General in Chief McClellan crushes the South in 1862. What is his postwar career?

McClellan drafted a pretty good multi theatre strategic offensive for 1862; Union armies would break through the Confederate cordon in TN and advance towards Vicksburg and Chattanooga in the West, and circumvent the Confederate fortifications around Manassas and march along the shortest land route to besiege Richmond in the East. Cut off the head of the snake, cut them in half, and take the gateway into the deep south. Unfortunately for the Union war effort, the General in Chief slot was left vacant, while also making McClellan responsible for a field army. Worst possible use of his abilities.

McClellan was ambitious as all hell, and success would only fuel his ego. However, he only formally entered politics after 1863, when he became a democrat, and that was after Emancipation alienated him. Strongly believing in hidden Southern unionism, he opposed large scale confiscation of property, especially Emancipation. If McClellan's plan is successful (in such a way that doesn't leave him room to accuse Lincoln of sabotaging him) in swiftly ending the war, would Lincoln give him a cabinet position, or keep him as commanding general for the next forty years? If so, would this keep him from joining the democrats, and emerging as their obvious frontrunner for the 64 elections?

While they were ultimately the right move, conscription and Emancipation gave the Democrats something they could really run against in 1864; even without their traditional base of support in the South, which didn't cast a single vote in Lincoln's name in 1860, they got within 44k votes of beating him. Would the relative lack of bloodshed and unpopular war measures be enough to make up for the quick reintegration of the South into the political landscape?

Not particularly likely. McClellan was a cautious man at heart. He consistently overestimated Confederate forces.

I think the notion Noodles is proposing is that McClellan makes the overall plan but doesn't lead the army in the field - accordingly he wouldn't get such an opportunity to overestimate the Confederate army.

The alt-Seven Days would probably go differently, right? A less tepid commander than McClellan could have kept up the attack hard and wouldn't have basically fought the entire campaign as an elaborate retreat. If McClellan isn't on site and is only hearing good news, he'll have no cause to order a general retreat and Lee's plan could continue to be hamstrung by his inexperience.

At the very least we could see an early siege of Richmond from that.

Practical Lobster said:

I think the notion Noodles is proposing is that McClellan makes the overall plan but doesn't lead the army in the field - accordingly he wouldn't get such an opportunity to overestimate the Confederate army.

The alt-Seven Days would probably go differently, right? A less tepid commander than McClellan could have kept up the attack hard and wouldn't have basically fought the entire campaign as an elaborate retreat. If McClellan isn't on site and is only hearing good news, he'll have no cause to order a general retreat and Lee's plan could continue to be hamstrung by his inexperience.

At the very least we could see an early siege of Richmond from that.

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Yeah, his plan was actually good he just didn't have the guts to see it through. If he stays in Washington another commander would likely succeed.

McClellan wants these operations to mutually support each other; if he can push Halleck to take Chattanooga in the West, the army on the Peninsula is going to be less apprehensive about advancing. Even if the Peninsula and Shendandoah armies still fail (not a guarantee, depending on who's in charge, if Lincoln still insists on binding the army to a railroad, and if Johnston is still wounded), taking Chattanooga is going to shorten the war by 17 months then and there. Grant might get beat up at Shiloh without Buell to reinforce, but he also might be more cautious without support coming in, and receive the Army of Mississippi more readily.

Chattanooga is really the lynchpin of the Confederate war effort; Bragg needed it for his Kentucky campaign, it was a key rail hub, and in 1862, there's nothing protecting it, and there's nothing protecting Atlanta past it. McClellan is a railroad guy; he worked on them before the war, mobilized troops by rail in the department of Ohio, and recognizes Chattanooga's importance as a rail hub. Let Albert Sidney Johnston give Grant a good slug; he's not going to take and hold Memphis, and definitely not Nashville. He can hold Corinth or Tupelo, but once Chattanooga falls, he'll have to give up either Mississippi or Georgia to Grant or Buell.

There are four main campaigns going on here: N Mississippi, E Tennessee, the Valley, and the Peninsula, plus coastal operations. Applying pressure consistently across all theatres, the Confederates are going to break somewhere, quite possibly everywhere in Spring 62. Then it's just a big mop up.

He'd already burned many bridges with Lincoln by that point, though; would Lincoln be humble and generous enough to tolerate and reward someone as arrogant and abrasive as McClellan for some really magnificent success, or would he try to get rid of him once he was no longer needed? McClellan was definitely enjoying his power by 1861, though I don't think he'd be one to make a bid for dictatorship (part of his opposition to advocates of hard war was that it would intensify the war, turn it into an act of conquest, necessitate a military dictatorship, reduce the south to subjugated provinces, and kill republican government). I could see him still going over to the Democrats after the war; he doesn't like Lincoln or abolitionists, and Winfield Scott Hancock carried the South quite handily despite being a Union general because he was a Democrat.

In this scenario, it is highly likely McClellan becomes President at some point. Maybe not in 1864. Such a quick win would boost Lincoln's popularity as well, and Lincoln would have a good shot at winning in 1864 especially if we have a reconstruction like scenario where multiple southern states cannot vote. Also, 1864 is probably too soon for a proper McClellan political career. He'd likely remain the country's highest ranking military officer for some time, and when he resigns he'll probably need a few years in civilian life.

However, by 1868 or any later year, I can see him becoming Democratic Party's candidate for President and easily winning.

I imagine he'd have a career similar to Eisenhower's. A moderate, prudent man who retains the achievements of his predecessors while while avoiding any "excesses". He'd be primarily concerned with reconciling north and south. After his presidency, he'd be a very successful businessman and senior statesman.

The South's reentry to the Union would likely be much quicker than OTL, considering this war would end without mass destruction and emancipation. McClellan probably dislikes Lincoln enough to try it if he has a shot, and I think he would if they could get the South back in before 1864. McClellan would probably sweep the South as a Democrat, and guessing based on the 1860 and 1864 elections, he had a good chance of taking key states like NY, PA (his home state), and OH, and his disciples wouldn't have been weeded out of the army yet.

He could probably appeal to the latent Whig vote in addition to the Democrats; 'Lincoln started the war, McClellan finished it', use that to undercut Lincoln's war winning brand. Imagine Fremont could give Lincoln some trouble too; OTL, he considered Lincoln too soft on Emancipation, but balked when he saw the Peace Democrat platform. Without that issue unifying Republicans (and War Democrats), McClellan might well think he has a shot.

The problem is that neither side could "win" in 1862. Even if McClellan took Richmond, most of the south is untouched. Yes losing Richmond is a big loss, but the Confederates will not see themselves as defeated. IMHO had McClellan been successful prior to the 1864 election either as a field commander or as general in chief, no question he would have run for the presidency.

sloreck said:

The problem is that neither side could "win" in 1862.

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I think it would be tough to win the war in 1862 too, but if the Peninsula Campaign is quickly successful and there is an alternate Shiloh with Grant still in field command, the Union armies would be well placed to advance further into the south after April. Grant could take Vicksburg and Mobile, and the Army of the Potomac could move south into North Carolina. With Richmond fallen, the Mississippi River in Union hands cutting the Confederacy in two, and multiple unions armies converging towards Atlanta, the Confederates could very well capitulate before the end of the year. If not, they'll lose by mid 1863 by latest.

It's not just Richmond, though; if Buell takes Chattanooga (an objective McClellan repeatedly pushed for, and was practically undefended) and Johnston/Bragg are still in the Corinth-Tupelo area, there's nothing protecting Atlanta, and a rail line leading straight into the heart of the Confederacy. Game over. No way the South can keep fighting after Atlanta, Tredegar Iron Works, and the powder mill at Augusta are in Union hands. War's over June-ish if Army of the Tennessee's still in fighting shape after Shiloh, Army of the Ohio's rolled into Chattanooga->Georgia, and Army of the Potomac's invested Richmond. Plus, the South probably wouldn't be as invested in the fight if McClellan's making sure everyone's property is respected and there's no Emancipation.

Electorally, I think you can expect a very respectable showing from Mac in 1864 right off the bat if the Southern states are quickly readmitted (the goal in early 1862 was restoration, not reconstruction). Can expect about 123 of the 152 electoral votes he needs right off the bat if every non Republican state breaks his way; from there his home state of PA gets him to 150, and Lincoln was cutting it close in terms of majorities in Illinois, Indiana, Ohio, and New York in 1860, against three opponents.