Operation "Winter Storm" early 1942

[Garth]

The Furher is dead and Goering as new head of the Reich passes all authority for the relief of Stalingrad to Erich von Manstein.

You are Erich von Manstein.

Paulus commander of the 6th army is ordered to attempt a break out from "The Kessel" in the general direction of the relieving forces

In early December 1942 the tactical situation is broady as it was in reality with the main attack to come from LVII Panzer Corps and the available units of Hoth's Fourth Panzer Army from Kotelnikovo.

There is one exception. A fully armed and re-fitted 17th Panzer Division stands ready to attack from the River Chir, only 40 kilometeres from The Kessel.

Can you - Field Marshall von Manstein make a difference to the ultimate outcome of the battle or is it simply too late?

Cheers

Garth

[Garth]

A correction to the heading of my initial post which should read:

"Operation Winter Storm Early December 1942"

Cheers

Garth

[cra0422]

Without Hitler's "not one step back" policy, the German commanders can now order withdrawals in order to regroup and counterattack.

Operation Winter Tempest in OTL made tremendous progress towards Stalingrad in order to relieve the 6th Army, but it called for Paulus to try and fight his way out in order to link up with them. As we all know, Paulus asked for permission from Hitler. With the Fuhrer dead, Paulus might make the decision himself and try to get out of Stalingrad.

[DMA]

Without Hitler's "not one step back" policy, the German commanders can now order withdrawals in order to regroup and counterattack.

Operation Winter Tempest in OTL made tremendous progress towards Stalingrad in order to relieve the 6th Army, but it called for Paulus to try and fight his way out in order to link up with them. As we all know, Paulus asked for permission from Hitler. With the Fuhrer dead, Paulus might make the decision himself and try to get out of Stalingrad.


I agree. there would be tactical withdrawals all over the place, especially at Stalingrad.

[Dathi THorfinnsson]

The Furher is dead and Goering as new head of the Reich passes all authority for the relief of Stalingrad to Erich von Manstein.

You are Erich von Manstein.

Paulus commander of the 6th army is ordered to attempt a break out from "The Kessel" in the general direction of the relieving forces


This IS the same Goering who insisted that the Luftwaffe could supply von Paulus with everything he needed, over ruling von Richtoffen (the guy in charge in the air theatre, who was bright enough to know it was totally impossible)?

[Garth]

This IS the same Goering who insisted that the Luftwaffe could supply von Paulus with everything he needed, over ruling von Richtoffen (the guy in charge in the air theatre, who was bright enough to know it was totally impossible)?

Agreed there was never anyway that the 6th army in Stalingrad could be fully supplied by the air.

However assuming (as I've stated) that Manstein does have full authority in the relief of Stalingrad and that Paulus attempts a break out - can the result of the conflict be any different?

Cheers

Garth

[Garth]

Without Hitler's "not one step back" policy, the German commanders can now order withdrawals in order to regroup and counterattack.

Operation Winter Tempest in OTL made tremendous progress towards Stalingrad in order to relieve the 6th Army, but it called for Paulus to try and fight his way out in order to link up with them. As we all know, Paulus asked for permission from Hitler. With the Fuhrer dead, Paulus might make the decision himself and try to get out of Stalingrad.

My feeling is that by early December 1942 the 6th army break out capability is severely impaired. Paulus tank's have relatively little fuel and the army is bunkering down for Chrismas.

That said - I also indicated that Paulus is ordered to attempt a break out - so with my slight change in the tactical situation (allowing 17th panzer to take off from the Chir) I think a link up is entirely possible.

The German break out attempt would probably include various attempts from small groups of soldiers through to a main attempt with the relatively few tanks left.

Eventually of course it was circumstances elsewhere - the Russians "Little Saturn" operation that forced Hoth to break off the relief attempt.

Cheers and thanks for your reply

Garth

[stevep]

My feeling is that by early December 1942 the 6th army break out capability is severely impaired. Paulus tank's have relatively little fuel and the army is bunkering down for Chrismas.

That said - I also indicated that Paulus is ordered to attempt a break out - so with my slight change in the tactical situation (allowing 17th panzer to take off from the Chir) I think a link up is entirely possible.

The German break out attempt would probably include various attempts from small groups of soldiers through to a main attempt with the relatively few tanks left.

Eventually of course it was circumstances elsewhere - the Russians "Little Saturn" operation that forced Hoth to break off the relief attempt.

Cheers and thanks for your reply

Garth
Garth

I think, as well as Hitler's refusal to allow a withdrawal there was some concern by Paulus that the army was better off dug in, in the city. That if they tried to withdraw they might be cut off and destroyed in the open. There was one group which did try a withdrawal and got largely destroyed.

However I agree it was the best chance of getting some of the forces out. Which might have helped in the following battles by giving the Germans more troops in the bitter conflicts that occurred. Also to cut off the retreat would have meant a major battle in the open which could have seen heavy Soviet as well as German losses.

The big point in this scenario is what happens afterwards. Will Goring be more hands off that Hitler, or commit even more resources to the Luftwaffe ground units? Will German production and resources be organised more efficiently or less? [Remembering how many roles Goring already played in the Nazi economic system and hence carries much of the blame for its poor performance]. Also would he try making a separate peace with either set of enemies and how would they respond?

Steve

[Garth]

Excellent post Steve - thank you.

Cheers

Garth

[Smaug]

Garth

I think, as well as Hitler's refusal to allow a withdrawal there was some concern by Paulus that the army was better off dug in, in the city. That if they tried to withdraw they might be cut off and destroyed in the open. There was one group which did try a withdrawal and got largely destroyed.

However I agree it was the best chance of getting some of the forces out. Which might have helped in the following battles by giving the Germans more troops in the bitter conflicts that occurred. Also to cut off the retreat would have meant a major battle in the open which could have seen heavy Soviet as well as German losses.

The big point in this scenario is what happens afterwards. Will Goring be more hands off that Hitler, or commit even more resources to the Luftwaffe ground units? Will German production and resources be organised more efficiently or less? [Remembering how many roles Goring already played in the Nazi economic system and hence carries much of the blame for its poor performance]. Also would he try making a separate peace with either set of enemies and how would they respond?

Steve

It would've made a bit of a difference if Goering didn't try to tie his commanders hands. Perhaps a rapid saving of the frontal units, evac'd to somewhat shorter frontage, might've given the Reich a few more months.

If truly professionsal minds were given reign on the Eastern Front, I think Germany might've given a bit more than they got.

It was a matter of time however..... Russia felt pretty righteous at this time, and rallyed industrially.

[Michele]

Tactical withdrawals will be perfectly pointless against Soviet operations that broke through tens of kilometers of frontage and advanced in the Axis rear for hundreds of kilometers.

If the Axis manages a general, strategic withdrawal, this will leave the Soviets basically in control of the terrain they had regained by the spring of 1943. The Soviet forces, of course, will have suffered less casualties. In theory, the same should be said of the Axis troops. The problem with this, however, is that plenty of them were not outfitted to move out of their prepared positions, over hundreds of kilometers, in the Russian winter. Plenty were non-motorized infantry. The Axis troops will thus experience a great deal of attrition even in just a strategic withdrawal with minimal enemy harassment; many of them simply are not up to this.

Of course, not losing hundreds of thousands of men will be a better situation for the Axis than in OTL. They will still have lost men; they will have lost the same amount of ground. Finally note I intentionally wrote about the loss of men – because many of those units will have left behind the heavy equipment and weaponry.