BAttle of Midway, minus Aleutians Fiasco

I have been interested in the Battle of Midway for many years, and I cannot help re-fighting it in my head, with particular attention on whether the Japanese could have won EVEN with the severe handicap of having their codes broken and their "mail being read" by USA Intelligence Officers.

One thing stands out, the fact that the Japanese Carrier force assigned to Midway was missing the two carriers (Shokaku and Zuikakau) that had been part of the original Pearl Harbor Strike....as we know, the Battle of Coral Sea resulted in Shokaku and Zuikaku being unavailable for Midway, and this proved a HUGE factor.....many "what if" questions center around what would have happened if these two carriers (each with their complement of 72 planes) had been part of the midway Task force....or even if just one of them were part of Nagumo's strike force (conceivably, Zuikaku could have been available with a reduced air complement of about 65 if they had combined the remnants of planes and pilots of both Shokaku and Zuikaku after Coral Sea!)



WHAT IF....the Aleutians Diversion that took place the week before Midway never happened? What if Yamamoto had not divided his forces but kept them focused on Midway, and the ships alloted to the Aleutians attack were instead part of the Midway operation? Consider this: The two Carriers assigned to the Aleutians, Junyo and Ryujo both were small ("light"), but each had around 45-48 total Aircraft......IF they had been with Nagumo along with Akagi, Kaga, Soryu and Hiryu, I think the battle of Midway turns out differently.

Suppose the japanese Combat Air Patrol has an additional 15-20 zeros aloft when the American Airstrikes hit the Japanese Fleet? We know the Japananes CAP totally decimated everything the Americans threw at them right up until the Dive Bombers arrived, and it was the singular LACK of additional Zeros in the Air allowing the Dive Bombers to come in almost unmolested that killed Japan's fortunes in this battle. With the two additional carriers being able to add to the CAP, it is conceivable that the Dive Bombers too would have at least been moderately scattered and the attack disrupted, to the point where the damage they inflict would not nearly have been as devastating......in fact even just a handful of zeros (say 4-5) flying into a American Dive Bomber formation of 20-25 planes would have been a real problem for them.

But suppose the Americans still nail two of the original four carriers (Kaga was a sitting duck, regardless, due to her size and the fact its decks and hangars were particularly scattered with munitions, as were Akagi's....Hiryu and Soryu did not have this problem.) Suppose Hiryu, Soryu Survive, commanded by the much more competent and aggressive Admiral Yamaguchi who takes over for the rattled and wounded Nagumo, and now he also has Junyo and Ryujo's planes as well.....he fights back and sinks Yorktown first, and then its his four carriers versus the Hornet and Enterprise and their severely depleted air groups.....I think Japan wins that scenario easily!


What does everyone else think? Would adding the Aleutians' forces have made a difference, and if so, how much of a difference?

If this delays the war in the pacific long enough, Japan might be able to surrender before the atomic bombings and possibly a portion of the conventional raids.

Since this doesn't affect the war in Europe, the Soviets still win in the same timeframe and invade Manchuria and Korea, which prompts the surrender before America can capture the islands necessary to launch the final stage of bombings.

That is if Europe is not affected enough to change the approximate date of V-E day.

end result is the same, but with less civilian casualties and no nuclear fallout in Japanese home islands.

Germany still loses

... Suppose the japanese Combat Air Patrol has an additional 15-20 zeros aloft when the American Airstrikes hit the Japanese Fleet? We know the Japananes CAP totally decimated everything the Americans threw at them right up until the Dive Bombers arrived, and it was the singular LACK of additional Zeros in the Air allowing the Dive Bombers to come in almost unmolested that killed Japan's fortunes in this battle. ...

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The numbers available for CAP would have been enough had there been a system for controlling the CAP, other than the flight commanders. The air commanders aboard the ships had very limited ability to direct the CAP to do anything. Aggravating this was the tendency of the aggressive IJN pilots to pursue the enemy at hand. The commanders in the air were unable to keep a reserve organized at high altitude. They also had a limited situational awareness. Lacking information from a radar.CIC combination the flight commanders in the air were dependent on their eyes and the occasional signal from the ships below. The ships in the outer screen had orders to make smoke when incoming aircraft were sighted & this seems to have been the only warning and direction to approaching enemy aircraft.

The long series of US attacks from multiple directions exhausted the CAP & dispersed it at or near sea level. Odds are the extra ten or fifteen aircraft would have been refueling, or pursuing Torpedo Six & Torpedo Eight when the dive bombers approached 20,000 feet above.

Had any CAP pursued the incoming dive bombers it would have given the US fighter pilots something to do. They missed the radio calls from the two torpedo squadrons & remained at altitude watching for anything coming at the dive bombers as they approached the enemy fleet.

Carl Schwamberger said:

Germany still loses



The numbers available for CAP would have been enough had there been a system for controlling the CAP, other than the flight commanders. The air commanders aboard the ships had very limited ability to direct the CAP to do anything. Aggravating this was the tendency of the aggressive IJN pilots to pursue the enemy at hand. The commanders in the air were unable to keep a reserve organized at high altitude. They also had a limited situational awareness. Lacking information from a radar.CIC combination the flight commanders in the air were dependent on their eyes and the occasional signal from the ships below. The ships in the outer screen had orders to make smoke when incoming aircraft were sighted & this seems to have been the only warning and direction to approaching enemy aircraft.

The long series of US attacks from multiple directions exhausted the CAP & dispersed it at or near sea level. Odds are the extra ten or fifteen aircraft would have been refueling, or pursuing Torpedo Six & Torpedo Eight when the dive bombers approached 20,000 feet above.

Had any CAP pursued the incoming dive bombers it would have given the US fighter pilots something to do. They missed the radio calls from the two torpedo squadrons & remained at altitude watching for anything coming at the dive bombers as they approached the enemy fleet.

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These are very good points, and probability dictates what you describe would have happened .....

But the scenario I outlined I think is very feasible.....having another 15-20 zeros zooming around might (no guarantees I know) have been a factor in messing up SOME of the dive bombers and spared one of the three carriers blown apart in the Dive Bombing run (again my vote is for Soryu to survive)....

But let's go with your scenario......now you have only Hiryu surviving WITH Junyo and Ryujo......Yamaguchi now has options besides launching a desperate counterattack with only his planes.....at the very least, I think Yamamoto would have continues the battle for another couple days and anything is possible considering his HUGE surface force.


OR.....do not forget, it would have been possible that SOME of the dive bombers in that first attack MIGHT have actually gone after Ryujo and Junyo instead of two of the other BIGGER carriers......Now things get interesting. Imagine Yamaguchi with Hiryu, Soryu and Kaga!!! On the other hand, if Akagi survives instead of KAGA, then you still have Nagumo with Akagi, Hiryu and one of the other four......That would have been no different, Nagumo would have crapped his pants and turned and fled with what he had left. But if you have Yamaguchi with the three BIG carriers remaining, I think Japan wins the battle with the heavy losses noted.

If we want to get real deep, consider when Nagumo launches his FIRST strike on Midway....having six carriers to divvy up the task helps on many tactical levels. And since we know he kept two carriers ready for Sea Action and the other two ready for more Midway strikes, if he has two more carriers, then perhaps he does not hesistate when he gets word that a second strike is needed on Midway? He launches a three carrier strike which would have been enough.....none of this "re-arming" and playing "musical munitions" that ultimately killed two of his carriers! And having three carriers ready for sea action instead of two means he can also launch an immediate strike on the American Carrier (the Yorktown) first spotted by his delayed scout plane when they were in the middle of rearming and playing musical munitions! Get it?

Bottom line, having those two smaller carriers with the MIDWAY force improves Japan's odds, all other things being equal......

Problem One: The air wings, such as they were, on Ryuho and Junyo were apple green. They were not the crack veterans of the Kido Butai. It's anyone's guess whether Nagumo sends them in with the first wave, holds them back for the second wave (unlikely), or keeps more of their Zeroes back for CAP. The problem was the IJN had their obsession with attack-attack-attack. Defense, whether by fighters or AA, just wasn't taken all that seriously. Even Japanese survivors reflected on this attitude post-Battle: "We thought the enemy would never hit our ships. But they did."

Until Midway the only real opposition the Japanese Navy had faced was the fifty RAF Hurricanes over Ceylon and the Battle of the Coral Sea, which the Japanese saw quite rightly as a tactical success. They lost one light carrier and believed for a time that along with the sinking of the Lexington the Yorktown either was sunk, a TCL, or would at least be in drydock for a year or more.

There's also the IJN mania for razzle-dazzle dispersal of task forces tactics, not changed even as of Leyte Gulf. They didn't stop these tactics until the time that they lacked the ships to do it. Also, its likely the CAP will be dispersed with the need to cover a larger number of carriers.

As to the Kaga and Akagi drawing all the American fire leaving the Hiryu and Soryu alone? It doesn't take much to sink a Hiryu-class. Not as vulnerable as the Ranger, but bad enough.

The Hiryu survived the first strike mainly because it was lucky. It had fled north to avoid torpedo attacks, taking it to the limits of the horizon, leaving the other three to absorb the blow. If anything, based on their size, the Junyo and Ryuho would be the most likely survivors, with the worst air crews surviving.

Also there's a problem with the ships themselves. They are all 24 knot or less vessels, they can't keep up with the KB at all and their slow speed would hamper air ops of the big carriers. Also the carriers were not carrying their full compliments of aircraft or even the right ones in one case so their air groups would have been limited and as someone said, apple green.

Also don't forget that Yamamoto wanted a fight, he was concerned that he'd spook the USN if they saw the size of his forces and would not come out to play. This just gets worse if you put the Alutians forces with what I assume would be the main body (as they are too slow to go with anything else). And lets not forget that the Yamato and friends were all at least a good days sailing from where the KB was.

usertron2020 said:

Problem One: The air wings, such as they were, on Ryuho and Junyo were apple green. They were not the crack veterans of the Kido Butai. It's anyone's guess whether Nagumo sends them in with the first wave, holds them back for the second wave (unlikely), or keeps more of their Zeroes back for CAP. The problem was the IJN had their obsession with attack-attack-attack. Defense, whether by fighters or AA, just wasn't taken all that seriously. Even Japanese survivors reflected on this attitude post-Battle: "We thought the enemy would never hit our ships. But they did."

Until Midway the only real opposition the Japanese Navy had faced was the fifty RAF Hurricanes over Ceylon and the Battle of the Coral Sea, which the Japanese saw quite rightly as a tactical success. They lost one light carrier and believed for a time that along with the sinking of the Lexington the Yorktown either was sunk, a TCL, or would at least be in drydock for a year or more.

There's also the IJN mania for razzle-dazzle dispersal of task forces tactics, not changed even as of Leyte Gulf. They didn't stop these tactics until the time that they lacked the ships to do it. Also, its likely the CAP will be dispersed with the need to cover a larger number of carriers.

As to the Kaga and Akagi drawing all the American fire leaving the Hiryu and Soryu alone? It doesn't take much to sink a Hiryu-class. Not as vulnerable as the Ranger, but bad enough.

The Hiryu survived the first strike mainly because it was lucky. It had fled north to avoid torpedo attacks, taking it to the limits of the horizon, leaving the other three to absorb the blow. If anything, based on their size, the Junyo and Ryuho would be the most likely survivors, with the worst air crews surviving.

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I agree with the part about the Japs not having enough defense, or being preoccupied with offense....they proved this was the case LATER when they added MORE fighters to the carriers and removed bombers.


But I disagree with the "Apple green" characterization of the air crews on the two smaller carriers......they were pretty experienced as of the Midway battle, as were most carrier aircrews during this time. Ryujo especially had significant experience prior to Midway. Remember, Japan had been fighting in China for ten years and its pilots up to the Midway campaign received lots of practice bombing chinese coastal targets and such.....

But you are correct about Japanes arrogance and their feeling of invincibility.....this "victory disease" was a major reason for their subsequent RAPID decline. Plus, as you also allude, carrier tactics were still being hashed out....neither side had it perfect yet.

If I remember right. Few issues were

1. The long range recon aircraft was delayed by something(malfunction?). If they spot American first they win most likely. Longer range and weight of numbers. If I remember right the one plane delayed had patrol sector where US taskforce was but I read this long time ago might be wrong

2. Order to rearm the bombers. Sure their damage control was not great but without all of those planes, bombs etc on deck effect of the dive bombers would not be as severe

3. Original plan was to always keep reserve for anti ship counter since US Carriers could always be around. Nagumo decided to deviate from Yamamoto approved plan

If you want them to win have them detect US Carrier group first by having the patrols in place. Then US carriers get mobbed by mass of torpedo planes 2-3 times of what happened and go kaput. Longer term they still lose.

Alternatively recon is still bad but Nagumo stick to the plan and keeps reserve to attack the carriers. Not as drastic as first option but they still win likely. Wiki has some mention that US bomber trying to suicide into bridge where Nagumo was might have affected his judgement(just saw this reading it now never heard of this before), have the pilot bail instead as POD

Having more CAP would not help much if anything else goes same. However maybe having more planes Nagumo keeps his reserve intact? So no rearm order and much earlier strike

I've wargamed this out some.

What I do with the three light carriers s keep them with the transports, which is appropriate for their speed. I keep the Kido Butai in reserve, ready to strike carriers. The light carriers, instead, will bomb Midway. Repeatedly, if necessary. They'll be the highly visible targets, and will gain valuable combat experience at relatively low risk. If the American carriers reveal themselves, then the Fleet carriers can strike them, and finish off the US Navy and the Empire can ask for terms.

someone said:

Problem One: The air wings, such as they were, on Ryuho and Junyo were apple green.

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sharlin said:

Also there's a problem with the ships themselves. They are all 24 knot or less vessels, they can't keep up with the KB at all and their slow speed would hamper air ops of the big carriers. Also the carriers were not carrying their full compliments of aircraft or even the right ones in one case so their air groups would have been limited and as someone said, apple green.

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I wasn't sure about their speed

Also don't forget that Yamamoto wanted a fight, he was concerned that he'd spook the USN if they saw the size of his forces and would not come out to play. This just gets worse if you put the Aluetians forces with what I assume would be the main body (as they are too slow to go with anything else). And lets not forget that the Yamato and friends were all at least a good days sailing from where the KB was.

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Part of the razzle-dazzle mania was the need felt for a strategic diversion and the arrogance in their belief that it would work: Nimitz not only gets "fooled" but abandons Hawaii to go rushing off into the North Pacific of all places to go defend a set of islands that enjoy about 25 days of clear flying weather year round.

In fact, the Aleutians proved to be the one place in the Pacific where the old slow WWI US battleships could be deployed in direct combat action. Once they had been fully repaired (for the Pearl survivors), modernized, their AA packages improved, anti-torpedo blisters increased, and escorts provided.

DaBurglar said:

I agree with the part about the Japs not having enough defense, or being preoccupied with offense....they proved this was the case LATER when they added MORE fighters to the carriers and removed bombers.

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Losing a lot of those bombers in frittered away battles of attrition in the Solomons helped to make room too.

But I disagree with the "Apple green" characterization of the air crews on the two smaller carriers......they were pretty experienced as of the Midway battle, as were most carrier aircrews during this time. Ryujo especially had significant experience prior to Midway. Remember, Japan had been fighting in China for ten years and its pilots up to the Midway campaign received lots of practice bombing Chinese coastal targets and such.

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Hmm. Considering the insane levels of over-training the IJN gave to their pilots, I'll concede your points, except on one angle: The two air wings themselves and well as their ship crews would have had little experience working as a team.

But you are correct about Japanes arrogance and their feeling of invincibility.....this "victory disease" was a major reason for their subsequent RAPID decline. Plus, as you also allude, carrier tactics were still being hashed out....neither side had it perfect yet.

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Agreed. Japanese carrier tactics were better than American by this time, especially in the air. But stupid overconfidence will cause a world champion super-heavyweight to lose to a smart flyweight boxer who was never more than a mere prize-fighter.

takerma said:

If I remember right. Few issues were

1. The long range recon aircraft was delayed by something(malfunction?). If they spot American first they win most likely. Longer range and weight of numbers. If I remember right the one plane delayed had patrol sector where US taskforce was but I read this long time ago might be wrong

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Commander Genda's recon scheme was a gamble, employing only a single-phase search using a handful of over-aged patrol planes, many from the cruisers and fast battleships. Single-phase meant that the only search wave would be launched at dawn, rather than a one-two wave with the first launched at night so that they would arrive at a respectable position for scouting at sun-up (so no nasty surprises). This kind of gamble was typical for IJN tactics though.

The whole thing turned into a complete cluster fuck. One plane having to abort with engine problems, another encountering heavy cloud cover, another apparently flying right over the US carriers and not seeing anything, and the infamous scout #4 that was delayed in launch, not seeing the US fleet until it was already on its homeward leg. Oh, and the modern scout plane from the Soryu to find out where the carriers were had a busted radio! Payback + Karma is an incredible bitch

2. Order to rearm the bombers. Sure their damage control was not great but without all of those planes, bombs etc on deck effect of the dive bombers would not be as severe

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They did this???

3. Original plan was to always keep reserve for anti ship counter since US Carriers could always be around. Nagumo decided to deviate from Yamamoto approved plan

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Nagumo only did so to facilitate a second strike on Midway, as he had been getting attacked by a peculiarly well-equipped for air combat Midway Island. His scout planes reported nothing. He didn't know about all the other scouting foul-ups, and gambled Scout #4 would see nothing either. Oops He ordered the second wave re-armed, but there were so many Midway and USN torpedo plane attacks the launch was delayed until Scout #4 found Fletcher's ships and the first wave had arrived, demanding to have the decks cleared so that they could land.

That's fine, but ordering his fleet to close with Fletcher while he Nagumo was both recovering aircraft AND re-arming the rest of his planes was beyond reckless. He should have headed SW, not NE. But...attack-attack-attack.

If you want them to win have them detect US Carrier group first by having the patrols in place.

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In addition to his OWN search planes, Fletcher has the inexhaustible 24 PBY's from Midway searching. You can argue for near-simultaneous findings, providing the Japanese use a two-phased search, but giving first discovery to the Japanese is putting a fist on the scale. You'd need to give Nagumo triple the number of search planes he had, and ALL of them fully modern.

Then US carriers get mobbed by mass of torpedo planes 2-3 times of what happened and go kaput. Longer term they still lose.

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The Japanese never even found Enterprise and Hornet (they deduced the numbers of carriers they faced solely by the numbers of aircraft they faced) until the returning Soryu scout told Rear Admiral Yamaguchi what he had seen (the rest of the carriers had already been sunk). Moments later, the last American strike of the day arrived to finish off the Hiryu.

Alternatively recon is still bad but Nagumo stick to the plan and keeps reserve to attack the carriers. Not as drastic as first option but they still win likely.

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You'd have to change Nagumo's CoS who's conservatism matched his own. Eliminate Midway first was their standing orders. Nagumo was riding high at the time, but not enough to challenge Yamamoto's standing orders.

Wiki has some mention that US bomber trying to suicide into bridge where Nagumo was might have affected his judgement(just saw this reading it now never heard of this before), have the pilot bail instead as POD

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Actually its most likely that the pilot and crew of that B-26 Marauder were dead when that happened. They were at sea-level, so bailing wasn't an option.

Having more CAP would not help much if anything else goes same. However maybe having more planes Nagumo keeps his reserve intact? So no rearm order and much earlier strike

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Considering how well Midway rode out the first strike, beyond losing their fighter squadron and suffering (unknown to the Japanese) the loss of their fuel pumping capability (requiring re-fueling by hand), a second strike for the purpose of destroying the airstrip was definitely necessary. Time was of the essence, and they needed Midway taken before the US fleet could intervene.

ScrewySqrl said:

I've wargamed this out some.

What I do with the three light carriers s keep them with the transports, which is appropriate for their speed. I keep the Kido Butai in reserve, ready to strike carriers. The light carriers, instead, will bomb Midway. Repeatedly, if necessary. They'll be the highly visible targets, and will gain valuable combat experience at relatively low risk. If the American carriers reveal themselves, then the Fleet carriers can strike them, and finish off the US Navy and the Empire can ask for terms.

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Those light carriers combined don't have the gravitas to knock out Midway, and apparently even the Japanese knew that. More likely those three carriers will run out of offensive bombers before Midway runs out of planes and the airstrip can be knocked out. Also, they'll need reserves for ASW, CAP, and combat losses. I doubt they could support more than 2-3 sorties before they would have to break off. In most wargames you don't count combat losses of aircraft.

The Japanese had zero plans for asking for terms. That's a sign of weakness. They expected US to ask for terms. No idea of what they'd done at Pearl.

This is all great input from everyone, thanks for giving it some thought, I respect all opinions and estimates. Midway is one fascinating, wide open battle due to the fact that the "game" (i.e. carrier warfare and taking a hostile Island via Amphibious landing) was being made up or invented as they went along......

When i suggested consolidating forces so that the aleutians package is added to the weight of the whole Midway force, I should also have made a suggestion about what would have happened IF...IF the "MAIN BODY" of the Yamato and the rest of the Heavy duty hitters sitting 280 miles behind Nagumo had in fact been brought up and grouped WITH the Carrier Strike force.....?? think about that for a moment......obviously it helps a little with Anti-Aircraft fire and making for a bigger "gauntlet" for any attacking planes to fly.....but why on earth did not the Japanese think about Utilizing all their surface forces to simply clobber and overwhelm Midway itself and save their air groups for the truly essential task of nailing the US fleet wherever and whenever it shows up? Also, when and after Midway is in fact taken, you had to allot many of the planes from the carriers to occupy the Midway Airfield, so again you should "save" the planes....


Suppose you have all those Japanese Battleships and cruisers bombarding midway, covered by some fighters from the carriers who stay safely back......as we know, Midway itself did not have much in terms of ACTUAL striking power; most of it was a hodge podge of different planes, many obsolete, who even if they could have attacked a huge force of surface ships (Battleships and cruisers) would not have been able to do more than modest damage, or worst case scenario, a battleship or two or a couple cruisers are lost......it was no easy task destroying the YAMATO (or the Musashi) when it came time to do so, so I can see Midway being rendered dead by Japan's massive surface elements......no? I dunno, something to ponder and playout anyway.....


If I were to go back in time as Japan's commander, what I would do is utilize the two light carriers with a combined plane total of 85-90 planes as being solely responsible for CAP duties......the light carriers were not quite as fast as the four main carriers, True, but its not as if the four Big carriers (akagi KAga Hiryu Soryu) were constantly hauling arse at maximum speed.....rarely did they do this in fact, so it is POSSIBLE for everyone to stay together, so to speak. Have Ryujo and Junyo keep 30-40% of the 85-90 Zeros they would have aloft at all times, rotating them up and down as needed, and keep the other 60% ready to go when the first signs of trouble appear......remember, CONSOLIDATING the Japanese forces allows for a wider/greater perimeter which allows for earlier warning, etc.

Also, spread the four (or six) carriers out to four corners of the formation/fleet instead of having them all nicely and neatly boxed together.....discovery of one means discovery of all! OR....if they bring up Yamato's group and the Aleutians forces and keep everything together, they conceivably could have TWO or more different groups close enough together so as to still be able to support each other, but still far enough apart to prevent discovery of one being discovery of all....afterall this is what HELPED the AMericans (even if it was NOT intended or by design), with Yorktown's group being far enough away from Hornet/Enterprise to prevent discovery en masse but still close enough to where they could combine and coordinate attack(s).

ScrewySqrl said:

I've wargamed this out some.

What I do with the three light carriers s keep them with the transports, which is appropriate for their speed. I keep the Kido Butai in reserve, ready to strike carriers. The light carriers, instead, will bomb Midway. Repeatedly, if necessary. They'll be the highly visible targets, and will gain valuable combat experience at relatively low risk. If the American carriers reveal themselves, then the Fleet carriers can strike them, and finish off the US Navy and the Empire can ask for terms.

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The terms: Paper or Plastic. For the body bags after the US is done getting revenge.

Midway would have to coincide with some sort of dual set-back (failure at Coral Sea, an early Torch that fails miserably + worse performance in Battle for the Atlantic perhaps?), and then extremely generous terms from the Japanese (i.e. reparations for Pearl Harbor and giving back the Philippines) for the US to even consider terms.

I suppose with the right butterflies it is not impossible...but, extremely unlikely.

I was just reading a book on this subject and it made some points that are instancing. 1st is that their carriers where lacking aircraft by this time due apparently to low aircraft build rates. The carriers that took part at midway OTL were down about 15% from the numbers at Pearl Harbor and that was with them taking aircraft from other roles. 2nd is that the Alaska attack was not a diversion but a plan he had to agree to or his plan to attack Midway would not be approved.

Agreed. The What if postulated could potentially change the outcome of the battle and, if so, that would be a big setback to the US. However, it's not going to be nearly enough of a setback that the US would accept terms, unless the Japanese were generous almost to the point of surrender -- reparations, evacuate PI, evacuate Hong Kong and Malay, evacuate much of Korea, Vietnam, and China, etc.

pattersonautobody said:

The terms: Paper or Plastic. For the body bags after the US is done getting revenge.

Midway would have to coincide with some sort of dual set-back (failure at Coral Sea, an early Torch that fails miserably + worse performance in Battle for the Atlantic perhaps?), and then extremely generous terms from the Japanese (i.e. reparations for Pearl Harbor and giving back the Philippines) for the US to even consider terms.

I suppose with the right butterflies it is not impossible...but, extremely unlikely.

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DaBurglar said:

This is all great input from everyone, thanks for giving it some thought, I respect all opinions and estimates. Midway is one fascinating, wide open battle due to the fact that the "game" (i.e. carrier warfare and taking a hostile Island via Amphibious landing) was being made up or invented as they went along......

When i suggested consolidating forces so that the aleutians package is added to the weight of the whole Midway force, I should also have made a suggestion about what would have happened IF...IF the "MAIN BODY" of the Yamato and the rest of the Heavy duty hitters sitting 280 miles behind Nagumo had in fact been brought up and grouped WITH the Carrier Strike force.....?? think about that for a moment......obviously it helps a little with Anti-Aircraft fire and making for a bigger "gauntlet" for any attacking planes to fly.....but why on earth did not the Japanese think about Utilizing all their surface forces to simply clobber and overwhelm Midway itself and save their air groups for the truly essential task of nailing the US fleet wherever and whenever it shows up? Also, when and after Midway is in fact taken, you had to allot many of the planes from the carriers to occupy the Midway Airfield, so again you should "save" the planes....


Suppose you have all those Japanese Battleships and cruisers bombarding midway, covered by some fighters from the carriers who stay safely back......as we know, Midway itself did not have much in terms of ACTUAL striking power; most of it was a hodge podge of different planes, many obsolete, who even if they could have attacked a huge force of surface ships (Battleships and cruisers) would not have been able to do more than modest damage, or worst case scenario, a battleship or two or a couple cruisers are lost......it was no easy task destroying the YAMATO (or the Musashi) when it came time to do so, so I can see Midway being rendered dead by Japan's massive surface elements......no? I dunno, something to ponder and playout anyway.....


If I were to go back in time as Japan's commander, what I would do is utilize the two light carriers with a combined plane total of 85-90 planes as being solely responsible for CAP duties......the light carriers were not quite as fast as the four main carriers, True, but its not as if the four Big carriers (akagi KAga Hiryu Soryu) were constantly hauling arse at maximum speed.....rarely did they do this in fact, so it is POSSIBLE for everyone to stay together, so to speak. Have Ryujo and Junyo keep 30-40% of the 85-90 Zeros they would have aloft at all times, rotating them up and down as needed, and keep the other 60% ready to go when the first signs of trouble appear......remember, CONSOLIDATING the Japanese forces allows for a wider/greater perimeter which allows for earlier warning, etc.

Also, spread the four (or six) carriers out to four corners of the formation/fleet instead of having them all nicely and neatly boxed together.....discovery of one means discovery of all! OR....if they bring up Yamato's group and the Aleutians forces and keep everything together, they conceivably could have TWO or more different groups close enough together so as to still be able to support each other, but still far enough apart to prevent discovery of one being discovery of all....afterall this is what HELPED the AMericans (even if it was NOT intended or by design), with Yorktown's group being far enough away from Hornet/Enterprise to prevent discovery en masse but still close enough to where they could combine and coordinate attack(s).

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The goal was actually not to take Midway, that was the bonus. Strategically Midway was not part of the original Japanese defensive perimeter, and for very valid reason. It was too far from the rest of the perimeter to provide support and would require disproportionate effort to hold for that reason.

The goal of the Midway plan was to lure the USN into a bushwack and eliminate its offensive striking power. It was, in effect, an effort to rectify the results of Pearl Harbor and give the Empire enough time to finish its plans and establish what was hoped to be a defensive perimeter that would be too costly to reduce, allowing Japan to end the war on favorable terms.

With this goal in mind the placement of the Main Body makes perfect sense. This was also the reason to attack the Aleutians, draw the U.S. forces out so they could be wrong-footed and eliminated. Had Japanese codes been secure there is a reasonable chance that the plan would have at least partially been successful.

The addition of the light carriers would only benefit insofar as it would increase the target load, making it more likely that additional decks survive the initial U.S. attacks, this is also the case for the addition of the Main Body. In either case the additions would also greatly slowed the "sprint" capabilities of the Kido Butai (the Rjuyo and Hiro class had a max speed of 25.5 knots, in practice this was closer to 23 knots). IJN doctrine for CAP was so poor that there is almost no chance that any substantial fighter force would have remained on high station, and fighter direction was virtually absent, partly because of lack of search radar across the force, partly because of basic tactical thought.

The same tactical thought greatly reduced the effectiveness of adding additional surface units to the carrier force escort. Unlike U.S. doctrine that always considered the AAA supplied by the escorts force to be a critical element of the carrier's defenses, IJN doctrine believed that the carrier's own AAA (IJN fleet carriers mounted twice the heavy AAA of their USN counterparts while IJN BB were the exact opposite) was sufficient to deal with most attacks along with CAP. The IJN 127mm 3rd year DP gun was was seriously deficient with both a low rate of fire (in actual use around 5 rounds per minute) and horrifically poor train rate of 6 degrees a second. with even the much better gun carrier on the carriers and capital ships, the Type 89 with a rate of 8 RPM sustained and 14 degree/sec train (as comparison the U.S. 5"/38 figures were 15-18 RPM sustained and 25-28 degree/sec) making the support fire from escorts, particularly destroyers and cruisers, vastly less effective than the fire provided by USN vessels in the same role.

Ironically the formation used by IJN multi-carrier fleets was established based on photos taken for publication of U.S. ships. The photos were, however, staged for publicity, and did not accurately reflect U.S. doctrine at the time, which was built around each carrier and its escorts operating as independent formations. The formation was also far less of an issue at Midway by the time the dive bomber strike appeared. Evasive maneuvering during the successive waves of attacks from Midway and then the ill-fated torpedo squadron actions had shattered the formations beyond recognition (this likely saved Hiryu from being sunk in the initial slaughter since she was far enough from the rest of the formation that her presence was obscured by a rain squall).

It is also worth considering that the Japanese never did locate TF 16, thereby missing 2/3 of the U.S. force in the area. The American carriers retained a substantive striking force that the Japanese never touched, a force more than capable of dispatching two additional light carriers in any follow up attack.

Lastly, the chances of the ad hoc invasion force being sent to capture Midway needs to be considered, even if the actual fleet ambush was successful. It was essentially a scratch team, with two separate formations that had never practiced together, totalling around 5,000 men that would have been attacking a more potent version of Tarawa (including six light tanks that the Japanese never did realize were on the atoll) with inadequate pre-landing bombardment (the plan called for a couple hours of shelling by a CruDiv), no coordinated CAS, and had no amphibious tractors to mount the atoll's reef, leaving troops to wade in for several hundred yards against well dug in troops and heavy automatic weapons. It does not game out well for the invaders, even if the Main Body is brought up to provide gunfire support since the heavy ships were armed with AP and very few bombardment rounds.

I don't agree that the HIRYU was hidden by a rain squall, that is largely a myth IMO. According to the position chart in Shattered Sword, she was between SORYU (the northern most flight deck) and AKAGI. Lem Massey's VT-3 attacked the HIRYU while Max Leslie went after SORYU which was what he should have done. USN doctrine at the time was one dive bomber squadron per carrier and Leslie had one dive bomber squadron.

VB-6 and VS-6 attacked the two carriers further south due to the direction they came in from.

One of the main flaws with this scenario is that it assumes the US responds in exactly the same way if there are six carriers in the KB instead of four.

Remember, Ady and Chase both reported only two carriers in their sighting reports. The more carriers you add, the greater the odds they see and report back three or even four carriers.

This is important because John Lundstrom (and Craig Symonds) make a strong case the Mitscher ordered the HAG to fly a course of 265 degrees because he believed that there were enemy carriers operating somewhere to the northwest of where Ady and Chase made their sightings. If more carriers are reported in those initial sighting reports, maybe the entire HAG takes the course it should have taken (the course that VT-8 took) and two squadrons of dive bombers, one squadron of torpedo bombers, and 10 fighters all arrive at about 0920.

Another possibility is that if more carriers are reported in the initial sightings, then Fletcher sends Wally Short's VS-5 out after they return from their morning scouting mission.

Just food for thought - only three of six American carrier based dive bomber squadrons made contact during the morning of 4 June for various reasons. More carriers in the KB possibly means more carriers reported by Ady and Chase and now different decisions are made by American commanders.

BTW, if you want to create a TL where more carriers are in the KB at Midway, don't screw around with the RYUJO and JUNYO, they are too slow.

Have the Japanese cobble together an air group for ZUIKAKU - a little out of the box but not ASB and throw in ZUIHO (she could keep up with the bigger carriers).

While you are at it, strip planes from RYUJO and JUNYO to give ZUIHO a full air group of A6Ms and B5Ns (30 total) instead of the 6 A6Ms, 6 A5Ms, and 12 B5Ns she took to Midway OTL.

With whatever is left over, equip JUNYO so she can provide cover to the invasion group (ZUIHO's mission OTL).

Dropping OP AL gives the IJN more than 2 CVL

Since OTL midway was a CV battle, you folk are understandably concentrating on the ATL changes in CVs

However Yamamoto also gains 4 (old) BB, many CA and CL, enough DD to escort and some SS.

Any and all of these types can swing the battle against the USN.

For example more DD may sink the Nautilus, leaving no sign post for McClusky to correct his bad navigation.

More CA may mean a better search from the kido butai

More ss may mean the usn is spotted on the way to point luck

Even the bb would thicken the aa, would form a real bombardment force freeing 4 ca and allow more freedom to the other batdiv

And 2 extra cvl might kill us search planes even if not capable of riding with nagumo

This NOT a butterfly flapping, but a great big buzzard

DaBurglar I agree with the part about the Japs not having enough defense, or being preoccupied with offense....they proved this was the case LATER when they added MORE fighters to the carriers and removed bombers…

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The Japanese had major technical hurdles to creating better air defence doctrine than what they had in existence at Midway. Within that doctrine, CAP and anti-aircraft tactics were taken deadly seriously, (Nagumo committed most of his Zeros to CAP defence after 0800, and Yamaguchi kept most of his back for CAP even when counterattacking – not the actions of admirals uninterested in defensive precautions).

But I disagree with the "Apple green" characterization of the air crews on the two smaller carriers......they were pretty experienced as of the Midway battle, as were most carrier aircrews during this time.

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I’ve not seen a good summary of these carrier’s precise training status for aircrews. I suspect at this point of the war, lack of aircraft was a bigger deal than lack of training. It is true that some key elite aviators were transferred to 4th CAR DIV from the other carrier groups prior to the battle, to help shore them up. Other tactical factors, Ryujo’s capacity for large scale torpedo attacks was also limited. Junyo was slower than Kaga by 2-3 knots while Ryujo was slightly faster than Kaga.