AHC: British victory at Malaya and Singapore
- Thread starter Emperor Palpatine
- Start date
The obvious, and usually favourite, solution in this kind of scenario is to have the British wrap up the North Africa and East Africa campaigns as soon as possible, beating the Italians before the Germans can send the Afrika Korps to support them or that they don't have enough time for the lead units to get established and are captured/forced to withdraw as well. That would free up a lot of manpower and equipment that can be shipped out to the Far East when Japan starts making threatening noises or begins their invasion spree, and providing that Vichy don't let the Germans to operate from Tunisia or Algeria it allows the British to potentially send convoys through the Mediterranean rather than all the way round the Cape when shipping supplies to Asia.
Driftless
Donor
Wouldn't there be a bit of a chicken-or-the-egg paradox?
The Japanese attacked because the British Empire was wholly committed elsewhere, along with the sidelined French & Dutch. The synchronicity of favorable conditions lined up for the Japanese; and they captitalized on the the several opportunities. Because of that synchronicity of events, they overran a huge chunk of the globe in a few months
If the British are fully prepared, do the Japanese even attack? Or at least do they attack then?
The Japanese attacked because the British Empire was wholly committed elsewhere, along with the sidelined French & Dutch. The synchronicity of favorable conditions lined up for the Japanese; and they captitalized on the the several opportunities. Because of that synchronicity of events, they overran a huge chunk of the globe in a few months
If the British are fully prepared, do the Japanese even attack? Or at least do they attack then?
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well these are the same Japanese who thought they could beat the US so...
Japanese Options
The Japanese need oil. Singapore and Malaya don't have any known oil at the time, but are potential threats to Japanese operations in the East Indies. Even if the Japanese know the British are so strong that it might not be possible for the Japanese to completely conquer Malaya/Singapore any time soon, it still makes a certain amount of sense to attack, anyway, in the hope of pushing in far enough to be able to contain any potential British threat to operations in the East Indies.
Riain
Banned
A fair bit of cut and paste, mainly to show when major units arrived, but I'll add in a bit myself.
In 1930, just two infantry battalions were stationed in Malaya, one British and one Indian. By 1937, this had increased to three British and one Indian battalions. Reinforcement of Malaya started in September 1939 with the arrival of the 12 Indian Infantry Brigade.
Late 1939, impressed by his efforts as civil/military governor of Kenya from 1936 in preparing that territory to defend against the Italian threat from Ethiopia former Air Marshal Brooke-Popham is appointed civil/military governor of British Malaya and given the task of preparing for the defence of these territories.
Early 1940, at the urging of Governor Brooke-Popham, after having smoothed things over with the sultan of Jahore, the GOC Malaya Command MajGen Lionel Bond conducts a large exercise with the 12th IB against the garrison troops of Malacca in accordance with his plan for a close defence of Jahore and Singapore.
The next formations to arrive in Malaya were the 6 Indian Infantry Brigade and 8 Indian Infantry Brigade which landed in Malaya in October and November 1940. They came under command of the 11 Indian Infantry Division that formed in Malaya in October 1940. These two brigades both comprised three Regular Indian Army battalions, but were short of artillery support.
18 November 1940, Far East Command formed, consisting Malaya and Burma commands, Far East Air Force and the Hong Kong Garrison, with LtGen Claude Auchinleck and the commanding officer.
December 1940, 11th Division conducts its first divisional exercise in the Federated Malay States, using the Malacca garrison and 12 IB as the opponent.
The 8 Australian Infantry Division was formed in Australia on 4 July 1940 as part of the 2 Australian Imperial Force. The 22 Brigade, which had been formed in New South Wales, was deployed to Malaya on 2 February 1941. This bought the total number of field Brigades to 4.
In March and April 1941, another division was sent from India to Malaya, this formation being the 9 Indian Infantry Division, comprising the 15 and 22 Indian Infantry Brigades. This formation also comprised units from the pre-war Regular Indian Army, but again was short of artillery. On arrival in Malaya, the brigades were redistributed between the two divisions. The 6 and 15 Brigades came under command of the 11 Division, with the 8 and 22 Brigades under command of the 9 Division. This was done to balance out the experience of the formations. Two British Army battalions (2 East Surrey's and 1 Leicestershires) joined the 11 Division, one being allocated to each brigade.
27 April 1941 LtGen Percival, the author of the 1937 study of Malay's strategic vulnerabilities, is appointed to GOC Malaya Command.
With two divisions now stationed in Malaya, a corps, headquarters was required, so the III Indian Corps was formed in May 1941. First Corps manoeuvres conducted in June, second in July.
August 1941, considering the still outstanding request from January for more troops and the non aggression pact signed with Thailand the previous year the civil and military authorities in Malaya decide against a plan to pre-emptively move large forces into Thailand to forestall a Japanese landing. The plan is to defend the beaches of Kota Baru in northwestern Malaya and send a blocking force a short distance into Thailand to defend a road cutting known as 'The Ledge' once war has broken out, this is known as operation Krohcol.
27 Brigade, 8 Australian Infantry Division arrived in Malaya in August 1941. First divisional exercise conducted in September 1941.
The 28 Indian Infantry Brigade arrived in August 1941 to act as corps reserve. This brings the total field brigades to 8.
September 1941, Duff Cooper arrives in Singapore as a special Cabinet Envoy. He acknowledges that Governor Brooke-Popham has done considerable good work in creating a political environment where the military can train unfettered by local sultans, but is critical of a lack of other preparations such as air raid shelters. B-P is happy to use Cooper's authority and make an excuse for a lack of local sympathy by being an outsider to get the civil authorities and population more prepared for war.
Early November 1941, major force on force Corps exercise with III Indian corps opposing 8 AIF Div and the Army reserve of 12 ID and Dinding garrison troops in the north of the FMS. As a result it is decided that the 12 IB which has been in country for 2 years will be the Corps reserve and 8 AIF and 28 IB be sent to Jahore and Singapore respectively for further training.
Hows that for a start?
In 1930, just two infantry battalions were stationed in Malaya, one British and one Indian. By 1937, this had increased to three British and one Indian battalions. Reinforcement of Malaya started in September 1939 with the arrival of the 12 Indian Infantry Brigade.
Late 1939, impressed by his efforts as civil/military governor of Kenya from 1936 in preparing that territory to defend against the Italian threat from Ethiopia former Air Marshal Brooke-Popham is appointed civil/military governor of British Malaya and given the task of preparing for the defence of these territories.
Early 1940, at the urging of Governor Brooke-Popham, after having smoothed things over with the sultan of Jahore, the GOC Malaya Command MajGen Lionel Bond conducts a large exercise with the 12th IB against the garrison troops of Malacca in accordance with his plan for a close defence of Jahore and Singapore.
The next formations to arrive in Malaya were the 6 Indian Infantry Brigade and 8 Indian Infantry Brigade which landed in Malaya in October and November 1940. They came under command of the 11 Indian Infantry Division that formed in Malaya in October 1940. These two brigades both comprised three Regular Indian Army battalions, but were short of artillery support.
18 November 1940, Far East Command formed, consisting Malaya and Burma commands, Far East Air Force and the Hong Kong Garrison, with LtGen Claude Auchinleck and the commanding officer.
December 1940, 11th Division conducts its first divisional exercise in the Federated Malay States, using the Malacca garrison and 12 IB as the opponent.
The 8 Australian Infantry Division was formed in Australia on 4 July 1940 as part of the 2 Australian Imperial Force. The 22 Brigade, which had been formed in New South Wales, was deployed to Malaya on 2 February 1941. This bought the total number of field Brigades to 4.
In March and April 1941, another division was sent from India to Malaya, this formation being the 9 Indian Infantry Division, comprising the 15 and 22 Indian Infantry Brigades. This formation also comprised units from the pre-war Regular Indian Army, but again was short of artillery. On arrival in Malaya, the brigades were redistributed between the two divisions. The 6 and 15 Brigades came under command of the 11 Division, with the 8 and 22 Brigades under command of the 9 Division. This was done to balance out the experience of the formations. Two British Army battalions (2 East Surrey's and 1 Leicestershires) joined the 11 Division, one being allocated to each brigade.
27 April 1941 LtGen Percival, the author of the 1937 study of Malay's strategic vulnerabilities, is appointed to GOC Malaya Command.
With two divisions now stationed in Malaya, a corps, headquarters was required, so the III Indian Corps was formed in May 1941. First Corps manoeuvres conducted in June, second in July.
August 1941, considering the still outstanding request from January for more troops and the non aggression pact signed with Thailand the previous year the civil and military authorities in Malaya decide against a plan to pre-emptively move large forces into Thailand to forestall a Japanese landing. The plan is to defend the beaches of Kota Baru in northwestern Malaya and send a blocking force a short distance into Thailand to defend a road cutting known as 'The Ledge' once war has broken out, this is known as operation Krohcol.
27 Brigade, 8 Australian Infantry Division arrived in Malaya in August 1941. First divisional exercise conducted in September 1941.
The 28 Indian Infantry Brigade arrived in August 1941 to act as corps reserve. This brings the total field brigades to 8.
September 1941, Duff Cooper arrives in Singapore as a special Cabinet Envoy. He acknowledges that Governor Brooke-Popham has done considerable good work in creating a political environment where the military can train unfettered by local sultans, but is critical of a lack of other preparations such as air raid shelters. B-P is happy to use Cooper's authority and make an excuse for a lack of local sympathy by being an outsider to get the civil authorities and population more prepared for war.
Early November 1941, major force on force Corps exercise with III Indian corps opposing 8 AIF Div and the Army reserve of 12 ID and Dinding garrison troops in the north of the FMS. As a result it is decided that the 12 IB which has been in country for 2 years will be the Corps reserve and 8 AIF and 28 IB be sent to Jahore and Singapore respectively for further training.
Hows that for a start?
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interesting. There is however, the issue of the RAF in Malaya which was hopelessly outdated. The British also need to send tanks to Malaya to combat Japanese tanks which were a horrible surprise.
With hindsight, that would be the obvious thing to do. However, the British at the time felt relatively confident in stopping a Japanese invasion (or at least, that's what I think was the opinion, all the Allies in the Eastern Theatre generally underestimated the potential combat performance of the Japanese at the start). What's more, they had members of the Axis already at war with them on what amounted to their front doorstep. Why send precious soldiers and planes to defend a peninsula against an enemy you're not fighting when you could send them to combat an enemy you very much are? Why puff up the Eastern Fleet when you have vital convoys in the Atlantic getting sunk?
The major focus of military operations in the wake of total Axis defeat in North Africa would be:
1. Defense of Great Britain, and the convoys feeding and fueling her.
2. Strengthening of Allied domination in the Mediterranean.
3. Bombing of German war production.
The political focus would be roping in whomever would join the Allies, especially the United States.
Note how none of thus makes any mention of the Far East. Although, the improved situation in North Africa would make reinforcement of the Eastern Theatre a far smaller task.
So Brooke-Popham would be replacing Shenton Thomas as governor of the Straits Settlements, and in that role also High Commissioner for the Federated Malay States and dealing with the Unfederated States as well? As you say he apparently did pretty well in the similar job in Kenya. Who do you think would take over as the main military commander under him?
IIRC the British would of had hardly any landing craft available at that point so aside from some small raids it would be a case of having the various units sitting about in North Africa or ship them off to the Far East where local commanders and politicians having been calling for more resources and you can at least use friendly ports to unload them. I'm not really quite sure what infantry divisions or Hurricane squadrons would be contributing to the Battle of the Atlantic or the bomber campaign. Maybe I'm inadvertently using hindsight a little too much but I don't think moving some reinforcements out there would be completely crazy.
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I will add to this
4. Sending supplies to 'prop' up Russia - this included hundreds of Tanks and Hurricanes
Had some of those been diverted to Singapore and Burma say 4 wings of Hurricanes - about 160 aircraft - and 2 Brigades of Armor - about 300 Valentine Tanks as well as more Artillery then jobs a goodun
A standard issue "Keith Park" being sent out might help as well but then he was needed in Malta and North Africa.......bit too early for clones???
Riain
Banned
The IJA sent so few troops that they needed armour and air superiority to even the odds. Malaya isn't the rolling plains of the Ukraine, it has a lot over cover against tanks and planes. With well trained troops, not caught flat footed by a half arsed Matador, fighting on the defensive air and armour superiority shouldn't be a crushing problem.
Riain
Banned
Yes, Thomas mired in peacetime inertia even during the invasion.
I don't know who would replace B-P, but a general would be better than an AVM because of the weakness of the FEAF compared to the Army.
I think history has been unfair to Percival - he had been a good officer at every other level throughout his career - he then gets given the job of commanding the army sent to defend the place having written a paper on the Defence of Malaya but not given the forces he needed.
With sufficient forces I think he is probably good enough a senior staff officer
As it was in OTL he suffered a Breakdown due to the stress of trying to stop the Japanese and should have been replaced by his staff - his 2IC should have stepped up - that's his job!
As for:-
"18 November 1940, Far East Command formed, consisting Malaya and Burma commands, Far East Air Force and the Hong Kong Garrison. (I need an AVM or LtGen for command of this joint force, any ideas?)"
The Auk? He was "out of work" at this time and had commanded disparate forces before with some success. He would be sent out to command the forces in the Burma theatre anyway and was instrumental in Supporting Uncle Bill Slims 14th Army from the summer of 1943.
he should have obeyed Churchill and fought to the death Stalingrad style. Yamashita did not have enough supplies to capture Singapore in house to house fighting.
Riain
Banned
Yamashita shouldn't have made it to Singapore at all, he should have been bogged down in the fms somewhere.
The Brits did have 'tanks' in Malaya, but they were Mathilda Is, with NO CANNON, only a machine gun.
Just a handful of Mathilda IIs even with its 2pounder pop gun would put paid to the Japanese tankettes, and help a lot.
Clearly, it would be 'easy' to stop the invasion - even up to the final days at Singapore. Whether the Brits could hold out once the Japanese brought in more troops might be another question. Especially when/if the Japanese take Sumatra, which makes Singapore pretty untenable.
Still, even stopping the first effort would make Britain look a lot less clueless, and might help its rep in the post war situation.
Also, any reinforcements for Malaya have to come from somewhere, since the Japanese war effort was on such a slender shoestring. That may well mean Burma holds, even if Singapore eventually falls.
Just a handful of Mathilda IIs even with its 2pounder pop gun would put paid to the Japanese tankettes, and help a lot.
Clearly, it would be 'easy' to stop the invasion - even up to the final days at Singapore. Whether the Brits could hold out once the Japanese brought in more troops might be another question. Especially when/if the Japanese take Sumatra, which makes Singapore pretty untenable.
Still, even stopping the first effort would make Britain look a lot less clueless, and might help its rep in the post war situation.
Also, any reinforcements for Malaya have to come from somewhere, since the Japanese war effort was on such a slender shoestring. That may well mean Burma holds, even if Singapore eventually falls.
Riain
Banned
I think the British were winning the race to reinforce malaya. During the campaign the ija bought in the imperial gaurds division in January but the British bought in the 18th division and 2 Indian brigades in January and February.
If the campaign up the peninsula had been going well enough the 18th could have shaken down and been a valuable addition. The 2 Indian brigades could have freed better trained units.
If the campaign up the peninsula had been going well enough the 18th could have shaken down and been a valuable addition. The 2 Indian brigades could have freed better trained units.
Riain
Banned
2 December, Force Z consisting of the new Battleship Prince of Wales and WW1 battlecruiser Repulse and escorting destroyers, commanded by Vice Admiral Tom Phillips arrives in Singapore to much public fanfare.
3 December, leaders conference between Duff Cooper, Governor Brooke-Popham, LtGens Aukinleck, Percival and Heath and VAdm Phillips takes place at Singapore Naval Base.
6 December Hudsons from RAF 1 sqn sight the Japanese invasion convoy at sea. Commanders put their forces on alert.
7/8 December 5th Division lands in southern Thailand and 18th Division lands around Kota Bharu. This is engaged by the 8th Bde of the 9th Indian division and 1 sqn RAAF Hudsons, with 22nd Bde forming up in deeper defence position to the rear.
8 December the civil and military leadership of Malaya gives order to initiate operation Krohcol. 6 bde 11 Indian division begins moving rapidly toward Khro despite the first Indian soldier to cross the border being shot dead by Thai gendarmerie and other Thai forces harassing the advancing column. Despite this delay the brigade arrives before the IJN 5th division and digs in. Force Z sorties mid morning hoping to be at Kota Baru on the night of the 9/10th.
8/9 December, after inflicting and taking heavy losses 8bde withdraws from the landing area near Kota Baru and moves to concentrate as a division. Initial units in operation Krohcol reach the town of Kroh, some 30 miles into Thailand.
3 December, leaders conference between Duff Cooper, Governor Brooke-Popham, LtGens Aukinleck, Percival and Heath and VAdm Phillips takes place at Singapore Naval Base.
6 December Hudsons from RAF 1 sqn sight the Japanese invasion convoy at sea. Commanders put their forces on alert.
7/8 December 5th Division lands in southern Thailand and 18th Division lands around Kota Bharu. This is engaged by the 8th Bde of the 9th Indian division and 1 sqn RAAF Hudsons, with 22nd Bde forming up in deeper defence position to the rear.
8 December the civil and military leadership of Malaya gives order to initiate operation Krohcol. 6 bde 11 Indian division begins moving rapidly toward Khro despite the first Indian soldier to cross the border being shot dead by Thai gendarmerie and other Thai forces harassing the advancing column. Despite this delay the brigade arrives before the IJN 5th division and digs in. Force Z sorties mid morning hoping to be at Kota Baru on the night of the 9/10th.
8/9 December, after inflicting and taking heavy losses 8bde withdraws from the landing area near Kota Baru and moves to concentrate as a division. Initial units in operation Krohcol reach the town of Kroh, some 30 miles into Thailand.