WI: Caesar Not Granted Same Provinces

So an interesting thing I came across while reading The Crowd In Rome In The Late Republic that I had only vaguely understood before I thought would make for a good what if:

Prior to the election of the consuls for 59, the senate had already allocated the consular provinces for that year, deliberately choosing provinces that had little to no prestige attached to them (what those provinces were I do not know). Yet an interesting thing happened in 59 that was (mostly) without precedent: The tribune Vatinius passed a law that overrode the Senate and granted Caesar Ciscalpine Gaul and Illyria Gaul-what's more, he was granted it for 5 years, when pro-consular appointments were normally one year. Then of course Metellus Celler, governor of Transalpine Gaul, suddenly died, and in another mostly unorthodox procedure, Caesar was given that province as well.

My question is, what if Vatinius doesn't get his law through? Say another tribune vetoes it and (as became necessary in the 50s) is able to gather enough men to gain physical control of the forum to prevent its passage. Assume the unprestigious province Caesar is given is Hispania Ulterior once more, where he just returned from as pro-praetor (since there was fighting in northern Hispania still unlike most of the other unprestigious provinces). Add to this that Metellus Celer doesn't unexpectedly die.

How does this effect the future of the republic? What about the unravelling situation in Transalpine Gaul, which the Helvetii are about to burst through? Or Caesar's career for that matter?
 
I don't think Illyria and Cisalpina were that un-prestigious. The Danubian regions were wealthy and could have been the prime cesarian target (the Gallic Wars being a mix of opportunism and propaganda when it comes to the first years).

Granted, Transalpina provided a wealthy province and a nest of recruits and local legions, but Cisalpina and Illyricum weren't deprived or particularly poor. The region beyond their borders weren't that poor as well and Burebista's threat could have advantageously replaced the (more or less made up) Germanic threat in Gaul.

Now for Vatinus' proposal being refused, you'd need IMO a PoD that would prevent Caesar's popularity and power at this point (meaning you'd make Caesar not obtaining Cisalpina and Illyricum as well). Maybe if Celer doesn't die, the Senate would simply give Caesar another province (the whole thing, IRRC, was about showing off and proving the Senate was relevant on these regard).

Even that is unsure : Celer was responsible of Cisalpina after all, and had Transalpina as a bonus without really going in these regions. If Caesar have Cisalpina, it would require a really pissing mode from the Senate to not give him.

But assuming it's possible and that Caesar is more focused on Pannonia and Rethia (a more aggressive Burebista, earlier Dacian rise, earlier acknowledgment of Ister and Danube being the same river, etc.)? Maybe Macedonia?
 
I don't think Illyria and Cisalpina were that un-prestigious. The Danubian regions were wealthy and could have been the prime cesarian target (the Gallic Wars being a mix of opportunism and propaganda when it comes to the first years).

Granted, Transalpina provided a wealthy province and a nest of recruits and local legions, but Cisalpina and Illyricum weren't deprived or particularly poor. The region beyond their borders weren't that poor as well and Burebista's threat could have advantageously replaced the (more or less made up) Germanic threat in Gaul.
I know. Those weren't what the Senate had allocated for Caesar. Vatinius overturned the Senate allocations and instead passed a law in the tribal assembly that gave Caesar Ciscalpine Gaul and Illyria.

Now for Vatinus' proposal being refused, you'd need IMO a PoD that would prevent Caesar's popularity and power at this point (meaning you'd make Caesar not obtaining Cisalpina and Illyricum as well). Maybe if Celer doesn't die, the Senate would simply give Caesar another province (the whole thing, IRRC, was about showing off and proving the Senate was relevant on these regard).

Even that is unsure : Celer was responsible of Cisalpina after all, and had Transalpina as a bonus without really going in these regions. If Caesar have Cisalpina, it would require a really pissing mode from the Senate to not give him.

But assuming it's possible and that Caesar is more focused on Pannonia and Rethia (a more aggressive Burebista, earlier Dacian rise, earlier acknowledgment of Ister and Danube being the same river, etc.)? Maybe Macedonia?
All good points. If Cicero is to believed, by the middle of the consulship, Caesar's popularity was on the wane and Bibulus' was on the rise due to his series of attacks on Caesar. However Bibulus' popuilarity took a hit when he was accused (really it seems there was no evidence to substantiate it) of being involved in a plot to assassinate Pompey. Vettius' murder the day before he was about to question Bibulus didn't help things either. The result was that when Bibulus tried to block Caesar's 5 year appointments to govern Ciscalpine and Transalpine Gaul, he didn't have the popularity with the people to successfully stand up to Pompey and Caesar's supporters.

So a POD here might be to delay Vatinius' law until the second half of Caesar's consulship, which shouldn't be that difficult using the tactic I outlined in the OP. By then, assuming Bibulus isn't accused of being involved in a plot to assassinate Pompey, Caesar's popularity is enough on the wane and his on the rise for him to have enough support with the people to block it.


I would really like to know what the two consular provinces being allocated for the year before Vatinius' law was passed were. That would help a lot with how things might go down from there.
 

bguy

Donor
I would really like to know what the two consular provinces being allocated for the year before Vatinius' law was passed were. That would help a lot with how things might go down from there.

Weren't the consular provinces that year originally supervision over Italy's forests and cattle trails?

From Suetonius's The Lives of the Twelve Caesars:

"So Caesar was chosen consul with Bibulus. With the same motives the aristocracy took care that provinces of the smallest importance should be assigned to the newly elected consuls; that is, mere woods and pastures. Thereupon Caesar, especially incensed by this slight, by every possible attention courted the goodwill of Gnaeus Pompeius, who was at odds with the senate because of its tardiness in ratifying his acts after his victory over king Mithridates."
 
Weren't the consular provinces that year originally supervision over Italy's forests and cattle trails?
Yeah- I believe it was a deliberate tactic to drive Caesar into bankruptcy, or at least to stop him getting his hands on an army.

With the same motives the aristocracy took care that provinces of the smallest importance should be assigned to the newly elected consuls; that is, mere woods and pastures. (Suetonius, Life of Julius Caesar, 19)
 
Weren't the consular provinces that year originally supervision over Italy's forests and cattle trails?

From Suetonius's The Lives of the Twelve Caesars:

"So Caesar was chosen consul with Bibulus. With the same motives the aristocracy took care that provinces of the smallest importance should be assigned to the newly elected consuls; that is, mere woods and pastures. Thereupon Caesar, especially incensed by this slight, by every possible attention courted the goodwill of Gnaeus Pompeius, who was at odds with the senate because of its tardiness in ratifying his acts after his victory over king Mithridates."

Yeah- I believe it was a deliberate tactic to drive Caesar into bankruptcy, or at least to stop him getting his hands on an army.

With the same motives the aristocracy took care that provinces of the smallest importance should be assigned to the newly elected consuls; that is, mere woods and pastures. (Suetonius, Life of Julius Caesar, 19)
Ah okay, this makes sense. So then this would have massive implications. I don't find it likely that they'll be able to withstand political pressure to grant Caesar some province, but if they do, I think that's the end of Caesar's career.

To do that though they need to separate him from Crassus and Pompey. I think it wouldn't be that hard for Crassus to give up on Caesar-you just have to convince him there's little to gain and a lot to lose with association with Caesar and Crassus' natural businessman style approach to politics would dissuade him from continuing his association with Caesar. Pompey is a different animal though-I don't know how you can drive a wedge between him and Caesar at this point, or at least convince him that continuing to lobby for Caesar is a losing cause.
 

bguy

Donor
To do that though they need to separate him from Crassus and Pompey. I think it wouldn't be that hard for Crassus to give up on Caesar-you just have to convince him there's little to gain and a lot to lose with association with Caesar and Crassus' natural businessman style approach to politics would dissuade him from continuing his association with Caesar.

Well Crasus's original reason for joining up with Caesar and Pompey was he was championing the cause of the tax farmers who had overbid for the tax contracts in Rome's eastern provinces, and the Optimates were blocking his efforts to get the pledged amounts reduced. As such Cato and company would have to drop their opposition to renegotiating the tax contracts to have any chance of separating Crassus from Caesar. How likely would they be to do that? Cato wasn't exactly known for his flexibility, and without the benefit of hindsight Crassus probably seemed more dangerous to the Optimates than Caesar did. And even if the Optimates are willing to bend on the tax contracts, they are still going to have a hard time outbidding Caesar for Crassus's support since Caesar will be willing to support Crassus in his desire for military conquest (something the Optimates won't support.)
 
From Suetonius's The Lives of the Twelve Caesars:
You did edit your post to add this, right? I'm pretty sure I didn't see the quote when I posted, and I really don't want to find out I've got early onset Alzheimers this close to a weekend.

I don't find it likely that they'll be able to withstand political pressure to grant Caesar some province, but if they do, I think that's the end of Caesar's career.
It depends how bad his financial situation is, really. I doubt he could afford another run for consul, but he might not be finished just yet. Suetonius claims being elected pontifex maximus almost bankrupted him, and unfortunately we'll never know how fully his income from Spain restored his position. Both Crassus and Pompey need Caesar to hold the triumvirate together, and might have been persuaded to prop him up financially (at least on a temporary basis). If the situation in Transalpine Gaul is sufficiently bad then Caesar might get an extraordinary command in order to resolve it: I can't see Pompey being inspired to leave Rome, even for that short a time.
 
I don't think you could call Transalpina a secondary province, at least not in all that mattered.
Caesar understood well its geostrategic and symbolical range, and played a lot on the Germanic threat, while Cimbri and Teutoni are still fresh in Roman memory (to say nothing of the eventual social troubles).

I'd point as well the presence of a legion, tied up with the proconsularship of Gallia, not really a detail in a militarized political roman life, critically when Caesar already had 3 of them (all of them in Aquilea, something that could point out an initial and equal interest on Pannonia along with other clues).

Furthermore, Transalpina wasn't exactly impoverished. Even if Plinus didn't yet described the province as a "Little Italy", it was since centuries a local trade hub, quite hellenized and romanized already and known by Romans since the Punic Wars. "Mere woods and pastures" is really caricatural at this point. (Suetonus not being renowned for his honesty and subtelty)
 
Well Crasus's original reason for joining up with Caesar and Pompey was he was championing the cause of the tax farmers who had overbid for the tax contracts in Rome's eastern provinces, and the Optimates were blocking his efforts to get the pledged amounts reduced. As such Cato and company would have to drop their opposition to renegotiating the tax contracts to have any chance of separating Crassus from Caesar. How likely would they be to do that? Cato wasn't exactly known for his flexibility, and without the benefit of hindsight Crassus probably seemed more dangerous to the Optimates than Caesar did. And even if the Optimates are willing to bend on the tax contracts, they are still going to have a hard time outbidding Caesar for Crassus's support since Caesar will be willing to support Crassus in his desire for military conquest (something the Optimates won't support.)
Hmm. Cato may not want to compromise but if the other optimates push for it, he can't really well do much about it (plus Cato does not have nearly as much influence as he would have in the latter half of the decade). Perhaps there might be a vested interest in driving a wedge between the newly reconciled Crassus and Pompey. I don't think its too much out of the range of possibility to get the optimates to bite the bullet and offer Crassus Gallia Transalpina in return for him dropping his support of Caesar and scrapping his reconciliation with Pompey. Particularly if someone like Cicero lends his support behind it (Cicero may have had ties to Pompey but he seemed extremely concerned at this time with the reconciliation between the trio that I think he might throw his support behind a chance to shatter it quickly).

Basically what the optimates (and I try not to use that term since the political lines were not that conveniently drawn) get rid of Caesar for good, and get Pompey sidelined in exchange for making concessions to Crassus.

It depends how bad his financial situation is, really. I doubt he could afford another run for consul, but he might not be finished just yet. Suetonius claims being elected pontifex maximus almost bankrupted him, and unfortunately we'll never know how fully his income from Spain restored his position. Both Crassus and Pompey need Caesar to hold the triumvirate together, and might have been persuaded to prop him up financially (at least on a temporary basis). If the situation in Transalpine Gaul is sufficiently bad then Caesar might get an extraordinary command in order to resolve it: I can't see Pompey being inspired to leave Rome, even for that short a time.
Caesar ran his career in a way that if he ever lost, he was done for. There's a very practical reason for why he alluded to committing suicide if he lost his campaign for the pontifex maximus-he was borrowing exorbitant amounts of money for the campaign. He did the same for his consulship run, although a lot of it this time around was borrowed from Crassus I believe. So for Caesar, he has to do everything in his power to get something. Especially since once he is a private citizen he's going to be prosecuted as soon as Cato & Company can run into the forum to set a date for the trial.

I don't think you could call Transalpina a secondary province, at least not in all that mattered.
Caesar understood well its geostrategic and symbolical range, and played a lot on the Germanic threat, while Cimbri and Teutoni are still fresh in Roman memory (to say nothing of the eventual social troubles).

I'd point as well the presence of a legion, tied up with the proconsularship of Gallia, not really a detail in a militarized political roman life, critically when Caesar already had 3 of them (all of them in Aquilea, something that could point out an initial and equal interest on Pannonia along with other clues).

Furthermore, Transalpina wasn't exactly impoverished. Even if Plinus didn't yet described the province as a "Little Italy", it was since centuries a local trade hub, quite hellenized and romanized already and known by Romans since the Punic Wars. "Mere woods and pastures" is really caricatural at this point. (Suetonus not being renowned for his honesty and subtelty)
What we are saying was, initially, the Senate wasn't granting Caesar Gallia Transalpina. They were literally granting the two consuls for the year essentially nothing. Gallia Transalpina was granted much later, towards the end of his consulship after Celer's death. What Suetonius is referring to is the initial allotment for provinces the Senate made for the consul designates. Vatinius overrode this early in Caesar's consulship by taking the issue directly to the people and having them vote to give Caesar Gallia Ciscalpina and Illyria, and then Pompey and Crassus intervened to make sure he also got Gallia Transalpina when Celer died.
 
Caesar ran his career in a way that if he ever lost, he was done for. There's a very practical reason for why he alluded to committing suicide if he lost his campaign for the pontifex maximus-he was borrowing exorbitant amounts of money for the campaign. He did the same for his consulship run, although a lot of it this time around was borrowed from Crassus I believe.
Note, however, that he doesn't allude to killing himself if he fails in his run for the consulship (wasn't he talking about going into exile in any case?). We'll never know for certain, but the evidence points to him being financially far worse off in his pontifex maximus run than his consulship. The former comes immediately after his term as aedile, where he spent massive amounts on entertainment without having had a governorship to enrich himself. I don't think it's accidental that Suetonius mentions him having to leave sureties with his creditors before he goes to Spain but not before he goes to Gaul.

EDIT: Just checked Plutarch's Life of Crassus, and he mentions Crassus lending Caesar 830 talents to pay his creditors before he went to Spain: it may be this you're remembering.

once he is a private citizen he's going to be prosecuted as soon as Cato & Company can run into the forum to set a date for the trial.
Though he'll still have proconsular imperium even if he's assigned the woods and pastures, and he'll also retain the support of Crassus and Pompey who want to avoid the measures he pushed through on their behalf being revoked. It's not even as if exile, which I imagine is as bad as the case might get for him, is a permanent punishment any more. What I imagine would have happened if he hadn't got Gaul was that he'd be increasingly reduced to a second tier politician, if not the actual client of either Pompey or Crassus.
 
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bguy

Donor
You did edit your post to add this, right? I'm pretty sure I didn't see the quote when I posted, and I really don't want to find out I've got early onset Alzheimers this close to a weekend.

I did edit my post to add the quote from Suetonius in about 2 minutes after I originally posted. You must have posted simultaneously with my edit.
 
Note, however, that he doesn't allude to killing himself if he fails in his run for the consulship (wasn't he talking about going into exile in any case?). We'll never know for certain, but the evidence points to him being financially far worse off in his pontifex maximus run than his consulship. The former comes immediately after his term as aedile, where he spent massive amounts on entertainment without having had a governorship to enrich himself. I don't think it's accidental that Suetonius mentions him having to leave sureties with his creditors before he goes to Spain but not before he goes to Gaul.
That's a fair point.
EDIT: Just checked Plutarch's Life of Crassus, and he mentions Crassus lending Caesar 830 talents to pay his creditors before he went to Spain: it may be this you're remembering.
Yes, I believe that is what I was remembering.
Though he'll still have proconsular imperium even if he's assigned the woods and pastures, and he'll also retain the support of Crassus and Pompey who want to avoid the measures he pushed through on their behalf being revoked. It's not even as if exile, which I imagine is as bad as the case might get for him, is a permanent punishment any more. What I imagine would have happened if he hadn't got Gaul was that he'd be increasingly reduced to a second tier politician, if not the actual client of either Pompey or Crassus.
True. The problem I think that must be overcome is how do you keep it so Vatinius' law doesn't get through. With the support of Pompey and Crassus and popularity with the people, there's going to be immense pressure for the optimates to fold even if they can get a tribune to not back down on his veto. It needs to be delayed to the second half of Caesar's consulship where his popularity is on the wane, and his popularity needs to somehow remain on the wane. Even then, you need either Pompey or Crassus to wager that it's not worth the effort or have significant incentive to pull back. Which is why I think doing something like granting Crassus Gallia Transalpina with understanding he'll break ranks with Pompey would be the perfect incentive here. It is my understanding Crassus' main reason for joining with Pompey and Caesar was to gain some form of military command, which is no longer necessary if the optimates compromise here (which I don't imagine is too difficult because they managed to let Caesar get Ciscalpine Gaul, Illyricum, and Transalpine Gaul for a staggering 5 years).
 
I did edit my post to add the quote from Suetonius in about 2 minutes after I originally posted. You must have posted simultaneously with my edit.
Yeah, I was hoping that was what happened. That's a relief.

True. The problem I think that must be overcome is how do you keep it so Vatinius' law doesn't get through.
The alternative, of course, is to have the law go through in the early part of the year and then either have it revoked or neuter it in the second half. If Caesar doesn't have tribunician support for the later part of the year because Clodius doesn't get elected, and Pompey and Crassus don't have tame tribunes or don't get them to oppose it, he's pretty stuck. The only thing I can think of is that an earlier Helvetii invasion might justify them taking the provinces off Caesar and giving them to a proven military man- either Pompey or Crassus. They could even appoint one of the two over Caesar and hope for a horrendous clash of personalities (as well as forcing them to split the loot).

Even then, you need either Pompey or Crassus to wager that it's not worth the effort or have significant incentive to pull back.
That's really the problem: the triumvirate works too well for the year we're looking at. Everybody's getting what they want, the personality clashes are put to one side, and the rest of the political establishment hasn't got a strategy for dealing with it.

It is my understanding Crassus' main reason for joining with Pompey and Caesar was to gain some form of military command, which is no longer necessary if the optimates compromise here (which I don't imagine is too difficult because they managed to let Caesar get Ciscalpine Gaul, Illyricum, and Transalpine Gaul for a staggering 5 years).
Pompey and Caesar had forged a slightly separate alliance in the later half of the year, so it might have been possible to draw Crassus out of the triumvirate. But it'd need a big offer (didn't Crassus have his heart set on a Parthian campaign by this time?), and I'm not positive whether the optimates are desperate enough to make it if it risks making Crassus the undisputed first man in Rome.
 
The alternative, of course, is to have the law go through in the early part of the year and then either have it revoked or neuter it in the second half. If Caesar doesn't have tribunician support for the later part of the year because Clodius doesn't get elected, and Pompey and Crassus don't have tame tribunes or don't get them to oppose it, he's pretty stuck. The only thing I can think of is that an earlier Helvetii invasion might justify them taking the provinces off Caesar and giving them to a proven military man- either Pompey or Crassus. They could even appoint one of the two over Caesar and hope for a horrendous clash of personalities (as well as forcing them to split the loot).
I think once you get it passed getting it revoked is going to be nigh impossible, barring very extraordinary circumstances, like Caesar being involved in a big scandal. Which, come to think of it, isn't that hard to do-Caesar was involved in a lot of shady dealings so I imagine it won't be that difficult for one of them to blow up in his face. I think it's too late though to get on him for possible involvement with Catiline (although I mean only a few years previously that had a prosecution for the killing of Saturninus that happened in 100 BC so...)since public opinion is actually shifting against Cicero on this.
That's really the problem: the triumvirate works too well for the year we're looking at. Everybody's getting what they want, the personality clashes are put to one side, and the rest of the political establishment hasn't got a strategy for dealing with it.
Agreed.
Pompey and Caesar had forged a slightly separate alliance in the later half of the year, so it might have been possible to draw Crassus out of the triumvirate. But it'd need a big offer (didn't Crassus have his heart set on a Parthian campaign by this time?), and I'm not positive whether the optimates are desperate enough to make it if it risks making Crassus the undisputed first man in Rome.
Crassus would likely prefer a Parthian campaign, but remember his command in Syria would not come for another few years-it's possible that command of Syria was something brought up a little later on in the triumvirate; perhaps immediately prior to 55 there were some political shifts in the east that made a campaign against Parthia attractive. Maybe it has something to do with a new Parthian king coming on the throne in 57.

Regardless, it's not that unlikely Crassus might see a campaign in Transalpine Gaul now better than waiting for a campaign in Syria later, especially given his age. As for how the optimates agree to it...well what if they don't have a choice? As you said, what if events in Transalpine Gaul (which it seems were already interesting enough that people expected something would need to be done there soon) got mighty interesting ahead of schedule? Then Crassus might jump at this opportunity himself-I'm sure he had a tribune under his wing that would propose a law to the comitia tributa to give him command in Transalpine Gaul, and he certainly has the power and influence to resist attempts to stop it.

After that, he doesn't much need Caesar or Pompey since his main goal-getting a prestigious military command-for the alliance is fulfilled.
 
I think once you get it passed getting it revoked is going to be nigh impossible,
It's not wholly without precedence: it tends to be military commands, but Marius got these revoked multiple times legally and Sulla once under exceptional circumstances. At the end of the day, if Caesar can use the legal system to give himself a province there's no reason the legal system can't be used to take it away.

barring very extraordinary circumstances, like Caesar being involved in a big scandal.
There's Vettius, if it goes on a bit longer or gets a bit bigger- on the assumption it was Caesar that put him up to it. Alternatively, Bibulus could get stabbed (as he was hoping to be) on the day the land law was passed. If one of the optimates was sufficiently ruthless, they might hire a knifeman themselves and tell him not to hit anything important.

Crassus would likely prefer a Parthian campaign, but remember his command in Syria would not come for another few years-
Crassus's price for the first triumvirate was a remission for the Asian tax farmers and his price for the second was Syria. I don't think he wants a military command until Caesar's victories in Gaul means Crassus is falling behind in the military prestige stakes. I also suspect the fact he went for Syria was more than just "it's the only place left": if he'd wanted to conquer poor barbarian tribesmen, he could have done so after his first consulship. Though I haven't any evidence, I suspect he was always more interested in the richer and more prestigious East: I thought I'd read somewhere that he had been interested in Parthia for a while, but on flicking through my sources I believe that may have been an authorial inference in Colleen McCulloch. I do believe, though, that he went to somewhere in the east as governor after his consulship (again, can't confirm this, but it would explain having Asian tax farmers in his clientele).

Long story short, I think if the optimates had offered Crassus the opportunity to beat up on the Gauls he'd have turned them down regardless of the trouble he was having with Pompey and Caesar. That's why it needs to be a big offer, but that in turn may mean it's too big for the optimates to make.

As for how the optimates agree to it...well what if they don't have a choice?
I think this assumes a level of pragmatism on the part of the optimates which probably wasn't there at this point in time. They want to preserve the republic and bring down those who challenge it, not install one of them as First Man. By the time they're prepared to tolerate the undisputed pre-eminence of Pompey, the existential threat to the republic is much greater.

what if events in Transalpine Gaul (which it seems were already interesting enough that people expected something would need to be done there soon) got mighty interesting ahead of schedule
The problem is that the optimates play up the threat as justification for taking it off Caesar, the popular cry will be to give it to Pompey: it'd be hard to justify awarding it to Crassus, particularly if (as I suspect) he wouldn't really want it.
 
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It's not wholly without precedence: it tends to be military commands, but Marius got these revoked multiple times legally and Sulla once under exceptional circumstances. At the end of the day, if Caesar can use the legal system to give himself a province there's no reason the legal system can't be used to take it away.
True, but it all depends if they can get the support of the people.
There's Vettius, if it goes on a bit longer or gets a bit bigger- on the assumption it was Caesar that put him up to it. Alternatively, Bibulus could get stabbed (as he was hoping to be) on the day the land law was passed. If one of the optimates was sufficiently ruthless, they might hire a knifeman themselves and tell him not to hit anything important.
This could work. I'm wondering if Bibulus being stabbed could lead to a repeat of the chaos in 100 that led to the death of Saturninus and lead to Caesar's death here?
Crassus's price for the first triumvirate was a remission for the Asian tax farmers and his price for the second was Syria. I don't think he wants a military command until Caesar's victories in Gaul means Crassus is falling behind in the military prestige stakes. I also suspect the fact he went for Syria was more than just "it's the only place left": if he'd wanted to conquer poor barbarian tribesmen, he could have done so after his first consulship. Though I haven't any evidence, I suspect he was always more interested in the richer and more prestigious East: I thought I'd read somewhere that he had been interested in Parthia for a while, but on flicking through my sources I believe that may have been an authorial inference in Colleen McCulloch. I do believe, though, that he went to somewhere in the east as governor after his consulship (again, can't confirm this, but it would explain having Asian tax farmers in his clientele).
Ah, this makes sense.
Long story short, I think if the optimates had offered Crassus the opportunity to beat up on the Gauls he'd have turned them down regardless of the trouble he was having with Pompey and Caesar. That's why it needs to be a big offer, but that in turn may mean it's too big for the optimates to make.
True.

I think this assumes a level of pragmatism on the part of the optimates which probably wasn't there at this point in time. They want to preserve the republic and bring down those who challenge it, not install one of them as First Man. By the time they're prepared to tolerate the undisputed pre-eminence of Pompey, the existential threat to the republic is much greater.
By that I meant a tribune might do the work for Crassus rather than him having to make a deal with the Senate.

The problem is that the optimates play up the threat as justification for taking it off Caesar, the popular cry will be to give it to Pompey: it'd be hard to justify awarding it to Crassus, particularly if (as I suspect) he wouldn't really want it.
Interestingly enough, I found this anecdote written by Cicero of events in late 57-early 56:
"Furious and pallid in the midst of the clamor, he [Clodius]took to asking his followers who it was killing the plebs by starvation: the gangs would answer, "Pompeius!" "Who wanted to go to Alexandria?" They would answer, "Pompeius!" "Whom did they want to go?" They would reply, "Crassus!"

Granted this was from 56 and Pompey was unpopular at the time but I think it is an important anecdote-given that this is just prior to the renewing of the triumvirate and Crassus was becoming interested in an eastern command, it's possible Crassus was behind this move by Clodius. Which that when he wanted to, Crassus certainly had the ability to influence popular politics in his favor.

The problem of course is you have to make Pompey as unpopular as he was in 57-56 back in 59.
 
True, but it all depends if they can get the support of the people.
But we're predicating this on Caesar's decline in popularity in the second half of his consulate, aren't we? Events such as Caesar getting the silent treatment at the games in July while Curio is applauded suggests that there might have been a workable majority there.
I'm wondering if Bibulus being stabbed could lead to a repeat of the chaos in 100 that led to the death of Saturninus and lead to Caesar's death here?
Perhaps: the only problem I can see is that the senatus consultum ultimum gives power to the consuls to preserve the republic, which becomes rather awkward when one of them appears to have had the other stabbed. I was thinking more that the violence would turn the people even further away from Caesar, leading to a conservative consul suffectus being elected, and persuading Crassus and Pompey that Caesar has lost control and it's time to drop him.
By that I meant a tribune might do the work for Crassus rather than him having to make a deal with the Senate.
However, we come back to the point about the triumvirate working well for all three members. If Crassus strikes out on his own to steal Caesar's command, the triumvirate is over and Crassus deliberately destroys a functioning alliance without forging a new one to compensate. The only circumstances I can see Crassus doing something like this is if he thought he would never have to achieve anything ever again in politics.
given that this is just prior to the renewing of the triumvirate and Crassus was becoming interested in an eastern command,
Crassus had talked about making Egypt a tributary nation during his censorship, so it's possible that he put Clodius up to it. On the other hand, who else did the crowd have to shout for? Obviously not Pompey, not Caesar because he's in Gaul, certainly not someone like Bibulus. Even assuming he did put Clodius up to it, I'm not sure this supports Crassus wanting a military command. The mission being discussed isn't necessarily a military one (no army attached) and it's to restore the king rather than to conquer the territory.
 
But we're predicating this on Caesar's decline in popularity in the second half of his consulate, aren't we? Events such as Caesar getting the silent treatment at the games in July while Curio is applauded suggests that there might have been a workable majority there.
True.
Perhaps: the only problem I can see is that the senatus consultum ultimum gives power to the consuls to preserve the republic, which becomes rather awkward when one of them appears to have had the other stabbed. I was thinking more that the violence would turn the people even further away from Caesar, leading to a conservative consul suffectus being elected, and persuading Crassus and Pompey that Caesar has lost control and it's time to drop him.
That could work.
However, we come back to the point about the triumvirate working well for all three members. If Crassus strikes out on his own to steal Caesar's command, the triumvirate is over and Crassus deliberately destroys a functioning alliance without forging a new one to compensate. The only circumstances I can see Crassus doing something like this is if he thought he would never have to achieve anything ever again in politics.
Well if they are already giving up on Caesar, the triumvirate is already dead. Still, you're right he's still allied with Pompey. Hmm. This is tough to get around.

Crassus had talked about making Egypt a tributary nation during his censorship, so it's possible that he put Clodius up to it. On the other hand, who else did the crowd have to shout for? Obviously not Pompey, not Caesar because he's in Gaul, certainly not someone like Bibulus. Even assuming he did put Clodius up to it, I'm not sure this supports Crassus wanting a military command. The mission being discussed isn't necessarily a military one (no army attached) and it's to restore the king rather than to conquer the territory.
This is true.
 
The key alliance was that between Pompey and Caesar.

Crassus and Caesar had been allied for 10 years before the formation of the so-called Triumvirate. And they did not achieve much together. That's why Caesar knew he needed to be allied with Pompey if he wanted to achieve great deeds.

The extraordinary command was the price he got for the extraordinary services he performed as consul in favour of Pompey and Crassus. If he had just had a normal consulship, he would not have had such an extraordinary command.

What must be understood is that, by 60, Pompey was on the verge of political collapse.
He failed again and again to have the Senate ratify his asian reorganization and was about to lose the support of his asian clients because of this failure.
He failed to have a law passed for giving lands to his veterans and was about to lose the trust of a large part of his veterans.

Who would support an imperator who was not able to settle things in Rome and pay back his clients and allies ? Nobody.

That's the immense service Caesar rendered to Pompey. Caesar put his hand s'il the dort on behalf of Pompey. And as he said t'en years later, he made enemies in behalf of Pompey. That's why their alliance lasted long. Pompey was well aware of the immense political skills of Caesar. He knew that the optimates only wanted to separate him from Caesar in order to first éliminateur Caesar, then to deal get rid of him, Pompey.

Galliano Cisalpina was the most important of all provinces at the time. Because It was the province where one was able to recruit goods roman soldiers more than any where else in the world. It's from this province that came most of Caesar's recruits.

Gallia Transalpine was given to Caesar afterwards only because of the prématuré death of Metellus Celer. Caesar's initial plan was to campaign against Burebistanin Dacia.
 
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