Part two
By the first few minutes of December 7th, the US Navy on and around Oahu, was coming to life. The first signal from Prince Robert had caused confusion at first, mainly due to the belief that the Canadian ship was still with the Pensacola convoy. It was shortly before the final garbled report from Prince Robert that they were under fire from a Japanese heavy cruiser that it was understood that the ship had detached from the convoy and was proceeding independently back to the Canadian west coast. By the time Admiral Kimmel had arrived at Pacific Fleet Head Quarters at 2330 hrs, the first orders had already gone out and the Army had been brought in on the situation.
As the patrols covering the channel and outer area beyond had already been warned and bolstered, and orders had been sent to bring all ships in harbour to condition Zed, Kimmel was able to spend a few minutes on a situational review and prepare a signal to Washington, before settling in to the task at hand.
His first order of business was to find out just who or what was north of Hawaii. By midnight, the first of the PBY’s were ready to take off, and at 0005 hrs, the lone short notice amphibian at Ford Island was opening its throttles as it began to race across the calm waters of Pearl Harbour. It was followed shortly after by seven more PBY’s from Kaneohe, with all eight aircraft headed north to search the ocean north of Oahu.
With the initial search launched, orders were sent to all task forces at sea in, or close to, Hawaiian waters. The Task Force first contacted was TF 12, which was centered on USS Lexington. With the carrier, three heavy cruisers and five destroyers, TF 12 was en route to Midway to deliver 18 Marine dive-bombers. However, new orders were cut, bringing the Task Force about to the Southeast to close the contact reported by Prince Robert.
Task Force 3, consisting of the heavy cruiser USS Indianapolis and five destroyer-minesweepers was ordered to close with TF 12 at best speed and join with them.
Admiral Halsey’s TF 8, consisting of the carrier USS Enterprise, three heavy cruisers and nine destroyers, was at that point two hundred and eighty miles west of Oahu, returning from Wake Island. Orders had been sent to USS Minneapolis, along with a destroyer and four destroyer-minesweepers operating within eighty miles of Oahu to join with Halsey’s Task Force as they closed on Oahu. Halsey in turn was ordered to move toward Nihau and be prepared to launch aircraft as early as possible.
There were four submarines at sea in the general vicinity of Pearl Harbour, USS Pollack and Pompano to the northeast, USS Plunger patrolling off Diamond Head, and USS Thresher, returning from operations off Midway. All of these subs were ordered north of Oahu at best speed, in an effort to make contact if possible.
Of the ships in harbour, the battleships of Pacific Fleet Battle Force were his main concerns. Of the eight battleships present, USS Pennsylvania was in dry dock, USS California was in a very vulnerable state due to being opened up for comprehensive inspection, while USS Arizona was berthed with the repair ship USS Vestal and was due to start a seven day tender upkeep. USS, Oklahoma and USS Nevada had just returned from operations with Halsey’s TF8 the day before. USS West Virginia had been moved alongside USS Maryland to facilitate an inspection of Maryland by command staff of Division 4 on Sunday, and some material efforts had been undertaken on Maryland to facilitate this as well. That left only USS West Virginia and USS Tennessee being in most respects ready.
While orders had been sent to all the battleships to go to condition Zed, USS Pennsylvania would not – by nature of her being dry docked – be able to fulfill those orders. The crew of California would do their utmost to comply, however it would take several hours at least to get her back to operational levels. Arizona was closer to Zed status, but some efforts had been made to prepare her for her tender upkeep, and the crew was making efforts to remedy those as well.
This left Kimmel with the option of sailing his battle line with six battleships, possibly seven with the remote opportunity of California joining them. Even with that, it would take at least four to five hours to get the battleships out of harbour.
Of the cruisers in Pearl Harbour, the two heavy cruisers – USS San Francisco and USS New Orleans – were both undergoing serious repairs or major overhaul. They would not be moving any time soon. The picture with the light cruisers was brighter. Among the heavier warships in harbour, the six light cruisers in harbour were among the first vessels in all respects ready.
Out of the twenty-nine destroyers present, at least 20 should be able to sail in a reasonable period of time as well. Of the four submarines at Pearl, three could be out of harbour by daybreak as well.
After this, it was a matter of the various tenders, support craft and lighter vessels, such as mine craft. There were even six of the 12 PT boats of the 1st PT Boat Squadron.
One ship in harbour that was of concern to Kimmel was the fleet oiler USS Neosho. Neosho was the largest tanker in the world when completed, and currently she was sitting at the Ford Island Dock, unloading the last half of its load of aviation fuel into the storage facility at Pearl Harbour NAS. It was not likely to be completely unloaded until 1000 hrs on Sunday. Along with every other detail to be considered, the Neosho would need some thought as well.
As to the air assets of the Navy, the bases on Ford Island, as well as Kaneohe and the Marine field at Ewa, were fast becoming hives of activity. The patrol bombers were the main focus at the air stations, as their respective ground crews spared no effort to get them ready. At the same time, the air crews were gathered up, briefed and otherwise prepared for action.
The carrier planes on Ford Island, whether they were from the various carrier based squadrons, located on Ford for repair or storage, were looked over and prepared as well. For aircraft assigned to the Fleet Battle Force, it was the same thing. While this jumbled selection of carrier types were organized, available pilots and crews were looked for as well.
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While the navy was preparing, the Army was sorting out its operations. On the airfields, there was feverous activity, as available ground crews swarmed over aircraft in an effort to get as many ready as possible. When the alert had sounded, less than half the fighters on Oahu were actually available for duty once fuelled and armed. However, many of the remaining fighters, while not showing as available, were actually just marked down for general maintenance and light repairs. With the concerted efforts of the ground personnel, many of these could possibly be brought up to active status if the effort was spent on them. It was the same for the bombers, and as the night progressed toward morning, the fitters, mechanics, technicians and armourers would set to work, to get as many planes as possible repaired, readied and dispersed.
While the Army Air Corps was busy, the rest of the Army was answering the call. While the various batteries of the Coastal Artillery were either manning their guns for the fortified mounts, or moving their mobile batteries into place, others were drawing out the needed ammunition to feed those batteries.
The regular line units of the army were starting their deployments too, whether by vehicle or on foot. Probably, the most obscure selection of army personnel were the relatively small number of technicians that were quietly loaded into trucks and cars to be sent out to bring the six portable radar sites on Oahu on line. Another group would gather at a little known locale known as the Airborne Information Center.
No matter what their trade or vocation, across Oahu the Army was coming to life and doing its best to perform their duties as specified.
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While the encounter with the enemy cruiser would throw off the original plans, Admiral Nagumo knew that for Japan’s efforts to succeed across the Pacific, the forces under his command would still have to carry out a successful strike on Pearl Harbour.
Yamamoto had been very specific in his orders. At least four of the American battleships of the Pacific Fleet must be destroyed. Only through their loss in such numbers would the American people be shocked enough to demand that their government come to a settlement advantageous to the Japanese. While there would be other targets, possibly even aircraft carriers in the area, and each of these in their own right would be valuable, the priority would be the American battleships, even if it meant jeopardizing his force to achieve that aim.
For it was understood by most in the Japanese command structure that the only way to have a successful end to the war that would soon be starting would be to hit the Americans so hard off the start that they would not pursue the conflict. However, those proponents of sea based aviation argued their opinion that the carrier was now the supreme naval asset, the real strength of a nation’s navy was, at that point in time, its battleships. Whether either argument was correct or not, for the plan to succeed, a large proportion of the battleships of the US Navy would have to be destroyed.
With that in mind, Nagumo and his staff gathered to adjust their plans to the new situation. Vice-Admiral Nagumo was fairly well certain that the cruiser his screening ships had sunk had gotten off a signal, therefore his position must be known. While the Americans were not likely to know the composition of his force, or indeed, what they might be up to, He did know they would be looking for whoever caused the demise of their compatriot.
More importantly however, in all likelihood, the hoped for surprise by the Kido Butai would be lost, and the airstrikes would be going in against a prepared and ready foe. However, the plans had been firm that even if they were discovered anywhere during the last twenty-four hours of their advance on Pearl Harbour, the attack was to continue. Too much was at stake at too many locations across the Pacific to attempt to pull back at that point.
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Kimmel in turn was pushing ahead with plans of his own. To be sure that his fleet units could safely egress from the harbour in the next few hours, orders were given for more destroyers, minesweepers and other needed craft to bolster the patrols in the channel out of the harbour, as well as the exclusion area beyond. This was bolstered by patrol bombers as they became available. A half dozen destroyers and four more minesweepers were underway to join USS Ward and her compatriots already on duty.
At the various army installations around Oahu, the security had been beefed up substantially. This allowed the airfields to take more precautions with their aircraft, allowing many to be placed back into revetments or otherwise dispersed. A few of the planes not deemed worthy of salvage attempts had been left where they were in exposed positions. This was not so much by design as it was more due to a lack of manpower and time.
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With the sudden activity at Pearl Harbour, as well as across Oahu, many civilians were beginning to sense something was afoot. Among the civilians was one Takeo Yoshikawa, an employee of the Japanese consulate. After a short period of observation, he made one last signal.
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While many would make much of the efforts made by the US Military’s efforts to pull themselves up to a proper active status that night, there would be many pitfalls. One of the first problems noticed was the lack of personnel, as many from all services were adrift when the first calls went out. Personnel would make their way to their various posts steadily through the next hours, however many would not be where they should be by the time the action began.
The lack of technicians and command staff in several locations would prove detrimental as well, particularly at Wheeler and Hickman Fields, where large percentages of the available first-string aircraft had been out of service for maintenance and light repairs, after a steady period of training cycles and war warnings. A strong effort to get as the men available in the early hours of the morning had made many aircraft as possible ready, and by 0330 hrs, most of the haphazard initial approach to the problem had become better organized. However, when the first fighter patrols would begin to take off at 0430 hrs, out of the 138 first line fighters at Wheeler Field, only 83 P-40 and 27 P-36 pursuits would be ready. Another ten of the older P-26 fighters backed up those planes, although these planes, being much slower, would only be of limited value.
Elsewhere on Oahu, a further dozen fighters were readied at Haleiwa, giving a total of 91 P-40s and 31 of the P-36s, plus the ten P-26s, with most of these planes being at Wheeler, but two dozen of them being split between Haleiwa and Bellows Field.
While the preparatory aircraft work had been going on getting as many fighters as possible ready at Wheeler, over at Hickman Field the bombers were being prepared as well. Just after 0300 hrs, the first trio of B-17Ds had departed Hickman to join the PBYs already searching to the north of Oahu. Out of the remaining nine available of that type, three more were armed and ready shortly after, while another pair would be ready by 0500 hrs.
There were 33 B-18 Bolo’s based at Hickman as well, and by 0500 hrs, 19 of these would be fuelled and ready for operations. The last type available in some numbers was the sleek new A-20 light bomber, of which thirteen were on the ground at Hickman, with nine of them ready for operations by 0500 hrs.
It was at 0305 hrs that came the now famous message from one of the searching PBY’s north of Oahu:
“... under fire from Japanese warships north of Oahu ... taking evasive action ...”
Moments later came an expanding report, which confirmed three aircraft carriers a battleship and numerous cruisers and destroyers. The aircraft, which had come out of the overcast almost directly over the Japanese fleet, had been hit by AA fire. However, it managed to limp back to Oahu and safely beach at Kaneohe shortly after 0500 hrs. Further PBY’s were called in to monitor the Japanese Fleet as it moved on toward Pearl Harbour.
Even as the first reports on the Japanese fleet were coming in, further action had started much closer. The first of the Pacific Fleet heavy vessels had begun to move out of Pearl Harbour at 0230 hrs, when Kimmel had ordered a dozen screening destroyers, along with the six light cruisers to put to sea. While somewhat slower than hoped for, the process was orderly and without any problem in the first stages.
The battleships were beginning to move as well. The big surprise was that Admiral Kidd’s Battleship Division 1 was actually the first of the battleships to get under way. While not ready for extended operations, Kidd had no intention of his ships getting caught in port, and had pushed hard to get his command ready to sail. By the time Kidd’s battleships were ready to move, West Virginia and Tennessee were ready to cast off as well once tugs were available to shift them into the channel. Maryland would bring up the rear, while with the uncertainty of California’s status, it was uncertain when she might sail.
However, plans began to unravel at 0309 hrs when USS Raleigh, which was following USS St. Louis out the channel, was struck amidships by a torpedo. Almost immediately, USS Ward sighted a small submarine broaching nearby and promptly brought it under fire, before depth charging the area after it sank from view. Shortly after that, USS Bagley sighted another passing through the wake of USS Helena, which was the next cruiser in line after Raleigh. Bagley came about and rammed the sub, finishing it off.
What had begun as an orderly operation quickly became a muddled affair for the Pacific Fleet. Another pair of torpedoes passing across the wake of the next cruiser, USS Phoenix, brought the submarine ambush panic to a crescendo, as those ships already in transit out of the harbour did their level best to get by this new unknown foe, while the patrolling destroyers aggressively began to hunt for more. The fear of submarine ambush became reality shortly after, when at 0327 hrs, two torpedoes slammed into the port side of USS Arizona as the battleship was about to turn to enter the channel out of Pearl Harbour. The first struck just forward of the foremost main turret, while the second struck under the bridge.
As Arizona began to flood forward and list to port, the crew began their efforts to contain the damages, while her Captain ordered a turn to starboard. As Arizona sheared off from the channel toward Ford Island, the destroyer Monahan ran down her assailant, which had broached after firing its torpedoes. In the confusion, and with Arizona’s sudden turn to starboard to stay in port, USS Oklahoma continued into the channel, followed by USS Nevada.
In those few short minutes, the USN Battleship force was thrown into total confusion. In the absence of Admiral Anderson – who was at home for the weekend and still not back at the time of sailing – Admiral Pye moved his sea going flag from California to West Virginia. When Arizona was torpedoed, USS West Virginia was just starting to be nudged away from USS Tennessee. However as news of the attack came in, that effort was halted, and by 0400 hrs, West Virginia was once more moored alongside Tennessee, as fears of more submarine attacks tempered the decision to sail.
USS Arizona, down by the bows and listing to port, had come around Ford Island to berth at the location just vacated by USS Helena.. The light cruiser Raleigh had limped back into port as far as Hospital point where it was beached as it had lost power from flooding and damages to her engineering spaces. Outside the harbour, the five light cruisers that had made it out of Pearl just before them gathered in Oklahoma and Nevada. Along with a screen of a dozen destroyers, this interim task force was ordered to set course to the northwest to join Halsey.
Inside the harbour, the scene was best described as confusing. Any of the fleet units remaining were either in no material condition to sail due to repairs and maintenance, or, as in Arizona and Raleigh, due to damage already sustained. The destroyer Monahan had dashed back into the harbour and ran alongside Arizona, to pick up Admiral Kidd to transfer him to USS Oklahoma.
The only other ships to leave Pearl were two submarines, Dolphin and Narwhal, with orders to patrol beyond the harbours entrance for enemy submarines.
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The Army Air Force pursuit pilots that had been gathering in since the first moments of the new day had been briefed as best as possible, given the confusing situation. While there was still no real firm intelligence on the intent of the approaching Japanese fleet, educated guesswork left little doubt as to what was coming. One old briefing officer remembered the words of Claire Chennault when he had given a briefing of his own when passing through Pearl Harbour some months earlier, regarding the agility of the Japanese aircraft and the abilities of their flyers. He was very firm in his opinion not to attempt to dog fight, but instead to use the tactics which had been put forward by Chennault. How well this reminder was received would remain to be seen if and when the Japanese aircraft were engaged.
By 0430 hrs, the Army Air Force was beginning to launch its first aircraft. While the first fourteen pursuits were lifting off from Wheeler, eighteen B-18’s were beginning to leave the ground at Hickman Field. Four B-17s, then a final group of A-20’s, all of which would be airborne by 0530 hrs, would follow them. By 0530 hrs, there would be 57 pursuit aircraft airborne from Wheeler, with another forty ready to launch as needed.
The Navy and Marine flyers had not been idle either. Shortly after 0500 hrs, 18 SBD’s, 7 Vindicators and 11 F4F Wildcats had begun to lift off from Ewa. They were followed out by 4 F4Fs and 3 SBD’s from Ford Island as they formed up and headed north to seek out the Japanese fleet.
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On the Enterprise, Admiral Halsey was trying to make sense of the situation as well. While he had given orders to begin preparing strike plans for his strike aircraft, He also had to deal with the Task Force that had managed to leave Pearl Harbour and was coming to join him. Task Force 8 had been steaming hard since receiving the first reports of the Japanese presence, and Halsey felt that he could hopefully get a strike off by 0800 hrs. However, having to deal with the battleships and cruisers coming from Pearl would severely limit his action As a result, he ordered the Pearl Force to steam a direct route to a point west of Niihau where both forces could then join. When the range closed sufficiently, Halsey would provide them what air cover could be spared.
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Further north, Task Force 12, centered on the carrier USS Lexington, was moving to the southeast, and preparing its air group for searches and strikes against the Japanese. This search effort was backed up by PBY’s out of Midway. Task Force 3, centered on the Heavy Cruiser Indianapolis, was pushing up from Johnston Island to join them. As more information on the Japanese came in, it was hoped that strikes might be able to be launched by mid morning.
By 0530 hrs, reports from the patrolling PBY’s had further illuminated the size and particulars of the Japanese force. It was reported to include six large aircraft carriers, along with at least five heavier escorts, including battleships. However, this was to be the last accurate report for a while, as fighters from the carriers were airborne by that time, and the lumbering amphibians were either forced off or shot down for the most part.
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By 0530 hrs, Vice Admiral Nagumo had his attack forces re-configured for an attack against a prepared target. If his command had not been discovered, the two planned attack waves would have been balanced with a large portion of fighters with each one. The original first wave was to include level and torpedo bombers for attacking the battleships and carriers, along with dive-bombers to attack the main air bases and carriers. The second wave would have consisted of dive and level bombers to not only strike at any carriers, cruisers, and destroyers, but to finish the destruction at the various air bases as well.
However, with the Americans now alerted, the plan was shifted to an alternate format. The first wave would be led by the bulk of the fighters available for the attack. The role of these fighters would be to sweep any defending fighters from the sky, before strafing airbases and suppressing anti-aircraft sights. On the secondary targets, 30 dive-bombers would bolster the fighters. With the defending fighters and anti-aircraft dealt with, the combination of high level and torpedo bombers could strike the primary target of the mission, the battleships of the Pacific fleet.
The second wave would follow close behind, with its level bombers concentrating on the various air bases, and the dive bombers seeking out priority targets listed as carriers, cruisers and destroyers in that order. After that, targets included further strikes on airbases and auxiliaries as available.
A final message from Yamamoto confirmed his belief that there would be no surprise, and while he held some reservations, realistically he felt that the Americans would not have had enough time to do anything much more than a very basic response. As long as his aircrews hit hard and fast, the battle would still be won.
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