive preparations. In OTL, Hepburn recommended that at the very least, the Navy should fund the expansion of Pan-Am’s fuel depot so that Navy PBYs could make some use of the base should war come early. Kimmel is OTL of course.
Last edited: