WI Disaster at Pearl Harbor

[Bill Garvin]

WI Nagumo succumbs to pressure from his air group commanders and launches a third strike at the oil tanks and harbor installations. The strike is somewhat successful, knocking out about half the oil storage facility (but missing the civilian storage facility at Honolulu harbor) and damaging the shipyards.

The aircraft are on their way back at dusk when disaster strikes. Enterprise and Lexington have closed in and launched their strike, hitting the Japanese carriers just before dusk. The demands of the third strike mean that Japanese CAP is inadequate and what there is gets pulled down to sea level to fight the torpedo planes. That's when the dive bombers arrive and get to work.

By the time the strike is over, the situation is

Akagi, burning and crippled, her flight deck gone. Fires out of control
Kaga, burning and crippled, her flight deck gone. Fires out of control
Soryu, burning and crippled, her flight deck gone. Fires out of control
Hiryu, undamaged
Shokaku, torpedoed once, hit twice by bombs, fires bad but under control speed down to 20 knots
Zuikaku undamaged

Hiei undamaged
Kirishima undamaged

Tone undamaged
Chikuma. Hit aft by a Vindicator and set on fire. Torpedoes exploded leaving ship devastated and capable of only 6 knots.

Destroyers, strafed but essentially undamaged.

The Japanese can't recover their third strike. The aircraft ditch and are lost. Of 414 Japanese aircraft, only 60 survive.

So, (a) you're Nagumo. What do you do (your sword was lost with Akago so you can't commit suicide).

b) where does WW2 go from here.

[Markus]

1. Enterprise was close enough to intervene, but she already lost some SBDs, Lexington was on the way to Midway. Can she be in position soon enough?

2. A dusk strike can´t be executed, becasue it would require the pilots to land at night on the CVs, something that just wasn´t done at this time. Even the Japanese could not do it. So this battle will take place on Dec.8th with the IJN doing a lot of recon to find the US CVs and having a strong CAP in place.

3. The damage is too high. Planes from two CVs do a lot more damage in one strike than three did in two strikes at Midway. Furthermore fires are highly unlikely in this scenario. The planes have not retuned and thus the hangars are empty. Shokaku was hit by three 1000 lb bombs at Coral Sea and no fires were started, she withdrew at top speed.

[admkenshin]

Suicide is pretty much the only way out now, except that Nagumo of course needs to get the surviving ships home first.

Is it possible that Japan might get into peace negotiations before the 'unconditional surrender' decision by the allies? Then again, anti-japanese sentiments were pretty large in the US (or at least the west coast) at this time so there might be a call for blood...

[Bill Garvin]

1. Enterprise was close enough to intervene, but she already lost some SBDs, Lexington was on the way to Midway. Can she be in position soon enough?

Yes, I worked the maths out. She could launch at 1600 to get the strike in (with Enterprise) at around 1700 to 1730. Sunset is at 1721.

A dusk strike can´t be executed, becasue it would require the pilots to land at night on the CVs, something that just wasn´t done at this time. Even the Japanese could not do it. So this battle will take place on Dec.8th with the IJN doing a lot of recon to find the US CVs and having a strong CAP in place.

The landing problem wouldn't necessarily stop the Americans from launching; they did at Philippine Sea accepting that the aircraft were at the limit of their range and would be back to the carriers after nighfall (famously, Mitscher turned the lights on to get them home) This is Pearl Harbor remember, the US Navy is not happy. A dusk strike (which prevents the Japanese from hitting back) has a lot to be said for it.

The damage is too high. Planes from two CVs do a lot more damage in one strike than three did in two strikes at Midway. Furthermore fires are highly unlikely in this scenario. The planes have not retuned and thus the hangars are empty. Shokaku was hit by three 1000 lb bombs at Coral Sea and no fires were started, she withdrew at top speed.

The damage is identical to Midway; three carriers set on fire and a cruiser worked over (plus non-fatal torpedo and bomb damage to a fourth carrier instead of Hiryu being sunk). The Japanese carriers have more than a hundred fully armed and fuelled aircraft on board (their defensive anti-ship strike) plus another seventy being repaired and rearmed/refuelled. So, the situation is very comparable to Midway. There's a LOT of dive bombers coming in, more than sixty so, given what happened at Midway, I don't think the damage caused is excessive.

[Shimbo]

IIRC, Enterprise was about 200 miles west of Pearl and inbound. Lexington was 400 miles to the west and outbound to Midway. So there would only be one carrier available.

Also, as the US carriers were ferrying aircraft to Wake and Midway did they even have a full compliment on their return?

[Bill Garvin]

IIRC, Enterprise was about 200 miles west of Pearl and inbound. Lexington was 400 miles to the west and outbound to Midway. So there would only be one carrier available.

Lex got the "Air raid pearl harbor" warning as soon as it was sent out around 0800. She was heading back to Pearl within minutes, flat out. At that rate it would take her a little over 7 hours and 35 minutes to get within range of the Japanese carriers. That means she's in the game from 15:30 onwards. It was an explicit intention of her Captain to join up with Enterprise and vice versa so the two carriers doing a joint strike is quite possible. It would be a ruthless decision, effectively dooming their air groups to ditching or trying to get back to Pearl and land (the aircraft have the range to do it although they'd be running on fumes) but there's precedent for it and, as I said, the US Navy are not happy campers.

Also, as the US carriers were ferrying aircraft to Wake and Midway did they even have a full complement on their return?

Not quite but near enough; Lex actually had 15 additional dive bombers (Vindicators) on board.

[Markus]

The landing problem wouldn't necessarily stop the Americans from launching; they did at Philippine Sea accepting that the aircraft were at the limit of their range and would be back to the carriers after nighfall (famously, Mitscher turned the lights on to get them home)

Yes, but PS was years later and the USN´s CV-ops had improved a great deal by then. I´m 99% certain they did not have this capability in 1941.



The damage is identical to Midway; three carriers set on fire and a cruiser worked over (plus non-fatal torpedo and bomb damage to a fourth carrier instead of Hiryu being sunk). The Japanese carriers have more than a hundred fully armed and fuelled aircraft on board (their defensive anti-ship strike) plus another seventy being repaired and rearmed/refuelled.No, the attackers are weaker, the planes under repair are neither armed nor fueled and the anti-ship strike is on the fight deck, not inside the hangar deck and there are no bombs and torpedoes being piled up inside the hangars.

Totally different situation.

I´ll look up the relevant section in "The frist Team" CU!

[Bill Garvin]

Yes, but PS was years later and the USN´s CV-ops had improved a great deal by then. I´m 99% certain they did not have this capability in 1941.

Sure they had improved, but the question isn't whether they could launch or not, they're launching in daylight. No problem there. The problem is recovery and the US Navy showed it was quite capable of ordering pilots out when the chance of recovering them was slight. So, recovery technique improvements aren't relevent since the pilots will be ditching, not landing on the carriers. The pilots did have other options - they could divert to Hawaii and either use the airstrips there or simply crash land their aircraft. The carriers having launched their aircraft get out of Dodge as fact as their screws will push them. They've all night to get clear.

No, the attackers are weaker, the planes under repair are neither armed nor fueled and the anti-ship strike is on the fight deck, not inside the hangar deck and there are no bombs and torpedoes being piled up inside the hangars. Totally different situation.

I disagree. The basic situation - the presence of armed and fuelled aircraft, the poor internal protection of Japanese carriers and their poor firefighting ability are all the same. The attacking force here is actually slightly stronger than at Midway; at Midway the damage was done by 54 SBDs, here there are 60 SBDs and 18 Vindicators. The actual situation is more favorabe to the Americans, spotting attacking aircraft coming in at dusk is very hard, the japanese carriers are silhoutted against the setting sun, there is less CAP up and those that are up are being recovered for the night (Oops, that means the flight deck must be cleared so the anti-ship strike is in the hangars. In fact they are probably being disarmed so there are bombs and torpedoes around and the fuel lines are open). So yes, it is a very similar situation to Midway

[Nicomacheus]

It seems like others are doing a good job of getting at the situation on the ground, but I'll open the discussion on the course of the war.

1) FDR definitely asks for a declaration of war on December 8th. The question is, does Hitler still declare war on the US and do so on schedule?

2) Unlike OTL, the US has essentially avenge Pearl Harbor on the spot, by decimating the Japanese Fleet earlier than OTL, without it seems the loss inflicted to the carriers at Midway. Is the Japanese political fallout enough to prompt Japanese peace feelers right away? If so, this might significantly complicate the US response, particularly if Hitler withholds a declaration on the US. On the whole, I doubt the Japanese give up, but they will need to re-evaluate sooner than they did iOTL. Perhaps they pull back far enough to re-group and deliver a strike elsewhere: a strong invasion of the Aleutians perhaps?

3) With the threat from IJN seemingly neutralized sooner (assuming the US and Germany still find themselves at war) the US seems like it might be able to focus on Europe faster. If the overall pace of the war does increase, then it might not end with the use of nuclear weapons. I'd also assume that if the US advances sooner, it's possible the Russians have not advanced as far west by the end of the War.

[Grimm Reaper]

Absolutely nothing like Midway. The Japanese CAP is neither frantic to land and refuel due to repeated combat action nor pulled down out of position by an entire series of previous attacks by American aircraft. And the American pilots haven't learned how deadly the Zero is while the Japanese certainly know to go for the bombers first.

Assuming, of course, that the same flaw that crippled a squadron at Midway when the electric arming circuit automatically dropped the bombs isn't lurking as a surprise.

If the Americans come in without fighter support the best bet is one to two Japanese carriers sunk or damaged and the Japanese realizing that there are two carriers around, important targets whose own strike capacity has been crippled. Worst case the IJN takes no serious hits and starts looking for the US carriers.:(

[Shimbo]

Lex got the "Air raid pearl harbor" warning as soon as it was sent out around 0800. She was heading back to Pearl within minutes, flat out. At that rate it would take her a little over 7 hours and 35 minutes to get within range of the Japanese carriers.

At best. Enterprise was actually supposed to be back in harbour before the attack began but the weather was so bad she was still 200 miles away. I don't know maybe it's possible but I'm guessing not.

Not quite but near enough; Lex actually had 15 additional dive bombers (Vindicators) on board.
OK.

[Grimm Reaper]

There is no possibility of Japanese peace feelers going out. They're winning every other aspect of their campaign and they expected to see 2-3 carriers lost or crippled in the strike at Pearl.

One reason Nagumo didn't launch a third strike was that he knew at least one US carrier was in the area and had to seriously consider whether the losses originally predicted were worth risking not for the entire operation but just to finish an already massive success which had come at an astonishingly low cost.

[Bill Garvin]

Absolutely nothing like Midway. The Japanese CAP is neither frantic to land and refuel due to repeated combat action nor pulled down out of position by an entire series of previous attacks by American aircraft.

They are due to land because its dusk and the Japanese carriers have no night landing capability so the A6Ms have to get down. They have been pulled down to sea level by the torpedo planes from the two American carriers. There's fewer of them also to be pulled down. So the situation is indeed very like Midway.

And the American pilots haven't learned how deadly the Zero is while the Japanese certainly know to go for the bombers first.

The former doesn't really matter, the latter works against the Japanese; they regard the torpedo bomber as the primary enemy (which in their navy is perfectly correct). So they go for the torpedo planes.

Assuming, of course, that the same flaw that crippled a squadron at Midway when the electric arming circuit automatically dropped the bombs isn't lurking as a surprise.

It isn't. That was new equipment that had only just been installed. It didn't exist at this time so the aircraft use the old system that worked perfectly well at Midway. That's another thing that runs in the American favor here, nobody chucks their bombs into the sea by accident.

If the Americans come in without fighter support the best bet is one to two Japanese carriers sunk or damaged and the Japanese realizing that there are two carriers around, important targets whose own strike capacity has been crippled. Worst case the IJN takes no serious hits and starts looking for the US carriers.:(

The Japanese can do nothing about it; by the time everything its over, its night and they can't operate at night. They can't start to search until next morning by which time the American carriers are long gone (12 hours at 30 knots in the opposite direction to the Japanese fleet). The Japanese can't hang around, they're running out of fuel and have an appointment with oilers to keep. Median case is, I agree, one or two carriers sunk. But, the issue here is what happens if the Japanese face the worst possible case for them and their carrier fleet gets raped. How does that impact on the whole concertina of operations they have planned (and which are already rolling - the invasion forces for Malaya and the Philippines are already on their way).

[ThomasG]

"Snip"

Only possible if Kido Butai is sailing with full ammo and AVGas stores, the Escorts have to be increased, and more tankers are needed for the destroyers.

Question is, what other operations are the Japanese going to cut to do that?

[Bill Garvin]

At best. Enterprise was actually supposed to be back in harbour before the attack began but the weather was so bad she was still 200 miles away. I don't know maybe it's possible but I'm guessing not.

Lex and Sara both had hull designs that made them uniquely capable of long, high-speed runs in bad weather - in fact its experience with these two ships that sold the US Navy on making its carriers as large as possible. (see Norman Friedman; US Carriers Illustrated Design history). It was a combination of size, hull lines and high freeboard that allowed them to hold maximum speed in conditions that other ships could not. So, uner these circumstances, I believe it is possible that Lex could get in close enough to link up with Enterprise and coordinate with her. Certainly Lex's Captain thought it was possible.

Only possible if Kido Butai is sailing with full ammo and AVGas stores, the Escorts have to be increased, and more tankers are needed for the destroyers. Question is, what other operations are the Japanese going to cut to do that?

Exactly my point, the Japanese carriers can't hang around to search for the American carriers next day. They're part of a complex, highly integrated plan and have very little scope to handle the unexpected. hence the point of this WI. What if everything goes to hell and the Japanese are faced with a naval disaster at Pearl - which is what their own war-games predicted.

[bard32]

WI Nagumo succumbs to pressure from his air group commanders and launches a third strike at the oil tanks and harbor installations. The strike is somewhat successful, knocking out about half the oil storage facility (but missing the civilian storage facility at Honolulu harbor) and damaging the shipyards.

The aircraft are on their way back at dusk when disaster strikes. Enterprise and Lexington have closed in and launched their strike, hitting the Japanese carriers just before dusk. The demands of the third strike mean that Japanese CAP is inadequate and what there is gets pulled down to sea level to fight the torpedo planes. That's when the dive bombers arrive and get to work.

By the time the strike is over, the situation is

Akagi, burning and crippled, her flight deck gone. Fires out of control
Kaga, burning and crippled, her flight deck gone. Fires out of control
Soryu, burning and crippled, her flight deck gone. Fires out of control
Hiryu, undamaged
Shokaku, torpedoed once, hit twice by bombs, fires bad but under control speed down to 20 knots
Zuikaku undamaged

Hiei undamaged
Kirishima undamaged

Tone undamaged
Chikuma. Hit aft by a Vindicator and set on fire. Torpedoes exploded leaving ship devastated and capable of only 6 knots.

Destroyers, strafed but essentially undamaged.

The Japanese can't recover their third strike. The aircraft ditch and are lost. Of 414 Japanese aircraft, only 60 survive.

So, (a) you're Nagumo. What do you do (your sword was lost with Akago so you can't commit suicide).

b) where does WW2 go from here.

Better than it went IOTL.

[Markus]

They are due to land because its dusk and the Japanese carriers have no night landing capability so the A6Ms have to get down. They have been pulled down to sea level by the torpedo planes from the two American carriers. There's fewer of them also to be pulled down. So the situation is indeed very like Midway.


Ok, I checked:
Lexington was 500 miles southeast of Midway, Enterprise 210 miles west of PH. Can both CV make contact and still attack the Japanese on Dec7th?

At least some of Enterprise´s TDB-pilots had trained night landing, the others made it to PH, when a fake sighting forced them to take off late and land after dusk. But the 3rd strike can´t happen like this! The Japanese can´t operate at night, so they just won´t launch a 3rd wave on Dec.7th. Nothing to recover at dusk, so no armed planes in the hangars at that time.

Any action takes place on Dec8th after dawn, with the Japanese super-vigilant, because of three enemy CVs unaccounted for.

[Bill Garvin]

Lexington was 500 miles southeast of Midway, Enterprise 210 miles west of PH. Can both CV make contact and still attack the Japanese on Dec7th?

It's tight and it means that Lex has to hold high speed in bad weather but, yes, it can be done. Lex enters strike range using her air group at around 1530. As I said, very tight but just doable.

At least some of Enterprise´s TDB-pilots had trained night landing, the others made it to PH, when a fake sighting forced them to take off late and land after dusk.

That's interesting; I didn't know that. Thank you.

But the 3rd strike can´t happen like this! The Japanese can´t operate at night, so they just won´t launch a 3rd wave on Dec.7th.

Oh, I agree, I worked the time out in some detail. The Japanese can't get the third strike off before 1400 which means it won't get back to the carriers until two hours after dark and that's a disaster. The US can replace its carrier groups, the Japanese can't. This whole thread emerged out of an analysis I did for the "what happened if Yamamoto commanded the strike force instead of Nagumo" thread. As I looked into it, it became more and more apparent as to why Nagumo refused to launch the third strike - he was a much smarter cookie than he was given credit for. But, as part of that study I realized that if, for some unknown, incredible reason, the Japanese did launch a third strike, the fact they would have to hang around close to Hawaii to recover it meant there was a narrow window of opportunity for the two American carriers to get a strike in. That led me to think about what the strike might be like and when I worked the air groups and so on out, it became apparent that it was nowhere near as one-sided as the 3:1 carrier ratio suggested. In fact, given a little luck and some courageous (read ruthless) commanders, there was the potential for the American fleet to do a lot of damage. So, we take a Japanese blunder in launching the thrid strike, American courage and some good luck and we create a Japanese disaster.

Any action takes place on Dec8th after dawn, with the Japanese super-vigilant, because of three enemy CVs unaccounted for.

The opportunity is gone by then, The US isn't going to take on six rested and regrouped Japanese carriers, not in daylight. The one chance they've got is a hit-and-run mugging, a sort of carrier warfare equivalent of a drive-by shooting. Anyway, by the 8th, the Japanese have to be on their way home, if they hang around to find the carriers they run out of fuel and that's that.

[Grimm Reaper]

Markus, and Nagumo would have been especially vigilant as his pilots shot down some of the planes from Enterprise so he KNEW there was at least one American carrier very close at hand.

[Bill Garvin]

Markus, and Nagumo would have been especially vigilant as his pilots shot down some of the planes from Enterprise so he KNEW there was at least one American carrier very close at hand.

Not necessarily, at most he knew his pilots had shot down some SBDs. They could have been land-based Navy aircraft, Marine Corps birds or even Army A-24s. They might have been other Army aircraft misidentified. He did suspect there might be at least one American carrier close of course but the SBD sighting doesn't change that. In OTL it was one more thing that made him decide the third strike was an insane risk but this thread supposes that he allowed himself to be bullied out of his correct decision and into making a terrible blunder.

[Markus]

Markus, and Nagumo would have been especially vigilant as his pilots shot down some of the planes from Enterprise so he KNEW there was at least one American carrier very close at hand.

Maybe, just maybe he would have known some SDBs were shot down, but that says nothing. Might have been USMC planes, a Navy squadron based in PH for training. But most likely he will never get that detailed reports and he does not need to. The CVs have to be somewhere, so unitl they are found it will be assumed they are close.


@Bill Garvin: The distance between Lex and "E" is probably 500 miles. Maybe the distance to the target is even more considering the Japanese are northwest of PH. Anyway, at 34kn "Lex" needs 14hrs to get near PH. 8+14= no attack before 22:00.

[Bill Garvin]

The distance between Lex and "E" is probably 500 miles. Maybe the distance to the target is even more considering the Japanese are northwest of PH. Anyway, at 34kn "Lex" needs 14hrs to get near PH. 8+14= no attack before 22:00.

The actual distance between Lex's position and the center of the Japanese task group's approximate position is 473 miles. 473 statute miles is 411 nautical miles The strike aircraft have a tactical radius of 150 miles so the distance to be traversed by the carrier is 411-150 = 261 nautical miles. 261/34 = 7.6 hours

0800 + 7.6 = 1530 hours. So Lex is in the game from 1530 hours onwards

You forgot to convert statute miles to nautical miles and to allow for aircraft range

[Markus]

You forgot to convert statute miles to nautical miles and to allow for aircraft range

No to the former -I use km-, yes to the latter. I didn´t know the exact location so I made an "estimate" using a ruler and a map: I placed Lex way too south, considering this Lex looks more like under 800km(430nm) from the Japanese.

Now you got to meet "E" and after that you can give it a try. If both CVs launch independently, the odds of striking simultaneously are almost zero.

[CalBear]

A success level like this is well on the outer edges of probability, although not completely impossible (although any success by the Vindicator with the 1941 torpedo trigger design is a REAL long shot). A dusk attack, when the Kido Butai is expecting her own aircraft to be returning home, and would likely have at least flight deck light on, is also the best case for the green American pilots as visibility would be poor, negating much of the advantage of the Japanese CAP.

Two carriers can put enough bombs on target to do this level of damage (at Midway, VS-8 & VB-8 completely missed the party, winding up landing at Midway almost out of fuel), assuming the find the targets. I would expect the losses top out at more like two decks, with a third badly damaged. AIRCRAFT losses would be on the order of 250-300, with AIRCREW losses more in the 100-125 range (which is not all that much higher than one would expect simply by launching the third strike.

In 1941 neither navy was good at night carrier operations; in this case, however, the American have the option of landing back at Pearl Harbor (even with the trigger happy gunners, a better option than going swimming).

[robdab2]

For my first posting here I'd like to give a 'tip o' the hat' to Bill Garvin for proposing an interesting variation on the usual alternative history at Pearl Harbor scenario that I see. I'm sorry that I missed it while it was actually underway and hope that I can bring new life back to the discussion with the following BUTs ... (sorry its a long list ... )

A.) When I plotted the KB's position some 200 nmiles north of PH and Lexington's position some 500 nmiles SE of Midway (on a direct line between Oahu and Midway) I measured a seperation distance of some 600 nmiles between the two, not 411 nmiles. Using Bill's calculation method of (600 - 150 air range)/34 kts = 13.25 hours at maximum speed, not Bill's 7.6 hours. This indicates to me the Lexington wouldn't be in a position to launch at the KB until 5.65 hours after 1530 or about 2115, well after dark.

AFAIK the USN's carrier pilots didn't have the capability to attack at night or to navigate long distances, over water, at night, without the use of their ZB radio homing beacon equippment (which REQUIRED an operating transmitter at the target end of the flight). So, no Lexington air attack was possible on the KB, late on Dec.7'41 that I can see.

Lundstrom also points out that Lexington operated but 17 old F2A-3 Buffalo fighters and that on Dec.11'41 thaey were grounded (on Lexington) due to corrosion failures in 12 of their 17 landing struts. Had air combat operations begun on Dec.7'41 I think it likely that several combat landing failures might have eliminated Lexington's fighter protection prematurely. To the KB's pilots great delight, no doubt ! There would have been no way for Nagumo to have known that of course but I thought it an interesting tidbit of information.

Enterprise did historically turn on her deck lights after dark on Dec'7'41 to allow 18 TBDs (one of which dropped a live torpedo on her deck after a bumpy landing - see Lundstrom's "First Team" - imagine the grief caused to the historical US war effort had it gone off ???) and 6 SBD "smokers" to land after fruitless searches to the SE and SW of Oahu for the KB. Lexington did turn on her searchlights to guide back two scouts whose radio homing gear had failed. Imagine the result had a Japanese submarine seen Enterprise or had Japanese RDF picked-up that Lexington radio homing transmission ?

In any case, the KB was lurking about 200 nmiles north of Oahu and any US strike with a range of only 150 nmiles would not have been able to land back on Oahu, 50 nmiles too far away, after an attack on the KB. So, even if Bill's US night attack manages to somehow navigate to the KB and somehow attack it, after dark, it's entire aircrew compliment would have had to swim home, with the sharks.

Enterprise alone certainly could have done so from her Dec.7'41 0800 starting point of 200 nmiles west of PH had she (or any of the US defenders of Oahu) known where the KB was located but at 1:6 odds would this have happened ? Adm. Kimmel in at least two of his under-oath Pearl Harbor Inquiry testimonies swore that had he known the KB's position, he planned to order an immediate air attack by the closest US carrier, so I predict a suicide strike by Enterprise. Remember also that Enterprise and her escort TF were historically so low on fuel that she had to enter a still burning PH on the night of Dec.8'41 to load more. Not a good condition in which to be considering a lone attack on the six KB carriers. Which brings up my next historical BUT ...

B.) H.P. Willmott's book "Pearl Harbor" (the 2001 volume, not either of his two earlier books of the same title) says on page #134 that, "...according to the Army Air force's own figures, it's aircraft flew a total of 48 sorties in search of the Japanese carriers between 0930 and 1520 on 7 December, although without the information from the Opana and Kaawa radar sites, a considerable part of this effort was wasted." And the KB was not found. No known location means no US airstrike can go there, doesn't it ? Historically Bill's proposed scenario cannot work ...

The simplest solution being a POD from history at the point when the Opana Point radar reported it's unknown aircraft sighting to Lt. Tyler (or was it Taylor ... I always get the two men mixed up). If he reports that Japanese airgroup heading down from the north, to the USN or USAAF as he did not do historically, then the US carriers at least have a chance to strike back if the KB stays around to launch a 3rd strike. But not historically.

I can't find the reference source at the moment but I also recall that an American RDF post in the mountains of Oahu did get a firm fix on the KB's position to the north of Oahu but could not report it because an Army telephone operator had taken over their one and only telephone line for some other emergency use, just after the Japanese attacked.

C.) The Japanese historically deployed about 30 fleet submarines (plus the 5 midgets) in support of their PH raid. Three submarines travelled with the KB (intended but not not actually used by Nagumo) to scout directly ahead of the KB. While the KB awaited the return of her airstrikes those three subs were delpoyed south of the KB to watch for US air and surface attacks, just such as Bill proposes. It seems likely that the KB would have received some warning of the large US airstrike that Bill supposes could have hit them, had Nagumo decided to "hang about" and launch a 3rd wave at Oahu.

Another four IJN subs were deployed in an east-east line about 50 nmiles south of the KB, as a second tripwire type warning line against any US attacks.

A further three IJN subs were deployed between the Hawaiian Islands of Oahu and Kauai (just where Enterprise and Lexington would have to pass if operating together and attempting to get to within 150 nm of the KB to strike. Command submarine I-8 was also located in this channel but south of the picket line. Yet more warning and now, a location on the US carriers that would have allowed a Japanese torpedo bomber strike on them BEFORE they were within their own airstrike range of the KB. Its looking ugly for Bill's Americans now, isn't it ?

Should Enterprise/Lexington have tried a sweep south and then east of Oahu, towards the KB for a dawn attack, another three IJN submarines were posted in the channel between Oahu and Molokai Islands and yet another 8 subs were posted in an arc south of Oahu. A further two IJN fleet submarines were lurking in/around Lahainia Roads, awaiting a radio call to US carrier targets.

I-74 was deployed as a pilot rescue sub just south of Niihau sland and also might have spotted and/or shot at Entrprise/Lexington.

Last but not least the 5 fleet submarine "mother-ship" carriers of the Japanese minisubs had released their cargoes by about midnight on Dec.6-7'41 and were thus freed to partol soth of Oahu for US military targets of opportunity, like two US carriers trying to slip by ...

Page #57 of "Japanese Submarine forces of World War 2" by Boyd has a really good map of the IJN submarine patrol stations for the PH raid ...

And Japanese submarine torpedoes worked, reliably.

D.) Several posters here have claimed that the KB's pilots could not have operated after dark BUT I beg to differ ...

http://www.ussessexcv9.org/pdfs/Japanese%20Carrier%20Operations.pdf shows that the IJN's carriers had night landing systems tested in 1932 and installed throughout by 1933. Such landings were a part of regular IJN aircrew training, for years prior to PH. Read it and weep.

http://www.j-aircraft.com/research/gregspringer/radios/radio_systems.htm shows that the vast majority of the KB's IJN warplanes carried factory installed radio homing compass equipment that would have allowed 3rd wave strikeplanes to return safely to their carriers, after dark on Dec.7'41. True, such radio homing transmitter use would probably have finally provided the US defenders of Oahu with an RDF bearing to the KB's location BUT not a distance. And with another 8-10 hours before sunrise, the KB could have been hundreds of miles away from that revealed position well before any US counter-strike could have reached it.

The May 7'42 carrier action, while not a very successful one for the Japanese carrier planes, does clearly illustrate that they could indeed have carried out night air operations during an extended PH raid.

I'm not claiming here that a Japanese 3rd wave could successfully bomb/torpedo afterdark (although Prange claims that they trained as early as 1934 on how to drop torpedoes at anchored warships, via flarelight), just that a 1400 takeoff (as Bill suggested), followed by a before dark attack around 1600, could indeed have found its way back to, and landed successfully on, the KB's carriers. Themselves then hidden by that darkness.

E.) Had a 3rd wave hit Oahu's USAAF airfields (again), the USN drydock caisson gates (3), the 4 fuel tank farms, the two fleet oilers (Neosho and Ramapo) then inside PH and the Atlantic-Richfield civilian tanker at Honolulu Harbor, CinCPac HQ and the US submarine base inside of PH, there is every indication that the US Pacific Fleet would have been forced back to the US West Coast for not just 6 months but rather, over two full years. So wrote/testified (under oath) US admirals Bloch, Kimmel, King and Nimitz at various PH Inquiry hearings. Men all in command positions where they had access to the truth.

Please remember that the 1942 German western Atlantic and Caribbean campaigns against Allied tankers was just getting underway. Parking dozens of scarce civilian tankers at PH for fuel storage might have meant the fall of England. Replacing that fuel would not at all be easy. Eventually the already started Red Hill underground fuel storage tanks would have been completed and filled but this would have taken another two +/- years.

At least 25 of the Japanese submarines participating in the historical PH raid could/would then have been ordered to sink any US tanker sighted on its way to Oahu. Remember that the USN had only 11 fleet oilers in the entire Pacific Ocean on Dec.7'41. Most were old, tired and slow with only 4 (including Neosho and Ramapo) being capable of underway refueling, at sea. The remaining 7 needed to be tied to a fuel dock (or drifting on a mirror-glass ocean) in order to refuel a US warship. Nimitz later wrote that he needed a full 74 fleet oilers (all capable of underway re-fueling) to carry the war to Japan. Imagine what little he could have done offensively with just 2 UW capable remaining afloat ? Their first two months would have been allocated to making sure that the pathetic remnants of the US Pacific Fleet got back to San Francisco from Oahu.

The potential ASW escorts based at PH would not even have enough fuel there to allow them to go out and escort the tankers in thru Hawaiian waters, let alone all the way from the US West Coast.

------------------------------------------------------

Alrighty then, my asbestos flame suit is on, fire away ...

[bard32]

WI Nagumo succumbs to pressure from his air group commanders and launches a third strike at the oil tanks and harbor installations. The strike is somewhat successful, knocking out about half the oil storage facility (but missing the civilian storage facility at Honolulu harbor) and damaging the shipyards.

The aircraft are on their way back at dusk when disaster strikes. Enterprise and Lexington have closed in and launched their strike, hitting the Japanese carriers just before dusk. The demands of the third strike mean that Japanese CAP is inadequate and what there is gets pulled down to sea level to fight the torpedo planes. That's when the dive bombers arrive and get to work.

By the time the strike is over, the situation is

Akagi, burning and crippled, her flight deck gone. Fires out of control
Kaga, burning and crippled, her flight deck gone. Fires out of control
Soryu, burning and crippled, her flight deck gone. Fires out of control
Hiryu, undamaged
Shokaku, torpedoed once, hit twice by bombs, fires bad but under control speed down to 20 knots
Zuikaku undamaged

Hiei undamaged
Kirishima undamaged

Tone undamaged
Chikuma. Hit aft by a Vindicator and set on fire. Torpedoes exploded leaving ship devastated and capable of only 6 knots.

Destroyers, strafed but essentially undamaged.

The Japanese can't recover their third strike. The aircraft ditch and are lost. Of 414 Japanese aircraft, only 60 survive.

So, (a) you're Nagumo. What do you do (your sword was lost with Akago so you can't commit suicide).

b) where does WW2 go from here.

The Pacific Fleet, from what I heard in late 1980, would have been out of action for at least six months. There wouldn't have been enough fuel for the
Pacific Fleet to go from Pearl Harbor and oppose them in the Coral Sea and at Midway.

[CalBear]

The Pacific Fleet, from what I heard in late 1980, would have been out of action for at least six months. There wouldn't have been enough fuel for the
Pacific Fleet to go from Pearl Harbor and oppose them in the Coral Sea and at Midway.


Bollocks.

There was a zero chance that ALL the fuel would be destroyed. For one thing, there were LOTS of fuel tanks (somewhere in the area of 60) in completely different areas, with earthen berms surrounding them to contain fuel in case of a rupture. There were also large fuel tanks located in the Civilian sector of Honolulu. A third strike would, literally, not have ahd enough strike aircraft to hit them all. Some, yes, all, not a chance.

[bard32]

Ok, I checked:
Lexington was 500 miles southeast of Midway, Enterprise 210 miles west of PH. Can both CV make contact and still attack the Japanese on Dec7th?

At least some of Enterprise´s TDB-pilots had trained night landing, the others made it to PH, when a fake sighting forced them to take off late and land after dusk. But the 3rd strike can´t happen like this! The Japanese can´t operate at night, so they just won´t launch a 3rd wave on Dec.7th. Nothing to recover at dusk, so no armed planes in the hangars at that time.

Any action takes place on Dec8th after dawn, with the Japanese super-vigilant, because of three enemy CVs unaccounted for.

Maybe. We know Halsey's reaction to Pearl Harbor once he saw the devastation. He said that the only place the Japanese language would be spoken was in hell.

[robdab2]

Calbear, you wrote,

For one thing, there were LOTS of fuel tanks (somewhere in the area of 60) in completely different areas, with earthen berms surrounding them to contain fuel in case of a rupture. -As best I can tell from the air photos of the time, 27 in the Pearl Harbor East tankfarm, another 27 in the Pearl Harbor West tankfarm and 9 avgas tanks on Ford Island. With another two big power plant tanks just east of Pearl City on the north shore of Pearl Harbor. That makes 63 military and 2 civilian targets up there. Total = 65

There were also large fuel tanks located in the civilian sector of Honolulu.- Honolulu Harbor had another 12 big fuel tanks clustered on that east harborside with two more biggies at the Honolulu Power Plant on the south shore of that harbor, so the total there is 14.

Not counting the myriad of small 25,000 gallon avgas tanks buried (and thus impossible to deliberately hit) at various US airbases around Oahu, I make it 65 + 14 = 79 worthy fuel targets.

A third strike would, literally, not have ahd enough strike aircraft to hit them all. - Willmott's 2001 book entitled "Pearl harbor" states (pg.151) that a Japanese strike of 111 Kates, 68 Vals and 56 Zekes could have launched by about 1500 on Dec.7'41 had Nagumo deciced to "stick around" long enough to risk a 3rd strike. Willmott rejects such a 3rd strike on the grounds that while such a launch would put the Japanese strike over Oahu again, during daylight for accurate bombing, the return flight (and KB carrier deck landings) after a 1712 sunset, would have meant Japanese warplanes landing in the dark.

My May 31/08 post on this thread demonstrates how I believe that such night landings were an option available to the KB's pilots.

I think that the nights spent crossing the northern Pacific while on the way to attack Oahu might well have been used as night landing "refresher" training time for the KB's pilots (who were grounded and did little else during the historical trip), had Nagumo the will to conduct another attack based on the resulting success from the first two waves. Yes, there would have been training losses but each of the KB's carriers already carried 9 disassembled replacement aircraft (3 Kates, 3 Vals, 3 Zekes) x6 = 54 in total so those losses could have been made up prior to the (AH) 3 air strikes.

We know that at least Hiryu carried spare aircrew historically from Cressman's book "A Magnificent Fight". If night landing practise were a part of the plan I believe that spare aircrews would have been assigned to each of the other 5 KB carriers, if not already historically done so.

Wrt there not being enough strike aircraft to hit Oahu's oil tankfarms, I believe that the numbers suggest otherwise. I have just detailed 65 PH tanks and there are 68 Vals available according to Willmott. A happy coincidence for the Japanese. Each would carry a 250kg oiltank buster HE GP bomb AND two wing rack mounted long burn 6okg incendiary bombs to ensure that the difficult to ignite bunker "C" fuel really got burning. Even near misses could be counted on to rupture simple earthen berms and to spray adjacent tanks with leak causing bomb fragments. These tanks were only constructed of rivetted 1/2" mild steel plate afterall.

This leaves 111 Kates, each capable of mounting 2x550kg HE GP bom,bs for other tasks like the 14 Honolulu Harbor oiltanks or any PH tanks missed by the Vals. 111 x 2 = 222 bombs of 550kgs each. CinCPac HG and another run at Oahu's airfields and warplanes also comes to mind.

Perhaps though, this is overkill and so, unwise. If 9 Kates loaded with torpedoes were retained on each of the KB's 6 carriers this would give a 54 plane strike reserve should an American carrier be located. And IIRC each American carrier of that time had only 17-18 fighter aircraft even when at full strengthy. At 3+:1 odds some Kates are going to get thru any US CAP. Of the 57 still available, some 14x2 = 28 armed with 2x550 kg bombs each might go to Oahu with a third wave while 29 could be assigned to (torpedo carrying) searches for any American surface or carrier forces within 200 miles. So maintaining Nagumo's historical orders about rearming with torpedoes after the first two waves.

Your comments are invited.

[CalBear]

Calbear, you wrote,

For one thing, there were LOTS of fuel tanks (somewhere in the area of 60) in completely different areas, with earthen berms surrounding them to contain fuel in case of a rupture. -As best I can tell from the air photos of the time, 27 in the Pearl Harbor East tankfarm, another 27 in the Pearl Harbor West tankfarm and 9 avgas tanks on Ford Island. With another two big power plant tanks just east of Pearl City on the north shore of Pearl Harbor. That makes 63 military and 2 civilian targets up there. Total = 65

There were also large fuel tanks located in the civilian sector of Honolulu.- Honolulu Harbor had another 12 big fuel tanks clustered on that east harborside with two more biggies at the Honolulu Power Plant on the south shore of that harbor, so the total there is 14.



Not counting the myriad of small 25,000 gallon avgas tanks buried (and thus impossible to deliberately hit) at various US airbases around Oahu, I make it 65 + 14 = 79 worthy fuel targets.

A third strike would, literally, not have ahd enough strike aircraft to hit them all. - Willmott's 2001 book entitled "Pearl harbor" states (pg.151) that a Japanese strike of 111 Kates, 68 Vals and 56 Zekes could have launched by about 1500 on Dec.7'41 had Nagumo deciced to "stick around" long enough to risk a 3rd strike. Willmott rejects such a 3rd strike on the grounds that while such a launch would put the Japanese strike over Oahu again, during daylight for accurate bombing, the return flight (and KB carrier deck landings) after a 1712 sunset, would have meant Japanese warplanes landing in the dark.

My May 31/08 post on this thread demonstrates how I believe that such night landings were an option available to the KB's pilots.

I think that the nights spent crossing the northern Pacific while on the way to attack Oahu might well have been used as night landing "refresher" training time for the KB's pilots (who were grounded and did little else during the historical trip), had Nagumo the will to conduct another attack based on the resulting success from the first two waves. Yes, there would have been training losses but each of the KB's carriers already carried 9 disassembled replacement aircraft (3 Kates, 3 Vals, 3 Zekes) x6 = 54 in total so those losses could have been made up prior to the (AH) 3 air strikes.

We know that at least Hiryu carried spare aircrew historically from Cressman's book "A Magnificent Fight". If night landing practise were a part of the plan I believe that spare aircrews would have been assigned to each of the other 5 KB carriers, if not already historically done so.

Wrt there not being enough strike aircraft to hit Oahu's oil tankfarms, I believe that the numbers suggest otherwise. I have just detailed 65 PH tanks and there are 68 Vals available according to Willmott. A happy coincidence for the Japanese. Each would carry a 250kg oiltank buster HE GP bomb AND two wing rack mounted long burn 6okg incendiary bombs to ensure that the difficult to ignite bunker "C" fuel really got burning. Even near misses could be counted on to rupture simple earthen berms and to spray adjacent tanks with leak causing bomb fragments. These tanks were only constructed of rivetted 1/2" mild steel plate afterall.

This leaves 111 Kates, each capable of mounting 2x550kg HE GP bom,bs for other tasks like the 14 Honolulu Harbor oiltanks or any PH tanks missed by the Vals. 111 x 2 = 222 bombs of 550kgs each. CinCPac HG and another run at Oahu's airfields and warplanes also comes to mind.

Perhaps though, this is overkill and so, unwise. If 9 Kates loaded with torpedoes were retained on each of the KB's 6 carriers this would give a 54 plane strike reserve should an American carrier be located. And IIRC each American carrier of that time had only 17-18 fighter aircraft even when at full strengthy. At 3+:1 odds some Kates are going to get thru any US CAP. Of the 57 still available, some 14x2 = 28 armed with 2x550 kg bombs each might go to Oahu with a third wave while 29 could be assigned to (torpedo carrying) searches for any American surface or carrier forces within 200 miles. So maintaining Nagumo's historical orders about rearming with torpedoes after the first two waves.

Your comments are invited.

The assumption that most of the attacking Vals would make destructive hits seems overly optomistic. Even without interference, it would not be at all unusual for pilots, especially tired pilots to have anywhere from a third to a half of bombs be clean misses (the first wave launched at 06:30, with pilots roused at roughly 05:00, meaning these men would ALL have been under almost constant stress and adrenaline rush for 8 hours by the time the 3rd wave arrived, longer if the attack has to wait for the second wave to refuel and rearm) and there will most assuredly BE interference. There will be far more activity from the American fighters (43 available, 27 being P-40B/C and 16 P-36) in any third wave, and the AAA will also be far heavier and likly far more effective (there are also some P-26s available which would be somewhat effective against a Val or B5N, although I suspect taking off in a Peashooter would be a one way trip).

Each Val that does suceed to the degree that it not just hits the tank, but actually ignites it, makes the mission of any following aircraft that much more difficult due to heavy smoke that the burning bunker fuel would create (it would not be surprising if the visibility wasn't already affected by smoke from the fires that did occur as a result of the first two waves). Level bombing, such as would be used by the B5N bombers would be especially heavily effected by sight obstruction, this becoming more true as the sun began to set. Any tanks breached but not burned will still have large volumes of usable fuel, again mitigating the overall effect of the attack.

Over all, it seems likely that even a 50% success rate is overly generous to expect. This would certainly be a significant impact, but far from putting the Base out of the war for half a year. Significant losses to the Japanese attackers, however, could easily throw a spanner into the immediate (next 30 day) activites of the 1st Air Fleet.

Regarding the fighter strength of the air wings of the American carriers, it was actually worse than you state. Lexington's Fighting 2 had 16 F2A Buffaloes & Enterprise had 16 F4F Wildcats. Both carriers were light on fighters since they were returning from plane delivery missions AND the fighter groups were transitioning from the Buffalo to the Wildcat (Saratoga only had nine F4Fs aboard when she pulled into San Diego where she was picking up her Wildcat squadron) All three ships had their full complement of SBD & TBD bombers on board. There wasn't a single carrier in the Fleet that had a full load out of what we generally consider the "normal" early war air wing of Wildcats, Dauntless & Devastators.

[robdab2]

Calbear, thanks for your comments,

The assumption that most of the attacking Vals would make destructive hits seems overly optomistic. - Possibly but the two round tank top sizes were 6,000+ sq.ft and 8,000+ sq.ft of non-moving, white painted, high contrast, bullseye target. To the best trained aviators then on the planet.

Even without interference, it would not be at all unusual for pilots, especially tired pilots to have anywhere from a third to a half of bombs be clean misses - It would be hard to have a "clean miss" in a tankfarm where the tanks are mostly less than 100' apart. Even if dropped squarely in the middle of the gap between two tanks, the 250kg bomb fragments are going to fly further than just 50', probably punching holes in both adjacent tanks. With the leaking oil then flowing towards two burning 60kg incendiaries (either one of which could also punch thru a tank top).

And any 250kg HE GP bomb landing squarely between two tanks is also going to blow a LARGE hole in the berm seperating those two tanks. If either one burns, then both will surely burn. Even after a "clean miss". The fire becomes a force multiplyer since the PH tank farms did not have any type of fire containment system installed as of Dec.7'41. One had been discussed but since the underground "Red Hill" fuel storage facilty was under construction, such an anti-fire system seemed a waste of money.

There will be far more activity from the American fighters (43 available, 27 being P-40B/C and 16 P-36) in any third wave, - With some 56 Zekes assigned to close escort the Vals and Kates, I'm not too, too worried.

and the AAA will also be far heavier and likly far more effective - against those Vals going after the Ford Island avgas tanks certainly but all of the other fuel tanks are well away from the Pacific Fleet's ships which were the focus of USN and General Short's mobile AAA units. Smoke from burning ships can obscure the pilot's view of his oil tank target but it might also give the Vals much cover against US AAA.

there are also some P-26s available which would be somewhat effective against a Val or B5N, although I suspect taking off in a Peashooter would be a one way trip. - Even if the 56 Zekes match the 43 P-40s and P-36s on a one-for-one basis, that still leaves 13 Zekes to match up vs the P-26s.

Each Val that does suceed to the degree that it not just hits the tank, but actually ignites it, makes the mission of any following aircraft that much more difficult due to heavy smoke that the burning bunker fuel would create (it would not be surprising if the visibility wasn't already affected by smoke from the fires that did occur as a result of the first two waves). - Since the wind that day was blowing mostly SW to NE that might certainly be true for the 9 avgas tanks on Ford Island as already mentioned.

But the simple method of bombing first the downwind tanks and proceeding upwind would help to ensure that burning tanks did not visually obscure ones not yet hit.

And think of all of that radiant heat. A flaming berm full of fuel would bring that heat to within 50' of any missed tank or, right to the tank if the berm between were breached. Probably on more than one side. How long do you think it would be before the unhit tank began venting combustable fumes as the fuel inside it began to heat and boil ? Fumes surrounded by a sea, an ocean of flame ...

Level bombing, such as would be used by the B5N bombers would be especially heavily effected by sight obstruction, - I've already indicated that the level bombers would be going after the Honolulu Harbor area tanks where historically, nothing much was burning except for a few AA shell flattened homes.

this becoming more true as the sun began to set. Any tanks breached but not burned - Given the scenario just outlined, with the firestorms themselves taking out any unbombed fuel tanks, just how many do you really think that will be ? They'll burn for days, as will most of the wooden buildings of Honolulu. And alot of the civilians there.

Over all, it seems likely that even a 50% success rate is overly generous to expect. - I'd estimate it at 95% based on my 30 years of construction work (which incuded 4 more modern US military tankfarms totaling 90 tanks, all much larger than those found at PH).

This would certainly be a significant impact, but far from putting the Base out of the war for half a year. - Much longer actually. I'd expect many of the base's surviving buildings to also be ignited by the radiant heat and many more of the USN's warships afloat in PH to be incinerated also. Have you ever been anywhere near a tankfarm fire ? I watched as 8 tanks progressively burned in Vladivostock many years ago. I didn't realize it at the time but I was "sunburned" by the IR heat from over a mile away. You don't want to know what the fumes will do to human lungs even if there is no flashover, which there would be.

Significant losses to the Japanese attackers, however, could easily throw a spanner into the immediate (next 30 day) activites of the 1st Air Fleet. - Granted but with a close escort of 56 Zekes vs only 27 modern US fighter aircraft, I don't see that happening. Certainly more 2nd wave Japanese bomber aircraft were downed by American fighters because the Japanese fighters were playing at straffing down on the deck instead of shepparding their bombers. After the 2nd wave's losses were counted back on the KB, similar would not be allowed on a 3rd wave strike.

Regarding the fighter strength of the air wings of the American carriers, it was actually worse than you state. Lexington's Fighting 2 had 16 F2A Buffaloes & Enterprise had 16 F4F Wildcats. Both carriers were light on fighters since they were returning from plane delivery missions AND the fighter groups were transitioning from the Buffalo to the Wildcat (Saratoga only had nine F4Fs aboard when she pulled into San Diego where she was picking up her Wildcat squadron) All three ships had their full complement of SBD & TBD bombers on board. (didn't Lexington still have extra Midway bound aircraft on her deck ?)There wasn't a single carrier in the Fleet that had a full load out of what we generally consider the "normal" early war air wing of Wildcats, Dauntless & Devastators.- We also know via Lundstrom that ALL of Lexington's Buffalo fighters would historically be grounded on Dec.11'41 due to corrosion caused landing gear strut collapses. Nagumo couldn't have known it but the harder landings of combat might have caused Buffalo deck crashes on Dec.7'41 had the carriers actually located each other.

[CalBear]

Calbear, thanks for your comments,

... <snip for space>
.

As I have stated in the past, we disagree on the likelihood of a firestorm (and I especially have to disagree with the danger of tank farm fires making it to the Harbor). I have no doubt in your sincerity, however, attacks throughout WW II and even fifty years later on tank farms were less effective than proposed here (The classic example in this area are the repeated attacks on the Ploesti, where even huge strikes, by several hundred bombers, failed to completely destroy the storage facilities, a similar result was obtained by very large U.S. strikes against Japanese held depots in the DEI. However, a generation later, during Linebacker II, a strike by the U.S. at the storage facilites found near Haiphong, using a similar number of strike aircraft as discussed here, albeit far more capable Skyhawk fighter/bombers, only destroyed about 70% of the 67 tanks targeted. Even in 1999, the NATO strike at Belgrade's power station, using PGM's, failed to destroy all the tanks)

I would say that the presence of that many alert fighter is a serious danger, given the damage inflicted by the few aircraft that got up in time for the first two waves. The Zero was a good fighter, but at 10-15K the P-40, even the P-36 wasn't a bad machine. The P-40 gave a very credible account of themselves when pitted against the Zero in Burma by the AVG and in the SW Pacific.

Lexington was carrying additional Vindicators for VBM-1.

[Markus]

The P-40 gave a very credible account of themselves when pitted against the Zero in Burma by the AVG and in the SW Pacific.


Certainly, but the AVG was the only fighter unit that had been drilled to aviod dogfighting from day one of the war. The pilots on PH don´t know the intel about the Zero and will use faulty tactics.

[robdab2]

Calbear, you wrote,

As I have stated in the past, we disagree on the likelihood of a firestorm - Yes but a firestorm is not really necessary to the success of "my" Japanese bombing the Oahu tankfarms. Just a regular tankfarm fire would have done nicely. There are several sets of photos on the www that show the final results of more modern tankfarm fires, fought with modern technologies, but the result is still complete devastation. Most oil tank fires are allowed to burn themselves out since there is still no practrical way to extinguish them, once alight.

(and I especially have to disagree with the danger of tank farm fires making it to the Harbor).- Not having toured the still remaining PH tanks I can only go by the testimonies of Admirals Bloch, Kimmel and King who have all stated that such would have been the case. And they were on the scene, at the time and all in a (responsible command) position to know.

I have no doubt in your sincerity, however, attacks throughout WW II and even fifty years later on tank farms were less effective than proposed here (The classic example in this area are the repeated attacks on the Ploesti, where even huge strikes, by several hundred bombers, failed to completely destroy the storage facilities, - Ploesti was a totally different "kettle of fish" to the 3rd wave tankfarm attack that I propose here.

A strike range of 2,400 miles vs just 200 miles to Oahu.

168 B-24s started (not "several hundred bombers") and the two lead navigational planes soon dropped out so that 40% of those bombers never even found the target let alone bombed it (just less than 100 did drop) vs the 111+68 = 179 IJN bombers that I propose. The 1st and 2nd waves had all managed to find Oahu so I don't imagine many 3rd wave Japanese flyers getting lost over just 200 miles.

My Japanese would have 56 Zekes along as a close escort. The Ploesti B-24s had no fighter escort at all.

A bomber strike 9 months previously had alerted the Germans to the possibilty of further bomber attacks so they installed a modern radar controlled fighter defense system that was far and away better than the not fully functioning Oahu radar effort of Dec.7'41.

Fully 40% of the Ploesti oil installations were mothballed at the time of the big strike so after 42% of those installation was destroyed, all but 2% was quickly replaced by formerly mothballed installations. On Oahu, all of the storage tanks were full on Dec.7'41. Neosho had just topped up the avgas tanks and finished pumping only 4 minutes before the first IJN bombs fell on PH. There was no no spare US storage capacity that day (save for the fume filled USS Neosho and USS Ramapo inside of PHwhich I also target).

a similar result was obtained by very large U.S. strikes against Japanese held depots in the DEI.- Can't say as I have studied these. Again by high altitude level bombers ? Will get back to you wrt this.

However, a generation later, during Linebacker II, a strike by the U.S. at the storage facilites found near Haiphong, using a similar number of strike aircraft as discussed here, albeit far more capable Skyhawk fighter/bombers, only destroyed about 70% of the 67 tanks targeted.- I am not acquainted with the details but one assumes hordes of MIGS and lots of SAMS which would not have been present at a 1941 Oahu. After so many decades is this really a valid comparison ?

AFAIK the Japanese pilots of Dec.7'41 thought it an honour to die in the service of their Emperor. Can you say the same about the American pilots who flew the Linebacker II missions ? Were they really happy to die for Johnson/Nixon ? They were no doubt brave men but I don't believe that they were as willing to push home their bombing attacks to that same degree of risk that would have been acceptable to the IJN pilots of Dec.7'41. Not by a longshot.

Even in 1999, the NATO strike at Belgrade's power station, using PGM's, failed to destroy all the tanks) - Again I am not familiar with the details of the Belgrade raid but after 58 years and with the addition of PGMs I don't see this example as a valid comparison to my PH proposal, at all. Hmmm, lets think about this one for a second, dying for Hirohito vs. dying for ...

With that kind of logic I could just as well claim that the destruction of the Hiroshima or Nagasaki oil tanks by just one single US bomber is proof positive that my 235 warplane 3rd strike scenario would work too. LOL.

I would say that the presence of that many alert fighter is a serious danger, given the damage inflicted by the few aircraft that got up in time for the first two waves. The Zero was a good fighter, but at 10-15K the P-40, even the P-36 wasn't a bad machine. The P-40 gave a very credible account of themselves when pitted against the Zero in Burma by the AVG and in the SW Pacific. - Most of the KB's pilots had China air combat experience while the US flyers were totaly green on Dec.7'41.

Yes the AVG's pilots eventually learned how to handle combat against the Zero family but as of Sunday Dec.7'41 those techniques had NOT yet been learned by Oahu's (some hungover) US pilots.

2nd wave Japanese bomber lossses were higher because (of more flak and because) the Japanese fighter pilots allowed themselves the fun of staffing ground targets rather than close escorting their vulnerable bomber against any US fighters breaking thru.

Lexington was carrying additional Vindicators for VBM-1. - Thanks for that. For some reasson I thought that it was a load of Devastators.

------------------------------------------------------------------------

Who/what is Eddie ? And where is he/she/it going ?

[CalBear]

Calbear, you wrote,

<snip for space>

a similar result was obtained by very large U.S. strikes against Japanese held depots in the DEI.- Can't say as I have studied these. Again by high altitude level bombers ? Will get back to you wrt this.

Similar, B-24's, but bombing from lower altitude due to the lessed defensive threat

However, a generation later, during Linebacker II, a strike by the U.S. at the storage facilites found near Haiphong, using a similar number of strike aircraft as discussed here, albeit far more capable Skyhawk fighter/bombers, only destroyed about 70% of the 67 tanks targeted.- I am not acquainted with the details but one assumes hordes of MIGS and lots of SAMS which would not have been present at a 1941 Oahu. After so many decades is this really a valid comparison ?

AFAIK the Japanese pilots of Dec.7'41 thought it an honour to die in the service of their Emperor. Can you say the same about the American pilots who flew the Linebacker II missions ? Were they really happy to die for Johnson/Nixon ? They were no doubt brave men but I don't believe that they were as willing to push home their bombing attacks to that same degree of risk that would have been acceptable to the IJN pilots of Dec.7'41. Not by a longshot.

SAM's yes, no MiG's at all. High cover by F-4's. Attacks were done by a combination of gravity bombs and rockets. Actual losses were very light, only a single A-4. Apparently the SEAD was very effective.

Even in 1999, the NATO strike at Belgrade's power station, using PGM's, failed to destroy all the tanks) - Again I am not familiar with the details of the Belgrade raid but after 58 years and with the addition of PGMs I don't see this example as a valid comparison to my PH proposal, at all. Hmmm, lets think about this one for a second, dying for Hirohito vs. dying for ...

With that kind of logic I could just as well claim that the destruction of the Hiroshima or Nagasaki oil tanks by just one single US bomber is proof positive that my 235 warplane 3rd strike scenario would work too. LOL.

Mainly I mentioned this strike as an example of the overall difficulty of achiveing a 100% success. This strike, with PGM's was about 80% effective. It is hard to kill all the tanks in a farm

I would say that the presence of that many alert fighter is a serious danger, given the damage inflicted by the few aircraft that got up in time for the first two waves. The Zero was a good fighter, but at 10-15K the P-40, even the P-36 wasn't a bad machine. The P-40 gave a very credible account of themselves when pitted against the Zero in Burma by the AVG and in the SW Pacific. - Most of the KB's pilots had China air combat experience while the US flyers were totaly green on Dec.7'41.

Yes the AVG's pilots eventually learned how to handle combat against the Zero family but as of Sunday Dec.7'41 those techniques had NOT yet been learned by Oahu's (some hungover) US pilots.

2nd wave Japanese bomber lossses were higher because (of more flak and because) the Japanese fighter pilots allowed themselves the fun of staffing ground targets rather than close escorting their vulnerable bomber against any US fighters breaking thru.

Fighters almost always can get through a defensive screen unless that are outnumbered by a wide margin (3-1, 4-1). Even late in the war, Japanese fighters managed to get through the Hellcat screens to attack the Avengers and dive bombers during the massive carrier raids on Japan.

Lexington was carrying additional Vindicators for VBM-1. - Thanks for that. For some reasson I thought that it was a load of Devastators.

Your welcome. I rechecked my source, the squadron wasn't VMB-1, it was VMSB-231. They were actually the second USMC squadron to receive the Vindicator.

BTW: It's Eddie Aikau. http://www.surfline.com/surfaz/surfaz.cfm?id=740

[robdab2]

Calbear,

Mainly I mentioned this strike as an example of the overall difficulty of achiveing a 100% success. This strike, with PGM's was about 80% effective. It is hard to kill all the tanks in a farm - Granted but at what % destroyed does the US Pacific Fleet say, "Uncle", and sail en-masse for the US West Coast ? And is there even enough fuel left in Oahu's surviving tanks for all of the Fleet's surviving units to do so ?

Fighters almost always can get through a defensive screen unless that are outnumbered by a wide margin (3-1, 4-1). - Completely green US pilots vs IJN combat veterans ? With 56 Zekes that have flown some 200 miles together vs 43 US planes of widely differing types, rising from several different (and still burning) airfields, while trying to rendevous and co-ordinate their scattered attacks on the Japanese ? Totally green pilots guided by a not fully operational, untrained and untried fighter direction centre that can't even directly radio it's own pilots more than 5 miles out to sea ?

Maybe (???) a few will slip thru to get at the combat veteran bombers but ... the Vals and Kates have machineguns too.

---------------------------------------------------

What are your thoughts on Lexington being able to get into air attack range of the KB on Ddec.7'41 ? Assuming of course that Nagumo stays around until the late afternoon of that day in order to fly a 3rd wave to Oahu and that the American searchers then somehow locate the KB.

----------------------------------------------------

Thanks for the reminder of Eddie. Having eaten sand on the North Shore myself, I will hoist a cold beer to his memory, later this evening.

[Markus]

With 56 Zekes that have flown some 200 miles together vs 43 US planes of widely differing types, rising from several different (and still burning) airfields, while trying to rendevous and co-ordinate their scattered attacks on the Japanese ?

Actually it´s just two types that are even "related": P-40B(C) and P-36A. And the airfields are just a few miles apart. Wait IIRC almost all of the fighters were based on one field.

And lack of coordination goes both ways, the Japanese were good at not being coordinated too. ;)

but ... the Vals and Kates have machineguns too.

One or two cal.30 machine guns vs. american warplanes? You got to be kidding!

edit: The Japanese flew in three plane formations so it´s 18 shotais of three planes and one of two. Provided the USAAF is flying in pairs, they might even "outnumber" the Japanese by 21 to 19.

And last but not least a very important question: I assume the KB has more than 56 Zeros at this stage?

[CalBear]

Calbear,

<snip for space>

What are your thoughts on Lexington being able to get into air attack range of the KB on Ddec.7'41 ? Assuming of course that Nagumo stays around until the late afternoon of that day in order to fly a 3rd wave to Oahu and that the American searchers then somehow locate the KB.

...

I don't see how it's possible on December 7, December 8 maybe, but the 7th is logistically, if not impossible, very unlikey. She's a good 10 hours steaming from launch range, assuming someone can find the Japanese (although there will be a resonable idea of the general area to search based on the approach/departure direction of the strike packages).

If the attack force IS located, they are almost in more danger late on the 7th from the fleet's subs; there are four subs in port, one on patrol off Maui, one on manuevers with a DD about 60 miles off Oahu, and three roughly 200 miles east of Oahu; all with speeds ranging from 17 - 20 knots on the surface. They can be in attack range start at 19:00-21:00, with the others arriving before dawn, assuming they run on the surface (& there would be no reason for them not to since they would not enter the patrol zone for the Kido Butai's aircraft until well after sunset). American torpedoes were bad, but not so bad that four or five boats would not get some disabling hits (based on the accounts available, it seems that around one in four torpedoes worked as designed, that would be more than enough if multiple boats were involved). It is even possible that the Argonnaut & Trout could cut the corner on them from Midway and catch up to them as they withdraw.

Obviously, this is all theory, but it is within the logistical envelope if Nagumo tarries too long.

[robdab2]

Markus,

Wait IIRC almost all of the fighters were based on one field. - Yeah, most of the rest were still burning. This does bring out a host of IJN options though. Perhaps Nagumo might have launched a wavetop 9 Zero sweep of Oahu's airfields just to see what condition his enemy was in ? Some US fighters would be on CAP but some more might have been caught on th ground by just such a sweep.

Which also brings to mind the concept that not all of the 43 surviving USAAF fighters could have responded to reports of a 3rd Japanese strike wave. Surely the US would be flying CAP pairs over the wounded USAAF airbases and several pairs over PH ? More over the major US bases on Oahu too. Not all of those CAP planes would have had the fuel on board needed to get into dogfights. So, some unknown number of US fighters LESS than 43 then.

One or two cal.30 machine guns vs. american warplanes? You got to be kidding - US warplanes flown by totally green pilots !

And last but not least a very important question: I assume the KB has more than 56 Zeros at this stage? - The 56 number leaves another 54 for CAP above the KB.

----------------------------------------------------------------
Calbear,

I don't see how it's possible on December 7, December 8 maybe, but the 7th is logistically, if not impossible, very unlikey - Agreed

one on patrol off Maui,- This is news to me. Which one ?

one on manuevers with a DD about 60 miles off Oahu, - IIRC some 60 miles SW of Oahu ?

Obviously, this is all theory, but it is within the logistical envelope if Nagumo tarries too long. - Theoretical certainly. What chance does a US submarine have for a good torpedo solution on a carrier doing 20+ knots and surrounded by a DD screen ? IF she can even find them ?

Are not the Entrerprise and Lexington in far greater danger from the 30 or so IJN submarines ALREADY parolling within Hawaiian waters ? No travel transit time needed by them.

---------------------------------------------------

Are you intersted in a discussion of Oahu's coastal artillery defenses vs some Japanese battleships ?

[CalBear]

<snip>
one on patrol off Maui,- This is news to me. Which one ?

SS 211 USS Grudgeon She was off Lahaiana Roads.

one on manuevers with a DD about 60 miles off Oahu, - IIRC some 60 miles SW of Oahu ?

Right with DD-336 USS Litchfield

Obviously, this is all theory, but it is within the logistical envelope if Nagumo tarries too long. - Theoretical certainly. What chance does a US submarine have for a good torpedo solution on a carrier doing 20+ knots and surrounded by a DD screen ? IF she can even find them ?

It depends. It is obviously one of those Kentucky windage scenarios, and you have to have the battle group's location zeroed, but if you do, all sort of potential opens up.

The winds would actually force the Japanese to head towards the American subs that had sortied if they were launching or recovering aircraft. Carrier conducting flight ops are generally following a very steady course and speed, making the calculations for launching the torpedoes pretty simple. American skippers proved themselves quite capable of getting in close, as Nautilus demonstrated at Midway (where she also demonstrated the torpedo issue).

Are not the Entrerprise and Lexington in far greater danger from the 30 or so IJN submarines ALREADY parolling within Hawaiian waters ? No travel transit time needed by them.

---------------------------------------------------

Are you intersted in a discussion of Oahu's coastal artillery defenses vs some Japanese battleships ?

The Japanese had huge problems with the sub lines around Pearl. They never even got a sniff of the Enterprise coming into port or going out, and couldn't close on Lexington the one time they did spot her. This was the first of what would quickly become a reoccurring issue for them throughout the war. The I boats were excellent designs, and they carried great torpedoes, but their results were awful in the scouting/interdiction role.

Sure. It isn't a particular are aof expertise of mine, but some information is always worthwhile.

[robdab2]

Calbear,

The Japanese had huge problems with the sub lines around Pearl. They never even got a sniff of the Enterprise coming into port or going out, -Not quite true. Lundstrom's "First Team" details on pages 24 & 25 an IJN submarine torpedo fired at the "Big E" on the evening of Dec.10'41 and another at 0900 on Dec.11 which only missed her butt by some 20 yards. Both to the north of Oahu, after she had re-fueled on Dec.8-9'41.

Surely two fascinating "what if's" for future discussion.

IIRC wasn't Saratoga torpedoed on Jan 11'42 by one of the PH I-boats ?

The winds would actually force the Japanese to head towards the American subs that had sortied if they were launching or recovering aircraft.- Yes but the launch times for the first and second waves were but 15 minutes each so we are not talking about the KB travelling very far towards the US subamrines out to the east.

The I boats were excellent designs, and they carried great torpedoes, but their results were awful in the scouting/interdiction role.- Do you have any thoughts on why that was ? I've always wondered why 30 odd IJN subs didn't bag any USN warships right after the PH strikes, other than a few minor merchant vessels.

Are you intersted in a discussion of Oahu's coastal artillery defenses vs some Japanese battleships ? Sure. It isn't a particular area of expertise of mine, but some information is always worthwhile.- Here or is it best to start a new thread and leave this one for ongoing IJN submarine discussion ?

[CalBear]

Calbear,


Are you intersted in a discussion of Oahu's coastal artillery defenses vs some Japanese battleships ? Sure. It isn't a particular area of expertise of mine, but some information is always worthwhile.- Here or is it best to start a new thread and leave this one for ongoing IJN submarine discussion ?

Probably a new thread, maybe for both. It will likely get more interest. There are a couple of posters who are pretty well versed in artillery who might want to talk about the Coastal Batteries.

[robdab2]

I've started "What IF the Combined Fleet Went to Oahu" at

http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?p=1793609#post1793609

for those so interested.

[robdab2]

Does anyone have any theories as to why they did so poorly at sinking American vessels in Hawaiian waters after the Pearl Harbor attacks ?

Was it just a lack of easy targets since the US West Coast stopped all sailings to Hawaii until sufficient convoy escorts could be gathered ?

There were some 28 well designed I-boats lurking there and it seems strange to me that they accomplished so little real destruction.

[DeathDemon]

Does anyone have any theories as to why they did so poorly at sinking American vessels in Hawaiian waters after the Pearl Harbor attacks ?

Was it just a lack of easy targets since the US West Coast stopped all sailings to Hawaii until sufficient convoy escorts could be gathered ?

There were some 28 well designed I-boats lurking there and it seems strange to me that they accomplished so little real destruction.
Well, I don't know if this applies to the I-boats around Hawaii in late 1941 and early 1942, but in overall, Japanese submarine tactics differed greatly from western submarine tactics.
The Japanese used their subs as scouts, to locate, follow, and then attack enemy task forces.
Of course, sinking a warship is a lot harder than sinking a merchant, not in the least because the warships maximum speed will be about 3 times that of a submerged submarine.

[robdab2]

DeathDemon,

The Japanese used their subs as scouts, to locate, follow, and then attack enemy task forces. - Yes but that is what mystifies me about the Allied merchant ships that they DID sink around Hawaii. And there were several, non military sinkings. Some even by risky deck gun attacks.

If your mission is to scout for US task forces then why give away your position at all, let alone by a long slow single gun surface attack that exposes your boat to return damage and gives your (supposed) victim lots of time to radio report your position too.