Argentina wins falklands war
- Thread starter walmart
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Saphroneth
Banned
The first question of any AH timeline: How?
The Falklands was not a war that was close to being won, by the Argentinians. So it would take some significant changes - and there's several ways it could be resolved, so it matters.
The UK could just accept the fait accomplit - but why? The navy already scrapped? Margaret Hilda was having an off year?
Or they could send down a force, but suffer logistic issues.
Or they could... or they could...
But the point is, the "how" needs to be addressed, it affects how everyone looks - including the US.
I want to say the Wayne Hughes had a few ideas in "Fleet Tactics: Theory and Practice". IIRC, getting land based air support to the Falklands immediately was one suggestion. Regardless, he suggested a few small but key changes made by the Argentinians could have radically altered the conflict and provided a realistic chance for the Argentinians.
Saphroneth
Banned
It might provide them a realistic chance to drive the Task Force off. What then?
Because there's at least three options.
Option one - the Brits give up. They've been humiliated in the eyes of the world, and everyone goes into oh-shit panic mode because the number two force in NATO has just been beaten easily. This will bring down the government, it'll probably lead to some kind of serious consequences for the members of that government (who'd cut the spending and arguably encouraged the Argentinians) and the special relationship collapses.
Option two - the Brits come back again later, with their other carriers (they had at least two more) and better forwards planning. That's going to be sticky for the Argentinians, especially since the Argentinians have no real way to catch the nuclear hunter-killer submarines.
Option three - the Brits call in their allies. The US cannot ditch them on this, if they do then the Brits will probably leave NATO and that leaves the GIUK gap uncovered, no US aircraft in the UK and the BAOR out of Germany - which means NATO basically has their whole conventional and even nuclear strategy undergo a fairly significant collapse.
So the US are going to come in. The Argentinians can't win against the USN, it's not even worth gaming out, but the result there is that the US look like the heavies of the piece and the Brits look a bit weak.
...so the OTL engagements aren't the war.
Argentina needs to be a superpower or Britain is under disarray.
But if it does Margaret will not have a second term.
But if it does Margaret will not have a second term.
As Saphroneth has pointed out, there's essentially only a few outcomes.
Bare in mind, though, the UK has a history of continuing to fight when faced with a serious defeat - a failure to retake the Falklands in itself while a defeat, wouldn't be the end - accepting Argentina's victory, though, would be. The UK is very unlikely to go for this.
As such, what does the UK have left?
HMS Invincible
HMS Hermes
Both of those fought in the Falklands.
HMS Illustrious - she arrived about 3 weeks after the war ended. She's definitely available.
HMS Ark Royal - she was launched and entering her "fitting out" stage in 1981. Commissioned in 1985 historically - so its entirely possible she could have been brought into service in 1983 if the UK goes all out.
HMS Bulwark - HMS Hermes sister, she entered mothball in March 1981 due to a fire she had sustained while conducting a exercise, she wasn't in great condition, but she was actually announced to bring back into service at the beginning of the Falklands War - however, her fire damage was extensive so she wasn't. A prolonged conflict though, with the UK pushed back from the Falklands in 1982 and forced to try again in the spring/summer or 1983?
She ll almost certainly be reactivated - that gives the Royal Navy all winter & the start of 1983 to get her back into fighting condition - alongside fitting out HMS Ark Royal.
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Basically, a UK counter-attack in 1983 see's Argentina, in the very best case scenario, facing down 3 Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers (HMS Illustrious, HMS Hermes & HMS Invincible).
More likely? It runs the very real risk of the UK sending all 5 against Argentina (HMS Illustrious, HMS Hermes, HMS Invincible, HMS Ark Royal, HMS Bulwark).
It also gives the UK all winter to recall her escorts back home, resupply them & conduct any minor repairs to ensure they are all in peak-condition, while also arranging with allies (i.e. Australia, New Zealand, Canada etc...) for them to stand in for UK RN deployment-commitments, like some of them historically did.
That means the RN's surface fleet could be substantially larger than the 1982 Taskforce. Combine this with a better organised & prepared Amphibious & Auxiliary force.... then things become EXTREMELY dicey for Argentina.
Lets not forget: Historically the RN, while sustaining losses to Argentinian Air attacks, ripped the guts out of the Argentinian Airforce in the process - its why the Royal Navy won., the RN could sustain the losses & attrition: The Argentinian Airforce, couldn't.
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Basically, there is no easy "Argentina Wins" button here - they might, if they play their cards right, manage to beat the 1982 Taskforce back, but beyond that? Unless the UK gives up (& generally, it doesn't give up when directly threatened by another nation, let alone when its territory is invaded and citizens occupied at gun point), 1983 see's a massive effort by the RN and likely a much more bloody & intense war, which almost certainly ends in a UK victory with a substantial risk of the conflict escalating beyond the Falklands (I.e. the UK targeting the mainland, Argentinian Navy etc... etc...)
Bare in mind, though, the UK has a history of continuing to fight when faced with a serious defeat - a failure to retake the Falklands in itself while a defeat, wouldn't be the end - accepting Argentina's victory, though, would be. The UK is very unlikely to go for this.
As such, what does the UK have left?
HMS Invincible
HMS Hermes
Both of those fought in the Falklands.
HMS Illustrious - she arrived about 3 weeks after the war ended. She's definitely available.
HMS Ark Royal - she was launched and entering her "fitting out" stage in 1981. Commissioned in 1985 historically - so its entirely possible she could have been brought into service in 1983 if the UK goes all out.
HMS Bulwark - HMS Hermes sister, she entered mothball in March 1981 due to a fire she had sustained while conducting a exercise, she wasn't in great condition, but she was actually announced to bring back into service at the beginning of the Falklands War - however, her fire damage was extensive so she wasn't. A prolonged conflict though, with the UK pushed back from the Falklands in 1982 and forced to try again in the spring/summer or 1983?
She ll almost certainly be reactivated - that gives the Royal Navy all winter & the start of 1983 to get her back into fighting condition - alongside fitting out HMS Ark Royal.
############
Basically, a UK counter-attack in 1983 see's Argentina, in the very best case scenario, facing down 3 Royal Navy Aircraft Carriers (HMS Illustrious, HMS Hermes & HMS Invincible).
More likely? It runs the very real risk of the UK sending all 5 against Argentina (HMS Illustrious, HMS Hermes, HMS Invincible, HMS Ark Royal, HMS Bulwark).
It also gives the UK all winter to recall her escorts back home, resupply them & conduct any minor repairs to ensure they are all in peak-condition, while also arranging with allies (i.e. Australia, New Zealand, Canada etc...) for them to stand in for UK RN deployment-commitments, like some of them historically did.
That means the RN's surface fleet could be substantially larger than the 1982 Taskforce. Combine this with a better organised & prepared Amphibious & Auxiliary force.... then things become EXTREMELY dicey for Argentina.
Lets not forget: Historically the RN, while sustaining losses to Argentinian Air attacks, ripped the guts out of the Argentinian Airforce in the process - its why the Royal Navy won., the RN could sustain the losses & attrition: The Argentinian Airforce, couldn't.
##############
Basically, there is no easy "Argentina Wins" button here - they might, if they play their cards right, manage to beat the 1982 Taskforce back, but beyond that? Unless the UK gives up (& generally, it doesn't give up when directly threatened by another nation, let alone when its territory is invaded and citizens occupied at gun point), 1983 see's a massive effort by the RN and likely a much more bloody & intense war, which almost certainly ends in a UK victory with a substantial risk of the conflict escalating beyond the Falklands (I.e. the UK targeting the mainland, Argentinian Navy etc... etc...)
Saphroneth
Banned
It's a thing often forgotten that the Brits operated with significant restraint in the Falklands.
Remember the 200 mile exclusion zone? That wasn't an agreed-upon warzone, it wasn't even anything legal. It was "We will shoot on sight inside this line, we reserve the right to do it otherwise". It was all for domestic consumption and a very real desire to minimize loss of life.
Had the RN been turned loose, they could have sunk both Argentinian capital ships (25 de Mayo and Belgrano) at the same time - and when your submarine can surface, call the leader of the country on the radio and say "I've got a ship here, should I shoot it or not?" in real time, then you have the upper hand to put it mildly.
Remember the 200 mile exclusion zone? That wasn't an agreed-upon warzone, it wasn't even anything legal. It was "We will shoot on sight inside this line, we reserve the right to do it otherwise". It was all for domestic consumption and a very real desire to minimize loss of life.
Had the RN been turned loose, they could have sunk both Argentinian capital ships (25 de Mayo and Belgrano) at the same time - and when your submarine can surface, call the leader of the country on the radio and say "I've got a ship here, should I shoot it or not?" in real time, then you have the upper hand to put it mildly.
Saphroneth
Banned
One possible reason for declaring the exclusion zone is that the USSR had implied they had a diesel boat in the area, hence the RN was basically saying "it's your own fault if something gets lost, Ivan" and thus attempting to let themselves conduct ASW without accidentally causing WW3.
The ability to sink the 25 de Mayo at the same time as the Belgrano is questionable, only in that the RN hasn't out-and-out said it could. They have said they could have sunk her later if they'd been willing to breach the Argentine 3-mile limit, and they have also said they knew the wind speeds at the location of the 25 de Mayo at the time of the Belgrano sinking were not sufficient to let her launch aircraft. (25 de Mayo needed wind over the bow to launch.) They had no surface assets close enough to measure the wind, so they probably had a sub there.
Now, the other fun bit is the call-home. It was definitely made, and the decision to fire was literally made at Cabinet level - in practice this means Margaret Hilda gave the order directly. The Belgrano does not appear to have noticed until the torpedoes hit.
5 decks is one thing, populating them with air groups is another though. While they took every Harrier they could fit in 1982, it was also every Sea Harrier available at the time. How many more would they have in 1983?
True, but none of the losses were mission critical assets. Adm Woodward himself stated his campaign would have been over in an afternoon if one of the carriers was removed from the order of battle, hence why they were usually stationed so far east of the islands.
Saphroneth
Banned
Remember that it was basically SHAR first then land harrier, and the land harriers were still quite deck capable. So they'd have a good deal of land harriers available - and the SHAR production run was in full swing at this point.
Anyway. If the RN took only a few losses while ripping the guts out of the Argentinian air force, how could the TTL Argentinian air force out-attrition the RN? The carriers nix the campaign if lost, but the RN has two of them and three spares!
The other thing to remember is that many of the SHAR pilots had tours as instructors and students at 'Top Gun' as until fairly recently they had been Phantom Pilots and had learned all of the tricks, fortes and foibles from the USN's relatively recent CAP mission experiences during the Vietnam war.
The SHAR Pilots were pound for pound probably the finest on the planet.
The Argentine Pilots were undoubtedly brave but had no operational legacy or tribal skills to call upon.
Interesting I had forgotten all about HMS Bulwark - its true she was laid up in poor state but I am convinced that had the decision been made she could have been made mission capable very quickly - Possibly within a year.
So as ASB as it sounds - in the unlikely outcome that the British had been forced to retire i.e. had the carriers been mission killed then Britain comes back much much stronger a year later - All Sea King AEW'd and CIWS'd to the nines and with more aircraft.
Sea Wolf would now be working properly and the Super Etendard and Exocets secrets would be known (the French were very forthcoming) and any air launched ones left in Argentine service would be effectively countered by ECM.
Isn't a big part of the issue the Exocet inventory? The Argentines only had a few of those with no additional deliveries to be expected. Once those are gone, they are relegated to dropping dumb bombs from visual range.
Fix the fusing issues with their bombs for one.
The RN does not have three spare operational carriers for the 1982 campaign. If they lose one in theatre by the time Illustrious gets them back in the fight the South Atlantic winter is in full swing and the Task Force is in a deep hole serviceability and ability to sustain operations wise - the campaign is over one way or the other until late 1982 at least, besides making good whatever attrition took place in the process of losing that second deck.
Another point Woodward made was that as far as the Task Force went the war ended just in time - winter was within days/hours of setting in, and serviceability issues were becoming a major factor due to being at sea so long.
British tactical victory in theatre in 1982 is nowhere as certain as it's often said to be.
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I think they had six Air launched ones in total (a 50% hit rate - not too shabby).
I read a great book on the success British Intelligence had in stopping Argentina from buying more Exocet's - including pretending to be acting on behalf of the Argentine Junta and buying any 'loose ones' that happened to be on the market.
The French turned their backs on the Argentines and provided the British with everything from how to jam the radar of the missile to a concise list of who had bought them.
5 air-launched exocets were available, all were expended for two ship losses (Sheffield and Atlantic Conveyor).
Some (I'm unsure of the exact number) ground launched exocets were available, 1 was expended for a non-mortal hit on Glamorgan.
Dumb bombs dropped from visual range accounted for all the other ship losses (Antelope, Ardent, Coventry, Sir Galahad) as well as other numerous hits on ships that either didn't sink them, or didn't detonate at all. Superficial damage on ships was also inflicted with rocket and cannon fire, and in one instance aircraft collision with the mast.
Saphroneth
Banned
RN worst case, they withdraw north until more carriers come in and try again next year - and there's those subs lurking around Argentine Navy can't leave port safely.
There's just no way to beat the subs.
And the RN can bring more harriers next year on more carriers, while the Argentinians can't get more aircraft on short notice, all the sellers aren't selling and all their neighbours hate them.
Wayne Hughes writes to Frank Uhlig in "How Navies Fight: The US Navy and Its Allies" on page 274:
"Instead of building the army to 13,000 the Argies should have moved heaven and earth to lengthen the the Stanley airfield runway and provide enough infrastructure to support half a dozen Recce aircraft (S-2Es) and 20 to 30 fighter-attack aircraft so that the whole Air Force and naval air could have continually staged in, replacing losses. Thus Stanley airfield was the unrecognized, undeveloped strategic center of the war. The Brits could have never reduced it, and it would have reversed the outcome".
"Instead of building the army to 13,000 the Argies should have moved heaven and earth to lengthen the the Stanley airfield runway and provide enough infrastructure to support half a dozen Recce aircraft (S-2Es) and 20 to 30 fighter-attack aircraft so that the whole Air Force and naval air could have continually staged in, replacing losses. Thus Stanley airfield was the unrecognized, undeveloped strategic center of the war. The Brits could have never reduced it, and it would have reversed the outcome".